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\. Summary.'-," : -:■ ■
--At'noon on J1 May 1941 Hitler* after a two hour speech summing up 
' ■ his • most ■ .renosi.; conquests ■ in the - Balkans*. -received ' the " ovation of 
.hi® ' M S s I s s *  ' The'-two .national, anthems'"were'sung.'and-.the-assembly , 
.^ -/dispersed#'-'. With' that« ..the - seal 'was-put-on. what -proved to-he' Ger- / ■
'9 many’s last successful Blitzkrieg,». :,/,! ■',:,-v
-la' the-'present study-'the relationship between this campaign and 
'■'hitler’s overall strategy is'.traced step by'step# '"'.Originally«'-'it- 
turns out« Hitler did not want:a war in either Greece or Yugoslavia« 
since both served him as" sources of raw "materials' and because' paths'.-' 
danger of a .general Balkan conflagration ensuing*"' This was the view 
he repeatedly put to his more bellicose ally • more strongly so over 
Iugoslavia«-.less explicitly where Greece was’ concerned*"->
■' With Hitler’s decision of September 1940 'to' 'transfer;- the-'war; ag-: '- 
\aints England.''into "the Mediterranean- this attitude .’changed* '■ He now-. ' 
came to regard Greece as a place worth poessesslng« and accordingly - 
-...■gave-Mussolini the go ahead on 4 October 1940* When the Italians 
-proved unable to handle the task« Hitler decided to move in himself# 
Scarcely had this decision been made* however« when a crucial 
-■■change, took-pftaèe. in Hitler’s overall strategy! he made up to attack 
•-..the Soviet Union ia 1941* Together "with the entire 'Mediterranean*'-"
;-Greece .now" became a secondary affair end a-nuisance*"'.-of which Hitler'-'. . 
>tried;- unsuccessfully - to get rid by diplomatic means# V 'Having::fai» - 
- led in this he saw no choice-but to go ahead with"his planned■int*- ■ ■ 
sion which* however* now acquired a new, defensive" purpose* :.v: '.v;;. /> • -
German -preparations’.-for 'operation-“Marita” are; next' described'-in. , 
'some, 'detail*'. Both ’man-and'' nature* it turns out* .did’ their'.-best'- to" 
put obstacles in the way# Consequently the campaign started two 
months’late# ‘ All attempts, to speed up the beginning. of< the doperà*,, •
tlon'»- so as to make 'it 'end' in time for the Hussian campaign - ended, 
in' failure*''.' .f,-:, ’ ■ } -
In : the last chapter the' effects of Hitler’s Balkan campaign on'
' his war against Kussia are dealt with# ; Contrary to what is usually '
believed, the decision to invade Yugoslavia is shown not to have bad 
appreciable detrimental effects in this conneetion# Bather, the late 
starting date of'operation "Barbarossa" is traced to the shortage of 
equipment from which the Wehrraacht was suffering# '
The 2alkan campaign was Hitler's last, and in a sense greatest, 
strategical success# On 31 Kay 19*H Hitler had reached the peak of 
his power in Europe* Although many victorious battles still lay 
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usoally believed. , Eovaver, it vas felt that in such c&ses sosto documenta­
ti« at least was nocesaary, aiti' tene. such questiona as 'to' tildi' Hitler de- ; 
cided to ebandon his invasion of th© lai tei Kingdom, '©r vhatthénature of 
 ^hie relationship with Russia in OctobeavHovember 1940 v&s, aro diseussed '
. in more detail and vitti thè ali of more documenta thaa would he possiti© 
or Mctasasy in' a atudyconcerned solely vith 'Hitler1® polìcy tovards ■ 
Gre©c© and Iugoslavia# • -
\ Por thè calce of. siatplicity, thè presant study is divided iato' tuo ■ 
parisi one dtaliag.vith tee'perlod froa Aprii to Hovember 1940, thè other ■; 
vite thè one fina Peceabar 1940 to June 1941, lt is aasuaed'that Hitler* s 
greatest worxy during tee first of these perioda vas how to solve thè »ac­
listi probi®»,, while thè Hnssian fpoblem forasi thè ' center of his interest ’ 
in thè second# fhis, of course, is to some extent an oversimplifìeation. 
Hitler vas ■ concerned vith. thè probi« posed by thè Soviet Union long before 
Hovember .1940, and thè English one continuai to vony hi» long after that ■ 
dal»# Moreover, thè two problema vere interrelated in his aind* Yat it 
vould se« that this iray of dividing up thè sequenoe of events providos a ' 
ftmmmzk that is mr@ or lese adequata in orlar to undarstand hispoliey 
tovards Greeoe and Iugoslavia, if nothing else*: It vas' teettfore deoided 
to adhere to it despite all difficulties. fhe. ixplication of this division 
i» that during thè first periodnitler*s objeetives in and attitudes to " ■ 
these :tn» ©sontnles must b© seen mainly - though net excluslvaly -■«'fòlli*- 
«ti©« ofhisefforta ,t© iefeat England, vhile his deteralnation to «toh ! ’ 
Russia largsly dicteted th« during th# seoond. ■. Vithin this fraaevorle, 
however, teiere is loft almoat infinite reo» far manoeuvre, intowhich other 
' testerà o*n, end vili, .be introducad# >
%  gratitude le extended to my supervieors at thè London School of
mios, Prof. J. Joll «d'ir. D.C Vatt, vho »ad all or parta of my thesis
and made many useful critici«# f te thè fctaffs of thè foreign office, aà- 
mlrality, Imperiai Var tiuseum and tee German Institute, vho vere alvaya .
aere thaa villlng te" halp In tee traclng of eouroe materiali to Ir*. G. ' 
Marnar ©f Raading Hhlveriily ter many an tour tf .ileinseloa.
3of the present vorkj and to the Central Besesrch Fund of the toiversity of ^ 
London, which was bo generous as to en&hle me "to'boy material without which
' thia''b©idr#eMÌd arihÄe''been'written*.'; ■
- i
London, June 1971 M* vi C
.Irle on Sean»s
Howadays thè superabundance of Bouree material about World War II has be- 
corno something of a elicila to be mentioned in prefaoes. Although thie -, 
superabundan.ee is aa reai in ©or subject ss in any ottor, largo traete ' 
of thè theoe of thè present study bave nevertheless not heen adequately
coverei so far« Thirty yesrs after» thare stili esista no single study' ^ ‘ .1 " ■ *■ ‘ @f Hitler1» Yugoslav polioy. Greece is in a somewhat better position,
though aaong thè numerous aocounts of tha antecedents of thè Italian at-;
tack on her there is none that is really satisfactory in thè senso of
utilising hoth thè Italian and thè Gezman sources« Ho singLe work coverà
thè entirs ’Rlka.n oeapaign in anythisg like a comprehenslve manner, ani
tho eonqueat of Iugoslavia in partioular has heen neglected« The enswial
question of thè relationship betveen thè Gezman eampaign in thè Balkans and 
thè one they later vaged in Sussia has received Iota of superficial aaswers 
. tnt no serious ©onsidaration* ' ,
,, 1 Thus, thè subjeot at hand presenta a number of largo gaps atout which 
no adequate vork has teen dono so far« In oziar to at least partly bridge 
these gaps allthe usuai prlnted sources, both diplomatio and militaxy, ; 
have teen used* ; Moat of them, and certainly thè more important ones, are ' 
too, familiar to te mentioned here«
,! Unprinted, but scarcaly lese veti knovn, are ivo largo and important 
VmoPies #f eviàenoe, thè one diplomatic, thè other militaxy« In tha pre«*. 
sent study, mueh use has been mie of thè records of thè Gezman foreign 
ministzy» particularly thè files of thè Uro lei^ ismisw^ lnister« thè 
' Staasalsretir and thè Batorrtm&aalcrttlr« aa veli as a number of lesa im- 
portoni files* The diary of tto German hi$i command - a microfilm©! copy 
of vhich ean be found at thè Admirslity, tondon • has alao been quote! : - '
1. , Sto' presesi'vriter considera the recent account by J« Wuechst, logos-
(Stuttgart, Seewald, 1969) a historiogra-
2» lt is remarkable that,' vhile there are a number of etadiee conceming
' ' luaan ©peratlins ' in Gretto (e*g A« _
, Feldzn.? (Heidelberg,. Fovinckel, 1957) none has
- slarfa. ,
frequently. M  wmes.ter® already been used by hundreds of scholars, ... 
farts of then hart been published in various oontexts and editions, so that 
. they scarcely need any further introduction.
Far less well known 1a a large mass of unpublished military materiH,
,. both Italian and Genaan. The Italian military sources'utillaed'consist 
'■ of two files, entitled Blalgenis *Br* and wlal«n.im" *'0»". both'of which 
'• are available on microfilm. ’ fhese" contain orders, letters, directives ■
. - and circulars originating in the Italian armed forces hi#i command and the 
• • aray h^ b command, pertaining to fee "Italian plans' for attacks on Yugoslavia 
' -«¿.Greece respectively* This material is absolutely indispensable for any 
v att«Bit-fe.".u»»K»ei fee complex of Germaa-Itallan, Geroan-Yugoslav-Greek and 
...It^ iaa«*Yt®iAiiP^ 3»A.r®lati©iU8 culminating in'the Italian attack on Greece ■
. ' on28 October 1^ 40• In 'addition "to these two, a number of smaller unnamed. ■
.. filea contadning matarial on fee development of fee ItHo-Greek war and 
'®ora»n-ItaliMt 'relations while it was 'going on.have'been used." '■' '
®rea a»re'isqprt«nt than fee Italian military material is'a large'no»-" 
ber of German military files of various origins centering around fee German 
: "««paigtt» in Greece and Yugoslavia, "-fo fee' author*« best knowledge, no aV - 
tosft "has "so far 'been aado^ to systematically use this first ©lass, direct 
■" and reliable, though extremely dry and "teohnleal, materisl' in an attempt to.' 
reconstruct "fee preparations, execution and results'of the Balkan campaign. - 
, the'«vide»©«'la question oonaists mainly (but not only) of various foams'of';
’ lalkaa Akten of. fee" command poets ''involved' down 'to the level of araies'i;
" : thai* is, 'records 'of1 fee ' aimed forcos' hl^ i command, fee' army.' high command,' '■' 
army high commands 12* and 2* and records of fee most important (in sice.
' as'veil" as in quality) unit' Subordinated to fees®, 'trnmmfmtm® Heist,
- which oocupies a place between'feat of a corps and an army* Fractictlly :
. HI fee material used, consisting of «holme Kotamand© * and" G h e f - y 
stems from fee" la (operations) department of. fee command posts involved. « v ' 
: , ' fhls. -material, too, is available on microfilm. From the, point of view of - 
availability Hone it would even be possible to get right down to the Jkltt'''.
. and grfe«ti»bl^fr of fee individuH corps and division* involved, except'y - 
in so far as fel-i would be aHerculean/and, in fee present context,"to - son* -
/extent useless task, because mst of the m m  important details can "be found •' 
.in'.the..'records of the hig§er.MOMiids»'
- Finally, mesial mention should be made of a number of studies by desman 
officers or ex-officers, which are often highly interesting and which, un- 
' fortunately,: hate not seen the light of print. Under German military jaw*» 
tie# aany of the senior command posts disposed of tMrirown officer' respon- 
; ■aible■ for'putting. the ■ operations . tarried .out ’by; those ’posts' into - something 
very much resembling a historical treatise or article, this .resulted in; ■,
: such specialised studies as "Ber Balkanfeldaug der 12. Armee • Generalfeld- 1 
marsohal List**, by oaptain 1. Visshaupt, written shortly after the campaign 
by a person who had personally taken part in it. . Studies not unlike these 
were also written by some German officers after the war, mostly in reply to 
speeifie questions posed by allied interrogators.: - This is a kind of mate-> 
rial,; to- which historical. scholarship would. do :W©11. to devote -more attention.
/
I/
P A fi f l .
- v ■ ■ : :. '.G&apttr. 1
Between the Md» Stilato»»# • ■
lying bsforo tha efMotr# of th« attacha brancii et tha Oberat©
Kormndo 4®r Hé m ®ht (OS#) in Berlin*  Deciphered, the telcgrsn read* "
' ■ General Boatta invited mi today end asked m  to traasntt tooftV tito» T tati < wi amtme&ml staff I
.■ ■ At General staff of «to received fton tot political 1m » - « . .
derehip to# order to pwp*#' * plan for m  attack m  YugosIo- » '- 
:’ via, predicated cn the coraitaent of Itoli#» forcoa against to# - yirtyffiavryi 'tort PIP if tojylayjft ■ toiOtogfc pul Stflla*** ', ■ '- ^
1 Ae initiation of those preparations Mi tot a©» that Italy . ■ ' ;.neant to attock on ohorteat order, bnt only laeant preparation . 
by to» general staff for & contingency «tot night arise to 2 - ' ;
. Eonths,in 1 year, or f@toap» tot at aU*2 / , . ■•-”
' ' ' XBoatta, «to talegren*8 author general von Stototoar added, tot esplained . 
that to attack across the Julian n py #1#»# vas 'tot fnoitte «»d that to» 
caploynent of to Italian any umbering S to 10 Mitote» fron toltola..' '
-to adit woU their allies pious# help with supplies,tha usa of ssUroaftti
to* ©told tot »^ aMMtoy staff totia, start as ###» to
grttttd ' thoy? to eyier to fully understand 'toto to# Italian request #to
1* Storio Boatta, toting chief of staff to tho Italian emy hi$t coaaand.
8» Baearnts on Csman fbrMan tolte (London, X«S* Stationary Office,
• jSStofTMii DC#?)«series to ^ iS» 9$ §mmm& li« 341» ' ■ ' '/
5« Itoti von Biniate, Goman nilitory attach# in Bora«
4* , Goman airport in food, supplies, hospitals etc* vas indispena&blo to tho oporationi Boatta omo lo« f43» 9*7*t940# Italian Mlltorr Escoria (USI )/I26/000590-602» Sho Dost important Question waa that of vani» clssf aftor all possible soureos hai toon ecunsratei Marshal Fiotto Badoglio, Chief of tho Italian Stato Maggioro Generalo (citi Storage, S£3S) still saw no way of filling «9 his ear park without Goman help« V. Boatta to Storage, lo. 125Q1 M  Ftot., 6«8.194»* lMd/00Q76l»67« Badoglio nera lo* SS® Sea« Op./l* lMd/000759-60| and Badoglio to tho army hi^ t coasand (Superoaercito), Io« 1772 0p., 8*8*1940, ibid/
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the German answer, it is aeoeseary to m  baric and look into the moaning 
of Yugoslavia to Hitler, Mussolini, the Axis end the war* Oat starting 
date in so doing is March 1959* '
’...■ t * . . . .. . . ... . ■ I, . . - . ‘ <
While it would he possible to write books about Hitler*3 attitude to, 
say, Russia or England, it is singularly difficult to get a clear pie» 
ture of this thoughts about and view on southeastern Europe in general, 
and Yugoslavia in particular* is an Austrian, he told Mussolini, he was 
"familiar with all these regions and the mentality of their inhabitants'* 
words, however, which mean little because Hitler considered himself a 
specialist on almost any Subject* In his "Hein Ksmpf" there are some 
' singularly unflattering references to Germany*s Balkan allies of World 
War I whom he calls "old impotent Gerffepel (trash) and "rotten bodies1**
To him the region was s barbaric and inhospitable one, Infested by Sezw 
biaohe BottbmsohiMieaer* an uncivilised world. 1
Although large parts of Ecarfcheastern Europe had at one time or ano­
ther been ruled from Yienna and still contained large German speaking 
populations, Hitler never used these facts as he did in other parts of 
Europe* Like Bismarck before him, he seems to have been of the opinion 
.that "the territorial problems and internal relationships of the ¿Balkan? 
states** did not concern Germany.^  He even went so far as to declare his 
"absolute political disinterest" in this region in'article 3 of the secret
5*' Hitler to EEuasolini, 16*2*1943# printed in Hitler e Mussolini* Letter# 
e .Bo«a«iti. (Mlaao, Histoid, 1945) p. 153*
6* Cf* Eh.W. Fabry, Balkaa^ Wirren* 194Q-1941 (Darmstadt, Wehr und Wisson 
Yerlagsge8eil8Chaft*1955. oiti ffabrv. Balkan) pp* 10-12*'~
7* Hitler*« speech to the Reichstag, 4 Kay 1941* printed in E* Domarus, - 
Hitler* Redon ttnd Proldonatlonen* 1932-19*5 (EHnehen, SMdeutsohar
■ w m m  .1&98. ■  ■ 1. .. •, - ( • - , ; . • - ' 1 - . !
. ' I' t ' - ' ’ '
. .fivte®#! of flit Mbbentrep-llilotw foot of $3 August 1939.8 ■' ' ,, '
: EconoMcally, however, things vere very different.'" In ease of war / 
against fit vest, such ns Hitler bat ft reckon with, Germany 'would be 
' blockaded and oat off from tar overseas supplies | and six years of in- ' 
tensive effort bad not, at the outbreak of World War II, guaranteed tar■ 
anything tyfe» agif pnff^ aiftrury fa the most var materials, fta .
countries of somihsaittttxa Europe, poorly developed indsutrially but com-  ^
paratively rich in natrual resources, vere the-obvious source - situated. 
at «tc IfMh»« very door . 'ta vhich to taw some of the deficie­
ncies. , Chief sMf' those was Oil, With wartime demand exceeding supply . 
(home production wive operational reserves! bv 1 to 6 »fitiaai tons in 
.' 1959»' Germany* s situation in Ibis respect was unenviable, Ibe only sou- - 
'' roe from vhich the gap could be bridged vere the Ploesti oil fields in 
Rumania, producing 6 million tons in 1939* lbs capspcity of these fields, 
moreover, could be considerably augmented.
Great as the importance of oil undoubtedly was, it is an error - a 
very fashionable one - to allow it to overshadow the other raw materials 
vhich the Balkan® could, and did, supply. Among these, the most impor­
tant were chrome, mangangse, cooper, lead, niche}, tin and aluminium, all 
of them indispensable for the production of atone and therefore to the var x 
effort, Yugoslavia’s stare in the supply of these materials was by no 
means insignificant. In aluminium, for instance, she supplied about one > 
third of Germany*a demand. Her output in copper, lead and hemp, though 
bymno means sufficient to cover German needs, vaa still about the only
8. 3St* ®V ri# Ho, 229« 2be text of the pact la somewhat ambiguous, as 
it does not make it clear whether Germany’s political disinterest ex­
tend* to the whole of southeastern Europe or to Bessarabia only, Ibis 
ambiguity was deliberately introduced by Ribbentrop, who thereby fell 
short of fulfilling Hitler’s instructions to declare, if necessary,
-the Reich’s political disinterest "even a® far is the Dardanelles"• 
Ribbentrop memo for Hitler, 24.6.1940, Ibid, x, Ho* 10,
9« In 1939 German production of oil ran at 3*5 tons annutAyj operational 
reserves stood at 2,5 million tenet and wartime rtfuirwwat» were es- _ 
timated at 10 to 12 million tons, for what Rumania could do, and did, ' 
to alleviate this situation, v, the appendices to A, Hillgruber, Hit­
ler gulag Carol und Hsrschal Antonescu (Wiesbaden. Steiner, 19531*"
remont3.”  As a. m m m  ot raw materiale, ( thercfore, Iugoslavia ranked.
Stesteta# ' .,k .r. V;V
V/ho ehould get hold of tiisso resources vas a problea tea* preoccupied 
tee leadors of thè Eoa©-Berlin Aste imt soae tiae befora tee war. Thou^ i 
la principi© tha tvo dict&tors tei divided their lebensr&uae fa such a 
tef as to make the wEast,’ ì)elong te Germany ead the "IlGditerraneanw to ' : 
Italy, tte boun&ariee between these ereaa tei - deliberately so, on Site.. .lilerf s side . -• •, tee» left vasue. !Tneir defitnion, varying conslderàbly. ; •; ; 
froa time te timo and froa capitai.te capitai, lorned the gcound of con^- , 
stant ¡fricition within tee. lede* vite Iugoslavia as a focal ' folate ■ \ ; .
ita aabassador in Berlin, Attolico, tiho asserted .-tea* Mtee KedÌterranean
tea certainly teen R33ignel te lbù|| end tee adjacent countries «ad tte 
Danube basin ¡J&¿j also belong te this area***2 By tee time it vas made, 
however, this claim had lost any semblance to reality it had ever had* 
Jiuoh better equipped economically than either Italy of France, Germany 
commenced to acquire economic leadership in tea region in 193^ *^  The
10. In 1939» Germany*s deficit (consumption minus production) *in copper 
amounted to 33oOOO tons, of which Yugoslavia could supply 350001 in 
lead, to 186000 tons, of which she could supply 74000| in aluminium, 
to 1167000 tons of which she could supply 371000} in tin, to 33000 
tens of which she could supply 34000* V* F. Friedensburg, Die Boh». «toffs nr-! T^wTv^.pr.^fviioTt jnt nenen Earona (Berlin, Gerhard Stalling,
XX ♦ , ÜIa-
'secretary of^ atete)”conversation,'31*3.11* ' Attolico-Veiz3Ücker
193% MZf 3D* *>* H@*
13« Ln contrnst to Italy (vhosa 0«« industrialisation vas only ona step
«  -ijH tlt «  A S  n w r  ArTi«i «a e%n— ' * « —  ■ «  , lili lí «lfrmiTi»TÍ •■■■■■-*» -* S S A - -»»*- .■» A *  —  - a A -  -t. la «mil <* .«. m  láá.mlmm OX wl&w OX %uB X&1K3& 8tSb03) fílUi i?T£U3.C€ \Ülv DJjT t#H® OC&Q3SX0
depression) Germany in the thirties vas áble te abüR; te alciost un- limited quantity of raw mataríais stqpply w»q<»M«faiy mte' equipment 
ia retum* This sha started doinsf on a pt*1*1* scale in 1936* urtdsr ■
Aifn ¡a.. M »  * iiii'i'fteiff íltt'nÁ « A r  IClUHaL ' ' ■-. . A  .t- M ... m fyiw . a.. — J k  .<.<***£■ ** J * . iiifM i f t « i M M  JL%n mtne airection oí nr* uixacnt* iiurchasizig raw mataríais oiiered oy tee 
' ^ B^ iVan countries at priesa vebl ábove those of the v^dd market, Ger- 
many quickly became their dominant trading partner* Y* A* and v«
íoynbee, Siggg.of.m m m U m Á . .i&totau.tet.»gM-ÍA....l^ oh iq|
.........  Whl&9 i£$ ais#0«F* S o »  .
' Austria f! <g »r’hngl ft-gaTH a~ Italian r\ane\a
m  Ml GX3it3d in tho Danube basin in the early thirties into a myth. ' 
(Phe nftmipatirm of Gy-g>fthnM ftyniri g in particular gave tho Duce a nasty '■
Jet tf '■ aa the :; fiwfM t^ py mf tha Mn- '
nich settlement.1^  Eounded out of central Europe, he tried to nnlce a !
a speech dated 26 Karch lf5ff; he;Mi 
©graphically, 'pcliMihiliirt M  -att f - th# '■
belon^ d;: to Italy, and tel; the'llediterranean: included the' Adriatic,; -sc . 
that Italian interests in relation to the A s m  -^ gff ,
. hut nyfe: efftlftjfftlBt* t'1^ ’ He then ^f^enentatlnns in Berlin to see' 
whether this 'iittd'iRftte' wtft shared there, only to receive an muiwer that T■ 
van in tat Mghiy ambiguous in gybeti^ io.
■ Eow to get hkfl1 of litgtealovi» van another on tiktth':tke . .
partners . Hitler** apyTv»nf!Vi to Shd# yy»ja>$pp vas almost pnrely ■'
econoaio| the n«i vana tiMM he not y»f*f to Ium# fey*1* '
any d ■ fiHd hlfl fl4^ •foa’rna | •■
that of other countries! Yng03lavia*s output Of rav materials* This van 
an aim that could be best achieved by friendly relations - end Ceraan-Yu-
aarl, The Balkans, the Great Powers and the European Her. 1939*1940 
{unpublished University of London PhDtheBis, 19&6) pp. 13-17*
14* 6* Ciano, Mery. 1939*1945 (London, Doubldday, 1946, cit* Ciano, 
Diary) ©ntrieaforl5, lo «3• 194&» Like England and France, Italy on this occasion withdrew its ambassador from Berlin under a pretext
15» , Speech on the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the first
faacl italianl dl comb at timeutc. printed in B. Mussolini, Scrlttl e*
■ M i w S r '(Ililaao.' If») ’ gil. 154-60.
Id. During the talks between the German chief of OKW and the Italian 
vice minister of defence on 6.4*1939 it was explained to the Ita­
lians that in the FSlhrer* s view Germany* a basic eastern orientation 
should not, in view of the "great economio importance" of the Balkan 
countries to the preparation for war, impede ."¿pint economio penet­
ration" there "in the first stage") ¿eltel-Pariani conversation, 6. 
4*1939» 1 Document! Diplomatic! Italian! (Eoaa, Idbrerla dello Stato 
1952 *» oiti DDIj Yiii serie. vol. xliij. appendix ill d. The FtShrer 
next sent Gflring to Home with the message that although Yugoslavia 
' "belonged one hundred percent" to Italy*s sphere of influence this 
only meant that Germany "did not wish to make an exclusive claim to 
southeastern Europe", and would not "act unilaterally in carrying 
out major economio motions there". GSring-IIussolini conversation,
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■ V • . v" ' .... - IQ -no vie area, were reestablished almost immediately. ' jEveiything seemed
’ to be going smoothly when the news of the Prague '®eup b»u#t;h®me to
' I-iussolini the dangers inherent in such a policy. Disappointed with the
failure of twenty years conspiracy with Italy to produce resutls, the
1 ' Croat separatist movement might turn to, Berlin. When Macek*s first li- v
¿»tenant, August Kosutic, went to Prague in mid March "for personai' ■'
reasons", Borne feared that the Croats had drawn the * for Italy - wrong
conclusions from, the Czech affair, and went into a-pant*.- '
i . . . • • • i . i 1 , ; f; •, i. . r *. - - * ' * • ' , •
If futher proof is needed of the way in which Xugoslavia fersmti the 
object of a dispute between Bo m and Berlin, it is supglied 'Tty'shat Ml*/-' 
lowed. Afraid lest the Croats might turn t0.'te*Bty,'"fc.a©Iini'; sadiealy 
decided he had to do everything to strehgti^ 'lA#^ te.fl^ iait them. 
Performing a complete volte face* he-all at ones‘dissevered Italy 1Ms,
"/ after ell, Interested in a "strong and united Xugoslavia", and even sto- 
rted to promote, after years of warmongering, Togos 1 av-Hungarian friend­
ship as a barrier against German expansion in the direction of the Adri- 
atic. To avoid jeopardizing Belgrade*s position, moreover, he postpo­
ned his planned invasion of Albania until he could sound out Yugoslavia 
and perhaps offer her some kind of compensation.
, Mussolini, however, was too much of a Xugoslev-baiter to persist for 
long in this polity. Having received some kind or reassurances from Ber­
lin to the effect that Germany did not lay exclusive claim to Xugoslavia, 
he soon .resumed his connections with Maoek. More dangerously still, he 
went ahead with his invasion of Albania. The character of that operation, 
however, underwent a change} it was turned into a demonstration of Its* 
lian independence via a via the Axis partner and interpreted as a measure *201
■ 19. Piano. iiary."eat» for 9.5.1959. _ t ■ ■/.-
20. 'MNNMri» jgj* Mi*»' W* 41«£| Eoptner, Ito&sl«fis_In .Criais«..1931.-1941 (New Xork, Columbia University Press, 1902) p. 136.
21. . Foreirn Belrtlo^ s of the United States (Washington, Government Prin-
■ r iaawiniS^ ''"±^ doe. so. S2. f. Also the 1
verbal of the Mussolini/Ciaao - Teleki/Csaky conversation, 20.4.1959,
. printed in H. Adam. Allianz Eltler-Horthy-Missolini (Budapest, Aka*»
• demiai Kiado, 1966) doe•Uo* 55*..• 1 '.
22. Hoptner, eit., p, 120.
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designed to call & halt to. German expansion In southeastern Europe.2^  . .
To the Germans tht occupation of Albania on T April 1959 was, in­
deed, most unwelcome* Since their factories were working overtime in 
preparation for war, they were sensitive to ery upheaval that might en- 
danger the free flow of raw materials| moreover, they already heard the . 
Anglo-French accusation that the Axis was out to dominate this region*2^  *
The Italian action, while of little value strategically and economically, 
lent substance to precisely that accusation. While ostensibly congra­
tulating the Puce on 15 April, therefore, GSring also warned him not to ' \
repeat the Albanian adventure elsewhere} all the the Axis wanted from Yu­
goslavia wad a benevolent neutrality that would allow Italy and Germany 
to make all purchases necessary for the war effort* IMssolini was not 
easily convinced} to him a reliable Yugoslavia was an occupied, or at 
least dismembered one* r-'' • * ‘ '
J Ignoring G-Sring*s Warning,' therefore, Mussolini vent on intriguing 
with the envoys of KaCek. tats in Hay his foreign minister Galeazzo Ci- 
ano recorded in his diazy an agreement that had allegedly been arrived at 
with the Croats* The agreement provided for a Croat rebellion finaneia-
(  ■ -  > , . r ; ■ i . , ;■ ' \ ' 1
lly supported by Italy to start within four to six months} Italian troops 
would then be called in and an independent Croatia proclaimed* This 
state would then enter in a kind of confederation with Italy* . All this >
in defiance of hitler, who continued to stress the importance of a "st-
~ . ’  ....... 1 . 1 ■ ! ‘ / ! 1 ‘‘
23* ‘ A telegram of 4 April in which the Italian foreign minister instru- ,
’ ets his ambassadors in Paris and London to discreetly spread rumours 
that the Albanian expedition was designed to contain Germany is 
printed in Toscano, ©2* cit*. p. 225} cad there is reason to believe 
that its substance is correct* Harzari, o|>, cit., pp* 52-3* v
24* Keitel-Pariaai conversation, 6.4*1939» PPI* viii* xiii, appendix iii '
25* Cdring-ISissolini conversation, 15*4*1939» PGFP. P» vi» No* 205* The « talks ended in an uneasy compromise i "Yugoslavia* Friendly attitude 
while waiting for farther developments in the internal policy of the 
country and the prerequisite of Yugoslavia*s adopting a clear pro- 
Axls line* - Germany to recognize Croatia ad being purely in the Ita­
lian sphere of influence"* Ibid. Po* 211*
26, Ciano, Piary. entry for 26*5.1939* :
15
. rong sad united Yugoslavia" • 1 , '
Mussolini's hopes vers soon dashed to pieces*, Macek disowned the ag-• 2Sreesent which, he claimed, had been negotiated behind his back. Instead
he signed, on 23 August, a Sporaaum (agreement) with the Yugoslav minister 
president Dragisa Cvetkovio, which gave the Croats a considerable degree 
of autonomy end made Macek himself deputy premier. With this Mussolini, 
who now had to fall back on the extremist Ustac® organisation, effectively 
saw his hopes for dismembering Yugoslavia buried.
Help came from an unexpet$d side. She shadow of war was hanging over 
Europe, and Hitler began to realise that, in spite of the "Pact of Steel" 
signed between Germany and Italy on 22 May, Mussolini was not going to en­
ter the war. To get him in, the Führer on 12 August uae^ eetedly dangled 
the Yugoslav bait before Ciano's eyas. Provided the Axis countries cove­
red each other's back, he said, they could eliminate what he called "the 
uncertain neutrals") Italy, for instance, should fall upon Yugoslavia who v 
could be considered such an "uncertain neutral".
War broke out on 1 September; Mussolini swallowed his pride and stayed * 
out. Nor did Hitler resent the fact for very long. After the termination 
of the Polish campaign he realized that he could do without his ally whose 
"nonbelligsrenee", moreover, served the useful purposes of protecting his« 
southern flank and keeping open a door for overseas imports. 1 Once Germany 
was at war and blockaded, Yugoslavia's importance as a supplier of raw ma­
terial Increased) on 5 October, therefore, an economio treaty was signed 
between, the two countries, effectively tying almost the whole of the lat- 
ter* s output in raw materials to the fomer's use. Shis in turn led to
87. ®t vif Bo. 271* ' ■ '•
28. Y. Macfek, In the Struggle for Freedom (New York, Speller&Sons, 1957) 
pp. 139-90» She person with whom Mussolini was treating finally tur- ' 
ned out to be a Belgrade spy) EOptaer, of»* clt.. pp. 138-39# 141*
29. Eitler-Ciano conversation, 12.8.1939» PGFP. B, vil, No. 45*
30. HgnflelTwlltigcho TertrS'rm. Juqoslawlr>n. Bd. iii, German Foreim Mini--
„ 1 e w  KeS^a t She treaty graawl.*1 1 of Ihge-.
elavia's production of copper to Germany (Incidentally forcing the 
Yugoslavs to seize the mines,from their French owners) and also pro­
vided for the shipment of large quantities of lead, tin and zinc. In 
return, Yugoslavia was to have aircraft and guns. The agrément was
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w  immediate flare up in' German-Italian relations with Ciano instructing
Ms representative in Belgrade to .see what he could do to prevent agree-
■■
Hitler»s desire to keep the war away from Yugoslavia was not facili­
tated by the policy of that country. Hemmed in as she was Between Ger­
many, Italy» Hungary and Bulgaria - all of them more or less hostile - 
Yugoslavia*s hnly possible course was to stay our of/the conflict, but 
her sympathies, particularly those of the army and sir.force, were cle­
arly on the side of the allies. In September 1939* Prince Paul is repo« 
rted to have declared th the French minister, Brugere, that his country - 
would enter the war on the side of the allies as soon as the latter sei­
zed Salonika - and thus secured an Italian-proof connection'with. Yugo- ' 
slavia - and cleared the Adriatic and Mediterranean of the Axis. 32 Yu­
goslavia, too, participated wholeheartedy in the planning of the Anglo-..- . 
Preach Salonika expedition in the winter of 1939-1940. 35
One spring and Yugoslavia* s pro-western policy crumbled together 
with Prance.The outbreak of war had deprived Yugoslavia of her former / 
support'in resisting the Axis, and the military defeat of the west left 
her at the mercy' of Germany.' Prince Paul, however, had foreseen this : '
eventually as early as autumn 1939* and was looking out for a substitute"-' 
ally that would be napible of making Germany think twice. There was only 
one state in Europe strong'enough'to play this role* the Soviet Union.
Yugoslavia*s 'relations with Moscow had not been good in the' inter-war. 
yexss. like Paris, Belgrade had served as an asylum for a great many ' . 
white Russians, who were cordially received. Until 1939 Czarist Russia 
was r#pr»»f«ted in Belgrade' by a Mr* Strandtman, a former counselor at 
the Czarist embassy. In autumn 1939* however, Strandtman had a talk with *31
■ confirmed and extended on 12 May 1940f v. the embassy in Belgrade 
' > ^the;foreign'ministry, 12.5.1940. BCffP. 3), lx, io. 237. ;
31. . Ciano to Indelli, 4.10.1939* fip i% i* fo. 600. ...
52,'.' B. laagere, tmL. Miim Ylchv (Tarves. 1944) pp. 165-6."
lading in Salonika v. M m  \ ed. AuswUrtiges Amt (Beu- .33* - Ibr -details about the allied, pirns for . a'
■ VJt •OWAM.AU, . 1941.
Prince Paul, after vhichhe suddenly snnotmeed h* vas no longer represen»; " 
•üag a gotaewaent that no longer existed. Prince Paul had evidently de«* . 
oâied to toprove his relation! with Stalinj the opening ®f negotlaiion®, ■ 
teever,’vM'delsyet until ugly rumeurs concerning a fortheoming Italien ,; 
:attosk on Tugoslavia"^  forced B©1 grade to act. -In March, the Tugoslav ■ . 
fifelga adaiitor Cincar Karkovie estabïished contact with Moscou via An» ; 
tea*-''Italy*» expansioniettendencies vers painted ont and the conviction 
«9MNMN& ■that Bussia ought net tolorpto this policy. Moscou ^ uickly and 
flanaU? replied it ©ppoted Italyto Balkan pirations," te came out ■ enor» . 
fettoally for the »«Imteiia»#® if thft State tta». ■ ïïnderscoring ita point, 
toi Soviet governaent expresssdwtllingaess to enter into negotdations to» - 
vaft' m 'eoeag»^.« treaty* initiated ©a 14 April, tea# on 11 May eaded in - 
tÉe iigiiâtor# ef an accord« On 24 ¿une, moreover, diplomatie" relation» ' '■ 
tetween -the'toi countriea vere estabïished, end Belgrade aent Milan Gavri- 
lovic, a leader of the Serh Agrarien Partÿ and a confirme! liberal, '.to .
; As ftoly.©es» Mirer intervention in the ver, the tente'«f tugosla» ■’,
via being drawn in increasad* ' »«â« Ms to .loin Hitler in«I®'. ' ^  mmmmu m  «. »— »  .
March, ■ Mussolini wm casting aronnd for a victlm mil enou^ i to suit 
Italy*s linited 'teetate,^ The choies turaed ont to ba a very lSuaited
. ........ ...... »■■»<■ ; ; v  ■' ,
14* ■ 'for'reports about Kagoslar fears, r, Mtelli -(XtaÜlan ainieter in 
. ..-'Baaw»ftl)'to'ü«Bit 16, 17.4.1940. MK» tex ix, iv, to». 96. 97, -
'■ • . ta Atens) to ’lil4*19#, 1MA. 1®."- " .■ iiî§ Butti (director of the European and Mediterranean affairs de» ■ .
; ftetet: ai the Italien ftreipi ministry) to CUm» - li#4*if#t lMi. -
i5i* j ^  r V- V-;
35* /.Ita iliat it ia.tNarttt'toi» «Marat of l«*ietoïte*l*f relattoiis » , about vhich very little is known - te been total frai Baptner, ou. 
./'-'■Jm*rM* 173-73. " - _ ■ , ; t
36. Cf. P. üebert, Italiens Weg ins Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt m/
Main, Atentæa, 1962)-pp. 4I6 ff. : _ ■ L - (_;
37* la eunner ipo Itoly 73 «toi tsea», oi ifeito. 24 m m -'' ■. stationed overaeas. ■ Only 19' «I te 49 divisions at hone had renched 
their full establishment in animal a an<^ vehioles. • The artillery -
■ 1 tM»"IÉqp«l.aMSr ©utêrt»i. -:9hmê'mm ér les» ©oopieto araioured divi»fiions vere equipped vlth tanks ' a%i^t es to be useless. - In Mbya 4 
■ Mto^aed; ^ .viistef tare' «Mhlt to wmm ®$£ t e  rote mâ. far toi®» ^, • nominal strength. Ml infentry te mountain divieions disposed of 2 .
taglMto «aly. m m ' m m  1400 «ireraft te fuality tf te air force
1$
rSNfO#Sll«i that, in c&se of a .
:: ''«irt vSti&7*8 - w@«im©#s would reader her unable to .attack anywhere' "'«»«ft ■ 
■ '<Kn*the,*i»t#»tt ifon**,'- that ,4» either .Ortm® or TogealisWt*« ' 1vea IS*»
' ssolini -to' «Aaife * ^ rtiwa. only knows whet 'this M e t  hare cost
him - that Italy would he unable to ¿o ''anythins spectacularf,# -^/ and when 
' fe#‘i»suedled■'■'‘plm of.wax*, on 31 March 1940 he'««fisaged cffe- 
naive action only on the Balkan front* Talking about Croatia, the 
Luce*a hands ‘'fairly itched* At the end of April , ha had his array' ■' 
chief of staff Marshal Eodolfo C-raziani prepare a plan of war based upon 
offense against Yugoslavia, and the air force started to deploy accordi- 
ngly*^ 2 His first reaction to the German invasion of the Low Countries 
of 10 May was to time the rising of Para lie* a TJst&ce, with whoa anag- 
reement' similar to the one he had previously tried to obtain from Macek 
- had been signed in January, for early June*^, As late as 29 Kay he con»
; . firmed his directive to Grasiani.^ At this period, just as one year 
earlier, these measures had a pronounced anti-German edge* their pwpos«, *402
was unknown. She navy was the best of the three services, but like 
the air force it suffered from lack of fuel. F. Boss#, liuseoliai e 
' lo 'Stato Maggiore fSoaa* 1951) obp* 1 . ■
53. For a good assessment of Mussolini*s war aims and strategy during 
the spring of 1940# V* E, faldella, L*Italia e la Seconda Guerra Mo- 
hdièie (Soma, Cappelli, 1959) PP* 65-^ 9, 123-02. ““ 7
39* Stato Maggiore Essrtito/lJfficio Storico t 1» Avans at a lino ad Si di el 
Barranl (Boaaw libreria dello Stato, n.d)p. 1Q5* ,x
40. Printed in Faldella, op. cit., p. 145« Aa offensive vas also plan- 
, ned in Italian East Africa} elsewhere Italy va3 to limit herself to 
"chiudere le porte della casa*, in Badoglio*s words.
41* Giano. Diary, entry for 9.4.194O.
42. E. Graziati!. Ho difeso la Patria (Bona, Garzanti, 1948, citi irmi»
■ ■ 1 eni, Patria) p. 189} G» Sfioro, l*Awpqngutlea Italian nella Seconda ^ '/
' •' Guein^n,IìÌoSial» (Soma, Issa, 2. eHtioS, ” 1957J  ^ 7 ' 77»8« f c S S T  -■■■ 
was not happy about the plan} according to him the Yugoslav® ware 
( strong enough to tie down his troops indefinitely.
45« Anfuso (Ciano*a chef de cabinet) memo, 25.1.1940, EDI# lx, ill,"He.
1941 Ciano, Pi ary* entry for 10*5.1940*
44* ME, lx, iv. Ho. 642.
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■ immmg others, was to get holt ©f a tisputet area wMle thè Mg irothsr. '
. Vva»,«Bgs0»d élmvàmm - ssatoh as you «aa,;, .• -.. ■ '
. Mussolini*a army and air ftm. wew^ ust starting their preparations -,
wken a lattar from tho flteer «osived and called him a'’halt. . Hitlar hat ,
■ ' - - 45 .■learnt about hia allyta plana in April ' and confirmation reached him in 
Msy,^ Aitar all that ve hwre seen about Ms Yugoslav polioy, it is not 
:■ thard to eeevhy ha’ vas unhappy atout, ttia Duee*s plana. Hitler»sover- 
¡whalaing priority in this periad was given to tha west*. her® ha had «a®- ■ 
,.,®<®ntr»ted. .«lasst.all Ms troops and hoped to gain a decisive victory,
,. In this contert Italy*s plana presented a diVersion» and oae that was ’ 
totally uarelated to the war against Franca and England. Koreover» they v 
, did not wöca «trategt« sense. '.'Even. if conpletely suooeeafal,. notMng '
. more thsn the tsansformation of the > Adriatto into an Italien Iahe. could 
'. he acMeved. . Hie Adriatic* however, is m  Inland sea with limited stria» : 
tegie sigaifieanoej being in possession of. both eides of thè Stratta of,
. Otranto, Italy could seal it «fit in sny case,, A successfül caapaign, "
; moxeover, would hat», the disadvantage of finally settling the’ question 
as to vhoae sphere of influence Yugoslavia helonged in, «ad tMs in a 
;■ way vMch was not, Ms deolaraiiwt to the contraiy notwithstanding, pa- .
; latable to Hitler*s taste. -. . ,
But waId it ho suooessihl? Hitler and Ms «my M$i command (OKH) ■ •
. wer® not si».» SKiey doubted whether "Yugoslav national structure* was ■ 
as •ieoayed* as thè Itali«« tried tomske outj^ end World ¥ar 1 had ■ 
taù^ it'tlia» ». healthy r®«pwt ftr,tii» I«§§sl»v soldier.^ 8. Eveaythisg’ ■ ,
■ considered, ; therefore, tfcsgr taaML' t® share OrMAtfd.*» skepMois». ’ , ■
: ; Lea’.dng the3e doubts asid®* the XtaUtft plan carried other dangars. 
Following the agreemont of ©•tob«» Yugoslavia*s entire econoay had been ; *48
, 45* F* Haider, Hrieffstagebuch (Stuttgart, Kehlhammer, 1962-1963* eiti 
- KTB/lIalder) o, 295* entry for 11.4*1940| Spakter memo* 23.4*1940»
‘ deutsche Botschaft Raa« Geheimakten 1940. GfT^ 228l/480553“57* B» latter source quotes the Italien secretary of state*
46* KTB/Halder. i, 277* 28J, entries for 4, 9.5.I94O.
47* , IM*» 309» m m  im  ,11*1*1940.. ' , ■
48. . fhla is a s««anelaf the*® in Sitl®r** sp®®«hea in the last yeers W  ,
" Üw» th# war, Wmm the tt*® QU sllocated fot th» Yugoslav oaapaign 
- : of 1941 (24 days instead of tho attuai 11) it is elear that Ms m m *peot was g®n»in®.
geared I# the Axis, so that an attack #n her could not but disrupt - tea- ■' 
. porsxily at least - the flow of raw materials* Even worse, Yugoslavia*s 
covetous neighbors Hungary and Bulgaria «• might seite the opportunity .
. to'.intervene, possibly drawing in Eumsaia as veil. . Shis in turn would, 
spell disaster to German war production, dependent as it was on Balkan 
raw materials. . Finally, - these was the mystery of Yugoslav-Soviet' rela-* 
tions. little as Hitler knew about these, he suspected a military pact 
and was definitely worried* A-Balkan explosion, such as mi^it be pro­
duced - by an Italian attack on Yugoslavia, might serve the Soviets as. an "/ 
ezcuse to surge southward j whether they would stop before reaching the 
Ploeoti oil fields was snybody#s guess. ' ' ;
■ 'For 'all:these reasons, Hitler did not drew of giving his ally the 
' green light over Yugoslavia* On 13 April he sent him a letter in which, . 
while denouncing “the smaller'neutral states" which "think theycaa enjoy ■"
■ the privilege of gravely insulting or damaging... Insolently a few great ’ 
powers" invoking "democratic freedom of the press and public opinion" to 
exouse themselves, he added that "I... am natwtally convinced that for us ' 
it is desirable to hold the Balkanic region. •• out of the war.MV On 26 - 
April: he'was reported "struggling with all possible means" .to keep the 
Balkans fulei.^2- To make .sure Eussolini did not move ho refused Italy*a ■' 
request for aras,^ and by 23 May he believed he had the "reigns well in
49* But net Greece';asked by' the Yugoslav minister about her attitude, ■ 
; * the Greek minister president on 14 May answered that "Greece .would 
- ' in' such a case stay neutral in spite of the Balkan pact, and only 
--»hoot at anybody who attacks Greece". Erbach (German minister'In y:
■ Athens) to foreign' ministry, Hr. 210 v. 15.5*1940, it 
' ‘ ‘ ' M* i, QRt/449/222710..' *“
50. : Hoptner, j h , olt». p. 177l X* and Y. Soynbee,
gfcflSyr ondon. Oxford waves**
51. P8if..i. ix.:Bb. iss. : y\
52. fhiMflwMtMA conversation, 26,4.1940, 1M&. ed.*i nets, p* 240..  ^ ■ -
55. On 17 Huy Boatta had asked for deliveries of German wsr material to'. .'
""■Italy, on'the ground* that,' as fee'latter had apliamei to enter fee ■
'; :■ .■ ■ war in: 1945« whs was unprepared to inter novj Eintelen to OSB/Genst. .■
■ ■ d.H/Att. Abt#«-'». 55/40 g.«os v. 175.19401 OEW/Ausland to ok^Ganst. ' 
' dJ^Att. Abt., Hr. 65/40 g.Bdos v. 23.5| and Mntelen to Olffl/Genst.d. , 
B/Att. Abt., Hr. 60/40 g.KdOs v. 28.5.1940. Eintelen to OKH/Genst.d.
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, .. : hand".-^ ■ Jfm a  day* la te r , ■bamfinet) his memy :mmtuanier incMef was still - 
■ - aaf£ iM «iiilj:R© 3^ na.-t© .t® ll^f0»Kl#a’M ii« t* r ;i# a A ia ;{iro ii} Elbbentrop' , 
that he personally should take ,ea re le sttee  Balkans he driven into"di'*»"
■ . -' order by I t a l y . . On JO 1-îay there arrived a letter from Ifessoiiaian­
nouncing that "I hold it desirable to prevent the extension of the m&* 
fliot to the settore dmuMmo-balcanico iron which Italy, too derives 
; suinta“.56/.
■ *-y ■ Strange «9'it may seen, this ostensibly conciliatory letter alarmed•v 
' y. M-tler*:; He knew his co-dictator too well to ' take hia at his wort, and in ■, 
;.y .«y.««®® had net yet forgotten the unpleasant way in which the Albanian
; affair.m sprung ©a Ma* ■ Shis time he.did not want'■ totake any èhi»aés*\.: ■
, .. .Hé tlerefore'pwieeiti' to write Jtissolini a letter in which' he...aft8ured his 
■ 'y.'.-: -illy', teat he. was ■ “in ; perfect1''accord*; 'wite' his 'desire-' to': keep 'the 'Behube -.r' :
* y y  basin and the Balkans out of 'tee. conflict* Moreover, he recommended '.teat ;.V
','y, ; ; tee .’Bue® make a publie statement to teat. effect.. . So allow' his; ally ' time ; ,
, to di#pt, the. messag®., Bitte* also' '«ted Ma te postpone Ms-'entry into» ' ’ y 
cy-, tee;«r,I^Mi 5 to 10..d»e * ostensibly in older te allow Gtr»issy tO’JKMbt ; 
; y;': : off';tea';3B a^sSai XNMfe M r  force*^ • ; •• -''Y-y
fM* m s 'a ,'bitter'pill for Mussolini, feat not'one that he'could 'réféss^ ''.
; ' te ;« « ill0w .1:..%'; 2 -Ant fee hai iMa;up M e M aàte ©ossplyi^ ® id& t'slaosi y 
: y  ' hsete'^rlin- dropped the ridi-«!«» pretext" it had dasnat up' to -V
:.y 'i«èsy,hit .«teyinte'tee war end Italy Misted te seleef'A^-date''ih®''li» ; i;
■ y Jolt#  ^ gig»i told tee ïhgosl^'miaister that M s  "'country èèMd.hoì' be-! : 
invaded, if it behaved "loyally**, a grave statement ef which".tee a is it te r  ; '
\ '.-.''^ /itt*'ibt.| :it« fe.'tt/ÏOOO? at tee Imperial,Var Utosewi* y" ; ;
: ;V ■ 54*. ; g j^ ie r » .  ' i ,  ■ 316» eatey for^  25. 5. 19# . :  y  ; ' - y , - y y , ". : : ' = v, ,  ;
• 55« fO i..It«do rf. ( lia i* « a '* i» ':# f tee foreign ministry at (X I) "w»»©: fo r r. y .y
. . ; . Y uWeissicker» 27*5*1940,  M P .-S. iX» »o. 328. , .. ? .. ... . y ;;
56. DPI, lx.lv* Ko* 646* .
51. Ibid* Bo* 6Q0* V* also L* Simoni, Berlino* Ambasciata d1 Italia. 1119 
-1945 (Soma, IHgliaresi, n*d) p. 122» / -
§§.*' MÜssolini to Hitler, 2*6.1940, BBÏ, ix, iv, Ho* .70S* ‘
59* Foreign ministry to Mackensen (German ambassador in Italy), 2.6.1940, 
Akten BSro Reiohsauseenminister* GE^/F9/000365* Y y
I  .■  v' /' ' ; ; ' ■ ■ ■  ■
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"loyally" took notice. . On the day after, the withdrawal of Italian fo­
rces and their transportation to Libya - vhere theywould presumably be / 
free of Hitler1® meddlesome interference « was started and on 10 June ' 
Mussolini,; ibba declaring war, grudgingly announced bis intention to 
spare not just Yugoslavia, but Greece, Turkey, Egypt and Switzerland as ■ 
.well*'.;;'.. ; .1 V / /; /’/.
Hitler bad won a considerable victory in the tug of war between him­
self and Mussolini, proving that he was perfectly able to hold his ally*® 
Balkan-plans in check when he wanted to. Behind Mussolini*s back, he was 
already reassuring the Yugoslavs} tongue in cheek, the German minister in 
Belgrade explained that "anybody could see that the interests of the Axis 
powers... were identical, and that Germany wanted to keep the peace in
southeastern Europe. .62 Thereupon the Yugoslavs claimed they were satis- 
6?fied, at least for the time being* ■" In any case, theydid demobilise in 
July. ■ , ■ ? •
The quiet was destined to be of abort..duration.- On 1 July Hitler met 
the new Italian ambassador, Bin© Alfieri, and committed the error 4f tal­
king somewhat strongly about Yugoslavia. .Eeferring to a collection of top 
level allied doecuments for the conduct of the war that his troops had 
discovered in an abandtoed railway carriage near^fitiy- la Charite, he said 
that it had been proved "just how equivocal and hostile" Yugoslavia*s att- 
titude to the Axis had been# Italy* he said, would have (dovra) to clear 
"many problems" at her frontier "at the right moment".6^ Ho sooner had *62
60« Heeren (German minister in Belgrade) to foreign, ministry, Hr. 455 v.
2.6.1940. St.S. Jugoelawiwi. :i.;e«/2M/i52«17. . . ¿7 ...
61.. Graziani to Staaage, Ho. 460 dl Prot*, 3.6.1940, IKR/00016l»62t Ar- 
■- mollini promenoria, 2.6.1940, ibid/0006Ht and Graziani telegram Ho.
. , 337* 5.6.1940* Ibld/000158.
62. Heeren to foreign ministry, Hr. 577: v.’ 15.5.' St.Sl laaoslawi^i..; i. ' 
GFH/230/152207-8.1 That this «tt efffcial policy Ä  by the
military attache in Belgmi©;being-:r«n»stei T^ -:OIH.'te:"e#opearte..; 
in'an effort to soothe Agpsl«fla*w fea»a| He««'to on/fiensi*' '- 
d.H/Att. Abt., Hr. 400 vT: 20.5*1940. St.S. JaaaaliHiiea. 1. <m/&Of 
152218. In Home Mackensen was working in the same direction*'’"1U »  
ensen to foreign ministry,; Hr. |85 v. 30.4. ibid. ■ G W / 230/152108-89. .
Voermann memo, 14.6*1940, st,s, 1, gm/m/issa&i 1 »
ren to foreign ministry, .Hr. 473 v. 12.6. ibid. 0111/230/152243. V' /
63.
64, BBI. ix, v, Ho. 161. The record of; the same•conversation
.this h®ws reached Mussolini than the Italian air forceand army were «Sft- 
; ©red; to .redeploy in the' faxm-fado*' 80® %  :in' view of possible "complica- 
. tions'in the direction of
> < Mussolini had obviously interpreted Hitler* a words as a broad hint 
that Germany would not object to «1 Italian action. To make dbubly sure 
"he'instructed Cistto, who Was about'to' leave' for Berlin, to inform Hitler 
of the need "to splitupYugoslaviart.^b7ien he raised the subject,''ho»* 
■/: -ever,' the Italian foreign minister was treated to an' angry lectures ■’ "
The decisive question in this connection was whether it was a 
-v?--'Cvsatter-of indifference to.Italy and the Dace which country had 
: possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. If Italy-'
‘ ■ '• should attack Yugoslavia, Hungary would immediately fall upon - A 
■,■ A Bfcaania*• •. the BustJana would.** bestir themselves,. cross fee,.
' Danube,’, end'seek to establish a connection wife’Bulgaria* ;'
tJpto this point Hi tier*»' exposition w&3 reasonable enough! to give Giano 
the creeps, ■ however, he prodeeded to paint a dark picture ,#f the Bulga- ■ . 
lV riii»S allowing the Soviets to cross • fetis* country end' reach tbs :Streits*
: So no Yugoslav adventured, please! 'Clearly alarmed by this show of Hit- 
;"..v , l«r*s"angir| Ciano quickly interposed that "personally he believed that 
the Yugoslav affair could be postponed until.the war with England had • ' ■ 
been,settled*'" The important thing now was to notefeat Yugoslavia m i  ".
., ;:i ttst a country friendly toward the Axis, and that ■ in. the new Europe* *,: she 
., '<#©«!&:' not. iwssert >  maintain her .present fossa",.Saving' mala' this. at-' .
' . "tempi', to '.save Whatever could be saved, Ciano duly reported Hitler*s words 
. fe Mussolini.68 ' ■ ■- : . . ■ ,Y :
Though.fee Duce wa3 undeterred by Mis.German demarche, he soon found ■ 
'."’.'.'feat M s  own military advisers were none too happy about fee whole aff- ■ 
bin ^ feey would have preferred to wait until after the "liquidation of *1
‘ -.v (MJB* '¿»"au lo»''T5) makes Hitler*a language ■©»'restrained*. "
65. Badoglio directive '*>. loSfy%.# 4.7.1940, Bm/l27/000751> Q* Arse»
© (ioaa, Gar- ■ ■ •'
66« ■ Claao.*lia3Bf.. entry for 5*7*1940. . / ■ .
1 67* iim* P* x. IT0. 75. ■ . ■■■''■■ ‘
' 6®*.''^';i%\, Ic/200.:1"''. ' V.V' '. ' \
QU& p$l!«WS in Iiorth Africa", and in any case needed-time' to transport ' 
troopafrom the French frontier, evacuate civilians from the border areas 
and confiscate the necessary enlaalaand vehicles.^ Even in the most' 
favourable case, preparations could not be completed before the middle of 
September.' Since the Yugoslav armed forces wire by no means negligible, 
-success, could be achieved only if part of thorn 'was tied down-by ..the hos- 
' tility of Germany .'and Hungary and the nonbenevolent neutrality- of Romania 
/and Greece.-'; It was asking'for a great deal to expect this combination of
■ circumstances, end the Commando Supremo'duly suggested'-German'help could : 
be dispensed -With.: provided - an' Italian a ny was allowed to operate from 
Austria* , Mtregsrding Hitler*s warning' therefore,. Hussolini on 22 July 
©rduwid'Stamage to' i#proa©h 'the Germans, and on 11 August ■ to have prep®*»"
.■ rations:completed■ by.20 September.^2 ' ^ ' .//'-',. -
. fh4 Italian request Was not, ©f course* welcsas in Berlin.' ...Having'--' t 
twice'before vetoed their ally1* action, the Germans verefurioua, . *Uh~ /.-' 
United' shamelessness!rtbrist@led the .army, chief of staff, ge&era&'3i&»
So' put a break on Italian enthusiasm, geairsl. Variljmt' so^esied 
/that the plans of the Yugoslav fortifications on the .Gexaen-frontier, - tot
■ which t o  Italians bad also asked* be handed ever to them "ommitting the ■ 
appended OSH evaluation' saying that .to fortifications..•.. would, not pre­
sent a serious obstacle to a modem *dr$t attacking: to», "p,. Even this,'..
was' too « M b  for,a ceutiou* Hitler* who. declared..himself ■ nt©t%*
lly .disinterested* in t o  Italian request and forbade t o  material fro»' . ■: nc ■ ■ ■- - - -
'..-being handed over«'.:On Hitler*s order,. GOT t o n  instructed Rintelen -to *726
6$, Hnsigned SM  memo, 12.7.1940, BfgA2$/O0O58S-8S«
‘ 70."'"- Bnsìgned S W  »«»,''12.7.1940, Ibid/0Q0610-12. ""
''.71.;''lto®Ì^ed"aG memo, 8.8.1940, lbld/00Q777-30. .
72. fiintelen to OS^Genst.d.E/®tt.Abt.f 22,7.1940, ite» Io.'1 0# at ;to 
Imperlai War Muoeuraj KTB/Halfler. lì, 35, entry for 25.7.1940.
75* Badoglio EB3 note, H . 8.I94O, 3XR/126/00062S.
74* KTB/rtaldsr. il, 63, entry for 14.8.1940«
75* Krie^stàgebuch des (fej (Frankfurt ora/Kain, Bemard&Graefe, 1965, citi 
■ KgB/yw)7 i. 05» entry for 14.8.1940. Walter Warllmont waa chief of 
(Landesverteitigung) department ai OEM and ita 3rd Mghest' nate» 
king officer*
76. - illi.-i. 56, entrjrxfbr 15.8.1940» , '
25
answer fioatia that “no assurances of any .Mad have been, made to the''-It»- ' 
lisas by the Belch foreign minister.., OQEDC Cannot discuss this’suggestion 
until te® political aspect has been clarifi8d.H^  This time,' however, ' ’'- 
,Berlin was clearly determined to make sure 'the message got through, . Bib- .■ 
bentrop therefore had Alfieri pay hi» a visit, then handed M m  a stifflyv 
■worded, "if polite, '»«jraaduai ■ ■: /V.-, " 'C-'
;h..;£n"principle'it should be said, that-tee Axis is at present.,, '■
■ "sagged on' a life to death struggle with England,'' and t e a t " '.
it would therefore'he inadvisable 'to tackle -any new problems ■" "
■ ,,, .'teat did not absolutely..have to be tackled in connection ,-.v .p.. -
: .site tee effort "to crush England, •• ■ ' '
A new seat of conflict in the■ Balkans would in certain."V--1 
circumstances start a general confiscation. How would Greece 
react? How would If affect Hungary? Above all,., it should 
be remembered teat Yugoslavia had close relations with Russia ,
Kqsoow would bo brought into the picture,•• in the end,
, Germany would be forced to,,, shift its:troops to tee cast.^g , •
©id Germans, then professed. several reasons for' not allowing Mussolini to 
attack Yugoslavia) the need to concentrate m  the war against England,, a ' 
task to which the Italian plana bore no ntevanee,and the fear of a gen©»' 
ral conil's^ rmtlon" in the Balkans with all the consequences' this implied 
for certain M#ly'ia£li®»«bl# materials in tee area* Behind those two ' ■ . 
reasons we any "safely '«ssu»®' another} Hitler*a basic unwillingness to do ■ 
anyteing teat ;»i#it help 'realise tee Italian' claim teat Yugoslavia belo- 
aged to teeir ■trtluslv® sphere "of interest. Finally, there Was the mys­
tery of Yugoslav-Soviet relations} little as Hitler fchew about these, 
the^ caused him loti of worries. Berlin knew that Turkey was somehow con- ' 
nested with tee rsagproahiasnt between tee Soviet Union and „Yugoslavia, . , 
and suspected tee, shadow of Sogland behind Turkey, ■ The .foreign ministry 
considered there was' a connection between the' establishment of iBoviet-Yu- • 
goalsv .diplomatic relations and the arrival of a special envoy of.Chur­
chill*», Sir Stafford Grippe, ■ 1«- Moscow»^ ■ A highly interesting dispatch *70
77. BGIP. B. xi. t>. 483.' ed.*a not®.  ^ '■ " , V  "v’- . ■
70. IMt. He.- 355.- eaclosure-lo. 2. ■ '
WO'eraran m«so,'10.7*1940, St.S, ■mwcivu'.l. CM/585/2426l8»19.
from Gavrilovic to Belgrade,; la. which the newly appointed minister repor- - 
ted a conversation with llolotow and caressed his conviction that the s 
Soviets were waiting for an opportunity to fall ofi Germany*s rear, and
• - 0Q
expected Yugoslavia to join them, also reached Hitler during July.
Slowly, Alfieri read the German note. Then, as he was never noted 
for political (or any other) wisdom, the Italian ambassador proceeded
to commit a bad blunder; he introduced the subject of Greece into, the ,-1 ' ; :
conversation. . '
ii ’ ’ : / _
like Yugoslavia, Greece formed something of a problem for the Axis; the 
ffirst thing to note, however, It that it was an infinitely less irapor- . 
tant problem. Greece was considerably weaker than Yugoslavia in popula­
tion and resources, while much less important economically to the Axis 02 ■war effort. ' Unlike Yugoslavia, moreover, her geographical position left 
scarcely any doubt as to whose sphere of influence she belonged in - that 
it, if the expression "the Mediterranean and the countries bordering on 
ltw had any meaning at all* /' .- -
Italisn-Greek relations h M  never been particularly good. In 1922 
Greece had tho ill look of being involved in the Corfu incident, which 
ended in Mussolini*s humiliation and whichhe regarded as a personal aff­
ront* Although governed by a quasi-fascist regime since 1935, Greece was 
tod dependent •* economically and militarily - in the Mediterranean to be 
permitted much room for manoevre in her relations. withtha; great power ■ ' ■ ■
that, Mussolini’s Mare nostrum notwithstanding, ruled the Mediterranean. 81
,„;„i;   „„ ;j''■■■' \ •
GO. T* fh.W. Fabry» - Per ttiler-StaliB Pakt' (Darmstadt. Fundus, 19«2, oit*
. - Fabry, B.M»*g.tiilaj m* 257 ft*'
81. A creature of Ciano*s, Alfieri was vain, stupid, irresponsible and so 
' v'" talkative that his master used M m  as a sure means to convey false
'' irtfd®**tion. • Y. ffaa> Initial, Srfeaish of fee Axis.- p.• 245; 'also..' Sie* i ■
; tort* fa* .sit»» p. 4 5 1 • .  stout'him''dot ■ the pages of the ; 
iifey of M s  main collaborator at the Italian embassy in Berlin, Mi- ' 
.^ ./'■cbele Lanza; Simoni, o£, oit.» pp. 187-88, 216, 219. ■
■02,'vThe only Greek export of any relevance to. the.war industry of the .Axis 








































































































































































;p#»#ibly oooupy Crete 
' Salon«»... : . - ■ -. '• * _ 5 .?■■■>■■■ i ' •
in case the British landed in
Compared .with his, three-fold veto of Mussolini*a Yugoslav .plans,.'- all 
„ this generated, reasrkably little excitement with Hitler. ; Thereare se* ;.-.v 
varfl, possible explanations for. this fact. To begin with, the Greek pro­
blem . was, much less. important eenomicslly,; militarilyand politically, than’■ 
theYugoslav one. '. Unlike Yugoslavia,; Greece had never formed..-the object.,- : 
of ,«* m m  » dilute, between, Germany. i»d Italy, sinoe her.place •
i».;.the,latter*s sphere of influence couldscarcely be doubted* Unlike
Yugoslavia,, to®,' hep- bases and particularly her islands did have a poten- 
tial ei^ iiioaaoe in relation to the war against Great Britain). .. stra- . 
tofltally Salonika, the Peloponnese and Crete - unlike, say, Zagreb, and 
Belgrade - were places worth possessing. More remote from the center of ;.
•• V * • ■ • ' ' ■».
tot inflict, and less surrounded by-hostile enemies, _a Greets. attacked by ,
Italy was less likely to provoke a general conflagration in toe. Balkans# ■ 
Last' not - least, Greets did not possess anything like Yugoslavia* smyste- 
rious and confidental relationship with Beset*) like toeir Turk neighbours,
fhe'irtaks feared, Soviet axapaslonist ,tendencies .in the'.Balkans, ..while .
’' \ the general' staff but with Giano' directly, - or through the under so- . - 
eretsiy of etate for Albanian affairs Benin! (DPI. lx. v, los. 442, 1 
469, 508) who «vea'^^misatM iireotly witolKT^ewd« of toe . 
."air ferae (e.g. Benini to frtool®, No. 19520/2784, 6.9.1940, mt/
127/§0§©335)» 'a'yisiiatiable procedure illustrating toe extent 
'■ ’whtfb toe ItaadUfft aiaistry had a say #van in mtoor operational d#»'./ : tail« ; Yisconti Prasca, too, regarded himself as responsible to too .':
* ■ ■: Uralm  aiaistor then ttptlalaf' toa d«0©-iiwpired -frontier' inci* ■:'
- . dent tout via tippea*.. to «pan toe attack on Sreeo#. (Yisooirtt Pra^,' ■
sea to ». ©44», 16.6.194®, ibid/000381), so tost ;■- - 'tttofHNval, itoff, 'expreisly faarlng an unauthorized Ciaao-Mvtotire,
ttofc $mm 'to imtiaA A  to MtaaeA on its mm orders only before -«¡p- , proving Ms request fht various kinds #f equipment. Y. Badoglio' to - - 
. Sup«v«MMitoa No. 1944 0p., 17*6.1940, lbld/O00370i and. haadiHetttw.- note on Sorioa to Mrotieiie'Seiierale di Artiglieria, Be. 137518/41/2,
' lf«6.I»40. -ilii/e»142. . -
105. Erbach to foreign ministry, Nr. 155 vi 12.4, St.S. Crleohenland. i, 
GPH/449/2227011 same to same, Nr. 210 v. 15.5. ibid. GR^449/222712i 
KfB/Halder. i, 277, 305, entries for 4, 19*5.1940.















































































































































































































?Greece ml "Balkan", which seems to have hid «©me reality
if wr. are to; Judge'by HI tier* s actions of 25 mi 26 April 1940,^  was sp- - \ 
parently grappa'ty' the highly 'mMm Ciano. When reporting te Mussolini
on M s  next 'conversation'with Hitler, therefore, he was careful to not® ;■'; / 
that "the'Ifhrer always thinks it extremely important for us to.maintain: ; t IQthe -]NNMa#''ia;th»' l«imhlw.BMk«io sectt*** Prom how''oh 'the ltali«is ; 1 ■ 
worked' in’' the' iassn^ tioa," which as we hat® seen had seme' basis in reality,/;  ^
Uni while the''"liik«ins* had of course to he lift in peace Greece did not
and «©Md: therefor® he invaded with impunity*11^
''frtf«»tioM!:''for.met an; invasion were no** shifted into gear, 'hut on V 
a'Wm *! |ui'fe;diff»^t from fee'cat discussed .between. Sitier. and. 6ia»e, ', 
ft#;':"f^sl-st»tss%ing A4'def«isiiir®^\'rtiti»»ritiA Character of their inter­
vention, 'the ■ Xliiiaiis' seised -upon the discovery of /the headless' of, .■ -’' , ■
#^:;lamt"^ifca,; eattle’M^i'via.'Alh^tia, as a pretext -.‘1» @p«;:a-prepend«.
117* When, it will be remembered, he was struggling "with all possible 
means" to keep "the Balkans" quiet while at the same time authori­
sing the Dues to improve his strategic situation "very much as the 
, iilhrer had done in the case of Denmark and Korvay" • The examination 
of the evidence seems to bear out the theids that, tinder the Axis 
geopolitical system, Greece was not included in the "Balkans"; in KG Case. Was she thus listed in any German-Italian discussion, e«g DGPP*
D, vii, Hoe* 266, 354* 362, 591y and especially in Mackensen to for­
eign ministry, Ho* 847 V* 9*5*1240, St*S«, Deutsoh-Italienische Bo- . 
siehungsn, ii, GP?|/l57l/380512t where under the heading Balkanatsa-
• ten-Itallen AldTpossible states (Eumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bul­
garia and even Slovakia) EXCEPT Greece are mentioned* The practice
t ' r was also consistently followed by the diary of the German navy high 
/ 1 command, which osaits Greece from the "Balkans" while including Hun­
gary, Yugoslavia, Humania and Bulgaria; e.g Kriepret^ ebuchi dea See- ' 
kriegsleitung (citi KTB/STCh)« Teil A, Heft xii, entry for 1*8*1940,
• m m M m m .  ■ 1 - ■ .... „
119* "Settore dannblano-balosnico"! Ciano to liossolini, 20*7*1940, DPI* ix, 
vi, Ho. 274* Though no German record of this conversation has been 
found it should be noted that the translation of this expression as 
"the Balkans and the Danube" by the DGPP (e*g* D, x, Ho* 4$4) is mis­
leading, as it creates the impression that the "Danube" was distlnot 
from "the Balkans". In this connection it is significant that the 
German original of the last named record retains the Italian expression*
119* 1 E* Schramm von Thadden, Grlechsnland und die Grossallchte to Zweiten 
Veltkrieg (Wiesbaden, Steiner,1955) p* 74*
Gieit* lgtt. against Gira«®«, ■ JacomiM, . who well ^ ksew M s  mater*saind, seni ■
, Ciano a magnificent merorandura .in which. h® comeaorated ^ the Albanien : ben-, ' 
.Veit m  beingHanimatadby a great patrioti® spirit" and clMasd that he '
had been killed on the Orders of the Greek governmont tot supporting the' • ' 12Ö 'Albani an Claim to Cismurla. \ .1« also referred vagiely to more Greek -:
, »»d««' on Albaniens "who hoped forltalian help to rejoin the motherland"
and to "Insults" and. "repression" to which the Albaniana in Cianroria?-Spl- .
„ ms vere subjectcd by their orual Greek overlords. = , : -
v Deliktes with this opportunity t© foment trombi® that mlght lead to«' '■
* -thè extenoion ©f thè Albanian frontler, Ciano iaraediately aoqüsiaied Ilu-
Bsolini vith the "lifficulties which had Krisen on th« Gr®eco?Alb®iiiitt ; -
.borde»** fhe Duce responded by ”contempiating an «et of force", and a
"surf»!®« attack" upon Grasce towards the «ad, of September* '/ Hs ordered. - '
. th« .'preas to start tö "stir up the problen", and had Ciano summon J&coaini
and Tisconii frasca to Bone.^ Having arrived on the very evening (10
August) Gian©' told thsa that "for politicai rsasons" Mussolini interndel. to
. : ecsupy Ci««Äa*!..fatasi to' se«' the Duce, in th« following ./fiscoati.
.. Pf&sc«. airodated an aiiask . in about fifteen days,. sine« otherwise the
§re#ks''«©ali' léssa of it and iahe counter-measuras, *22 "Jacomini and Tis-
'■ «©ati'fwsMà mmaäAm the epiaeaiicn.possiblt and even easy, .provlded it is
120# DPI, ix, v, Ho* 386. For the Greek version of the affair, v. .the 
. official corynuilcme of the Agones d*Athens, 12*8*1940, St*.!--»- Italien. 
"11» GB|/B147ob21o6.* According to this version Bsai Hoidia, a nm* 
dexer with a prize of twenty years standing on Ms head, had been 
. killed by Albanians, not Greeks. Somewhat naively, Blzo BaniSh®': : 
hoped to have this account published in Germany, but Weizs&cker told 
him to forget about it. (WeiasScker memo, 13*8*1940, Mg* D. If,
* Ho. 345)* : fhe Germans nevertheless knew perfectly well-that 'll*'
, charges were fabricated! Panwit* (German consul in llrfrtm) to'<&*».' 
eign ministry, 17*8.1940* St.S* Italien. iii, G^ VB14/002172.. . ; ,
121* Clano* Diary, entries for 10 and 11.8,1940.
,122*. S* Visconti.Prasca, Io ho aareddito la Grecia (Kilsao, Bizzoli, 194&) 
PP* 31-4* 2?he proposed operation aimed at the occupation of GlMttii* 
. only, i.e was limited in scope. Supposed it succeeded, suek.a "©tain©
■ ■ ; di mano" could not but lead to the landing of the MIMA'in
left of Greece* so much was clear even to the Italian 'general stiff. 




carried '«at at once. As Dues, on the other hand, remains of the opinion 
that*.# should be. postponed until .lbs end of. September*.12^ /
Alamed bjr the press campaign dirsoted against his country, the Greek 
minister yr>og^ ‘^ar>t appani«!.^ to Berlin. . BAtler, «8 «§ 
to 'till.««' the Italics to hsss their way. 
sMtjr provide« -the wate» M n t  s®®* itMftd-pncyMMi. «#»
1 -1» could aet* however, ■ MMrti the .®co«p«tl@a of the re»- 
mote, 'atriotegUtiifer worthlM» Ciamuni«- «ador & riitoulsits irredentist .' ■ .
’ yir«*watt mA 'siiik of the rest ©f-to®*®» into & l*4tt®ii, -
base* ’ A© adventure planned by Italy had another drawback; Yugoslavia* s 
Albanian minority was oven larger than Greece*», and an Italian operation 
based upon the irredentist claim to Ciamuria mi$at therefore turn into a• 1 y ' - ’ t 1 ■ ■ • * • ; ■ - - • ■ ' ;  ^ ‘ * , , . * .highly undesirable precedent*
On 14 August, therefore» Eibbentrop inquired with Alfieri whether 
Italy Intended to go to war over her claims in Cismria, to be put off 
by the ambassador* s declaration that he did not know and would send for 
instructions •*2'* Cisnb answered his question by telling him td’inform 
Sibbentrop that - •, •' • V ' ’ ^ • '/
Our attitude toward Greece is determined by motives of a pro-t ■ 
cautionary nature.•« we cannot ignore the possibility lest 
the English proceed to occupy some naval bases on the Greek /
., coast. . In that ease, we shall have at hand all the,military.,; means suitable to prevent such a British action* ■ An epilogue • 
to this situation, «Moh does not exclude the possibility of reconciliation, may be expected in the first ten days of Sop- 123
123. Ciano.Biary* entry for 12*8.1940* Cieno himself agreed with Yis- 
- conti Prase a about the timing, and in defiance of Mussolini ordered 
him to attack in 15 days; Yis conti Prasca to Staaage, Bo* 04220, 
iV 15.8.1940, Effi/127/000381.
-124; ’Erbach to foreign ministry, 13*8*1940, HE8V B, x, Bo* 353«
125* Alfieri to Ciano, 14.8.1940. BPX.lx. v, Bo. 415«
125.' Ciano to Alfieri, 15.8.1940. ibid. Bo. 420. Ae Palazzo ChigL was 
apparently out to cro&ie the impression that, while the Bant Hoxha 
affair was to be exploited politically, tay military action that 
might be taken would be directed against the British; Kaekensen to 
foreign ministry, Br. 1515 14*8» St.S. Italian, iii, GPM/B14/
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to, veto; It applied with far less fores to Greec©, vhoss geographical posi- .
, tion compared, favourably with ‘ teat Of: Yugoslav!*. end which' had'' not: even •. m* ' ’. 
cognised the Soviet Union. /’•. ‘v"“"'-’V" a ,r'fV -r ;V ,
-', la consideration of these factors, Rome could only blink with astonish- :
_ seat at tee now» from Berlin. .Is'view' of ptat:#smtS'there1 was 'hut'very '■ 
t little room for surprise at Hitler*a reaction to Mussolini*s Yugoslav plans, 
hut a German veto on an eventual preventive operation in Greece had clearly 
not been expected. Having as yet no inkling of tee blunder committed by Al- 
; fieri, Ciano moodily confided to his diary that "an eventual action against 
Greece is not at all. welcome in Berlin) it is a complete order to halt all*' ■ ■' I*®. ■■■!,■ " ' ■ i , ■. along the line". Soon, however, it turned out teat thing» were not so 
had after all. ..... • ''
,',tl III \ ‘ r - * '* ■*> - ! * * •, * ■ . , « - ,
<;;i' A. , f . t , ,( i . . . •; . ; ’ • ; . '
¡ On 17; August 1940 the Italian government found itself in tee embarrassing 
position of being forced to surrender, for tee untold time, to an ultimatum 
. from Berlin. Shat this was so, was partly tee fault of Mussolini himself,
1 because ho had insisted on ramming the Yugoslav issue down the Nazi throat 
: long after it had been made clear to him teat Berlin Vac sick and tired of 
the dish) on tee other hand, there was tee unnecessary German "veto” on ac- 
i tion against Greece, which Was mainly due to Alfieri*» bad diplomacy - but 
}• .this, of course, was a factor which Home could not yet know.
- As far as Yugoslavia was concerned unconditional surrender Won the only 
way out. The campaign against her had been planned on the assumption that'
■ •. German, help, at least to the extent of allowing Italian troops to operate 
from Austria, would be forthcoming) now that this hope had been disappointed 
the entire plan dropped »tone dead. . The war of words against Yugoslavia was
156. Ciano, Diary; entry for 17.8.1940. The wording of this entry seems 
to show teat tee Italian foreign minister was under the impression 
that Alfieri had carried out Ms original instructions) otherwise,
Ms reference to an "eventual* attack on Greece - which he himself had 
just ordered to start in 15 days - is incomprehensible.
halted at oncej contacts with the Hungarian general staff, which had already
been initiated, were suspended immediately* J She general staff dropped its
attempts to update the plan because the question was considered "outdated".^2
As the prerequisites of the campaign vanished into thin air, the operations
department of Stsmge appealed for fresh directives, to be fobbed, off by Ba-
doglio with the words Hi dirretive' sono* lasoiar doradre". ^  Some kind of
sohiercmneto was still planned for the eastern frontier, but nobody in the
airy knew what it was to be like, nor cared very much."^ Even Mussolini*
m  occasional upflare of anger notwithstanding,*^ had to see the gana was
lost« On 12 September the operation was oficially scaled down to the level
of an invasion in support of a Croat rising which the Puce still hoped was
issainenetj by the end of the -month etfen this schieranento had practically
been abandoned and the order was issued to demoblise the army«*^ She final , - " qxg
order cancelling the entire plan then followed on 4 October*
ljl* Armellini, op. cit*, p, 59| Boatta to Stamage, Ho. 307 di Prot., Bov* 
1940, II1R/l2o/OOOS83-85*
132*- Boatta letter Ho* 15801 di Prot., 19*8.1940, E!R/l2o/00054^47* and 
unsigned Sili Ufficio Op. Ses. 1* memo, 24*8.1940, ibid/QQ0C>31« .
133* Hots on unsigned SHG Ufficio Op* Sea# 1* memo, 11*9*1940, ibid/000585.
134« Typwritten coment on Badolgio directive Ho* ES/0p./4, 11.9.1940, ibid/ 
OOO369* Boatta*s statement that in the second half of September every­
thing wa3 ready for the attack on Yugoslavia to start "within 24 hours" ' 
(Mr.Boatta, Otto Milioni di Baionette. Yerona, Mondadori, 1946, pp. 
117-13) should be taken cum grano sails.
135« M0n 10 September general Soddu cossaunicated that liussolini was furious x 
against Yugoslavia and that consequently it was necessary to hold in 
readiness "Esigenza *E*M against Yugoslavia./ Bossi, op. cit., p. 74«
13(5* Armellini, oj>. cit*» p. 79f Badoglio directive Ho* 2485 Op., 12*9*1940,
■ , I?m/l26/000M3-45*
137* Bossi, oj>. cit.» PP* 74-75» l’or the significance of this demobiliza- 
tion order in terms of Mussolini*s overall strategy, v. the interesting 
evaluation in A. Killgruber, Hitlers Strate/rte (Frankfurt am/ilain, Ber«.
■ nard&Graefe, ' 1965» db* Hillgruber* Straberei pp. 283-85*
133. Graziasi circular Ho. 234* 4*10*1940, EIR/125/ooq66Q-61. It is probably
■ ■ no , accident that the order dates from the day of Mussolini*s moating
with Hitler, during which his ideas on Greece were also radically modi- 
, . fled} v. infra* p. 66.
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The story of Greece va3 more complicated. Following the German 
. Ciano had culled' on Mastaasta' and promised M b ’ -feat "for the moment” every- 
.’ thing would' he deferred #68 'h«?ing only secondary importance to 'the 'supresi» .
7 goal of fee Axis powers, namely the defeat of England". ! He was just going ■ ,■
'” to send Alfieri a telegram that was "largely inspired,’ or one could say, di- 
' stated by the 'Dace" in which Mussolini 'assured M s  nervous partner that, 
wMle no action against Yugoslavia was contemplated, "the controversy with ■ 
Greece would be dealt .with by diplomatic means". ' Significantly, he added . 
that' the fact that Italy was' reinforcing her 'six 'divisions' in Albania by 
«other;three was not to'be 'construed' as a prelude' to military action.
7 Ciano next improved on his role as messenger boy and sent a watered-dpwn 
'version of this telegram to Berlin*" "the Italian government 'is in accord 
with the Gossan’government'in the conviction that the war against England 
is one of fundamental significance 'also in respect of all objectives of po- 
V libital systematization" • ' fMs 'Was clean language going back to M s  origi- ;
' nal instructions.. ' "I# 'action of any sort' is intended against Yugoslavia" - . 
'"a promise Which Ciano, with M s  marked preference for Greece, must have"-:' 
'"found"'easy to mike *' while "IBS' AITS®! IS HW  BEHG HADE ’¿¡emphasis supplied/
’W 'transfer the controversy with Greece to .fee diplomatic plane".^
' r Ciano was clearly recovering M s  nerve, and so was Mussolini* She let-' :' 
', term's first reaction to the German Atgaarohe had been' to draft a military ■ di*
'"" rective indefinitely postponing the action against Greece ■ and Yugoslavia} "'.
1 this he at first wanted to communicate'’to Hitler by telephone, but then 
counteraanded-his Own instructions and decided to send it in writing.
7 Finally he did neither 'of’'these, but went back to .his old policy of dis- - 7 , 
patching a letter'in' which ha. repeated' that he was not going to alter M s  '• 






•Maekenssa to foreign ministry. ’ 17.8.1940.”M g . .D. x. lo. 357. '■ 
Ciano to Alfieri, 17.8.1940, M3BP« D, x, Ho. 353, enclosure Ho. 1. 
'!$&»' 'i%:v,'Ho.'467. : ’.
Ciano. .Maasr.. enter for 22.8.1940. ■ ■ , '.
Mussolini to Hitler,. 24.8.1940, £jj^ ' 1«, v, Ho. 484. ,
X.
kz
; * nothing butapiece of Ixis hanby'panky.
' Mussolini did not ,®®aft:a;Wi!i of what ha said« ‘SWi3^:'«3«iji@i':Wi«'S«r- 
aw'^'to^'Atloiw?®, 'hs^^itffctiy'fwladsd'&at' it was not to ho taken '
/ too' tranglcally144 *1489and fMekly case up with a new order* "as tothe Yugoslav
■ "ajEfair* i . XSS 'V O O U im  1 «  LAPSED. -"/She general' staff? is -to' hold' ready ‘ :- 
for Greece... possible lines of action are to he studied". * Preparations
.' then'Went on undisturbed. ■ Ciano ordered Jacoaini Mto slow down the pace”
. ,tet;*to /rttikn :tot‘jptoatii^ effectiveness of measures already taken"| Eoa-  ^
,tta infor»sd'’Ti*toati''teMoa' that the operation had been postponed from 1-,' ' 
S®ptosiber to 1 Ctotober and that the assesily of the" troops' required would be 
 ^deliyCd accordingly.14^  ‘'flaming went on as usual* with' Corfu' 'and 'toe is« • 
.(-;latto8.'Ciffli»aadtng to® Gulf of Patras being added • with the explicit aim' of;' ' 
endowing toe whole business Mto a aorv pronounced anti"'British oharaet«*» v 
-to'' to® list of .place» to hs occupied.1^  - Evan the' troop transports,' origt«
. nally suspended,; were resumed ■ aftor a few days ^ • as clear a sign as any _
■ tost, to# Italians fca&'*®**V®i*d their composure after the;first impression "
'of toe' 0®a*a: "veto"'; had mm ■ off.; . If ■ to®' operation was further ■ postponed, - - 
and scheduled for•20 October, tods was to®'result not of Uernan pressure but' 
tf'trimspori difficulties.14^  ' ; : x'..'-
A y  'did'to«' Italians' give 'up Yugoslavia, Ail®' going ahead with their 
. prepiamtioa» for Oreeeef i The .answer is probably, to"be found in the fact ;
. toat Ail® ''no;toli; scats' inmsion" of toe former was possible without Gera®».'.' 
help*' - toe'latter A ' « ® M  and presumably liable' to occupation *tto®t*t such
144. . StoanMHa von giadi®». ,0». oit.. p. 74»
"":145. 'laiogiio to Boatta*. Ho. 2016'Op., 20.8.1940. IMB/l27/000373.
■ 146.' ■ Ciano to Jacoaini, 22.8.1940, S L  lo. 469 i Boatta to fiseoabi,-
, , , Prasca, Ho. l650 di taret., 23.80940, IW127/000361.
' 147.'"'- loatta'-to'liySogli# and'Sottu, So.'ISiO/di trot., 26.8.1940. Sil/127/■
- , W 5 M 4 » ;  -■ . ; (
148. ■ iM tts to ffflii® ' di m  della B/S®i# Marina»- Ho.' 3^ 75 di fr o t ., ' 29.8. :
' 19#, O U J 00QU9t ■ Sssdgli to Rpeifecite, Bo.' 35227,' 26.8.194®, IMd/ 
■ ,0C|036>3B7AartLUri* Jfc* oit., »»* 66, 70. - v.
149. '" -BadagUo to tapereaeraito’ and itfanaaiah* 31.8.1940, BS/127/000345.
aid,;/After 'all, ,a population .of. only 8 millions '»pared with-'.
■ Yugoslafla|e 16,^ Moreover, it seems likelythat Mussolini and Cisno had 
' made some kind of guess abont,Alflsrl'a bínate - .in.any case, the;latter:',;.-. r 
was never again utilized as an intermediatiy on this question - and corre- 
. ctlyconcluded that tíia;’fierm«s. were. more, concerned with Yugoslavia than 
' ■' wife Greece. . libbmtrop, was report id to h»rs ■ said feat "every effort" must . '■' . .
■be concentrated against, Baglaad... bee®»«..the» alone is the question of , ~ ■"-hi-.:,:. •'  ^ <'■ ' ' / / .life ant death“f '/^feeayaftaps better, drop .the .entire foolish-claim to Cia- /" 
muria - ^ fe «raid noV and did not;interest-Hilter--;.and stesa:thi'.'«ti- 
. British character of the Greek venture. This line was consistently adopted, ' ■
’ end' wife considerable success. Mussolini*a letter to Hitler of"'24 August : 
al^ ready contains no reference, to fe® Daut Bafea affair* instead, ;fee';MÜBU- '■; .
' ©ieni, continuous .and .verified complicity ..of Greeee wife Great -Bfeain":.w a s . 
stressed and fee “fast", feat “all Greek. ports. art bases against us'* espl»»*.;•/': 
sized, y - The same line wa3 adopted • wife considerable success, that re- .;
minds one of the Hitler-Clano conversation of 7 July - by Mussolini at his r;"- 
' next meeting wife Ribbeatrop,*^  and so on to within four days of fee actual 
attack by Ciano, Eoatta and Badoglio.1*^  . At fee turn time,. fee i»edenMtt'. , ' *152
• 150«' 'It'is' slgalStoiimt feat fes Italiana nover seen to have reageded 'fee '/■■-■
■ 'the.'reason for.fee pe»tpot«i«ni'ef the operation.
.M m m U M  himself feaft.hlMqrs wanted to wait until the end of,Septa» ■, \ .' ' 
mberj (Cisno, Diary, entry for 12.8.1940)! both before and after' fee ’ " outbreak of war Ciano, Jacoaini, Visconti Prasca end Barsinaol agreed 
that Badoglio was responsible for fee delay« ?• Armellini, oj^. cit., 
p. 159f Kackensen to foreign ministry, Hr« 475/40 £• v« 18.10.1940, ;Deutsche Botschaft Roa, Gehelmakten 1940, (ply2281/4816S4-37♦ Clam
even repeated this version to the Germans (same to seme, ibid« Hr« 500/ , V
40 v, 1«11, Gilí/2281/481735-57) vho, after all, ought to have known. >
151. Ciano, Pi pry, entry for 17.8.1940. ; .x. / ' .
152. i»iv, «6*'4S4*
155« On 19 September! DGFP. D, ad, Ho. 75, sad DPI, ix, v, Ho. 617* ,®S® .fti»' 
estion of what exactly was said on the occasion is controversial and 
will be discussed below* It should be noted, however, feat SOTS reoortg/' 
sites* the anti-British character of fee attack on Greece as described f 
by Mussolini. - '
154« DGFP. D. 3d, Ho. 1551 St.5. Italian. ill. GE-i/b14/002506| IMi» Hr. 1884 v. 19.10.1940, GK1/BU7002292i KTJj/SKL. A 14, entry for 27007X940, GSR/
, 3/006576. The conversations axe dated 50.9, 14, 19 and 25*10 respectively.
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claim to Ciamria disappear never to bo taken up again. She Italians liad . 
. evidently reopened their old records and dr»«» the right conclusions* To : 
attack Greece, it was Ciano*© tactics of July,,'not Jaeomlni* s of August,
' ' that were the ri$ii ones*
■ : H§surtoll«|'''.toey made' some attempt' to carry tociar ’controversy with'.',.
'■Greece* fetotoe "diplomatic plane” as promised. For .Ci«o himself this
: ms nothing new, since ha had always hoped that Greece would give way with-
out war* r~ ■. In the first «hook of the German veto tha Italians had Justi- .
fied their decision to bring up further forcas by'the need to. exercise pa-'
11 tied pressure on Greece,.J and there are some indications that this "' 157 '■mi not Just as attempt tothrowdustin their allies* eyes. On. 13 Au­
gust, the German minister in Athens had seen Metaxas and demanded a change 
in Greece*s policyl Metaxas, however, merely replied that ho could-not,do. , 
So as long as England 'ruled the Mediterranean* . Shis was an old stozypt 
that the Greek minister president had already used on a number of occasions!
perhaps in order te show Ato«* exactly too ruled toe Hir® lastro** ’ feat ■' v 
•typical stile fascista attack ».fee torpedoing of the old cruiser "Helle* 
right in toé'.middle of * religious festival at Tinos - took'flam a «are 
two days later* Glano next prepared a note for the Greek government, in .- 
' which he claimed that ’the questions which divide Greece and' Albania /sic7 ' 





note* líos. 1, entry for 11.8*194®,4» ■'■
D, x, p* 509, ed.*s foot«*:
Eintelen memo,' 23*10*1940, Iftiit*.Si 
93.
xii, '675/253392-
Armellini. an. ©It** p* 5®f i1* . _
Albania (loma, Cappelli, 1965) pp« 225-24.
la Política d»ll*itid,ii;;...li,
..158*
According to to® latter . . 
authority Borne "could not make up its mind whether to opt for toe 
small solution (annexation of Ciamuria and a new Italo-Greek accord) - 
or a radical one(total militaryfeccupation of the country).. A* late ' 
»3 «n& August they.-tended to the pclltioal solution"*  ^Ciano seems 
to have said sdaetoing to Hacksaw» »tout "diplomatic pressure* (ill*, 
'iXm v, ■!©■*: 439) toils toe fact that the B«at Boxha affair was raised - 
only two months after the actual murder may also indicate Rome had ’ 
decided to plunge for too "small" solution.
'Srbaeh to foreign ministry, 13*8.1940, M U ’. B, x, Bo* 333* . ■ ■
. those which exist 1» other zones of the Banubian-Balkanio sector,' liters 
¿»»tierswere drawn with an eye ■ more to. opportunity that to justice, a» 
solution could also he similar"* < Clano than asks.the Greeks to agree to a 
solution "on the same basis as the one adopted - or "being addpted - in si­
milar circumstances in the Banubian-Balkanlc region",' i.e similar to the ; 
Second Vienna Award, under the terms of which two thirds of Transylvania ■■ ■ ICQ 'were just biing granted to Eungary. However, the note was never deli­
vered, perhaps beoaus® the Italians, as we have seen, had sufficiently re­
covered from the stupor following the German tel® to fix & new date for 
the attack, and Clano, who wanted to have "hie" war against Greece, felt ' 
he could now dispense with such diplomatic niceties.
■ On the other side,'Berlin' seems to have 'regarded fee' proposal' to■ tran­
sfer'the controversy to the diplomatic plane more seriously. There, too, . 
people had for some .tine hoped that Greece would cede without iffering re- 
sistaace, and in any case there could be no harm in an attempt to bully 
her into' submission. Even before IS August Veizs&ckerhad coolly -told " 
Mzo Baagabe, whan M® takas had instructed to inquire about Italian inten­
tions toward 'Greece, .that his country .had better change its p »-British 
orientation.1^ 1. following the attack on "lelle" Bizo Iragsbe reappeared. ■/ 
in the Vilhelms trass® rad asked for an interview with Ribbentrop. E# was 
told' - - fait*1 truthfully - that the 'foreign minister was out 'of town "and' 
had to contest' himself with a talk to'"underse»eta^ " of'state Weermann.
She', latter -answered his questions evasively, stating merely that "as his ■■ ‘ '• . . jgrtpersonal «pinion" no, attack on'Greece seemed "lawlnent". ' After the
depart«» of the ralaseaior iftma proceeded to draw up a 'MummOm in ■ 
«hUfe-he,rated Mbbesbwpto permission to toll Mao tap«!».tta* "we have ;
no infoaiitim'that .ra'Italian attack on'Greece''Is lisiiiimi ■ In caso Greece'
159. Matted in Jraomtitlt S&. §i|.f yp* t|4-5€. ■ «he, document bears m  '. 
date, tot toe reference to the Second VUh m  Award as a- solution _ - '
■ adapted* tote» toe days *5-17 August Uhriy*
160. ' EEB/galder. i, ■ JOG,'entry for 21.5.1940. ''
161. ■ Velisacker memo, DCFP, B, *, So* 554. 1 • :
162. , WOtftosm to' toe eabassy is'Greece,'' 22.S.1940* IMd» Ho. 577. ■, 0  :
dass 86t gire profecatio» to It&ly"«"^  ^. In view of the supposed German ' 
vsto on Italien action sgainst ’ Greese, and the German desirato: kaep the 
1 Balkan# peaceful, this was tb®’logicai answer calcul&ted to calai things 
domi hut thla dee# not seera to have been Hibbentrop * s alm when he vetosd 
Voermannto memo and instructed hia to ireat the matter dilatorily,*^  thus 
ksepdng tbe preesnre on Greece. Consequently, the unb.&ppy ¿abaa3ador was 
unable to get any new Information! instead, hie governaent hadto suffer 
- toe agony of Erbach joining the war of nenr®3 Hin close understanding with 
hl# Italien tollèaftie,-in an attempt to make it elear to the Greeks that 
their aafety eauld be found only in understanding obeiseance to the small'" 
and-great desires ©f toe‘Axis'powers" •
One week after bis original application» Hizo Bangaba ' was finally re­
solved bjr Eibbenti’op at thè lattar*s estáte'in foschi* j 'far fron being com­
fort ed, however,, the unhappy smbassador was subjeoted to a serie#' of Savage 
threatsiGenasny "classified count ir es aa those which alignsd thaselves ; 
with ' the Ixis, ' and - those which ' had ; aligned toes»elre» with: England. We 
ponsidered. Greece ' as a country which had gone ^ over to ' England« ». ' such an ' 
attitude seemed unwise to' toe foreign minister*- Por toe coming centurie#.* ' 
Europe woulá be eontrolled by toe Axis powers, and toe attitude of toe Axis 
'toward .toe Europe an countriee would by guided by toe' attitude which tosse 
States maintained tovarda Säigland in .'toé fl#rt which Geraaay and Italy were 
waging for their existoaié*'* '' Hizo Bangab® was nert confronted with a large 
number of • unfounded, as the Germans explicitly kaew ...» accusations re- *164
163* feo*#*» mea®, '20*8*1140, -StoS» Griechenland»- i# Jj|¡/449/i2f717*- ..V>
164. “ libltatrep '" to: toe la^atic#: in freo«#» •. 24.8.1940, M W *  1,',x, Eo • ■ .386,, 
V .' / vhere to®\legati«» 1# ©fftered net-to moke map poettlre statements* 
Cltdius Ito» toe fortipt miniatry economic department also tolá.two 
‘GieÄ''Mfr»i*it#tiWi# 'toai "Greece was risking mor® by her 'rigid ato 
: . -, ■ titsiàe ■ .toa».. tf to- #•» wtohes",, adáing toat. he ; "did not
toiak.it w«.in Greeeeto intoreet to aaiatain her attitude »»til toe 1 
•r; Englito dMAatit&oa'sf toe ll®iltorriae«a was tacken*«Ptoidtoto $Un> ■ 
s ttaa gi/ff24/l694694*. Clearly, this e^ paipi of tetìStdatien »S ■
':: . .‘ö w S T s w ®  ^ w*' ■, ; ,
165* to foiwiiar^ ráster*' BGPF. B«* x. ifo. 5S5» •
166, EXS/OBt» i, 42,' «tsy fer 9*8.19^ 3# ■ low rlÄeulous to® whol® Itali«
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thè pian vas based on thè rèaateblt assunption that on© could figli a - 
. "largo" or a "amali'’ war accordine to on©*® owa ehoicej thè oecupation of 
' thè vhol© of Grece© would roquiro twenty divlslons, andeince this nuaber 
0©uld noi be brought up fast enou# to suit Mussolini it vas decìded to '
. oonduot. a Msmallt > campaign for thè 'oecupation of Ciasoria only,forvhioh.
¿te divisione would saffi©©.; fh© vhoie thing vas noi *v*n ooneeirsd"*; \
as à BvarM • against Greeoe, ' bui,1' la: te vords of Visconti Prasca, :m  
. w*ilg© di maà;. i a a kind'of ailitary parata carrisd out against ; " 
slitti opposition, which th© bulk of thè Gre@k forc«3 concentrated on th© - ■
' ' Bulgari an fronti er.“^ 8 Ài tha end ©f inguai it vas deoided to allocata a
furthèr divlsion forth© oecupation of Corfu, vhils tlia trenaportation of 
te. foro««'designisi'io raìse te number of troopa in Albania to thè required 
lavai - "Parma, Sienna” and ‘’Piemonte” divisions »'vai siarted early in Se- ; 
ptaobsr.^ . .‘$r te end’of -te sentii,' tea© foro«® bad' ¡¡unrivad'atià ver©'.--';' 
ready foraction. Giano vas determined to hav© Bhis* war, and at no 
timé .afte' te’ beginning of Septeaber va® ter© any doubi but that he ; / :
^ld,l8l,^;':.\v.;,•. i. ’ /■"' ' : ° ! :‘ V " j;
■'.'Ii-is' almost tmnecessary to add that these activitìes did noi ®seap©;" - 
Gsrman attention. The miliiary attaché voh Rintelen had in' faot reported 
te resumption of preparati©»® almost as soon as te decision was inade, '
1.76 • 'Sten» -1 \
177* Visconti A* £&*».»• 2% : -5 *' ■' : ;'".VV
17®* ' Faldella, 'i®. «&«»'*• 262| Boatta, 0£. ¿&|., p. 120| Rossi, 0£.
p. 82. Afte te oecupation of Giasraria "a nm  Italo-Greek accord
■ would b© arslwtd atj -Ìacomlni, fa* ctl. > p* 224* ' . / . .
179* boatta to Baàolgio and Sodili, No» 1800 di Prot., 2S.3.1940»




m i. i% 'V ,  NO. rn* : -  ^ y .  .vX
Armellini, og,. eit., p. 65, entry for 28.8.1940* "Ciano vanta hi* war and, recent direotivea notivthstanding, ho vili probcbly get it11.
H. Greiner, Die Oberate VehrraaohtfUhrun^  (Viesbaden, Lise®, 1951) P» 
1741 Rintelen to "Ofl#,” Hr. 140/4O g.Kàos^ t. 21.8.1940, Verbindungatab Adriiralstab der kflulgli^ ohe ltallenische Marine.
^000373* , ;
feil 7o. m T
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while tha Greeks eoErplidned about treop concentrations m  their border, , ' 
Berlin did ..not react to the ncvsf -late, in ângnst* petple there 








XS3. lg» ' 1* ' 3% ' £»«. 5ÎÎ. ^
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Chspter 2
art#«® and the ledi terrene«.'
; V V' V ■: ..
'Bulk» 'jfhbleii® vere forcing Hitler to vork overUme in' late Augnat 1940.: ;
Just vhha it seoaad that he had sueceeded in restraining the Buce*s Yugos-^
lar ambitions, another danger to the pesos in the Banube Basin arose* that
'• of *»gr* revisioni«. '■ The Hungarians, ' indeed» had ehosen to revive their
daim to Traasylvània in Aprili and it had taken a storn Axis waming to ;
prevent an explosion that vould haba been ruinons to Gex&an economi o inte* /
, resta in thè area. : In August, hovever, ' there vas no holding the Hungariansf ■ '
nini s ter president Tele# and foreign mlnister Czaky announced their doter*
■ mination ' to. solve. th® ïransylvanian probi« at ail ooêts, even. that of var, , "
end tet® two oountries had in fact already begun to shoot it out. To Hitler ;
such a var - partieulsBy in view of tha ample end oily prospects it vould .
open to the Soviets* vho vere eppwently encouraglng Hungary1 • could not
but end in disaster. He therefore sumoned the parties to thè Vienna Bel«* -
2, vedre in order to impose the so-called Second Vienna Award,. under which ■ 
tenas Hungary vas granted about two thlrds of h« daims, for good mensure, . ' 
Bulgaria vas. dsi promised a sliee of the Bobrudja lieu for ressdnìng in ' ; V 
peaoa vith Rumania. ' tîhat vas left of Rumania • Mie Eussians had already * 
taken their share in thè Bukovlna end northem Bessarabie - vas thea guanan- 
teed by Germany. 3Ms eettlement, Hitler hoped, vdrijld take the fuse ont of y . 
thè Sentirti pswdor km* '■ ;■ ;■ ■ ' :
: fosâitg back froa Vienna, Hitler feund new problema facing him. ■ Having 
defeated Freaoe, the Hhrer discovered that, Mie far reaching laprovei»«t y: -, 
in his strategie position notMthstanding, the fundamental ^ probi« facing ■
1. ' Smsansdorf. (iexaaa minister in Budapest) to foreipi sdsiftxf,' 5«7* .■
. -, 1940| MME» 1, %  Wê. Uff Sfhd«b«¿»' (anba3sador in Hfteeov) t# fOrtigay 
: ainistiy, ibid. Ho. 406 j Talamo (italien «iaister is-Bud^ est) to Oí®»,
, bsi. , . • \ .
2. '■ fhe finrfe lleno* Avari had gl ven parts of Btatheiil« to Hungary in Goto«. *; ber 1938. -y h
52
himIumS.' wbii’,really,1 » «  ®»difi«jd*.. How a® before, there, was an actively fi­
ghting *|fanan&' in' fee' we®t*, one who could,' if driven to «gfcNaee»' count -.
upon, the help if the United State»«' _■ The half hearted «ttcopt 'to 'achieve a
m w § m m I w peace luotfag fidled, * the -.“life «id' death" . strufigie' against ■.
Great Britiaa want on, ■ , After. son®, preliminaries ‘ which are irrelevant to :, ■ ■ '
. ©ur: the»«,^  the invasion of the .British Isles was ordered -on IS July»** , ■ •: V •; - 
According to thi® order prffwr»tlea& for the landing were1 to he completed 
% 'tec'Kiddle'of'iaguft, hat an. the 14th. of that w«#k the iirst doubt*.as ; 
to whether' it w&sio be eaxried out had already appeared. ,/ After the end ...
, of Aagiist' ¿tt«?la'.iat««*t, in the operation rapidly diminished,*^  while a :.V ■ ,
lettg series of "c^witm©#® made it®. realteatioa before'«d-Sept«!»» . ■
•: g  ■ ! - - V  : : ' v :1 : -■ ; ■’ * ■ ‘ ' i . , , *' ' ■' i -■ ' ■ ■impossible, " long' before. that tenain arrived the operation had for all
■ praattohl 'puip©®#®^  been ©«soviet/®M a ■different course decided upon. ■ ;.. . v. ■;
, adopted to bring down Biglaai was less direct and xaoro
■ tint“ contaii^'" It» ala was to dispense with a straightforward invasion
af till' ISttish ’lalef by hitting Greet. Britain at other vulnerable spots • .,'.■; ■’ ; 
plarfeiOularly the ~ i ^ M » n W | i siaoirttat was -about the''only part of the , 1
, »ltiii:,^ irf; thai' Baa Within reach of -fee. Aid® powers* : Shi idea appe***\ ■
■ saA'f&*',tiMi 'first, t&aa in a ««MMatea-yMparaft by gteiral'Jodi of OIM in
' , ; VtrpOfaotioal .puxpoaaaf :the starting date of the. ao»ealla4/ .
3# m  19 «i.tto liA«t;:! %  Mllfpmber, Steat^e* 'pp, 144-65, ■ ■' V ■ ‘
, a*”" j-f.details v,' 1, P<^:'*im:Intemehmen "SeelSwe" («ttin^t'mste»*""
5,' "IHLxaativa.X»«. I6f-* f t d a t a t Hitler»s War Pirec* - ,=
. M m  ( t o a i o n p ■». A seoond order, "di- <
; ; n i B n  .1®* 17”» was M i  ca 1' August! ibid* p* 37« .
. 6 . 'na/sKL. 'A it, aMtqr:ft* I4.8.1940, GHR/3/000086. '-v ;
_ 7*'.:amgmb®ri'£^|^e,>p;vl ^ » 4 . V , ^  :"v ■■
B. Klee, on, cit., ppi. 198-204*
9« FtLhror Conferences on ITaval Affairs (printed in Erascey»s Haval Kannhl.
1948* citi goIlA) 1^ 4Q, ii* lof. As early as 13 S^ teaber Hitler "did 
not dream" of taking the risk connected with the operation, and after , 
considering it» abolition decided to pursue preparations further so as 
not to drop the "moral pressure" on England* CTB/OHW* i, 76# 78*
10* PGFP. D, yiii, Ho* 514# and ed.*s note*
"perijittrsi" stwtsgy » s t  he fixed m  20 Jte®, when Hitler called M ®  navy 
8 o a w M «  in «hitf,' adrniraT Eaeder, to discuss the occupation of the Azo- 
m e  and other'Atlantic Islands l^ r Germany. ■ A somewhat more detailed dis­
cussion of these problems is contained in a Seekriegsleitung a»ioraMua' -*'■ 
'written, eight days later# 11 the deliaination of Russian and Italian inter©-! 
r#tS|. which is 'in progp#s«,**:! gives rooato hope thai i^a the' not 'too' die- 
! taat future 'these' states' wilt i »ire ■ in i aseordanee with a plan, inspired ..tjy... 
Gemurr' end with the support of German §r»s, with the goal!of brining down 
. the. British.position in the Hear last«»* It is certain that, in the near fu- 
fur® fire divisions will he.* reeqpdppsd for employment overseas, 1
as will a series of infantry^divisions« * ^ 3 0  dune a coherent plan of;/;
«wttoai had been worked out hy^general Jodi, always one.of the main expono- ■' 
Rta of öti»':'ippr©aeh*^’, .V';-; - V !'-; : 1 •;■ v ' V^: /
'■; 'Sine#''political means!«® sit 'lead -to tbs desired. rasult»* »<#►-.■ ■ .: !
. .  land*#''Will .to-realst mast 'he''broken by other mam*
■ /■ ' a«; Varfare against Äe.-BÄtish Isles* b* XKfes*ilo&'of-the
t «I 1»* Jfc A t *  J* ' ,,n .„i -Mil 4  -— % *  I i f f  -wBaa W vSw • d # i. ‘ ■1 ,1. ‘ -j ‘ 'i ;
. >s final victory is a faestioa of ttsse-only..., . . V.,
'M';te':fb)t the W'j^plgst England ©att he «etiiseied only ■ - ; ’'■"!
ill*«# m  by means of , states interested in the downfall of the '
Bsitlsh'%§!*••«« the««»''are, in the first pla»* ■ Italy, Spain, . ;
■ ‘.v.vw- \ Vr , ! >
11* I* SHI,' Teil unsigned SSL memo, "Eraga der Besetzung der Azoren",
; GBR/55/001125^ 50* The occupation of these islands, like the "periphe­
ral" strategy as a whole, was directed as much against the US as ag- ,
• gainst England! Eillgruher, Strategie* pp* 196-206*
If* for details H. Toscano, Unn TJoncata Inteaa itglo-sovietica nel 194-0 e 
•' 1941 (Hrenae, 1951). .
13. OS^ /WPSt/Aht.L Hr. 33 120/40 g.Hdos Chufsache v. 28.6.1940, "SriegfÜh-rung gegen England", Oherteormando das KrlerrsnarineAfeitdngen 0W, vol. 
1, 1. April 1939-1 April 1941«.GRl/ö5397l^ 02719-13oV This plan "inspi­
red hy Germany" vas a brainchild of OHM. An offensive from "Traascau-
’ , easia" into Iraqi with the , aim of cutting British communications between
oast and Vest was being considered. OKU/UTA/Abt.L, Hr. 494/40 g.Kdos 
V. 21.3.1940, "Bis militärpolitische Lage im Sahen Orient", signed hy 
Shit ei. ' - ! ' ■ ",
14. Trials of Major Var Criminals (international MHitssy Tribunal,' Hum»»
• oerg." 194^ «' eit» »gJ aatmT' 301.
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fight for tioteay any m m , hat oaly to «ola» ■ ■ '
'■■.■■ tuia her Mfrwim  m A , world -fotótloa. It ©«a. therefore b*/;
'■ 7’. ' a»Mted-.t!i*t ,sh© would be ready far pease'If eeafliiaei' that'v ! ' '■ ,’;s v7 ■ ■ ■ '.
■ •' :.:.«às wÊML^ mm. #1111 b*'afeMilr'«ridarei. - On the otto*« hand, . ■ V 7 '7 ,, ; ' '
. she will .resist t# the bitter «ad any atteapt -to #l|ada«t#', ■ ■^7-',77v
■' . ' ■ h®r. \ . , ■•■■' ■' ■ V. 7, ; ■
■ would»naist.of a. series.©f^tiasfesoa fbe. Bst»-Z 
tó#:wa*ld;piisit3«^ > profila* # lïWfs^ sire.M^ it^ jpg of the i«w uaMl' : ;/ ■ ,; 
iB^ IÂad.;t>«»_« a M j a r - j W , * > Ç * * ar; ♦** ouiî bi*,l©®«is. ! ^'fîrst step la ■
■i this éireotioit,. ■ •ososdiiig :to -.Jódl,. ■. was t# ■ ty ;ia. ©#«#iiiioa of ‘the Suoi • 7 , • V; 
Caasi/ by %« m m #*» .riiiA WM i» fût ttiMMd' between, Bit*» ; ï '
la#,- «oft- the > Italian ©afry ê^'laber,^ . ffc«y Âtarir'«là©
*^©4 t© tali© Attesi ta##' *fa»e - «agenti«7 eéMMBb#' of ':> ■ 7
IWhiMiifrtawtiVt’J'-TMifwt. other PriSM^é«*»'«Mb a® m «tiwic on 10* «¡ni-i- . '*''v
©f the oil pipé ia'JWÜP^ ';m m  «oMldaaod.éiiarisv: Jtaly. j l ’Est Um 9 a A ' s\ \  ,7 
Jaiflust i* fa*i. bêaa #««##•# Mat it *w«* p»«ft maa fltbiraitar ' that «resented •■I • 1 'v > ., ■:(,' .’ . . • , -', YJ , 7ti*; wot. f o s s d a t a g 1,;%  ÿ S^ tMlMf.Wlli.jMyoMjli
Btisr** blüèiï« and àrlMSutiMi 'wara ''under va?« ■ Sinoa ét tliat Mw*>.■7 ■ ’ 7> .-■;■< ■ ' '■.'■■ 7' - ■ ' , . , . ■ ';-" '.;tho wt». ia to fp tr . M  aiw à^ ?. ^ ^ir*t; iMtnMtlM tr witmaM ; ■ ;'.','7, ,:,
baêiâ oa' 'j^hé^ æstuaptioa tjhad.. M v $ U M  » alé sot •Âli##« ,i¿'Í940« - ; it Ä # t -7",.' ;
ba .íMi,át4«r bid àoxè' ®r l#«# ató# t# his mind Mi tbi «tfoot -■ ■,’. ;. ’ ■ ;■-
ttat: 'té ímmím '&£■ ■&& British Isles would be aitenptsd. Acoordinsly, he
* vae easily sarsuaded to tlio ooro detailed scliemoo subsdtted to 'Ma hf '
der oa ‘6-««ä72ö'S^ t»b«e*(2®'.'''!M ««ly■•»'!§ 8«ftMM 7-7-;. '. '
up tb.4 'wBi^ tres ytórtí if tb# ^ ESätE^ßmstä^ wlÈmÈ/é s^t' ** tlii ' • y#%: ; *•'- ’• •';
. ' ...i. ..•.■..i.l.~w— .i»'~.-J --;-'■■• 7‘* ! '■'7'. ;7; . 7'
■' IS* ■ ®®% 1^1*'■, : ■■■ .<• ; V;  ^ : <7
' 16» ': EP3/Halder. li, 45, entry for.50.7.1940. ' ' v T-‘! ; 1 ' v ' * ’ ’
17. Ibid, ii, 33, 47, 72, 82, entries for 27, 31.7,23, 3l.i*lf40i f# Ä »
. KfB7oSW. i, 17, entry for 9.8*1940.
IS. gro/Qgy. i,,5$# 64, entries for 2, 5.9.1940. . 7 ^ , 7 .
• If# " Afcteonotlae ttber die 'Entwiolcliipg „der..ijiteaialige... M. ..Soga«.13É5...-20». 77
8.1QAD. printed la K^3/Cffi¥. i. 9681 r. also MUaraber. Stratege.
' pp.’355*60 ¿ ' /■• »' ■ 7 7 ' ■ ■ v '■ .-■ ■ '■ i' ; ■ ;
» ,  FCM. 1940, ii, 95-7, IO4-8.
\
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18 • was Ming dtncussod,. ;.
At tha saaa time, Hitler scanned the horison for possible allies in the 
struggle against England* Since Jodi had already listed them, ' it remained
to- to endow, toi® potior tien with topically |friad#l0%uimt nsse»# he 
'spoke- about a "ocmt&ma&tal block" and about nm  anti-British 'iront stret** - 
ching from Jferoooo to lorway“, f . Italy, Spain, Bussia and'Japan were;lia»
■ ted ao potential alitee*,;, As it Wi®;to#., Ssmmi two :
needed .for A ®  wajiiatioh ‘of,too »©at imsediato plans- ■•^ '■¿»‘/oom^ation of--'
■ Sué* and Gibraltar • Hitler set out 'to win. to«»; over*'' ; Contacts with Spain, - 
broken off in Juno, ' were resumed 'in1 September*2^., but negotiations with for** 
ei|h "aiaiitor 8«a»o S«uiiar> proved tJdclgr and iBwi'y.««®#t»^ 'bso»se; %-ala.: - 
’denied, ft-lot • -pi^oal«ly at'R»oe*a;«®«e#‘iin'ior^ ''West Africa ~^ ]:r 
«Ml offered tpt Uttle#2^ ,. Italy# too, .wa aauadadf on 10, s^ t^ b#r,Eihtf-’-^- 
len, who hat-Just rotwnod from a visit to .Berlin, mat Baie^ io for a long ,:- • ■ 1 ' , l.- i ■ * . . i > ‘.j . - ;i ■ >- 0*5 .1 - ■ .■■•■■■■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ , !ronvorsation abetft .the .niW.'.^^oaA,00.13 September a^ visit'^ •■Eib%»»;.;i ' 
trop to .Boni, • supposed to open .the .way toward, toe .eip^ ture .of;» ,&dpétite,. 
Bant’ bototen Germany# -Xtoly and Japan - was announo*df2‘> by tho time $m ar**'• O'-- ."n-5- . - . • vi: “ ■ S n i-/ - ^ i • . ' 1 ‘ * . f ■• '
' rived on the 19th# the Italians must hate been Marat least in outline,■i ;> •: 1 :.i : t , : : • : . ;» > . l: ’ ! - : • ’ ■ ‘ J ' ■ ■' ' ■ 1
of'too new Gers» ^proato# . .- - V. ■' ' 1 «■■;’: i, ('■■ V- .’i;■ .1
1 ! II
| i, '• v  ’ i ' -V . i -* U ’ - 'i ' .S ■" r  1 ; - - ; : ■' ' : * V  n  >■’ . ; ■' V'. "r "  1 : :German decision t@'' toipten' tbs leasing in theBritish lsles and toeon-
74» entries forlO,; 11.9.1940. .' - V.
B^/Halder« li* 31» ontry for 22.7*1940| v. also Baeder*s record of 
the same conference With Hitler» printed in K* Klee, Bokunenten gum.
: Untomehraon W3ael8wan (Msterschmidti Gdttingen» 19^ 0} p* 240«
23# In Jun Franco offered to «inter tho warj fBGFP* D, ix, ITo* 430) how- 
' ever,'It was not until the adoption of the “peripheral” strategy that 
Hitlri'showed any interest in the offer* >
t|* BGFF* D. xi, Eos* 63» 97* . For the entire Sapnish question, y. B,S, 
Detwiller. Hitler* Franco und Gibraltar (Wiesbaden* Stoinar« 1962).
tf* Eintelen to 0K3l/Genst.d.H/Att«Abt,, Hr* 67/4O g«Edos v* 11.9«1940.
ti* Clano, Diary, entry for 13«9*1940, 1
1
!. stataste ®a bsttariïïg' to« S6#ish position la toe H®iitwtrwmm. huâ iaport»
' ant implications for tîio Bailcan countries, above «11 forGreece. Hitler’a
, basic aim in the Danube région vas not affected by thla decision to'''tura to
tiw Mediterranean; : now as before» he needed tha rav materlals • froa tout re-
. gion3, and vas. ttersfort datorssiei in malntsining thè peaca in' Hungary, .
Smania» Tugoilsvia and Bulgaria. Abo ve all, Ss vas anxiou3 to keop his .
. snpply of rmr materiels out of tho Bussi» dut chea, to vhich ho had so ir»
. reaponaibly conaitted thè entire région in thè previous yoar* - Thto anxiety
had ledto thè Second Vienna Avard and to thè subséquent gaaxantee and thè27, sending of troops to Smania* Fron tho strategie point of vìev, ' thè. de­
cision to tura, south dii tot open any new perspectives in that part of Bu- :
. repe, for England*s intere3ts thero vera nominai. tous,. southoastera Su».' 
ropa renaineà vhat sà® Bai dvays besa • a sourco of raw materiale, ebora • ; 
di. oli, ond a prise for Gemany eai^ Russia to fight overj not, however, a , 
 ^ragion toat, vas stratogically iapo^ tont for thè v«r againsi Ehgland» , .
" As far m  Groeco vas concamed, ' bovevor, matto» vera radically diffe- . 
; xeni*'; ; Wmm an, irwlsiraai tías settore òanubiano-bsloanicoè ono
that lai batter bo loft in peaoe in order to av/oid unneceesary complica- ,, 
'tiens, tot MS othervisa quite uninportant, Greece, and in faàftlemlsr Crete, 
tumed into a potential basa for operations against tho entiro Sritish po­
stion in tos Bear .'sto; Màdie Fast. ' The occupation of ;ih» Greto 'raainland, ; - ; 
together vito too Aegean Archipelago, would to more to» maraly open .ite 
vey tovard the effectivo «Mt of too Xtalian-hold Dodekaneze Islanda as an 
aeronaval .basii against Egyptj it vould inaensly reinforca .tot position ,et:\ 
thè Axis in thè Mediterranoan* Tuo íuzgoaíng aeronaval Systems, tho Ionien» 
Libyan-Siciliaa and thè Greek-Aegsan-rCretan,, vould iaterieto. to ■ fora a 
largo and well guardod basis for. aeronaval manoevering on internai Unes 
botvesn iis varions parts, re3tricting tha English tO tvo mutually isolated 
etron^ iolds in Alexandria »1 Gibraltar, and eventually forcing thea to ab- 
boston tot Mediterranean dtofttoar*. .. ..fht 'fto«Mfi«aef. .tot ?deien»ese... 
f&«j Crete vould secure toe flahSc of the lidi» advance into Egypt» and at
27* 'f*"BlUarólNMf*'Strategia« pi« 252 ff*-'; v, v
23« . Cidi*'e>* -Jd(ja»s P* *56« " ' '
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■ .' carry out the landingin England, and the war will be completely trsasfer- 
.: red to the Kediterransaa. Instead of fighting England on her own sell$,
«a attempt will he made to defeat her .is' Egypt".'*2 _ In this context, oer- 
'tain possibilities aa' to the: Italian "plans' for Greece might 'well he opened)‘ • 
' , and Mussolini, aided by Ciano, 'set out to explore them. She adfroitness - 
displayed in the process Ami that the lessons of July and August had not . 
been forgotten.^ , ‘ -.V ' ,
■ While Hussolini and Gisne regarded the talks as an opportunity to for» 
vard their on plans, Ribbeatrop found himself in as'unpleasant position.
&  had come 'to home, among other things, in order to announce the imminent N 
' . idgnataro of the Tripartite Feet by Germany, Japan and Italy. ~ Therele- < \
• want negotiations had teen, carried out 'almost exclusively between Germany' ■
■ and Japan^  so that tte Italians were’ effectively faced with a fait accom- 
Illto which Xtey were asked to add M r  signature. To ids them over, ■
' Mbbentrop had to «mlaim to them their share is the division- of Ac world, . 
and particularly reassure them that German incursions into their roegnizdd v' 
Sphere of influence,' such aa had occured in August, would not te repeated.  ^
At the $mm .time he was supposed te sound Italy about the construction of > 
hitler's block with Russia, an ekward mission, because Germany herself had 
■ intervened te prevent m  ItalO«Geviot ranorochmsnt in July. tibtestripr'in - 
. short, was - at a disadvantage, end in no position te ralte objections te any' *35
32. Armellini. on. cit.. p. fl, ' ' , ^ '■ ■
35. The Ribbontrop-Mussolini talks have been interpreted in various ways, 
none of them satisfactory. According te T. Higgins, The Soft Under­
belly (Hew fork, Macmillan 1966), p. 9* Ribbentrop gave the DucVthe 
Green light over Greeca because Hitler "recognised the need for such 
. a small scale,condensation... for his frustrated.»• ally", in view of 
his own intention te occupy Rumania. Hillgruber, Strategie. p. 233, 
regards the talks as the end of Mussolini's Yugoslav ambitions.
Schroma von Thaddan, eg>. oit.* p. 91» says Ribbantrop personally 
overestimated the Italian military machine and "regarded Greece through 
Italian eyes", a view for which there is no firm evidence. V. banger,
.and 3. Gleason, The Undeclared War (Washington D.C., Dept. of State, 
1953) take Ribbentrop*s word for a lalsaes aller over both Greece and 
Yugoslavia. ,
34» Tt Th. Sommer, Deutschland uni Jnp«n swlsbhen don M-cthyi, 1935*1941 
.(TUbingen, Mohr, 19S2J p. 398. 2 . . '  :
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deiaanda -fea! fe® Italiana fe^Vtefeg «p, .' '. ;' ', ' ; .V ;
. .f&ls. feing so* fes lefe fertign a&nisfer tfeed fe' evade safe' denand»''' • 
fe.fe«stfeli»g; fee». ...CtatjMfe.fe.ifot ,fe#t I«« fe« :eipeefed,' 11 w«r ' 
he,: not, tha Italiana,.; vho releed^  tho quastion of Gresca and Yugoslavia! : i 
temiMaf fee t»t««tleii§ fefslÉ®», ha *e■lfhaeii•d, fea! thggr formad aa /■'■
. *efeiisAv§* • * l l s l l «  ^ .latesst* t. atad triad fe" roll fem t# ' fe . #i®iag. that ■ ¡ : 
elfeou^ a "at feap»®í»eitt time* i t vas felfear fe ie®¡a®«trat# «t **«tire 
elf«t”; epte»^ fegl«á, Xfefe could «mmi' m  Gexmany»« "sjrcspathetlo si#« ■ '■ 
port” la ¿salina wife .fea«« statea at sema futura date.^  . Shls pnovlded •>, 
fe®. l»i..«lfe fe» ©jeaiiic.he had feen valtiig fe». liMwmteop «a» 'léete*; - v 
ingfor freshways fe comba! Englandi hs, Hassolini, Muid próvida hia vlfe' 1 - 
One. . Bofe fes German and tfe Italian records of fee convereation a^ ree : 
feal fee fe«er «feleatfe infest m  avoiding fee pitfalls of Augast, did 1 
not va3te a fiin^le vork about theAlbaniaa irredentist clain to Clavarla! \ ; 
instead, fe proceeded wife vfemt dennnciation3 of órnese as m  Biglieh  ^ ' 
efeü**feftfe, nel^. fea «MgHKiMa^ fe-fe®«“Qwmm'«i'fewsy • it «as-«m . ■ >. 
that Eitler hinself had put into his moufe,^  and fe 'felih rdbbentrop could . - ^ v.' 
aol'i.p»8lhfevffeifl «,fei«HphaaÍ9tÍ.fee Importanee ®f iieefe fethá& tfe ■./. ' ;
- franawork of ,ths Moditerranean «fe apilas! En^ land,' and pointed «ti fea! - 1 ^ •
'..fee. trefe harbours could, i£ mmmsm* . *•»«. as a rffugo for '.fee Eritish".■ 
'fleet -afta» 'fee, expeoted fell af Egypt. . Mfetetifee iihfeiiteap 'í m U m * ;.■y . ',
that fe raisingtha iseue fe fe* sel a trap for hlmself. BaUttf* laaoly,' :
fe\'«»l«^\feal .fee.etiope ef ,fe*;M.fefe fteel. fe .(tawefe.«wlá .fe a ■ 
pod;^^^' teiM ,11 .«íifU:ii..Mfer' te' Wkiit fefee«'v ; .^V-T". .
. llussolini had won. an iapressive vlctory. He had cucceeded in eatahli— ' 
feá«g fe# necesslty for ÍSafe *fe proceel tovards fee ©f . . .
1 ia*la *»at efe ñama timert m>' ««»4 wtha T>rincinal ob.1 active ' ■
wat fe' fefeel a feznaa ppeiwl* 'M.;v; ■ ■ -
had fet* ■ iafeti©' «tw#fei' an ü  ,itod*. tari, fee-'
•f Úinritir «f !As^ í1 had fe«: m m  íkm_ mads «f f«# ,wlfe fei» ■; J
lia V Sfe- 0«aMM feeefe le m t ,  ®# fe , fe . 73f fe® H a ll«  w ,  M*  ' '■', .; fe., '#1|» ■ «le. latfer has "full■ «wrfe* efe. fefeaii. fe»»«". »»spfelfe • .
: ’ §m 'Hw ^ *s la M i  : ■ ■- ■ ■ ■ ; ".'V':
36. DGFP. I, lah.fe» 165» •’
Gtxaans retuming to their Ite*« fsadinass
rata an Itali» ati&ck m  Greece in eertain
in Äly * to tolt- 
hi« HSwsvsr, x and ■
thia is thecrucial point, the cireuastaacsa themselves had changed.v; From 
a defensiva neacuro 'far toa unlikely eventuali ty of a British occupation , 
'"®f tos irtte islanda * tot 'tentedsrti //tote unlikely anymore5^  -thè Ita- ■ _ 
lian- aitate: on Creeoa vaa implieitly rsso®ii*«d as paxt of tos Maditerra- 
m m  offensive against England. ' Mussolini had reeogaized that “the prin- - ' 
oipal objsctive 'mm ' to defeat England“ (accordine to the ■ Italien record) ' 
and preteste “first''if all to «*«y out the aitate ea Egypt“ (aeoording to ■ 
thè t a M  one)| for the reat, ho hod hi» vay* Ae he expeotad tha second 
eta^ of his E£jT>tisn offensive - toe atfliist froaSiài al Barroni to Mer sa 
Matruk * to.start in Md^ iiteter,'® this arrangment did rot even isply a : 
dslay in bis original time tat le. ' Above all, ho had rdceived what aasuntod 
to a tacit German approvai of bis plana for Greecej end Mussolini, it must 
ho rememherod, tei a knack for Htacit approvals**. ' The fact that ha did get 
1 it ’toteM not perplex ns tg» w»«§>-t ■ After all, tos Grate if ate»
ried Mit in tos sequenoe mentioned at Eome, that Ms after tos occupation. ^
' or al least elosing of tos tes Canal, «Mili'teto perfect stratsgi* sense . - 
stau in tos solar 'syss ®f ; -
filili did n»t rsssivs a German fpitoffyi.SttHafl. tosstenisg ■- : '
Yugoslavia. ; Indeed, it is douhtful vhsther he «tei for one. ; The Itali» 
Invasion of tote country, it vili te rcaemhered, «ould tot he tersisi. out 
tetotet German telp, and aoteSfasntly veiy little mm done to jrapare for. . 
it* "-Sto avail&ble evidence doea not aste it tesar vhat exactly was said ' 
ahout ' to» »tejos*. ^ ; AMMtlMv ■to' -, tos Qmm»- record, • i M M  failowai li- 
hhentrop in thè Country togstote vito Greece and in ¡terssaKUi®
desire •*§ remain «t psace“ with tetof teseMdfiy to the IJalian as*, which 
soeas more credihle, he scarcely mentioned it #t all«. Strategie conside- 
sattUm« «ais it Uff düüsalt to present fb«®it«»ta as a tarn** ir tos
37« • ?* liftto t« 67»
38« mmi '»laft, B*. m *
ili#
lalder, ü,'13§» 1», 
entiy for 28.JG.if4©
I
fte.fS» '26.li«if4öi SBÚBb' i,
v. y..5 . ■ ;
•' it is unlikely that Kussolinltried. The savagery; ■
" of the ’ German replyto kit. fteasner attempt 'mat hare beenbefore his eyes» '' '
' and in any case» an attack on Tugoslaviawould placa him in the unpalatable ■
position of havi»® to.-aak these considerations must ■
■ hate playdowa his plana far that country! and the order for ;•
■ ds^ f^tiiatiWt'. issued, a., few, days. Inter,, confirms this interpretation.':' ' ,;
'/"•V' v'/'-' . , ... IT':..*; : : ". u.V/ '-'i ’■; v •- ; . ( ¡S ;- uv ■-i
- ; .< i ' « ;  ‘ ’ H.; ; '• ‘ !. ' V'- ’ ■ ■"
Onhis return from Eom®9 Eibl3enti,op found the atmospherein Berlin was un- .
. deff#i*l§.o Stotts** ■.Spin %rilki with Serrano Saner about' Spainto «try. into,.': ' ; 
tha var had bsan difficult» and the ftUkraar, proddsd on by von Stohrer (Ger­
man ambassador to Madrid), GOT, U t e  ii ii S^ii^ilMt»«»40 'all'of, V 
vho cojn/bined in . fha.mar^ f<^1 j q$ tha Spanish alii»'
ance, began to )M*» second thou^ its. .■ Spain offered but little by the way 
of. a i l i t a i q r , but asked; an • «nUdtaai' prt.ee .for her help. lot':/ \ ■. 
only would *«ba require generous Geraan aid in military equipment, raw ma- • 
twUi»';;««d ;Vbnt her demands ia-Ssrto’West Africa, '«here a!»»",' '
hoped to take over a d«C«bl« chunk of' the French Empire, were such that ,  ^
any attempt to put thsa into practice would lead to the immediate defection 
of the of French Africa to de Gaulle the ‘pyf mg which -
• Hitler, 'i*t ttepeifiii« of a *pmm »fty#.«■» in’ a®'portion'to'prevent. As ■ 
toe tot m m  -tftfr- to oedo to Germany toe latter'asked for /..;
in oirter’to'SMitMt this important area.^  Kitler was. pro-
rn m m m m m m m a m m m m m m m m M m m m m m m m m m m m m  ■ ^ ^
40. BGFP. 3), x, Ho. 315» 326| KTB/Halder. li, 79, entry for 27.8.1940» r, 
also li*> Asamann, Me BewChunfl?en der Seekrlegslidtona na ton Aeutsto«», franzBaischen Entowhxiraiaditaausamen^ ehenge^ enibigignAund did Be- . 
hguptung des franzdsischen Kolonlalreichg In Afrika v. 3.7.1940-27,11, 
'1942, fa Sjtt etudy, Glhiyii7(P)/0OO4b4-6O7). In this connection it 
should be added that SKL, despite its interest in toe occupation of 
Gibraltar, was as well aware as anybody of toe weakness of Spain, and 
store interested in North West Africa (as a submarine base) than any- 
, bo<3y eisftf,;.,, - ,
■ fcably much against Ms vill^  ^foroed to txy and taducs tha EraBli to dt£-
- 3>uring the second half of S^ ptatart" France loomed ever la^.
rger as a poesiblo partner. The wins stage« ef Hitler*a decision ma- 
kins need not cone am us here# but the most important single factor siasa
■ -.ts» heft bw»;ifc».' teftentaii «1 m m v m IMI.. resistance pat, up by the t
French f® tha British attempt t® seize Dakar of 23-25 September/4 0n23
m “ . _ > ' . „ .
■hy,iit* 
kj®' 4yto an «¡mna
the 25th, althou^ a the Ftthrer vao regarded
e line of ttM»#t'that ‘Muld lead '. 
tte;aitiM*UB «m  still n«»tl«e3y fluid*
It/»hit' have been eomehwera 'after «As, date,' that hi' ,t®ld;H«§der 'that hi ;■.;
. Maid “pwhailj* »ther than with agwLn»
because the latter whs affrpBjag too, little and too uruch/^  on
' M :m * ^ m r^ [mrn already contemplating a netting atth.Fetfia»^  tnl W  
! We *£aA*/m: Wm$ 'dap he agreed with Siane as 'a (:.
meeting with liusaolini to bo held on 4 Ootober, in order to discuss the 
:irM»;i9|apaili«^ ; »ting the next fewjuys his decision to try and win ev«r 
Italy to a policy of cooperation with Francs m s h  to hare hardened.^
■ < Italian resistance,' jsyfwfd» ^ v&s t-h0 most immediate obstacle facing 
any kind of German-French cooperation* however limited. '. From My. on- "
;wa**»"tii® Italians haft left wi'«fttapMA in their ®f®srt»' t» drive ^
43*
—
i9Mfctot Mittler, i St*
44« KEB/oIW. i, 93» entry for 26.9*1940J E. Jhckel, Frankrelch in Hit­
lers Europe (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1$66) pp.108-9*
45« ggB^ alder. il, 109* v :
46. i b A b »--u «*>»:■ v  :; _
47, e, Eaeder* Main Behan (TtiMngen, Schlichtenmayer, 1951) P* 246.
4®. Klee» Dokuaenten. p* 114*
49. Ciano, Mary, entry for 28.9*1940. This time Hitler did not delegate the task to Eibbentrop, probably because tha latter was known for Ms 
anti-French views) KPB/Haldar, ii» 117» entry for 29*9*1940*
|Q. KTB/Halder, ii» 116-19, 1212 121, entries for 30.9, 2.10.1940.
;.Mfj’ewin .the shadow Of such a possibility.53, ' They also Objected to'the 
release of mqr'lMUii'forces for the define« of tho'french Jta#iro,5t so "
that S'tier ms forced: to use a ttiek when allowing French forces sta-
■ Mined.in AfMLaa.-tO :takO p^tvia',iie.'"4«f«ii#' of bakar.^  ^ The French
WMld' sot. ¿offend; their coloai««' if: convinced ■ they were ’ -to be, handed ever'
' to Itislyr MmmliMi ‘ thereforo hod to drop 'Me claims* ‘ as 'well, as. egret". ' 
to & partial frettoh MMMMtt in order to make 4» defence possible.54 
- To obtain «bie;«w&Mt was Hitler’s explicit aim in his meeting with ■' 
• Far fwm being ready to sacadftoo french 'interests. to < =;•. ■; 
Spain 'and Ithly* as he «»ted' to do daring the M m  of Bibbentrop’s vi- - 
fit to' the Italian Oepital*.^  he now wanted to limit his ally’s claims 
on her.' This applied to %Mn tool' the question of her «.try into the.;
war vaa no longer
’ 'bo//
kutSt Mmupiil |.wf $0
in'««» to
 ^. »«out«*».57' ^ ' ’
that Hitler, coming to tho’ 
in something that would involve at leaii the ' 
of all Mit h j m b  war asms.* was in no position 
to deny and lOQaitfl« tho Puce might raise. .
51* Gcsohke* 0£. cit., p. 42. for a series of Italian pinpricks, dating 
from 6 September £o 24 October and obviously designed to raise Ger­
man mistrust of the french, v. St.S. Frankreioh, iii, 0FM/121/U9851» 
119891* 120051, 120077* 120079» also lintelen to OKH/Genst.d.H/Att.. t Abt., Ajpp. Nr. 7 ou Nr. 56/40 g.Kdos v. 7,3.1940, end seme to same,
’ Nr. 67/40 g.Edos V. 11.9*1940* item No. 1007 at tho Imperial War Mu­
seum. So great was Italian fear of a rapprochement talcing place that 
they contemplated the creation of an Italo-French block designed to 
' contain Germany. (DPI, in, v, No. 417).
92. KTB/SCL. A 13, entry for 1.9.1940, Cm/5/0002Q8i PGFP. P, xi, No. 28.
53, The French had asked for help (La delegation franchise «flares..do., la
■ ■ *■ commisaion »Hernando d*ia«lsifio»i -forio..1§>4^  f§7».lfl§KCfl/otM. i. 95. entry for 28.9.1940) end Hitler complied by releasing 
french forces stationed in Africa for the purpose. Ho then faced the 
Italians with a fait acoomell and told them, in effect, to shut up.
-■ a l a  B* Id . to V § $ U ...  ....
14.
55.
16. KTB/OKW. i, jM»St ft», l.i@*l>4#* Ibid, i, , 70* A!, «M
UM' tM «* as a settled
has»
57. KTB/Halder. 11,121, tetfcr fte t.lQ.lf#."
In particular, he would bo unable to excita Ms «I3y»» M m k iitt ^  im­
posing a vet# «a M s  picas for Sim m , tm m m  about É ÍA  were. circula­
ting la BotMsu^?/' fm m  the reeerto of the «MVMMtUn» It would. @»«usr'
that Mtler .su^c^W'-to^pc^u^iag.^c Puce'to follow suit la. Mis Branch 
policy, ^ without real .ct^«nMti«u .The Its*.:.
U*mo* camming o#the[resal to of the Conference fhsr their » 'p a r s e s ,;;, 
concluded .that. Itmeant that m m  attention «cali la the fate» Is ..given, 
to the ItaU^ NaMSMfM.;oaA partcitlsrly "the «orton. ttotttfnvttoan”» which, 
was eapciiei^ us".58 *60 ,< iwhsM .la the records'of this ecaversa*
tl#AJfe:'tJ» a .fact that‘is .sussed .ia it«#lf,-toi*^'-.
^ p t i'^»^.»fB^'.ia_'pi»M««il3r every .other is^erta&t i««tó-Ittíl®a'^'''’:.
onTOTtmn-f «Hyn^a 4jyi| T - ■. ;• ’ , _ .-■ / '' ,. ;.
' .The lack of any rsforenca to the. Balkans,, however, Is insufficient to 
prove that ths matter was not touched apea bettioea Sltler and Kaoatli«!«.' 
The Brenner meeting of 4 October 1940 is «as of the 'moot "fishy* la'they, 
history of Vorld Var II, ia so far aa it was'hard to get:a g»@d .aceeuiit .' 
of ltf6* sad ia so far as it gave rise :ti ."a.heap; of aahiguitlea in ths 
P^oreign7 ministries of both sides"*62 63. W v m : im > -tee 0«ntt.*AMwatar in 
Borne it was impossible to find out "whetter the subject of Greece was not 
o«psiiored tvom  a  new point of view",6^  «tail* oat. of .Ililerfe «looMt;-. '■.
58. , The most recent vso*ning dated frej 50 September* BGH»« 1, xi, lío.
- ■ - ,135V ■'■•■▼# Aloe E. m m  WeizsScker, Memoirs (London, Gollascs, 1951) ■
p*'244#;. ‘ ; . y  y  ■ ._ ■ : _  ^ «.
5f. This, at any rate, was what the Germans understood as the result Of 
the meeting! KTB/Éalder. l i , 129, entry for 8.10.1940| KTB/OIW. i , 
111, entry for 5*10*1940. The German record of the conversation is 
PGBP. P, xi, Bo. 159| the Italian one, DPI, ix, v, Bo. 677*
80. Cieno, Diary, entry for 4.10.1940* PPI* ix, v, Bo* 617* Axmellini, 
on. clt*. pp. 119-20. Schmidt, the German interpreter, noted Mus­
solini *s interest in the announcement that the center of war should
„ be transferred to the eastern Mediterranean* ?• Schmidt, -Statist auf 
dlclomatlsoher Btthnc (Bonn, Athenian, 1953) P* 499*
81. Simonl, oj>. clt** p* 172* Ten Etzdorf also had very little inform- 
tlon about the talks when first reporting about them to OKU on 8 
October* BTB/Halder. i i , 129*
62* KTB/FTalder. 11. I8g. entry for 13.11.1940*
6 3 , DGFP. D, xl, Bo* 191* Thie, exactly a fortnight after the meeting.
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associates, puszlsd hy thè lattar*® reluctanoe to put a bratto bis ally*s 
plana, conciudsd that tit la :a»t impossibl® that te Hihrer ha® roachod an ’ , 
■undsrstanding vith lluasolini con em«lag th® aitaci: on Greoaa doriag their , 
meeting &t th® Breanerrt.^ 'th® Mia eren claiiaea to possesa reporta te thè > 
sane effect.  ^ So njraterioua vere thes® conversatlons that whea Ciano 
lattar clalmel that Hitler had allowed Khssolini to go ahsad Hibbontrop■1 ' ■ 
falt »ibi« t® dl«alas thls a® ft taetical msnosver dealgned to throw sand 
la Ms' rafa* th® »iatesite te  Hitler himself, ^  vho dld
not repudiats lt* . tChe immlativa svidence that something about Greecs dld 
la f&ct pasa betveea Hitler and liussolini at th© Brenner 1® therofore con- ■: 
slderable. 'itetela! knew some Gertaan, and used that language during at 
least part.ff ^  in tha break bet-'“.
vsen ita tvo parta, thè tv® leader® exehanged a few rarda betveen tette ' ' v.
! eelri3? Ve shall never know. Hoverer, ter» 1® no reai need to go a® 
far as that* Àesuming that thè eub^ ect vas left vaimentioned, Mussolini . 
wo-uldfrpbably bare interpreted Hitler *® Eilene® »  a tacit confiasnation 
of tahat teteptei m  te outeome «f hi® talks vith Mibentrop.' ’ ‘ V-V'
. In faot tersi»' eomaevidence that he did more than tdiat. Eeturning 
froa te Brenner, he had @rafti«al issue te arc^r circular that poi afi- ■'
■»1 te to'«fast wn® laft"of.Ma'pi®»®'to; etite'..IhgoMtea* At t e V ; - .
: ite tlae Imi had som® nevideaa 'atei ireeeet^ '/ ""h ■
H2/3/000562. ' :
' lii> m  ■ lfi§4 ▼. 19.10, GBH/B14/02292. teThis tei» §»e»lle» Is discussed in detail he] B.
A® 1® ptetebr te appearanca *f te-vivi "Autowagen" (in inverted ; 
commas) la te M m i «rifiMÌ reote. te® i® Maply » te, literal' tetete«»' «i te'"ÌtaUaa aateggm,, tesy. ' ’ '■ 7 v’ ■ . r:, ■ ■ ■ r. ->
, 68* Tf* «np1** P* io* footnote Io* - 1J0* ,,
69. Armellini, 0£. elt*. pp. 97* 105-6. Tho text of te note is printed 
in Stato Maggiore Esercito, Ufficio Storico, La crime offensive bri- 
un -ia ' afrioa settentrioimle (Jtoa% libreria dello stato, n.d), 
i, fe» noi» '"mvr"o«teUte ordered Ma te resta»» hi® attatóe in
Egypt by 15 October at the latest* this clearly presents en attempt 
on Mussolini*® eld® to keep the promise he gare to Hitler during the conference* H* Granite, In Afrioa Settenteonale, 1940-1941 poma, 
Ballisi, 1948, Citi Gradite« Àfrica) p* 103»
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5od*@r ¿¡5*10*114^  it wamaga'Sam toneDuce sasrived*.* it ««®- ' ' v ■ ■.'..'. talna a short note for Badolgto... in which are enumerated the '• .
'. new aspeots examined with the ffeer... to tot# one, another / : ' ' , \
-■ 'fir  qpjpenN*A»«v :; 1 • |Ph-sa ®ot®' /«¿egit*>«y■ new fiats' that doMMtrato' ’ ;
: ..' the Sue#»# tosipto. iiw «1 Jwmni is a tostteal satoessi \ ' -v. ■ ■
'.. ■ . Mersa Motto Mil poMMMKt *' #t»tofijiM'eto... flMiair^ cwifcoA \ , \
' '‘'""1««*®^#^ it will »win to ho seen which of Dta-'tut jdll-'v
/V/.ars «# toe., iritiili.■•&%•»»»«;fMtttob is, to'fMl'fltotf.to® -
i m a m  r e a p p e a r s  « 4  d o e #  s o t  M s m ' t o ' b e  > \ : Y  .limited to the realization of immediate alas* hut »'aim at the , "■, ;
■ ■ .; i»| of  on Fngltfb at*oiig$#®ld. • Bit WowwTia hut Salonica •
th# ftraok naval bases, that is the whole of ■Greete#;- -¡'TGv:'
®» »oettaf with BlfUr«; than* hud pit'a nailer «1 fresh ideas into Base#- 
list*# 'h»4t flu» mat :ii^wtoat of tiiiilt m m  1. tout torteee was to he." a t-; ■ 
tacked ouisr «<**—»- toe Msrsa Katruh (and to# subseauent
blocking of toe Sue» Canal by German bombers, which' m m  ynpMti W  Hitler) . ., 
and in oonneotion therewith! 2. that to he effective vitMn such a frsme- 
worv. the invasion of Greece would have 'to aim 'sot at ftl «maria. only, hut ■ . ' 
at too of the entire fyffig r^-d probably toe iflaed« ^
m  «wail ,J$ ■ m/k t<wa »¡taM—¡ii«4 honed to initiate tto' lAvtoUNi'eA
Morsa Ilatruh at’^ i 'Miitt# «f ^  m  iitiA m  $mm® at its '«¿¿J. _
;. : /.;■„.
■ Aft'aMMlIalto M m 'that am expressed is this- / ■
ii»ietoto»^ «p..iAstoer they to»at had h ^  liamati*
leaat in «til»» ».at to* is toord to say, fhe IsntfMst uMd in'/,'.
connection if' M  captort of Hersa Katruh ewtMaly ,V
suggests pifle military | — a since ^ paaitai was not accoc^ anied '
hy any of his own generals at toe meeitii^  it is a® likely m  tot toiat' ';. 
h*' picked up the phrase about »iitttMP 'aa* «strategy« diroetlp''fto|a''tos:'; . *71
70* It will he remembered - that up to this time the Italian operational 
plan was aiming at toe seizure of Ciamruria only* As late as 15 Oc­
tober Badoglio issued a directive (So. 5O84) hased on the assumption 
that this was the case. Paldella, eg. cit.. p. 266.
71. This was intended "to teach Hitler a lesson*"| Armellini, op. cit..
' . . . ' . - x
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the' chiefof 0»* ■ flUHMKitel; fititel.' ■ fewwi»* ■ i^ eeulaiioa' of' tMs kind ■' 
tmm% yield'• eertiiS» i«nmi it is:ta Gwen plans of the same'period _■
that we mast ton»' ■"• ■ .+ '• v . ‘
' Both deteaidwily wA-&££wmlmii&9. ttw Ghnaa* did in fast have m m  ';.';. ,
- plans Yfer-tb® iviWai It «ill he tMdail.VMl in July '
and August Hitler and JiMaatonp had ■ Mttraiatd Italian fw*";. ■' - ■
, ventlve measures against Creece ia'tase of a- British landing in Crete| «md" 
as (tha British proceeded 'te'.,'©os«fl»tEat« 'toMiv »¿La strength in the ^lMbUv-, , ■
 ^terranean during the «tama it .was considered in Berlin that this,pessl- ' 
billty ;w*i m  'i&@r©asl»gly meal '■ la re*pons# to a Greek inquiry the _
British on 5 September had said that in case of a Greek-Italien war they 
would try to "forestall" the Italians in Crete* and a force va3 in foot 
beisg hold ready for the purpose*'-' This fact did not stay entirely hid­
den fron the eyes of Berlin* is so far as SIX* received a report from 
toQrpt that the English and Australian troops on the Sues Canal were busy 
canying out M R i  disembarkation manoeuvres at the Timsah Lake* lama- 
alia and fori fhad* "together with other reports" this was regarded as 
a Sigh, that Mia British were planning to occupy Crete* most probably in 
' MMMtdatt'tdlhiib* Italian offensive from Libya« On their side, the 
freaks wort'»¡pried to prepare Crete and Lemnos "for the landing of 
troops oi a -0mA' scale"| ** not Italian troops* to be sure« In view of 





KTB/siq. A 14, entry for 21.10.1940* C-?m/3/00536.
E.L. V/oodward, British Foreim Policy in the Second World War (Lon-
! ton* B«H Statloawr'Sflioe*' 1910)».i*.pp.rip9* 510. ^
RTB/SKL. a 13, entry for 13.9.1940, g?m/3/000296t ibid. A 14, entry 
for 29.10.1940, OHR/3/000594. All this toes EOf mean that SKL was 
enthusiastic about the matter* because it was feared that Kussolini 
was planning "LABS ACTlOlvS (original emphasis) only", and that the 
operation was beyond Italy* s operational' ability. However, the basic strategic importance of the Question was clearly recognized.
Ibid, A 14, entry for 25.10.1940, GIGI/3/Q00562. In relation to our 
intepretation of previous events the statement that in the interest of tiia war agilnst England it had BASICALLY been agreed with the 
Italians that no MLITABY action would take place in the BALKANS in 
particularly interesting.
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. According to reports froa several sources (in the first line • 
the air force liasion officer) Italy plans to attack Greece 
on 26*10, possibly with Bulgarian help#**
Ko official confirmation so far* The foreign ministry 
is not yet convinced of the correctness of the reports* Ba- 
. sically, it has Been agreed with the Italians,that a mill-., 
tary offensive in the Balkans is to "be written off in favour 
• J of the main war against England* However, reports lying %a- 
; . fore SKL say. that during the talks between the Ptihrer and the 
Duos the former had given Italy a free hand in case a mill» . 
tary offensive against Greece becomes necessary to forestall . m  Jtoglistj, initiative# « . < . :. - .
Defensively,: therefore, Hitler was still committed to the line he had 
adopted in July and August, i*e authorizing preventive measures* In a 
wider context, however, he was now committed to the "peripheral* stra­
tegy, that is to offensive notion in the Mediterranean* ' The decision 
to cooperate with Prance rather than with Spain, which had just been 
made, meant - as general Martas correctly surmised - that Gibraltar pas­
sed into second priority, while the eastern Mediterranean would now be­
come the center of attention*^ . In the course of October, this approach
- accordingly became the subject of serious study in the various German
: staffs, ( Operations on a large scale, against Egypt 'as well'' as against 
Syria'(via Bulgaria and Turkey, ultimately aimed at Iraq) were being ex- 
aained* * mto such a framework, operations against Greece, and parti­
cularly against Crete, could be made to fit without ary difficulty*^ 8 - 
An Olbf study prepared about the question showed that, within this eon-
®*,***l,***'*"*®*,i1*"*1*^  ^-
- 76# 1M* -ix, t, Ho* 617*'; t, v , : •
77* ■ CTB/Ualder* ii, 152, 153# entries for 27, 28.10.1940. The opera- 
' tion would aim at closing the Mediterranean and driving out the 
;, British fleet. . Ultimately, an advance into’ Iraq; would deprive En- 
- ‘ ’ gland- of her oil* • ; ^
78* Ibid. 148, 151, entries for 24, 25.10.1940* The Germans might per­
haps be prepared to support an operation against Crete by means of 
paratroopers (Simoni, o£* cit., p. 177# entry for 24*10.1940) and 
such plans, considered and rejected by the Italian general staff 
(Ed®si, 0£. oit*, p* SO), seem to have been mentioned in some Ger- 
man-Italian staff talks,, as can be inferred from a mas» prepared 
. by Rintelen for OM on 23*10.1940| CHR/50/000769»70*
text, thè advantages of a successful occupation of the whole of Greece 
would be very great - while the consequences of a failure would be equ­
ally grave.^  , She upshot of the investigation, conducted at both OSH 
and OST and lasting for about two weeks, was a proposal which Jodi pre- 
pared to submit to Ilarras. In,this note, a combined Genaaa-Italiaa 
offensive in the eastern Mediterranean, including Crete and Greece in 
the last stage, was proposed* ‘ ,
She following order of operations seems expedient* .
1. She continuation of the Italian offensive in Libya, in or­
der to take Hers a Hatruh'as soon as possible. ,
2* After the occupation of Morsa Hatruh, continuation of tías 
attack on the English naval squadron at Alexandria by all po­ssible means* , ■•••■ , , * -v • ; ; - !
3* After sufficient weakening of this squadron, the start of '
, operations against Greece with simultaneous occupation of
' Crete. ; t , * • ‘ ‘ •
Jodi also warned against any Italian action aimed at occupying only part 
of Greece, because this would inevitably lead to a British landing in 
what was left* Hie memorandum therefore contains both essential points . 
of Mussolini*s directive! the need to defer the Greek operation until 
affect the seizure of Keren Hatruh, and the importance of conquering the 
whole of Greece*. She memorandum, prepared while Eitler was »/ay in France, 
was made vo'thless by the outbreak of the Italo-Greek war. Outdated, it ; 
Was probably referred to the files, never to be looked at again. Still, 
it is very much in line with Hitlers words of 20 November, when he wrote 
to Mussolini that it would have been better to postpone the invasion of 
Greece until after & "listening like” occupation of Crete
-, '  . .■ . • ■ ' 'i
79. mm/om. i, 125, entry for 24.10.1940.
80, Ibid, i, 132, entry for 28.10.1940.
81« Ibid. 1. 131-32* entry for 23.10.1940.
82. Hot all the German staffs agreed with this order of operations, SSL, 
in a memo dated 1 September, had claimed that the conquest of Crete was an "indispensable preliminary" (in view of the transport situa­
tion) to a successful attack on Egypt. Anlage zu KIB/SICb. o adv, 
"Lagebetrachtung des Chefs des Yerbinduagstabes beim Königlichen 
italienischen Kriegsmarine" (Weicholz), pp. 10-13* Gffl/ll2/000092Q-3.
83. Eitler to Mussolini, 20.11,1940, BGFP. p, ad, Ho. 359*
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The resemblance between _ the three above-mentioned documents - Musso­
lini* s directive, Jodi*a nemo and Hitler*® letter.'- is too great to be 
attributed to sheer cfebne®. Ail 'test contain the sane basic elements 
which, considered strategically, did after all make perfect sense. To 
argue that Massolioi, OM, Haider.'and/ Mtlac 'all arrived at the same '', 
’solution independently is most unlikely# Bow such more probably that _• 
Hitler,' who had an excellent eye for strati^ # told Mussolini at the 
Brenner that he could go ahead, provided that* 1* he waited until after 
the fall of Ilersa Matruh. 2# made sure no part of Greece eluded his 
grasp# • ■ '' ■ >  ■. ' ‘ ' v * V • ! ‘
. To make certain on both points was, in fact, just what Mussolini set 
out to do# ; Possibly losing patience with Grazisni, who disobeyed the' ! 
order he had received on 5 October to resume bis advance by the middle' '
‘ of the month and kept postponing it,8^  he summoned Baddglio and Boatta 
to meet him on the 14th at the Palazzo Tenesia, Shore,' he informed the ' 
two flabbergasted generals about a radical change in his plans for 
Greece# . Ho more was there a question of occupying Ciamuria}' it was the 
entire peninsula which he wanted# ' This order Was 'clearly designed to . 
forestall a British landing, end tire Italian general staff interpreted it 
as such#8**. Though one need not, in the light of the directive of 5 Oct­
ober, take Boatta* s assertion' that **this was the first time on which I 
and the general staff received notice of this plan'* too literally, there 
can be no doubt but that he was stunned* Asked by the Bucé how many ' 
troops would be needed, he answered that twenty divisions - engaged si­
multaneously at the beginning of the attack - were required# The tran-1. , \ ¡ - i ...... Í , ;eportatioh of those forces would require three months, so that the off­
ensive could not be opened before February 1941# The Buce seemed to 
agree,’ ordered Eoatta to cancel all demobilisation measures - just ini­
tiated - and to prepare a timetable for the transfer of the twelve di­
visions needed to raise the total number of troops in Albania to the ,
84# Arme11 ini, on# cit»* pp# 10é, 110-11, 124-25# -
85* Ibid, up# 111, 120.
• . f  -
desired level* Eoatta also was to prepare an operational plan for the 
cotaaittoent of these large forces, a plan which «weld not be put into ‘ 
effect before three months had jessed”*® -
•.!.$y,the next day* he had changed his mind again* Three months now 
seemed too long for him to wait for the elusive glory he .longed for, He 
therefore’, summoned another conference at the Palazzo Venezia, ‘ This time 
Ciano, Jaeomini, Visconti Prases end Soddu - but not, interestingly enough, 
the commanders of the air force and the navy - were also present* Seizing 
upon an old SEO memorandum, which requested 12 days notice before the start 
of the ZHSTED operation,6^  he now called for tho attack to begin on the 
earliest possible date,-that is 25 October* At -the same time, he divided 
the operation into two stages) an initial advance into Ciamuria, followed 
later on by a “march on Athens”* 33y means of this piece of jugglery he ob­
viously hoped to go round the need to bring up further forces, and thus 
save,three »oaths* y .< •*.. : • ' ' «•: ; .T i ;h ; 1
: Having solved - to his own satisfaction, at least - the problem of 
occupying the whole Of Greece without wasting time, Mussolini now had his 
attention Called by Ba&oglio to the other part of hla presumed agreement 
with Hitler, l*e the coordination of the invasion of Greece with the Ita­
lian offensive in Egypt* There wore two sides to the question, the chief ' 
of .stiff explained»® t > y s ; ; ;, , - •
«■3»isipiw|efips|as|^pswma*iispsse^ , « . s • • • • .
86, Roatta, o&. cit.* pp, 120-22) Araellini, 0£, clt«« p. 115* The fro- .
• ijuontly heard claim that Mussolini was pushed into his war against 
 ^t. Greece by the Gorman occupation of Rumania (v* Cisao, Pi ary, entry
for 12,10,1940) can, I think, be safely disregarded* The Italians
• . knew everything about that action before it took place (DPI, is, v,
,. ■ Eos* ,550* 556* 615* 618) and Cisco himself mentioned it in his diary 
before it took place, (Clano, Mary, entry for 8,10,1940), Even 
>, without all these, it is rather unlikely that !$assolici*s first re-
• action to the news was to contemplate a postponement hf three months 
of his invasion of Greece, Bather - this conclusion seems inevitable
■ - his sds was to bring it into the context discussed between him and Hitler at the Brenner,
87.. Ghcigned SIS memo, ".amwanto ner il Puce»* 18,9,1940, ES/l27/000515.
88.. .. Hitler e tftosoliiii*.. letters e Doettaenti. pp, 61-67«
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That of Greece and that of British aid. Like you X an of the 
opinion -that there will almost certainly he no British land­
ings* , She British are far more preoccupied with,Egypt tha& 
with Greece and will not willingly put their troops on board 
7 ; ships in the Mediterranean* Therefore, the only possible 
assistance will be with aircraft*
• In anticipation of this it would be possible to make the
7  operation against Greece coincide with the attack on Karsa'
Katruh. In this case it would be difficult for then to dis* 
engage aircraft from Egypt to send to Greece* Ve would do 
, , this because Grasiani could also be ready By the 26th of the 
/ ; month. ( : f ".. i .... <.., .v .. _ ' l 7 ■  ^,
To this Hussdlini replied*
X should like Grasiani *s operation to take place some days 
■, beforehand. : Then the fact of the conquest of Kersa Katruh ' 
will males the possibility of such assistance still more di­
fficult, especially in view of the fact that we shall not 
halt there* Having list their pivotal point, Egypt, the ‘ - 
British Empire will be in a state of defeat, even if London 
can still hold out*«* in addition there is the morale fac- 
s . tor* This African success would give impetus to the sold-
, iert in Albania*. ' >'That is why X should like to synchronize the two opera- 
,tions, with the African one slightly in advance*'
■ In principle, at leat, the Italian plan of attack was perfectly in accord 
with what the Germans would like it to be* The operation aimed at the 
conquest ot the whole of Greece, and was coordinated with the Egyptian 
campaign» If everything went well, both parts of Mussolini*s directive 
of ,5 October would bo fulfilled» The only sour point - an admittedly im­
portant one <*,vas Crete*; But the Italians were loath to employ their 
navy in sn ail out attempt to seize that island «* unlike the British, 
they were in no position to replace their lost ships®'* - and in any ease 
it is hard to see how, Crete could be reached by the Italians with Greece 
between them and it* She occupation of the island, as the Germans dis­
covered to their cost in May 1941» was difficult enou^ i even when the 
Greek mainland was available as a basis. In October 1940 the Italian
staffs did in fact consider the operation, only to reject it*
■, • •' ' ■ ~ - •' •1 - - ■ ■ , • ? '
> 89* Rintelen to OKW/W&t/Aualand, 23,10.1940, I. SSL, c, xiii, MItali- 
enistbe Erlegflihruns«, GM/50/000769-70.
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Mussolini made his decision to attack Greece on 15 October*  even though 
the German foreign ministry was professing a strange and unusual inabi­
lity* to go to the heart of the matter, ^  Berlin soon knew everything 
about the plan* Thus, OKH on 13 October received notice from Eiatslen 
that the attack would start on 25 October.^ 1 This was correct, except - 
that Bln&elen could not know that Badoglio had Just succeeded in having 
the opening of hostilities postponed by two days*^ 2 There follow! a 
long series of reports from the German representatives in Belgrade and 
Ankara, as well as the consul general in Tiranna and the German general 
at the headquarters of the Italian air force, von Pohl, who also named 
the 26th.^  Some of these reports - notably those sent by Kackensen - 
arrived in Berlin before Hitler*s departure on his voyage to France and 
Spain, and are known to have been submitted to him* The first of those 
was a rather ambiguous telegram No* 473/40 g* of 18 October, which sta­
ted that Ciano was all for the attack, Badoglio against and Mussolini he­
sitating»^  There followed No* 1883 of 19 October, in which the attack 
vas announced in no uncertain terms and the date given as the 2Jrd*^  
tfpon this Hitter, the director of Ribbentrop1 s office, prepared a strong 
demarche aimed at making Mussolini stop in his trank* Bibbentxop, how-
90* KTB/ok .^ i, 120, entry for 11*10*1940* The enquiry may have resul­
ted from fresh rumours concerning the attackf KTB/SZI>, A 14, entry .' 
for 10.10.1940, GM/5/000359.
91* KTB/OKff, i, 123, entry for 18,10.1948* "Italian attack on Greece 
with 10 divisions at the end of October (25.10?)"* 7* also Bossl,
f * cit*. p. 85» «ud E. von Eintelen, Mussolini als Bund/genoaseIblngen, Wunderlich, • 1$52>) p* 103* . • ..
92* Ciano, Diary, entry for 18*10.1940| Armellini, o£. cit** p. 119* -
93* Heeren to fossilg» ministry, Hr. 766 v. 21,10, St.S. Jufflelawien* i, 
GBM/250/15235i Fapen to foreign ministry. Nr* 883 v. 18.10, St.S* 
Grieohenland. 1, 0^ /449/228031 KT3/0B?* 1, 123, entry for 22.10*
• 1940| Gspelaer, VelSteh \
94* Deutsche Botschaft Boa, Geheimaktea 1940* GSTt/2281/481684*87*
95* St.5. Italian. iii, GEM/B14/002291. The date given by this telegram makes any guesses to the effect that Hitler thought he still had time 
Impossible*
ever, vetoed this tnft afi too explicit, and aantaN* Eittor to anever 11a- 
ckansen in Home by having him adress a ’friendly inquiry” to Ciano# Be­
fore Bitter could carry out those instructions, however, a third telegram 
from Maokensen, Bo# 1834 of 19 October, arrived# This time Maekensen re­
ported that Ciano had told him Hitler had allowed Mussolini to go aheadq<in Greece#' Was this Just a trick on Oiano’s side? Bibbentrop, who had 
been present at the Brenner and may be assumed to have been as well in- 
formed as anybody of what had taken place there, did not think so# On re­
ceiving Ciano *s statement he ordered Bitter, to hold back his instructions 
to Kefckensen until the matter could be cleared with the Ffihrer. Ho then 
sent another collaborator, von SteengraCht, to ask Hitler whether Ciana’s 
words were based upon truth and what to do about them# Steengraoht saw 
to it that Bo* 1864 was submitted to the FUhrsr, then telephoned the lat­
ter’s redply back to Bitter} Hitler had decided that "no questions should 
be adressed to Borne* Mackensen next received a pointed reply to his - 
question as to what to do about the news concerning the attack# *you will 
notice that Oh this point we are at present sending you no instructions 
of any kind, and are not even directing you to make official inquiry as 
to whether there is some truth in the story or not*#^ 9 One would be hard 
pressed to imagine clearer terms in which Hitler, whose order inspired 
this telegram directly, could have caressed his reluctance to cross Mu­
ssolini *t Greek plans# 1 '
Meanwhile, there were other things to occupy his mind. The decision
96# Ibid. 03*1/114/002292.
97* BOffF# 37, ad, Bo# 502# In this document, dated 7«11#1940, Bitter
sums up the procedings prior to the Italian attack. It appears that 
even though the warnings were raining down on Berlin during the last 
hours before Hitler’s departure for francs the FShrer did not even 
authorise *a friendly inquiry”, not to mention a veto# It seems 
that a second attempt to stop the Italians was made by Kordt and 
Weisshcker} in this case Hitler rejected a draft that had already 
been approved by Ribbentrop# E# Kordt, Nioht eaa den Akten (Stu­
ttgart, Deutsche Verlagsgeaellschaft, 1950) pV 408#
98. BGFP# B, ad, Bo# 209# In this Cable VsirsScker also told Mackensen 
that his anxiety that "the other end of the Axis” should be treated carefully (in view of the Rumanian business) was shared "in the hig­hest places*#
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'te ®fl far txmm rather thon far, Spain hai ©jasai ' a anbcr of «tterely. 
eoapUrete-teiltet futsti©»», ,«hi«tit. ha »at hart felt, ha atei» vas 
ahi» to solvo. - %ila' hoping to aim over tet French, he still needed th© 
spaniate ,te, «©tptimte ta tee »tirera «f «ratta*. ite# «Uta'if ■the 
■latter' tes :’lap«ét a liait an «bai 1» «©«la «ffar te te ’tenar* ■ ’ At Y 
’.'te «ntt tea#. ha wouia 'te» 'te' ksep a wary V» on Ms' Italian partner, '.
■ tente' respites» af te fresali «vor« hy a» «a«» imiat, ■ 'tanMcamtiaiV ■
ha deciâad te make what was forhia 're unprecedented. gesture j, ha would 
travel to Franca in tear to meet Bette# - tel to Spain in order to naet 
Franco.55 the fret tet this ««« te Jin* «¡sd tea laat tire in Ätterte 
rentra' ©rea«'«»'»'À«t«te’tet h» left’hl» rè^prètes'for reytely ■./'•; 
less. tere tet' Duca is a singular indication af te importance ht attri- 
lutei t# tet tela after# ' ’ ■..•,■■■■ '. y
■ ■ ' At 23*^'hre» ©f »  iéteh«*#^ ' tetratet# ha tat o n t  tu a jéunrtfcr 
'.tet tete finally taka him ovar almost 4»000 miles, Sts te «te to try# 
ly means of personal ’remit«»# 'te persuade the French, Spaniards and 
Itali»»’ t e  tm0ñ''émét''éí£Í¡mmMm'~WÉá saepanito in’ t e  «Mstntetlm ■©• 
A wcontinental Hock" dirocted against England, tei» wm » truly MPre«:; 
lean task, ©nt tent# te’ he himself tete te put it# ®onlâ"te’t«à3M out
o n l y  t e p ^ b ' a ’* ^ r e i i t é é  Y'; * ' v
■’-.Y' ater1»’»pati»! tete, nicknamed "A^te“# tmmlsA tertMdb Aten#.’
Sanar# 'teir red frei« 'te « h u  «t »reteir©# vhera ha vm te rett',te '■; 
fwmA riet' parad«** ’Site# at i«00-"ite* m  te ■ libteatrtp«» " Y
'i p d á  t e a , i* t o i A ' ,’| «Mietet te* irei -far©!#» »tester «M M«'
' imarnkm «teff«’imà'wadmê. hilf re tear tarli«*# couplets ate te te' ; 
«rente iMsh «¡erit «tre'sitretia»* ’ Swifted ©a tea «®y te IIw*«4»#^V y 
tety renaste tf « late* saints* «P - in ««farea * tet 'result#- ©f te ’■
n» **♦ x&* *3S# reteire ^  10# 15.10.1940. , ^
» .  Ser Sekretär des W®smi ■ IBtetm  ..f.lá te te . 1934-1945 (ptertasts*)# :
.. p. tei - .f ' ' . . . . :' . •
101. EEB/gsldtr»' II*' 1Í4t 'tete te 1.10.19#* 7 ; ’: Y





- > meeting, a# vali ss a draft of a Germani talian-Prench protocol, 'ite. con- . '
. tenta of bote documenta ia rougbly similari in retura ime recognizing 
■ , frano©»® ."rightfbl pi«»» in Europe" after te end of te wrt te Asia ; •
.f«»i«ra vanted ber to cooperate militarily against En^ Late, particularly 
, . in Africa.*0"^ Whether Hitler did or did not actually se© te documenta 
. . in question i is noi really relevantj teey do, in aay oaae, repreaent 
., what he vonld bar© litoti te outcoae of bis tate vite Lavai and Petain r 
../tabe*.,',::. .■ •.
, At 183Q hours thè Gferman ambassadorte Vichy, Abetz, arrived vite ■ ;
Lavai in his bag. ' te Eltler-Rlbbentrop-Laval meeting started an hour 
. later. Levai v&s not autertaed te sign any agreement. but thè record 
. does show a dear villingneas on bis side. . : After thè night;. .
at te railwaya station, Hitler traveled on te Eateaye on te 
' >, Spandali borier*., tere, on 23 Ootebar,.. be met franco and bis .nprly, #jp-^  ;
In a"owanation laating'^ -,
• tee© end a half hours, nothing i$m «ohi«rei* . Xraaao’ r©fW»i .a'protesa■ . ■"■ ■'; ; ■- < - v - - • • io*? : ,. ^ te^ enterite, w#. alai repeated bis e*»»«» insani#* ‘ •
.. \ - 'te failure^ of te tate at lendaye natrfcally sads te fortàooialiig' - „/ .
. meeting; ulte ^ Potala appeax .ovea m m  ; important*. l£ te ■ jontey; tea» ' not .
te : ©te/ls flai«©,.; «ai lf pari At toast Of':te *«»tÌJa»tiil bltetf’..teà».
, , capti©« te«: te .te« iato reallty, frano© bai te be «©a ©ver, and Hitler . "
' tem tetotif-'tetoateaif te' io/.te.11® . fetate, -in-fari# t «mm , v
;, reeertei ■ •,. «ai t e  meotiig 'tette hSm .1©#« ;of a ««tei# » te». Lteal»^ •
but Hitler te»., net #•» te bava aottoei te ' te old tetetìte ' ■
104. Jggp. ». M$ fc. » 1» 'v,/.,
’ . 1®5*. Seiilfai 'o£. cit., p. f7# .Aritele JB» .iit» p* 114» . - ; ,
106. mm* w*' rt. ho. m * .... ' *,
tè?.. ibtA.'fc. m .  "V;v" •r r;y : /:.
106. : MpUÌ, A* MÉ™ >• 5«4? ...
. 109. te *©oori of'tee ©i®v«ati«a i» MB» 1, ai# M»* 227* .,*i» tei^d ',«w» ftUrly rmérmijSilé m% atqp torni fr» iater*
- -■ .m§Wm mà wéMm test mat far bagnate hi# ©«| lattate, •■'-, b#'tofstiiat®..»'«lofir'te Mtior* . M ' i  iato^ tteteoa te. tela ' . - apisoda as « deliberate attempt m  Petain*s side te sbift.tee' sub^ eot ,
, Mante«, b o i l e r . : • ■
Uù.--*m*a»*;Mé **»• !.. 111. ; .: ; ’
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in ■' -pewoniiity. loft a.t»i®»iilt«a i^ a^ mytea «a the ■ ■ **11® OSH,
rfeisg Mai '!-OSSf, yi, fe# faa»#i.gn ministry all got fee notion that the 
teon a great success.. ^ Cooperation was,agreed upon in principle, while 
''detail* wrti supposed to be settled in fee nearfuture.11^
Xt wa3 tins,- ■ after /this great achievement, .to' cast a waxy eye toward’ 
fee' other end of fee Axis and make sure 'it' would not max fee results just 
obtained by raising excessive clslms on ¡France. Hitler*s announcement of
114'Mis. journey to franco, rocoivad in on "20 October,* 'Mid'been net
vife ill-disguised anger. - His nesting with Laval and Petain had caused
'(l«f.f»®^ .ifei,«^ ««.''Wt'''fes'ltalii» «¿MUMBr'ia Berlin»1^  wl&s'fat» ' 
ting Mussolini in a "black mood" because ’'the Germans'prefer fee French ; 
to m %  - ./.Italy*# mm- t# in cw* than mere words.
As soon 1» Hitler set out m  his journey, the Italians started ts foment 
trouble by ts tw^~a ever ss&tacl of fee FffWMft. f f # d f . "■ •
coast _ and Itatadllta* 1 , lateipfetinf IssoaM policy. as designed ■ to delay: ■: 
the cession of ioleidea/im the hdpe of future British ad American aid, 
feey biat<>4 darkly at »e«* lrinfl §f between Fetain end de . ■
HI* Kra/Hnlder, li, 152, 153, entries for 27.10, 1.11.1940J Lagebespre- chung OIC^ /WFSt/Abt.L, 29.10.1940* printed in ELee, Dokumenten, p*
122. Hitler later described Fetain as "Hindeaburg personified" •
112. Jm/OSM. 127, 129, 150-31# 135, 145* entries for 25, 27, 23, 29.10,1.11.19401 RTB/SKL. A 14,-entry for 26.10.1940, GHR/3/000577I Geschke, 
op. cit.» pp* 81# 95-6. On 25 October fee foreign ministry was "ra­
diant" • They "believed they Mad succeeded in... reaching an accord 
wife France". (Simeni, op. cit.. p. 173). On 26 and 2^  October Abets 
reported feat Laval Mad already taken steps to implement fee agree- ' 
meat and feat fee approval of fee French cabinet had been obtained. 
(DGFP. 23, ad, llos. 234, 24I). The Germans did not, of course, know 
about fee Anglo-French accords reached at behind their backsf Gesclce, 
op. cit.. pp. 102-4* ,
; HJ.. Perhaps even. by. «ft-tataUiito BlVh«RtstpnLm& w m W m  s®
, .- by 0. J*et% Iks ftgii&ft.. ftsihliit (XHb,, Graven, 1951) p. 158. .. ' ■
114* . BII*' ix . V, ®0. 719*/' -v.. . '
I l f , . Wsessazm swao, 21,16,' gt.8. Italien. i l l ,  Gm/BU/002501. '
116. 'AaswiMJiit. jg, j4i»s jp.'12§**26._ ■ v'_■ • . ■ ,
117. M g .  I, X U  Ho. »5. .
■ Gaulle*-18 '£» mis# sure fill«»® Wmmfe policyvould 'sot poach on their ' 
mê«mm9 aloag list of ,terMt«ial «ad economic eoncess-
;Air tMs^ isarctly SûmiêmâmQd. any good in 
«Medics;wifeatt«apt'to:idJi'©'Wir.tbs' f^ aehf ;if Italy was to he - 
prevented iron spoiling the tender roots of the Franco-German understan­
ding,-" something had to he done fast. ' '■■;
In the evening of 24 October, therefore, Eibbentrop called up Ciano 
in Borne* HO feave him an account of the talks at Hendaye and Bontoire, 
but the telephone connection was had and the Italian foreign sinister did 
not conceal his “fears and suspicions“* Hihhentxop subsequently sat 
down end wrote him a letter, in which he sxaplined that, while the out­
come of the negotiations with Spain had not been satisfactory, France had 
agreed in principle to cooperate* The Führer, he added, would soon send 
the luce a letter to explain these matters in more detail, and also wanted 
to meet him - somewhere in northern Italy - in the near future* . Mb- . 
benirop next had this draft * which bears the date 24 October - typed out 
on the large-lettered “Ptthrer* typwriter, and sent it to Hitler for app­
roval* ,it came back bearing a pencilled note* “FBhrer* « « elnverstanden“*
signed by the representative of the foreign ministry at Hitler* s head-122quarters, Valter Hewel* > At 0400 hours on the 25th Mbbentrop*a message
was sent to the foreign ministry in Berlin, Where it arrived at 0650. It
was given a new number - IJjOO - and forwarded to Home, where it arrived 'JO’S ■ “at 0800 hours* Hackensen asked for an audience with Ciano, and deli-
113* KTB/S1CL« A 14, entry for 23*10*1940, GB5/3/000548*
119* DPI* ix, r, Ho. 793* The demands included a rectification of the 
Franco-Italien border, as well as the cession of Hiee, Corsica, 
Tunis, Somali, etc* etc*
120. Ciano, Mary* entry for 24*10.1940.
121« Akten Bftro HAH* GffB/Fl/Q0Q5l6»18* The meeting was supposed to take 
place on 5 Kovemberj Kintolen, 0£* cit*. p. 109.
122. Akten Bitro RAM* CB!/Fl/00050-15*
123* Ribbentrop to Kackensen, Hr.' 6 v. 25*10, St.S. Franhreich. iii, &mj 
121/120084-85* It is this version that is printed in DGFP. 3>, x±,
' ' ' " Ho. 199* ’ ' ''
■ - ■ ' ; . ; : ' : - ,7 . 79 " i
- n ia  . . . . . . . . . . m i ] m i    i■ ■ ii^ w w i w i Wiiiiih iiiik niw  >■ 11 1 ^ 1 1^ 11 m ip i im i iiiiw m i» w m i . i i ^ m i w i w m o i n »  vmmmmmt mmmmi m wmmHwmm *       m«m   1      miiiinn i n i  ■
• • ■ \9A ■ ' . ,vered the. a««j§a#l st 1230 hours on ■ the„m m  day. ■ Ilardly able to" m d * ■ ' . •; 
. 'tain ii*. ;foy 'owr the great prospect®. opened by the 0©»ia«K»'oh m »  : 
rocheaeat. 'Gfsne.feigikfid the sabastsior and told him he w m  ..looking for-.'- 
v W i  to. the :iltle3>a2gi»linl 'meeting, ;which ««rdlmg to 'Mm was to take; . "
; jtafts.oa;? o*;'4:livv&far*' ;l'; : s . '
Partly, after Msels»««!*s departure, the telephone in Ciano*s office ; ' — 
/■•' r « ^  «gain* /Mhhentfop was m  the line* He minced no words in esfisla»»'
' lag hi® pufpfiief ;ho vrafcsd the.meeting between Hitler and Mussolini to •*
ha «ftvaaNd ta. «n.s»li*r data.*, 01»  did not like this sudden chons© . :' -■
. of plan m he mjqHHHkad that Hitler«® intention* in' wiping to Italy so 
' 'am «ftar his meetingf: with Mata, was to- »¿a bar renounce her oUctaa ;
■ an Iwwia -.but. he «»14 not dlftpae* .'A seating'was.in^ nriiyfixad for; ' 
''ikakbor# '38,0titoWr» at iftwanaa*^ , Having laid down the phi», Mbb«i**',’. v 
■ t®»p info«* Berlin, where Ma telegram «ived at 1500 hour®* . ■_■ Wei**'''.
■ iiolwr them. informed Hackensen, and told to the ho*s. w»t«€_ to to mmm * \: :
to Florence for the occasion,^
- What sale Ribbantrop - and behind him, Hitler • change hia mind? Hi­
storical shholarship, mostly based on statements made by various partici-■ 123 1pants after the war, has it that it was the announcement of I!us3olini,s 
imminent attack on Greece, in whatever fora it was transmitted to Hitler, 
that caused the latter to redirect hia train to Florence* On the other 
hand* it is remarkable that heither the 0KW nor the Haider diaries, both
U9* Hackonsen to foreign ministry, Hr* 1914 r* 25*10*1940, St «3« Ita- ,
.; lien, lii, GFM/B14/002509*
125* Giano, Mazy. entry for 25*10*1940.
Ifi* Eibbentrop to foreign ministry, Ur* 7 r* 25*10, St.S* Italion. iii,
U7* Nr* 1511v. 26.10. St*S* Italian. ill* Gill/Bl4/002512* At 1900
hours on the 25th, the German chief of protocol, who was in Paris, 
had also been informedl Ribbentrop to Boerenberg, 25*10, ibid* 
G3^ /B14/0025U*
123. Keitel affidavit, T&flC. x, 5231 Schmidt, og* cit** p. 5°5i WeizaSi- cker, o£. cit., p* 244. Schmidt and Weizs&cker contradict each 
other in giving different dates for fee decision and about the id­
entity of the message that cuasad it* Keitel did not mention the 
, Greek affair when informing 0KW| KJB/QKW. i. 128, entry for 25.10.





first class contemporary sources, mention this reason. She SEL diary says 
the -visit had been planned for sons time as part of Hitler* s policy toward 
Prance end Spain,, hut its timing is supposed to have been determined!hy S 
the news of the Italian attack, y However, this account is too muddled 
‘»; it makes Hitler learn of the attack on '-the7 27th, _ while’in fact the ■ de- '
■ oision to travel to Florence had been Bade48 hows earlier - ’to".receive :' 
much credence, particularly because Ml had to rely on QEW reports for ■
: similar miters^: ' .’ ! ‘ ’’ ; ' ■' ’ ■ ■
A close examination of the facts will show that the theory according 
,to^ which it,was!the.annohnceaent of'the Italian'action'that caused' Hit- 
. 1«*»' ¿eeisioQ is ‘rather ,'sh^ r*: • ifcroutfiout his ’ journey'in France»; the 
: rain of reports warning aggdnsithis eventuality had gone on. The German 
gweral, at, the Italian h«*4|uarti«i of the _ air ■force sent _ two urgent te­
legrams on 21 «ad 24 October*^0 from Belgrade there CMf-.distwhing:^ 
while both Hackensea and Eintelen kept sounding tho alarm.*^2 ■ 
Hone of ; this affected Hitler in the sllghtast. Such was is slms of 
. MfopUt« ’ «Ad _ such .Hitler» s; lotion' -' or. lack of reaction.*: that both '
©ISf ;«d ’.the: navy -hi#. cojaaaad Concluded he must have had given his; ally 
the green light at the Brenner, as Jodi noted, Mwithout informing his
close collaborators’*. *I.135’
Itfv KTB/SKL. a 14» entry for 29.10.1940» GER/5/000589.
Greiner» eg. cit.. p, 182* Eintelen» o£, cit.. p. 108j CTB/OHt/« i,
 ^; 123, 125, entries for 22, 24.10.194Q* DGFP. D, ad, So, 225.
III. Heeren to foreign ministry» Hr. 16$ v* 21,10» St.S, Jarcslawien.
. i. GHl/230/015255.
■; 132. St.S. Italien. GHH/B14/002306i Eintelen to OEH, 2J.10.1940, KTB/ . 
SHE. C xiii, GHE/3/0QQ769-701 same to same, 25.10.1940, ibid. GHR/ 
57000702-84. Eintelen in particular seems to have regarded the 
, attack as a settled matter and was keeping up a lively speculation 
as to the motives behind it. '
111* HJB/dgV, i, 124» entry for 23*10,1940» The claim (Schramm von Thadden, op. cit», p, 93) that Jodi could not possibly have been 
right because Otherwise Ciano would have used Hitler* s laissea 
aller when scolded by the latter does not carry conviction for the 
following reaons* 1. Ciano did in fact raise precisely this claim,
2. As an argument it was useless, because Hitler later bj&med Ita­




In order to find ont vby Hitler changad his plans, ttorefore, ve mat 
xeeon&truct the eventa thatled to that decision, ’ Aaong the documents " ; 
;ttot «sa''!®' «townto hâve beea-recoived'Br Hitler ©a 25'Û®t©b«r.there 
two that concera the Greeksff air and may therefore ba relevant to the : 
fthrer * s; decision to ■ travel ' to ’ Florence, - The on© ■ is a. telegraa ' from la» : 
chensen, the othar a lëtter from the Duce. Arriving at the foreiga ad* 
nistiyln Berlin at 1500 tours,'' îïackensen*a t alegran vas forwsrded ■ to : ,= 
“Heinrich” - and presunably to ”Amerika” «3 vell - at 1340, In this 1 v 
dispatch, Cianots ohéf de' cabinet, Filippo infuso, vas reportad as in- : 
fonning a circle of fri ends confidentally that the totaoltan'Greec* vu h. i*àcertain’to siart ”noch dièses *toShsasaA#w, Despite seos assertions 
to tto contrar^ y* it isimpossible to show that it vas this tolegsto'thaft 
made Hitler change his mind and formel tto m m m  behind Ribbentrop * s : 
second teliftoae-eall' to Gl«toV;:Sat only does aMt of the .'evidento w@ : ' 
possess point in another direction, but it is impossible to m m i  that / 
Htler 'âitided thistoîtgrto into ' a “serions” and “non serions” paît#. -h ■, 
Either he believed in'lis' contents, or he did not* If he did* he should 
hâve advanoed the dateof his meeting with Mussolini still farkhtr cr, ' v 
failing tfaat, ring up tto Duce.*^  • ' If he' did net, there vas m  reason . 
to'. àot ' at;' ail* ■ ' But to1 assume ■ that ■ the message made' Hitler change his •. '
, ■ ■ r  ■ .  ■ - \ ‘
plato, yeivmÉ not considerad .sufficiently urgent t» justifÿ sa even " . 
ètofler’»éeting Is dearly .beprnd 'Mie. tontos ef .crtoibiMty* Hather. ' -
tto» sirving to 'proÉ? for Hitler*s'iniestio» 'to stop Mussolini, there* :. • 
lire, tM# doonpieat tends to dtomsttoië the estent to vhich Hitler vas
prsp*to,to. i»re !esto¡«ie^ M»t.ni»«t vamlugs -atout tto Italias;pitos*
15 v. __
i, ^ 449/222611.
UstadMl -a/mm asMtïataodlne, the fut 1* tint Hitler*» Jora«, 
ney to Italy vas ait chaxactsrized by any great has te. Instead of ’
rtoiyettiiig M* ;M* tonoMwa i&  «to.aftanaaft m m r n  *S m * M
mmt tto si#i m, «tort»» a* '?«***»‘..«N» tetotlto on to to- ■ 
J S m . * *  ; b »  mmm to ««k m  für mrntm, »t 1 »  ,
tours m  to« ifUt. fatthrers Tagebuch. pp. ft»7)* . tf a direct 
joumay is mito ont mmm m» to reasto vhy
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•aas* te believed that Germany is aHowtng the French too much freedom, - 
end that Italian demands era thu3 receiving no consideration".1^  ^  .•
# . ■ ■ - ■ • In a letter to the FBhrer the lace has expressed Italy*s 
fear of too1 ©loso .a relatlonship hetween Gonataay and' Franco 
and ^ .posaiMlity'Of, a swtval i» powcr* -. ■ The sai» theme of the conversation is to sootha tieso ^ -
fears and ti dieousa the detalla of fútate relations with '
rtly not envisaged m  a subject for the discussion
' ?*
H' Jjt Thima.ni%f
Tho above statements originate in three different dates and two separata 
persona, ono of them Hitler himself* They vere recorded by two of Gar» 
many*6 top officers and by his liifedn man with the army, all of than in 
daily contact with the itShrer. It Is almost impossible to imagine any­
thing clearer* Kasaolini*a letter, cot Kackensen** telegram, made Hitler 
rush to Florence! the two pages about France, not the passage about Greece, 
were the immediate cause; His aim vaa to talk ilussollni into cooperation 
with France, not to talk him out of his attack on Greece*
Given the situation, there was little also he eould do* His journey 
to France and Spain vaa, all things considered, a qualified success only* 
The talks with Franco had failed completely * Hitler was under no 11 In-
' . I - . -  -clone on that point - and thus the beginning of some kind of undostanding 
with France vaa the only result he could stew for his efforts* How, this
. . , .. I -■■■■■• . s, 't and or understanding was being put in jooprady by his ally, who vent back 
oh what had boon agreed between the two of them at the Brenner and "dis­
missed the understanding with France out of hand"* If given a chance, his 
exorbitant claims ofl Prance eould, and would, put an end to whatever ag-
Aufsoichmngen des Yertreters des Aus—
V4/
ti had'be« arrived at with the tr«eh.. ' French -»stai«®®« would "be-■ ï \ * >, i *■" : V\< 1 ■ ‘ •' •- • ' v. ‘ ' /■harder« their colonies« under the threat of beinj£ taken owr ter X%&- 
Ijr*• would■ icsert'to"de_Oaalle and..41» British.1'; So:more’*«tt-4tóigJjí&*.; • ."'■-
fronti to'acre "c«totontil.iàsÂw*/,,%|«*v'.bad;'*e^-:m «m , :Â»»éiialV':; 
Had’;feiM/fr»fmí»d’d»,óffÍtíil^rwáJila«..%®,t«9«ái à# had ¿ustlis-
toiì in hto:Íeto«é*’' 1 " * '.. . ■..•i/';.-, - < ■< '. ■ ;>.'-;v-: ’"' - ;'- :■'/■.
'V■';xtoteaí:cf’rttania#,ho. Berlin, tÄ*sr@ ha had: been expected;on!Sunday,■ 
27 Ootobea,1^ 8 Hitler therefore. redirected "Amerika" to Munich, where ha 
arrivad on the 26th, closely trailed byhisforeign minister in "Heinrich". 
AJtor-'sitoidiii# a'night ^sh^hÌ a day, .to®*», ■ he departed for Florence at 1800 •, :; 
hours "-cf ''the' 27th. Meanwhile, further news fran,Italy aiudvcd.'^ At 1200 ■; 
p.m ofthe 27th, Eintel« had called.us BSrekel from OKtf/lusland and told'-' 
his it 'tèa» now "practically certain" that the attack would start ;«se?ly'
next'morning. ' : The s-v ..«•■• » ■ I/O ■ -was passed on. to. Jcil, ^  who compared:it with
other reports lying before his and concluded Pdntelen was ri^ ht. OEaf next
informed'. the. £®m£m »toistry, «to** Mito», toopAttef both the '. report, ■ 
and', led i'to1 ìto ìltoto itaè  to. " le in r i^ “ ,. Ito way ,to R or«® * .150; ,
Way Jodi was one jmwm*»*! in whose iudtonenh Hitler trusted» if star. Sit* :•p 'Pm p  w p f p p »p  ippipp ' w * * w  w 'F « » i i i p  ppm p  i p » »  _ p w p w w  > M P P ij p p j iw 'w p K ^ r  PPWy p ^p ^p p  ,. v *  p p  p 'w ^p p  , wp^ »  p  p 1! :, ,. •■'. ■.. , , 1 v‘ • 1 > '■' .1 ' ■'•;t'ter**/ toces#®. «u*t tact mto, it .cl ecr ,to..Ma .tost he ,could. «nitre -.to® ; : \
late. ■ À telephone '«ali. to ths Im w, ' however, si#t ' still ' halt 'the. attack. 
Bat’ »tier did not M&M use of this l«it^^sit opportanity presented to :
him. Ä e M ^ ,th»''is!ao''iiiÄcctoca,.^ t httfniidimA it.in toe ^first 
plcto.;' Instead, námm¡3ai"'fMttaufd its.ncyafS scattaM «nÍHRf' to» 
severed J^p*^ ‘ ' \ ; <..... .■ ■¡.IW..<. . ,v ;
At 1000 'hears ea toe' 28th, (toilc( to» .tosto tree ptosis# toro^ .M.®**;'1'; 
gna, itoto'ctoitrei« Ô» Italian attoÄ'.« ftreece.hed started.^ “^2 Mtl«*s 
Immediate reaction is ja®«», to/.ns toa«>.toe:4ia«y; ef his snqr aide, de _chmp.
148. ; .cate, it 124* »tor..Ite 23.104940. - • , < • •:■; ;
149. ' nu. 12$, «toy
130« iinrito*, '27404940, St.S. Italien. iii, GKI/BI4/OO2317.
181. '• Betodito1«*  Mi.»'s. ■■■-
152. 'ìmÈÈÈL 'ii-'ltf, entry for 284049401 'als® Schmidt, ££. cit., p. : ■. w^xr.; . ' , ,
major B.G Engel.The FUhrer; "»waring' and cursing", Bat the main ta­
rget of his anger,: curiously enough, was not the Dace himself, ■Bather,; ■
. he fumed at the Germ« "liaison staffs and attacshes", vhoa he accused of 
being "idlers, but no spies", a fact that had "spoilt many a plan ff . 
his",1'52 In view of tha 'foregoing, ’■ feis was simply not true,' For ^ the 
laat ten day sHi tier had been bombarded by a hail of reports coneerning ■
' the imminent action, some of .them giving precise' dates.'. Scarcely a Ger- .
' :aea',official' anywhere near Italy who .did not sound the alarm, litter, and 
EibbentropjWeizsfcker and Keitel, had called his attention to the news. 
He had: ®vm,,(supposedly) .redirected, his .train to meet Mussolini end stop 
, him.,:r And. now he' was shouting; he knew nothing of. the . entire business and 
blaming his subordinates. What was he up to? There is no 'certain ms- ' 
we»,, but an .te^ restiiif guess cm ■ be. made.: On later. eeeaslciis, ■" after the 
Italian offensive had turned into a fiasco, Hitler repeatedly assured hie 
. military advisers - that is, the people who had not accompanied Mm on 
. his journey ^ ,-iiarefiri had no first-hand.knowledge of what had juipt»*;'
. ,1iiat .he had' "known nothing* about the attack «4 was ««is*plet@ly'N,
.«prised*» by It.1-55 It sees» to have taken other asasuree' to mall» this 
/viwi«n..ie*Hi .«edible, . «.iwwti^tiiB aimed at Msccverlng the culprit 
, "iperisct* was launched,l5^  and - a hi#xly suspicious
f act-, the original of mother telegram from llackensen, eentfrom Rome at 
: 2250 hours of the 27th and transmitting Ciano»s OFFICIAL announcement of 
. •:.^ ;'ultiaa^ 8i"’t§ trees» was dcstriyed, by a "ZerrciimaaoMiia". _ i.e dellbe^ . 
; Is^ lt possiblA that Hitler, anMtipaiiiig' the _ cvmtiMsli^ r of
; «  Italian failure, was creating an "alibi* for himself? .One would not *15
•: .Iff,: .*rf4ted,ia BlUgruber, 'Stmt^e, p*. 286. Hitler alee ad»iS8«d:ss» 
"*...dcrogatey: voufll* ..to ■ the Italians, whom he accused of being ."«pi#«
1:155* ii# » * 1 0 . 1 9 4 0 * 1, 147* «try fir 5.11.19#*
:1M* BGFP. B. ad, Ho. J02j KJB/galder, ‘ li. 181, entry for 15.11.1940. 
There is no indication that a culprit was ever found. ,
155. This telegram reached Bibbentrop at 2520 hours. Together with a , second despatch, in which Mackensen transmitted the text of the 
ultimatum, it was zerreis-ed on 29 October* As Hewel signed this 
operation, the order io likely to have come from Hitler. T, Ur. 
1945» 194o V. 27*10, Beutache Botechaft Rom. Geheimakten 1940. CFH/ 
2281/481694, 481695-7021 ;
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■ put it past tea,.. He was aetor enou^ i to pit on a stow.
. Scarcely «a hoar later he needed all hi* acting taLent* when he ^ar» 
rived at. ^orease,. only to find a bessing toee meeting: him; at the sto* ;■'■ 1 
tion with the unforgetablo words "Fdhrer, we are marcMng! TMs morning 
a victorious Italian say hear crossed toe'Greek border!Hitler otrnm, • ■ 
tained, himself admirably, supposing, of course, that he was really angjy . 
in fee first place. If he was, then the Italians never got an inkling 
of his resentment* ' Neither Ciano nor Mussolini ever seem to have connee-  ^. 
ted the forthcoming visit with the Greek affalrj^ at'Florence, it was ' ' 
scarcely mentioned at all* Instead of making a fuss, Hitler opened the ' 
conference by congratulating and «Moursging Ms ally, actually offering i ’ 
Ma German ycKsotatista to aecnqpy Crete with,1-53 The subject was then v'c, 
left aside, not to resptear during the mmm tours of Hitler»* visit* ’'If V 
EL tier was really asg*y, tote m m  a remarkable tsar A« farce m  Ms eldef ' ^ 
or was it? , :r .; 1 ,J v’v;
like;most ELtt«p*»»«oliai tsrtsmMMwt tide ©a», too, developed into ,;v 
a Htoir^  wattlopie* .• A Mie range of subjects was covered, or rather raa» - 
.believer, iwtesh we «« safely leave aside* Slit m m  of fee meeting was 
formed by Hitler»* report stoat the e«wfw«tt©ms he hid just had*; Hitler' , 
told 'about hia-talk witii toes», whom he did not like a bit,' and with ■ 4' , 
torsiwhose impression on him was scarcely better. . For Petain he had - 
natoing' but prates* levs' was a man witii whs* isaetteig could be done*1.,:.' •; ’ 
It tier tetaasA .aossMiai^ lMSs» was »Vri^Mtably going to .«to v’-V-‘
tor toe^ wir at an early stage,: and ©no# m m  plained the importance of • - \ ’ .u 
swiving at an egfeeaeiit with Wtitam*" to to« reassured his ally that ho 
did net, however, intoad that comtiy to talas Italy»* place as Germany»s 
senior pwtiwPf and alas ««ceeeied i» tabuing the toee*s demands, or re- . 
tiier in having them deferred into the react« liters* At 1800 tours
156» Esladdt* ■■-«»*• ill.. w» 506* '■ ’’ ;■
157* ' 01«»,' Mary* entries for 24, 25.10.1940| isinailtal» a* 5UH P* V ■
■ 125# - :■■• , ■ .-■■■■ :■ v - 1; -
153. a# Ms»'re«©rt is m  i. si, to. 24% toe Xtalisa cat MI* .is, .
V, »0. 807. , ■ ■,. ■.
159* 'WBBrsva »asslMfllu a* 6?» . ;
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the FBhrer once sore hoarded his-' train and traveled hack to Kunich, leav­
ing behind a Clan© who hhppily noted that "the conference has shown.*., 
that German solidarity had not failed U3W.^° On Ms side, Hitler was' V • 
under the iapresson that he had successfully carried out his main pur- 1 
pose, i.e making the Hue® fall 'into" line with his french policy.^ Hath ■ 
sides therefore came away satisfied from this meeting, although for <*uite 
different' reasons* 1 ' :
• ' i  , ; ' . i • •• .. -
Eetuming from Florence and considering fee Italian action, Hitler does 
not appear, to' hate had much Cause for reaeafeent. Several of fee'reports' . 
reaching him. stressed fee connection between the invasion of Greece and 
fe# forthcoming attack Wi'IttrH# end'were feerefore perfectly in line, 
if not actually wife what he had dieaoussed wife Mussolini at fee Brenner,
■ then at least wife'the new ♦’eastern BMitemiMioik*'' swreafe" feat wed 'juit " 
ewifging from fee studies conducted at OSH, CHSf and OEM. Like the It®*'" 
liens, *^he probably did not es^ sei'fee aifedi to''develop into a'red! 
"war*, end, should this nevertheless happen, then Greece would be .defat* ; 
ted within a very Short time.164 : 160*24
160. . QUn»f Manr,’enter far 2S.10.1940. i \ -
' \ CTB/lTalder. ii, 157, 153, entries for 51.10, 1.11.19#. ,
162. T."eanm. o.*»0* fectacfes"Hot. 130 end IJt.' ; ' ' ? v
16|* The Italian operational plans were hosed on the assumption feat no 
= ' major complications would arise, and this assumption proved to be 
correct. Luring the conference of 15 October Ciano had said Greece 
would not fight because her leaders had been bribed, and he repeated 
this claim to Badoglio ten days later. (Badoglio, 0£. cit., p. 48), 
The Italian ultimatum to Greece carefully avoided the word "war*1, 
and Borne regarded the fact that Ketasas did not speak of "war at any 
price" as an encouraging sign. (i-Iaokensen to foreign ministry, Sr.
‘ * 523 v* 28.10, St.S, Grieohonlend, i, GFH/449/222825). At 1445 hours
they had not ^ et given up hope (some to same, Hr. 1950 v. 28.10, it, S. Italien. iii, GPK/B14/002S18) while on the 29th it was the Greeks,
• ! 'not the ’Italians, who broke off diplomatic relations.
164. WeizsEoker memo, 23.10. St.S. Griechenlsnd. i, GFH/449/2228501 Kra- mars memo, 28.10, Unst.S. Grlechenland. xii. GHl7o75/258597. fee
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->' It Is usually alleged that Hitler, was angry.•* Mussolinihee^ sts® he 
feared lest the Italian action might cause the entire Balkans to go up 
in Usaci* ' Steve .is net a son# of evidence for this. Indeed, if the - 
Ffihrer ever Bothered to 'read, the reports reaching hi® he should have„ 
known that the Italians vere right in assuming no diplomatic consplica- , 
tions. She countries whose intervention vas at all possible vere Yugo- ; 
slavla, Bulgariadad farter* ’ .Sow Yugoslavia was knows for weeks to fa» : ■ 
vote a neutral attitude, provided the Italians did not demand .rights of 
transit) her attitude vas reconfirmed a few days before the Italian at» . . 
task'took place..Italian attest to get her in notwithstanding,^  . 
Bulgaria was not making any agressive noises, held in check as she was 
by We Turks.^ Vitkin a few days of the start of hostilities this
aiutate‘of tew m  ®®mflr»§l.,15® ' .
lince' it was the fear of turkey that prevented ite Bulgarians from ., 
Joining Mussolini, it vas Ankara which held the key to the peace in the . 
Balkans. Teh days prior ■ to '.the outbreak of hostilities the Turkish ,©*#». t 
bitet"had held a meeting' and decided 'sot' to interfere., lotice was■ given ■ '■ ' 
te We Greek govèrnemènt.15^  After the Italian attack the Turks did, to 
be '«oro» .move, their- «toy into Turkish Thrace, but only in order to hold ':
.. ■» ' ' \
■ ■ last mentioned document sums up what vas known of the Greek artay > ^ 
with the words "the Greek army Is incapable of ind^ontet milit«ey _ . 
tetiea er even of defending its .oountry without foreign aid*'. : '
165* Eeerea to foreign ministry, 26.9,1940, BGPF. 1, xi, Bo. 110f same ' 
to same, 25.10.1940, ibid. », 229j KTs711£. A 14# «fey for 30.10.
■' ( -■ - 1940, 0W3/000595.
166. Mussolini*» meeiws§©r boy on this JMMtoudoa, Anfuso, has Wooxibod
. . them in some colourful detail in his »'Pejaare'TaWa&s al loop, di •’
. Garda (Bologna, Crolli, 1957} Jf. v. ¿so ■ bW o^ LIo» ooT^  ■ - '
oit.. p. 54»
167. Richthofen (German minister in Soils) to foreign ministry* K** 493 
, r. 24*10# St.S. Bulgarie©. ii, GFM/585/242744.
16s. KT3/SBX. a 14# entry for 29.10.1940# G?I3/3/000590t Voermann meno#
51.10, St.S. Bnlflarien. 11, GMS/535/242755. and same to same, Hr,
518 v. 31.10, ibid. < ^ 585/242751* The Greeks themselves counted on Bulgarian neutrality since September! A. Pap ago 0, The Battle of 
Greece (Athens, Hellenic Publishing Press, 1949) P* 252.
169. Papen (German ambassador in Ankara) to foreign ministry, Hr. 885 v.
18.10, St.S. Grieofeenland. i, GK5/449/222803.
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The decision 1» Oemqay Ore®»©
' ■ . 'I ■
' Returning from te.tetlng ai Plorane©'on 29 October «id looking back upon 
■toe. record of the six. weeks that had passed sines the. decision to tea to' 
tot ' "p®rif&i«dw strategy, Hitler hadreeson for qualified eptiMsmt,
' France' had ostensibly been won over, and - talks, boterà Eibbentrop and ban.
. vai for the signature of. sa agreement were oq*«t«t to take place' in the ' 
néar fatare* ■, Italy hid. also been persuaded .to; @s©p«r»te, end at the same 
tosti consented to postpone her demands on Prance to a more convenient 
time*. The only bloton toe fine piettre vas Spain, which had not yet been 
load© to commit herself* _ However, : Hitler still hoped to achieve the "Ma- 
of Spanish policy with that of the Axis, and "coerce” franco to en­
ter the war* She ”guidelines” for the ihtei.(te^ i«%aniah cooperation 
had., beta laid down between Ribbentrop and Sun/er at lendaye, and Hitler 
clealy hoped to have this secret agreement signed and ratified within a 
.¿art time*^, , ,. ; ' '":V ,V y
■ While tackling the political problems himself, Hitler largely left ,
. the military preparations. to his staff. ' these preparations « and this is , 
typical ef .the way ito worked^  . were not 'made depadeat #a toe resuits of 
.toe politisi! 'attorniati. that is, they mais to be pushed ahead even before 
the S@s#leto«i tf, to», latter, an as to have toss ready for immediate ex­
ecution'in case e# anttott* itas* ' toe diary ®f .tot s®V chief of staff *4
1* ■ Pl/sth. Hsndskton ”Pelix”, ”Iiederschrift fiber Besprechung Chefs.I*
. ( . - X r m  toffs W l V « ”». 4.11*1940» P• 7* Sìa/5/OQO501*
2.; ' 'lìàfaìàtoi; ii* : 16 4, ;totaqr 'for 4*11*1940. ' ' ’ ; * ' ' '
5*:; enter iterl if *10*19#.; '
4. ' O f * ' " f c t o y » . »• ’52 1» '34S. tore te» 'anywhere else, this 
' - ■'«stood is i f a t  i s t o .  ‘18* itself, where military aeasu- 
ms «pdas# m .le««'tosn.torto'•etetoiss.'«to;tt4ictA to go ahead in 
tovme# if tot'toqpttttto'y«Utotto'tosisi«» mà regardless of their 
results.'
bristles, with references to preparations for action against both Gibral-■ 5 •tar aad S®pt from about the middle of September onward. Seoonnaissance
parties were seat out, forces and specialised equipment prepared, plans
studied and directives issued. For our purpose, it is the preparations 
for the eastern Mediterransanthat are most interesting. The dispatch of 
one -'air /corps and „two 'saieàred divisions to Libya was considered. : Their / 
employment wfts, of eeurss, -sub*}e«t to- the agreement of Mussoliniand de­
pendent on the course of Italian operations*^  > The understsnding of the • 
latter, is therefore essential : to, any ; analysis ; of Goman ' strategy in the;
eastern Mediterranean. _';'/' /r; •* -, -v
;■ In Libya the Italians had two araies, one of them, the 10th, facing > 
Egypt , with 10. divisions* ; - Opposing them, were British divisions ' consisting 
'of about 3 divisions. The Italian offensive against Egypt was envisaged
to fall into three stages by its commander, Marshal ledelfo Graziani. ' The 
first. of .those would consist.of an advance over 'm m  100 Sa. to Sidi ' el / ;
Barrani. The i««eMfW0nM bring his.forces to Kersa M&truh. The third-.':, 
and most important would Involve the.atm»®# to atd'oooepaticn of Alexan­
dria and the Sm s  Canal. Given the lack of roads and supplies in'the 'de*
sett, each of these stagi« would base' io he separated fresi thenext. ene ' - ■/ < 
by *  eehslteable .f«àie .duiag which .watliiass would be ladd,' renda, «ott»;.- - 
atruoted «ad materials brouhgt up. . The «tele operatìon oould therefore '
, reasonably be 'éxpected to last for at least aererai months..  ^ , v. : ;
•. The Germana, it vili be remembéred, had beea considering thetransfer 
. of forti«.te Litya since August. Thèir first offer te this effect had ; : 
been trensnìitted to Eoneeven before Graziani went over te thè realization 
/©f(hls. "fimi/stage", on lj Septeaberj it remaiiiei vm m m nm à J^ Jodl then • 
Itrti« «illtsagr, ettaol»e> generai !&»»*,/ih©. communicated .
5. » / M i « ,  ii, 102, 110, 115, IP, 144» l44-45t H7» entries for 16,
V • " ' »t ' a» ■ *5 «10*19# * ; / : : r. ' / ; ; -V.h/'
6. : a» best short iAeeasÉioa is'G.- ÌWrtlf Wm. Desert Generals (London,
,  .%W«r,: tI, »•;. , .. , . . ...V . ,  ;; -V- ; . ; ....
7. ' i.6i. .mfaT *** 5.9.1940. »ten tarli«:attuta were made 
■ iojSy ix, v, lo. 16l) and August ÙBS/QBf. i, 17» entry for
' 9.8.I94O) but had remained unanswered. ;
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' ' ' • . gthè Germani proposai to Badoglio and promise! an early ansver. In thè 
'■ meantime,1QIM instructed ' QM to - make ' all ' thè ' necessary preparations, 1 so' ' 
as to prevent a Iosa of time when thè Itallan ansver arrive!.' ' Witoin a 
\ few days, thè German military attaché In Rome reported that, contrary to 
expectationa, Badoglio and Roatta were not at all entiaLsiastlc to' have ' 
German araoured unita in Libya and would prefer Stukas.10 Asked for his 
■ opinion» Grasiani himself evade! thè (juestion on 10 September. Bado- 
■ gito vs more straightforward in a SUI cenfesmace on thè 25thi ■.
j  ; • : 1‘- <•' V  '  i ' . . . . . . .  ■*  “  ■  '  '  "
; Ihe Germana have ■off «ed ( two ' erooured ' divisione. . "Roatta, who. 
, ., has studied thè question, conclude! that thè transfert of a 
single diviiioa vili retuire six montbs. Wemust tate «ogni»"'
• aznce of thè faot thai in Africa ve need traini, and that thè 
’ ■uomini ve have there «e supsrior to' thè German soldiers.
- ■ Giksetuently» if thè m&tter is eonsidered at all, lt must 
, ; be limite!, to to«. eeseion of materials, not of aen.|2 f
Badoglio» however, did not transnit his refusai to Berlin, again leaving
, ' toef Germ®» , Hitler toerefere, rateai thè Eubject at 'thè :■
Brianer 'on 4 ' Oetober* ' ' Mi» ' otoer ' aapoets" of thè lame, eonversatlon, ' tote ;■ 
one» too,‘gava rlse to conflicting interpretations. Aecording to thè Ita»., 
liaa‘re«oi€|"»ts«a,iM rofustd Hitler*s offe* of •special'unito for thè. 
aitato' ©»'l®pl", seying toni vhile ho did »t need them for thè "second 
stage" 'of thè offriva he 'reoorved .tot right of laftomiaf toe ftìbrer o f .
6« , WB/ùJM*' i. 73. ' -entry’ for 11.9*19101; ' ' ' ' : '*v " j":-. ~
9* Ibi!. i. 78. entry for 14*9.1940. 
ìOiibid, 81» 83» entriee'for 18, 20.9.1940. : '
11* *fto.'’cmple$»»«at of such unita... ia certainly useful. But it can take 
. ,,. placo «nly if adeguate logietie orpmisalloa io proviied for, vhioh
*""■ étto not «e«®. poswiblo' gtvoa.toe. ■■■■'■* * - “  ““ " ~J
■ • Africa, p. 112, end 1. tavwarl,
ÌÌT185.
at’ eur disposai"• ' Grattimi » „
{»»a» fossi, '.1949)
12. Rrintod in' '»midolla, ap.. «dt.,: ». '235. . ■. Bascially, ■ toe »phloi» m
• thct 'toe'GoWBeas ofcwet imtogiil unito# ■ ubile too Italiana ventai to 
' have material <mly| Mìiioii» to 0SH/6enst.d.^ /Att.Abt., ' Hr. ' 67/40 g. \ Kdos v. 11.9.1940J OKB/Genst.d.l/Att.Apt. to Rintelen, Ir. 34/40 g.
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;
rations reTealod as hopelessly inadequate, tut it now appeared that the at­
tach eiasply 'had no' strategic - aim at all* instead of racing for Salonika, ' 
"the Italiana wanted to try and fight their way wouto from Albania into the 
strategically' vothlesa region, of Epirus down to the Calf of Arts} assuming ' 
they over'reached' there, they would regroup and march on Athens.^ * • :
■' fiwrslov advance - in what tno' strategically the wrong direst!*» - of 
the Italian offensive was not at all in Mtate» with Hitler* s "periphe- 
ralM plansj what was more, it enabled the British to occupy Crete and send 
air force units to Greece itself, 8» opportunity which they grasped on 6 
November.“ Having kept his mouth shut at'Korea®*,’and, as far as we knew,,..- 
immediately after, ^  Hitler finally exploded on 1 November, after Rintelen*s 
reports had male it crystal'clear' that the. ©ifiiialwe was firmly togged down. 
Belatedly, he Oamd to Judge the operation - which he had probably authorised 
and in ary caste'refused'to veto » "negatively in eve*y respect*. '.He was 
"very angry at the Italian machinations* and his disappointment with .toe'' 
martial inefficiency of hla ally such that ho had loot "any inclination for 
military cooperation with him*.^  Ho then proceeded to demonstrato that v' 
tola was m  more than a momentary burst of. irritation bp postponing hie do-", 
elsion as to- whether to send troops to' Libia and making it dependent on . 
fhomato report. '. When the African project was allowed to fall through two 
days later Greece wot not' even mentioned, and - too decision Justified on per* 
feotly rational grounds that were chared by the sober OZH. . . ( ' ;
- Even before making that doelsien Hitler, in m m H m m  with his' usual’ ■ 
method, Ml taken stops to provide for an alternative course of aotleii." In­





m/anr. i, .143* «hjr ior 1*11.1940* m/ltt* A 14, entry for 29
lISIail/l/0CX?i94. If the attack on Greece was comparable to to 
■ man ’Capture if Ierway,. to« toe failure to soiie Oreto was compar 
• to a Gorman Mine to m ' for Trondheim or Narvik. It
.10. 
o flev»
A m * enphaaia in the «AfiBcg7 character of too operaties that a 
priood and «ba*ras«ei too §mini g»/«L* A 14, «tor fto 28*10.
■If40. 8«/3/^5i2-i3:' " '
;»ja« oit.* p. .507» whose «urart ia usually «acted in tots ee*
esyethat it was in too "long... nights of too WBSt TEAS" 
/emphasis 'supplied/.that Hitler lamented toe Italia» mtiea. This is 
«.interesting statement to which wo shall return.
M i, 144» «toy for 1.11.19#| EEB/kalder. il, 158, «try foro. ;
fl
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' Italian offensiv® in Egypt, ha told Irta that , "should the employment of Ger­
ms®,.troops in Libya he written off, a second rate substitute -  an adirane®  ^ ’ 
f l «  Bulgaria to the Aegean -  may become necessary*'. Disappointed with fee;: 
, Italian ferferaai»«, ; Hitler was'Casting around for «aas to carry out fee . 
"peripheral" strategy without them end, if necessity, in spite, of them. It • 
was within this framework that the idea of an invasion of Greece from the 
north -  coupled with a German" at task on Gibraltar, from which he now inton- 
. did to '«elude fee ■ Italians*  ^ -  presented. itself to him. ' "If Greece 'were , 
lost'Ä.^|ft..i»«naeed"l he''reasoned, "England 'would practically be .driven ; 
out of the Mediterranean". ■ So therefore had the subject incorporated into
fee agenda of a scheduled «nforen«' with his denier military .advisers, 
which aim was to discuss and coordinate all military measures designed "to 
male® England admit the war is lost", as'adder, put i t .^
. At 1430 hours of feo 4fe, therefore, a select group of top officers 
consisting of Keitel, Jodi, Brsuchitsch, Haider, Deyhle and.Sohmundt -  ga- / 
feorod at fee Reichskanzlei to meet .fee FBhrer, ; One bp « e , Balder reported
about the »suits, of the,studi« oonducted by OKH about fee various aspects 
of fee;."pertthswd" strategy, asking for decision from Hitler.^0 fee re- . : 
cults of: fee, ©onfotone# were m  follows*.'
1. . Gibraltar. Ealder regarded the problem as "difficult, but certainly 
soluble", and warned Hitler that "fee Boole alone will not do", fee FBbrer. / 
€^p»«ed his hope that Franco would enter fee war,- and ordered, preparations 
t# go on. - -Ho -also' said that .fee fuestioa of fee Atlantic Islands (Canaries, 
Astro»)., m m  being «¡»liiti*'.v': . , - .g'  - .-
•. .-2# Libya. '/'Bidder reported about feat he had learnt from feoma about *3840
57. • ga/QPf*-1.-144. ' «ter' for l.n.1940.
38. G. Ciano, L*lteei>a verso le ' Catastrofe (Miene, Mondadori, 1946, eit*.'
■ Gian», PSaronaJ¿.^5, ia Mttà Imperial Staff would have agreed.
39« mA^Lder. : i i . l60.entry for 2.11.1940. ' -
40. ’ .fee'.'following'aoo«at blenda two different entries in Haider»s diary} 
eae. reoording' the chief of the any general staff*s notes for his re- ■ 
,. .port to.Bitlor (ibid, i l . 159-62) and the other a'traaseriptlon of 
■ the f8hrer*s deciÄfes'at the conference itself, (ibid. 163-65, entry 
for 4.11.1940), ■
Italian reluctance and inefficiency, adding that in order to he really effe­
ctive the German expeditionary force would have to he so , large as to affect 
the preparadness for "continental operation” • Hitler, who had already been 
put into the picture by Thoma himself, agreed. Basing his decision upon 
Italian reluetanoe, logistic and operational difficulties, he confirmed his 
determination to allow the project to fall through for the time being.
3* Turkey. Haider reported about the study had by his Oberquartler*' 
melster I (and effective second in command) general Bantus, for an advance 
from Bulgaria through Turkey to Syria.^  Hitler rejected these plans as 
too sanguine, for they would bring Russia into the picture.^ 2
4. Greece. Here the idea seems to have been Hitler’s own, for there 
is no reference to it in Balder*s Vortra/rsnotlg. He ordered OKH "to prepare 
to assist £ a rapid invasion of Turkish Thrace”. In all probability, we 
can assume with Jacobsen that this operation was meant to subject Turkey 
quickly in case of a TurMsh-Bulgarisrt war breaking out, an ominous possi­
bility which might well set the Russiias racing southward.
However, Hitler seems to have said more than this. Though for some rea­
son Haider did rot record any further utterances of his on this subject, we 
find him and Brauchitsch discussing the measures to be taken by 02H for ”Bu­
lgaria/Greece” two hours later.“ Since this discussion is entitled ”Erge- 
bnis der ITthrerbesurechun^ . it is quite clear that Hitler must have said 
something more about Greece than would appear from the record in Haider* s 
diary. His words were recorded by the QK¥ diarist, Helmut Greiners ”OKH 
will prepare, if necessary to occupy*.. Greek Macedonia end Thrace in order 
to create the prerequisites for the employment of German air force units 
against the British bases threatening the Rumanian oil fields".^  These 4123
41. ' V. supra, p. , footnote Ho. 77» Two corps and three (or six) months 
, were required for the operation.
42. KTB/Kalder, ii, 191# entry for 24.11.1940* "during the last conference 
the itihrer told me* *we can go to the Straits only after Russia is 
beaten*”.
43. Ibid. 11, 166, entry for 4*11*1940.
44* KT3/0KW. i, 150, entry for 4*11*1940.
/f
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two BOurces, "both imsdlate firsthand records of the 
give m  two dxfferent reasoas for whatever German action was to he taken in 
tht BaIkan3, hor does the confusion end there. The SSL diary, recording ' 
'the inforaationsupplied hy Jodi about theconfeaience, has a third version* 
"the F(ihrer con3idBr3 the luaanian oil fields menaced from Lemnos! Kiore- 
' fore E#IEl)IA!rE ^ eaphasis in the original/ dispatch of antiaircraft u$its,
" fighters jKid interceptorstoEuaaaia... !Tne support of tholtalian offen- 
' siw l^ riLn*t.'teie«e"ty troops'..#'"is being ordered.•• The «da'is’ W  "■
/ advance over Eumania end Bulgaria against Greece in the direction' of Silo* . ( 
>• the comaitaent of troop3 for supporting Bulgaria against X 
'••* will' ha eMewd**^- ■. fhe,thriit records, originating in two dis- / 
'tlast "the result" is utter jonftudra«^ '..is 'soefoes '
-lie objectives Hitler wm pursuing in. Greece they ere' singularly' inadequate.
■"' 2» "our _ attoipt. te ie*m' iis«rih&Bf .nor® about, BUMNor* s' aS*8; in ordering 
1 of an attack m  Greece, thei^ fore, we are forced to fall 
in etiMart' !•«# ddrooi, ■ ’ivideaee« ‘Per one thing, the very fact that'; 
thesuhject was brought up in a conference that was'’designed to coordinate 
(Wm measures of tha war against ikigland, and in the first place these for- 
ning part of tee nperipheraiH atratQ£y, is of course inportant. ■ So is the, 
fact Wmt it M  first nentioned in ee»®eti©a with the Egyptian offensive ' 
end a3 a .Ae^ sipifiotiiee of thesiTf»t»
is.jointed 1 ■
in the plans for the war in the Iloditerranea1:, since here one *i
45» KTB/SXL. Handakten "Pelix", "Nidderschrift fiber Besprechung I. SSL bei 
Chefs UP3t/OS3i General Jodi am 4.11.1940, p. 2, C2&/115/000459-505.
4S. Thus, the SEX diary, says that the menace to the Buaaaian oil fields
i was to be dealt with by the "immediate” dispatch of air force units -
(not mentioned anywhere else), while the German invasion of Greece, 
directed against Larissa end EOT against Lemnos, was supposed to be 
"in support of the Italian offensive". This statement is in turn con­
tradicted by Hitler telling Haider that he wanted the Italians "to go it alone". (fCTB/Halder. ii, 159, entry for I.H.I94O). A farther sign 
of confusion is the note hy the SEX diarist saying that "two divisions 
of two corps" were being considered.- It seems hopeless to try and unravel his tangle of conflicting, incomplete and partially nonsensi­cal statements.
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; . WfpM- evtsywfiarit ';tte. Barite-fetid «a» ' ;.ffesrtfore* ,Ite .plans '■ - /•/■/v’"far an.' <temm attsclc ¿tarn1 tolgasela -«ipiast norteer» iieeee were. .V 
already iacluded la ’'directive lio. lS'1, issued on 12 Eoveaber, ■ '
. ., 'which enlarged about Ite. flaming and. direction lx of the war . - 
: ’ in Ite Iter liti« ted; occupied himself with the •'
.. , ,,'ftette of peoaMag tes'Ili&iteiKonte forte* warfare of-tee • •■, , AXlS. - ' . “ ’ '■ ■ 47 ; : ■ '• - ■.■ :, v'\.,,;..5- ;
Tlie decisioa to invade Greece with German troops coming from the north tin ’.
crust therefore be viewed in. a context of "securing the ; 
for the varfare often Ixle'^  that is not an Italian or even 
From ths"«t«t* if wtedirected-«fstiist tte British* '/"It 
was regarded m  part -  perhaps not ©os, that had teen included in that 'itesi '..;
. in'-the praliainary studies, but still a part - of the *p«ipfearteM ' strategy* '
' ' As a llediterranean and "peripheralt operation, the tension 'of Greece ' 
was incorporated info the «®d*r summing up all > the measures which Hitler ' 
expected totakeagainat the British in /too Mediterranean during the winter.
On 4 November Hitler had ordered OB# to. prepare ’ such an order, to te ' sig 
ty Ma sad i«Mt as a Sior diTtete"#^ ;; A first 'draft was ready on 5 
vember, but rsjected by Jodi teewso it gaso too ss»®h prominence to fps*t-_ !;. ' 
tion'MS«& Lion"» "the landing in United Kingdom, tette Hitler still teoatet 
inibii Inmmmi MtiiiA t» ite spring»^  ■ 9b. T November Warlimoat 
Jodi " a' «eon-nd drafts in'
On 12' Xèwwtete this onavaslssued over Hitler*» signature m  "war directive
47* .3« ihxeller-IIillebraad, ,I)er Zusammenhang zwisefeen te deutschen Balkan-
\ fMisag'naft t e  teuton'!a !tesill¡fl«,* 1551, IS Ho. .
; A1 1454 ft the Imperial War Museum, Citi Muelle3>Hillebrand, Zusaamen* 
hang) Wm 4*5«' ' " ' • ’ :
48* In this context it is interesting that, according to the Greek military 
attache in Berlin, OKI was planning "to attack the British fleet and 
bases in the eastern Mediterranean and for this purpose intended to 
; establish air bases in eastern Shrace..* in connection vitifadvEmce ba­
ses in the Bodekaneze.». Shis German platyf has nothing to do with giv­
ing assistance to Italy in Albania". British foreign Office Documents. 
(urrprintod, cit* BFOP). Sargent memo, 50*10*1940, o 1J159*
49.. KTO/oar. i, 150-51* entry for 4.11.1940.
v.lMl>'.l,M5g. ; ■ ' ' v .
51*- JOpJI* i§ 157*
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-■'Is* ASw*^ ;-:J|wyf4ijig.•#» toe mn3m% of,toen» la^ttie si» totisrt'V’it"'7 
' laid Im i: toe following direotives on each of the main prohleast ■ ■ 7' - -
1# ' lelaiiens wito Bmmm* ■'• ‘ : 7
'■ yWm aim of sy. policy “towa*! Mrmm is to ©oepieratii wito; tout •■.■•:.' •;•.
- ■ ■ ■ country in the lost Affective Banner possible for the future ^ .
' ■ conduct of .toe wm against England, for the present Jtonoe ' V -.'■
1 will’ assume the role.'of a t*osb«lli#Wiattt pwr sod «ill 'thus ,
■•■ be^ refutoed to'allow 'CNoeash’srsr afusures'on,.,trenail 'territory .' cad particularly in the Uxlma. colonies. She will also be ■'.' h
7 req,uired to eupport these measures with her own forces as far,' :•
' : m 'say"-.be neeesssay, ■: The most urgent duty of the 3tees®h is ■
'" to oecuretheirAfrican possessions (Mont and Equatorial Af* ">
" • / ■.’ ftoa|f1 ieftoaiwely «ol offensively* against England and. the 7' V
first priority. " She'Rp«s©h were reported to he "very
'mmiltg of toeir talks with ffitl«*^ 7«id'©a'’30 'Oetsbir 
feiito 'hit btoaieiit •’ hit .riifttotes to' ©osporotr with Germany to' the "frenoh .■ 
'wttdUwi*^ '’' 8oa«s%n«itly|7 tMH ww busily negotiating toe". details. of • “to# ita*.', 
ture military Zusemenarbeit between the toe countries'by steens'of; to# ■»* ■
..M»ti##.'o«rtl^ #a*® ; : \;''■;; ■ ,-; -Vi"-/-;■ "_■,v, ■ -
; t. Political measures to bring about the entry into , the war of /
, Spain in toe ne» future, hove already been initiated. She ' y 
‘ aim of GE8HABT ^original eaphaais* designed to exclude toe ~
ltaHan|7 intervention in toe Iberian peninsula,** will be * '
. to drive toe Englich.froa toe Western Ilediterraaeang. : To 1 ^ V?\V.*»;V
(BfibQL r  v 1 *  ' .* f ; r ;;1 ■ j , ’ ■ ■ ( j, ;. „, ’ , , 1 ■ i * ’* ■
...»c ;(Gibralt» i$ to be Captured and toe .Straits o i o s e d * '
. 7 7 . »•"tr'iie pevtotei^ iftis« ptotof'ii foot*" --'v-.-v: 
■ "V-'tog at'*»y eto».|®iat'§a .toi'-ibi t^jto.prttoirili,« to toe „At*, ■
ro follovodaBOries of for % fairly
1^: docigned to occupy Gihralt.art the
51*4 /^MWtaA'-to fmmor l# f» f -ait**
53'» ’-1 KTb/sicl« a H4f: jintp^K“ 3®*^*l
% * i for. v,
)• " Q| "14# ,15S|:; |,*W| entries for 1, 4» 7» S«ll*lf#f1 slit! 0» ife* 3f* ■ ' ■ ' ,  :
of Morocco* Shis was the peripheral” strategy at its largest and most san­
guine, involving cooperation with BOSS Prance and Spain and aimed at driving 
the British out of, the western Mediterranean as well as securing the coast • 
of Horth Vest Africa for the Axis* But Hitler had not forgotten the eastern 
Mediterranean* ■ • , : ii; . • ' ■ -
The employment of German forces will he considered«., only after 
the Italians have reached Mersa Matruh.
. One armoured division. •» will stand feedy for service in north 
t Africa* 1 ( ■"
As long as Mere a Matruh was not reached Alexandria and Suez vers beyond the 
reach of the German, air force, and this made the transfer of forces to Libya 
pointless* Hitler therefore fell back on his original idea, i.e of sending 
his troops there only for the "third” stage, even though he now realized 
that it was as likely as not that this stage would never materialize* Still,
. in the faint hope that the Italians would finally get moving in December, he 
ordered preparations to go on. Meanwhile, a paragraph concerning the ”sec- 
end rate substitute” for the Egyptian operation was incorporated into the 
directive* , ■
Commander in chief army will be prepared, if necessary* to occupy from Bulgaria the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea* This 
will enable the German air force to attack targets in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and in particular those English sir bases threate­
ning the Rumanian oil fields* '
The object of German intervention in Greece was exactly similar to that of 
expeditionary Corps in Libya* to provide air bases for use against the 
British in the eastern Mediterranean. So inpatient was Hitler to achieve 
this aim that, two weeks later, he decided he would rather not wait until 
the realization of the other parts of his program, but try end induce the 56
56. KTB>to. i, 182, entry for 19.11.1940| OBi/WESt/Abt.L Hr. —/40 g. 
ICdos v* 22.11.1940, end Qi&yfet/Abt.L Hr. 72/40 g.Edos Chefsache v. 
26,11, both in Sammelmape ”Akten btr. Weisung Hr. 18”, item Ho. M.I 
4/14/620 at the Imperial War Museum. Also ETB/Halder. ii, 179, entry 
for 14*11.1940« On 13 Movember Greiner noted that it was again in­
tended to offer Badoglio German air force units for the SECOHD stage 






tire Greektìainltod.^1 '-this decision natß^lly ràqaired the commitment to •
»re forces than had toen. envisaged ■mê, «eagtit -.tow*. «iti. Ito ■ * ■
buildup . ^ œ s  whith*.'-as m  jéuùl .se#*.. wert. We.ttortoto®': » 'v
find'Haider.oip^iaitoj^ »hont .tto - tot«@to.-©n»s#l^';
w s  and 02¥"f faß.-' the' Jtowgs/to woak. IpaisA m  -thè -generai ., ^ ;"y. '
■staffrt by reason of the insufflcienjt oLplhr pi-Hu» ÖK'.Äfectiwst'ÄiÄ 
"did not ««y/wtot'-wiis^ iitotei in Bulgp«jj^, but salar prattled «tantvtto y‘ y? 
strength of the troops »ftored '«mi even -aïroitapetofiewaits?* ' . totole-1# f. ^ 
see' a way ont of theeetouito« Haider '»folto'W*Af by toting'-.ths*.' the 
Ite»' «¿i one nor® showing mm», interest in operati®». *ito Lion% ■ «hito ' ' ■ ■; - 
vas “tbä most '.certain, way .to gat at • fn'any «••%'-the OIV- dire#*- ■•/.■■.
tires * h i v i w  'eoafuato* Jito to 'he ehsytof, end hy All Vmmútm Ito€to.'«l^: •■■•',. 
»■^.^:a'ftoriy:.'to^,ld«i. to to'*tito:W«9«*toUft vrtU he
V .  ' 1 ■  ■  (■ '■ ■ ■  t  - 1 . ■ ■ > .  '  > , . - '  , ,  .  . . .« f< ■ '■ ■. f ■ ’ ■ " “ .'■'■ ' . • ' ■•■■- '■■.; : m  s  v; ■-> v- :■>-.;■ ■
to 4. lortober. I94O''ÇSS,sto,'its«lf’.Äiieatto '«Mb a sew,task! 'that torrefai : 
ring» vi thin tot framework of •itoeftiw Bto.l** tot str*»;-''-^
ÿ«pgr# to.isttoito'èf Ä«.öir&tvi*e'''ilA Bulgaria, '.Cm* 'tarato .^ -yy-
after .the (»aftotofl#. at tto ItotoatoMlei* Salii* «it sto-dova'.'''. ■
t® toft-.a first 'ioto''to'fe».r»t«irements of 'ä s -§«s®fä«Ä »'tito had'jttst'.to*'. 
tortol'.. . -y .;/ -í:-... -¡ : . v^'' , : ■'■'■ ;
■ Since the,ftoiltoito to tilt',«saltatili®.«Mb transe"4» tosatoti« toas*«» -. r .
Vtors^ t.hto»-to;;Ätlto*s-i»tot, ,bn«» tto .iéf.d*s; largest snas»!®^ ;■■ 
Its four aay;gro«tfl,ato''tto i'»toto’ lay 'seatterto all ofer luMve9/ganiscm*" 
■ iag «10 o^^ito »««Les 'iná- yvaitoftUsg for all ìda/fc..to' ¿fwtuaUtlM^ ..' ¿ 
gvirth as -fclas protection of tìie to toi; ftats* against the to .
9i1anl,Íáar«!V M M  to';«tee »roes was en#^i on active
totto'lltotoeiis «toe .iwvanasily nada 'ium iùm tb* : ■ ,'.
61. " i. «to «to mrnm if^ 4f|i«-. (w xs* al 1059/I at tto Imperial War Museum, alti êiMàmm'' Balkan) m * W .  7. also
^  O t e »  il* l|l»:lf4' ^
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: worthy by the cession of nuclei earmarked for : the establishment of new
''uhits.^ ; . -v v-4
at' first ' «9peered modest «nan¿h# '•. She obvious unit3 to seiest were XXXX* :■ ■ -
v. ■ '§xstf':éàèt>* .und 2.í: Sad- 9. ,ér»wtâ::Ârlsioat’«torMîmtet ..te. it, because ’ : .' 
;'..'tiv;were';eloieit;-to'; the '«tene of action*. Having teen trasnported to ti#*---.
■ ' ma/in August in order t«-occupy, if necessary» the Ploesti oil fields,^  
/•'they'hai to ' a .'large extent been releived of their .tasi» by the «onoentra*
.: tloa; of : the ' mighty Beerasgruune B with ita 35 divisions in Bolead, ¡md By - 
the''dispatih oí a German army mission' to lámanla proper after the Second ^  < ; 
-'''Tisana 'Award* ^ -./ - ■'V  ■ • l----*-'.:'; ’ ';■ v=--;  ^ \-' -./ --
ŒX* *erps «old.be joined by another, still unspecified, corps con- 
> slating «£ 2 wwtttaln or infantry divisions. In addition, it would be ne*
' oèssàry to " brli% up lft»stea»e:' * 'artillery, coimmmications and engineering 
. /troops ' of -all kinds, whose proportion in relation ' to the' number of organic .
divisions would hate' to' be »ther M#'be«®»»» -of. the' difficult terrain in 
■ " -thè Balkans*,.:Svtn so, - the forte 'i&vi'sagtd was ■ small' to ba put under ■
' ,'tà#;eoaaand#;-»0t of .'en'®»y but of Pmsmmmma* Heist'* so called after ite 
«*m*aÄtr*- "thT thèn ¿olea»! gÉiMràl-'SHold'Von-Heist * which status was some- 
1 '-...where between that of «  a»y end -a'" corps.6^' ^’»eidti‘i®. by'various rumours '
" -'V'about frèparattott®■ mède ly'--thè tusslea Balck Seai fleet, the appearance of .
■ Sòvièt offtOer»'in Istanbul Âd'a'SdLtiià;'i«idiag la SaloailEa,6^  OICI must '
• h*Vèfelt''tî»t haate' could do no hiasaf as early as 4 IToveaber, therefore, '
-. ■ -'^ »ail'Greiffenb^ -'of àÒC introduced oolonel Zed tiler, chief of staff to'
-■ / -ViïàK&àanÈ»ê- Heiiti 'to hie unit*a h»w't«*te,;':a.o' tl»t'the staff could' start
- ‘ - .63.',-'.üni» ^ .:if®gr»for,the enlargement^  the array from 120 to ISO di­
visions, .,el!/divisions were required to-'oede .part of their, 'men .and:. ,- 
-; - ' v. staffs for: the ' establishment of new unitsî in November 1940, 'no ' les» ■ l:
7§ ditisions had., äus be« made : inocúlete* '
m/eai» i* %  entry for. 29.8*1940.- - /  ; /■,- - - ; ■ V'/ '/ ''/v\;/'-V./
65. >9» p«f#»e.'fèr idâ: tbe'-'aMy group was-moved. to Boland has been the > 
eubjest of sea* 'discussion. Here the views expressed by HUgruber,
> StrateM,».’'n. 254, '«a?® 'acoepted..; / • 1 : '■ ; ’/'/ ■ / ' ■ . f ,
- 66, ' "mÉMalâm: 'it,' 165, « t s y  for "4«U*lf40*;' " • ' " ; ’■ " f ! „
. . 67. auf d«a Balkan** folder, quoted by Fabry, Balkan,
■'., •' - P. 73. ■ . ■ . .
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...  ^ Î ‘ g g .. i ; - ... • • • ■ ; ' ' ; v ' :
".Vit* . > . : ...V , ■ , ;,,V.:;/ '■
Four divisions seemad a. modest '®u»b®r 'te «tari vite, ^ tut vhen colonel 
Bausinger, chief of .te# operations department at OU, submitted his itrst .
V, plana,te ^Jialder on 6 Boveraher it appeared that tee chief of tea general '"’i .
; .staff, had ,TOd«»tiJiatiid; te®, vtr^ ifte;©f te® forces refairei.. .¡, .60* and S3 
MAdolf Hitler” • bote motorized elite units • divisions ver®, added to SS*
; corps, xaising, the. number of largo uni ta under ita, emmmâ. te. four* :. XXX. ;■
 ^\ .corps, which ai that time vas still, under ^ te® :. command of • army group B in 
. Polan&and had to be released on the next dey, vas selected to join il. . 
I64* and 78* lnfantrydivisions, as vall as 6* and 5* mountain divisions, 
ver® plaoed undor ita commandé Within tha epaoe of two dsys, therefore, 
te® forces .®«g0makêâ for te® Greek operation had grovn froa 4 te 8, divi- ■ 
ai©»« » vite tee'.'mateer.®f; amy troopa increasing in proportion* ; .
On te«, next day, ■ 7 Hovember,. Solder aummoned his APC * major Gehlea ■- 
and colonel Heusinger te.. hâve a firat look .ai te« concentration and deploy- 
nant ,of:te# forcoa*.', Hitler1# directive had speoified that tha atteok.vas 
to oome tes te® sorte via Bulgaria, and in ord#r te reach test coimtry it 
vould .h® n*c«swMKqr. te- march from tha Balte throu^ i aâth«r Poland ' or .Han»' ■: - 
gary into Euaania* Politlcally, te® question of te# attitude of tee last,
, '.saBOi^ teuntAte'Vte.rot .regardai as a probleaf hôte had h#« driven into 1V -;
. tee ,ars»a of Eitler hy thair fear of Stalin and eould be regarded as sef«; ■ 
Germas satelites* ' ' Wan««*» had slreacbr eonsented te tee cassas» of Germas '
; .troopa, on their vay te, te® Rnmania» ciUWLdc on 50 September, andwhen,
. 'Mil« on 20 Novamber aaM jœoiiicf Seltki for riÿita of transit for "»ldi*»;. 
V tional troopa 'tecta vera granted vithout further ado on te® sert day.
. éè&êml Ion Antonesou of Eumania,. inforoed of te® Germas plana by SeÎtel
., . ■ on 23.1^ naÀar^  dite wdaad M'difXiacItlMi his only refusât vas ihat 
'.tee hurden of supplying tha troopa should not fall dn his oountry, as the
68. Ihid. iMd.
69, M.d«r* ■ ii. 167, entry for 6*11.1940* Of 5» mountain division wfrtaiUMKb'''imi riiaiarfi tee rast of te# division vould he ready©nly
only ty end 3tee«ih«.
70. Eitler-feleki conversation, 20*11.1940, PGPP. P, ad, Ho. 365t Hihhen- !.- ■ trop »«, - 21.11.1940, - Aktan Mro RAM, eWfl6/OOOQ2A,
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Germán army mission sent to Rumania in October «as already devouring a v«y: .
' considerable part ot the Rumsnian budget.^ 1 The refuest vas readily gran- \
, ted by Hitler, 'and OIS wasconfronted with the naed to brin® up ail supplies ■ 
■for ovsr 100,000 msn froa Gexmany - a task vkich, in view of thè state of 
the central luropeaa raad net, vas likely to cause great difficulties and 
perhaps delay. '-':-
From the operational point of view, thè ori« to concentrate on thè M »  
garo-Greek ffcontier and carry out tbe operation from tbere vas, indeed, a 
diffiôult one* '' The Greek border vas heavily fortified by thè so called ■ -:v 
"Metaxas line", a modem series of fortifications construoted betveen 1936 ■ 
and 1939« dn attack in this direction vould not point tovard the heart of 
Greece, but only to Greek Thrace. Moreover, thè deployment area vas remote '
. . and hard toreach. Rumania, through vhich thetroops vould perfores hade 
to pass on their Vay to Bulgaria, couldin theory be reaehed through either 
■ Sungary or Roland, but "in 'effect she vas cut eff j£cm thè latter country in 
- 1939 vhen the Russians invaded eastem Roland and,. déspite soma lest moment 
. Germán attempta to save it froa their elutches,^ 2 took possession, of paset'^  - 
• of the vital Breslau-Lvov-Carnauti railvay. The remaining rail communlca- 
; tions betveen Roland and Rumania,. odd bits of sitale track Crossing the ■ (
.■ Carphatians fromnorth west to south east, that is in a direction hasically. ;
■' tangenti&l ‘ to that of the valleys, ver® paswitiitlly unsuitable for troop ^
. transports.^  ^ The attitude of Rana Frank, the ïlazi govemor of Poland vho - 
had built Ma tvnMn^em there, mi» not helpfal either.^
; v0nly by vay of ffiapay* -Hito,'' «ould- «e-r^A Rumania. Once there, ■ 
however, the tr0ip®: vould be faced vith the blunt f act that there vere m  : ' ■ 
bridges over the Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria. ■ They vould therefors '
; k«r® to travel by nát'ffceii ámatela .tiw»#.Stagary iato iaaaniaf ' disestrain, ^
71. Fgbrv. Balkan. p, 82.
' 72. TXSÊf* D. viii. Roa. 102, 257. " : —  ■ ; '
73. Accordine to Warlimonti F&brv. Hitler-Staiin. t>. ' V '■
74. flBÁMdiá' ii¿ 168. entry for 6.11.1940. -
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north of. the Danube* march, to the Ävert cons tract provisional bridges* 'and ; 
finally, cross into northern Bulgaria. Mia then their or^ deal would just'' 
he beginning, for they would »till face a march or »«varal hundred miles 
right acras» the latter' counter to the Greek frontier* a lengthy, complica- - 
tea and, to the troops, tiring: iperatim...''Given conditions in Salgarán,' . 
which could safely: be assumed'to be bad enough, 'the buildup was bound to 
last for ten 'weeks, if. this 'raute, were., selected. ^  .. '
' To make sure about the conditions that would face the arty in Bulgaria 
was the first" thing to do. On 8 'Boftanber 'air' reeei»ais»«aee .over the' country . 
was therefore cleared.1 On the day after, colonel Bruckmarm, military at- ■ 
tache in-Sofia,'' delivered a report ."about the Bulgarian army, 'ram'net and . 
climate.*^  The picture painted was so dark that Haider decided'to organize ' 
a regular reconnaissance staff under the command of colonel Kinzel, head of 
fremde 'Seare-'Oet def«Hnwat«.:tc study ranii ticas • #a the spot.^ 8 V:' 
Hitler*» order to deploy in southern Bulgaria for '«a operation against 
Gram*' was, in summa, everything but easy, to put into pwwti®»* - Bor were '' 
the difficulties of a geographical nature - only..' Bulgaria had only one rail- 
way leading directly inte- .Greece: (Salonika) -«-th» ©no brancing off the Sofia 
-Istanbul liai'.nesá*'Athlon and running south through the valley of the Mari- 
tsa - and .that.one was too close to the Turkish border to be utilized. On 
their .Way sou1h,\tha''Gmaaa’''tewp»‘WÄÖ.d'.bÄf» the Turkish army looking or er 
their left Acul^ ri-'ató'.the' attifetóe of Turkey'!» the' entry'of German . 
tr«sp».;ittto',Balp«la was by no means clear. On their right flank, the Ger­
mans would have ara ther uncertain factor* Yugoslavia. . ’ r.
If .the Bulgarian operation, was' a difficult one* it was the government of 
Belgrade that was in a peeáti#«.to make it w y  w»ár eaaier* ; Hungary-Kumania 
was one route into Bulgaria* Austria-Yugoslavia was another, and an infini- 
tely shorter easier .cae at'that*-' If Yugoslavia ooaseated,.it would be
75. Ibid.. 170. «ater for 7.11.194-0. -,■'■■■■■ \ ■
76. ‘Ibid. 172. entry ftr 8.11.1940. > \ ; ' ■ y; V"; ’
77« Rid«' 175. enter for 9.11.1940. ■ . .
78. Ibid. 175, '«»try for 11.11.1940. .'.'flnral'was'regarded as especially'iui&lr &r tie ..Job because he had' done similar work in the Balkans '' 'during World-War I. • - ■
1

eort, I» attitude venid determine vhether Hitler eould braach out into the 
eastem MM&immmm' m plazmed* ov vhethsr he would be stuck in soutia- ,v: 
eiwriom Bi»pe* _ ; -
• Bering the fírst Aays of Eoveaber» therefore, 'Gmsam diplomacy Initi- ; 
ated aoves which ultímate ala vas not only to openthe vay through Bulgaria 
,and| ií possible# Yugoslavia, but 'te' establish political control over those '
. párbs of eoutlaoestern Europa thatweronot yet unier its swajr. . rae capí*'-'-,
• tal» on whicb Germán diplom&oy vould soca fiad itsslf kn.oc3d.ng vfere Sofía, _ - 
' Belgrado and Ankara. ' Wmmmtt títere '««i^ amito* great'power which. h&d its : ■ 
HM^ látaraata. la fhe’jtf«* and wanted to hava a eay about ita fate* in hia . 
effO*ta t®. incorpórate tha whol» «f ®ontl»»8t«am Europa ia the Germán ephere 
©f ínfluence» Eitler clashed head on vith the Sfviet Union. /
f i l l  I I
/
Chapter 4
Proa the Mediterraneen to the ^
In the present context, the RusAian problem 1® almost & new one* It is very 
probable that the mystery enveloping Soviet-Xuglslav relations played a role 
in Hitler* s categorical and persistent refusal to allow Mussolini to attack 
the latter country, while the fear lest the Soviets might exploit the Italian 
failure in Greece to forward their own aims * to advance in the direction of 
the Straits and ultimately, perhaps, to join hands with the British in Greeoe 
• may have played a role in his decision to build up his forces in Rumania 
and Bulgaria as a preliminary to the Greek operation. ; Esoept for this, _ the 
Russian factor does not seem to have had a large influence on our context.
Proa about July 1J40 onward, German-Soviet relationships proceeded on 
several different levels. On one hand there was the idea - conceived-by OKS/ 
and strongly sponsored by Ribbentrop in the foreign ministry1 - of construc­
ting an anti-British continental block, an idea which to Borne extent was 
taken up by Hitler himself. On the other hand, there was the German-Soviet 
struggle for influence in eastern Europe, a struggle that stretched right 
across the continent from Pinnland in the north to Turkey in the south. Ex­
ploiting Hitler*® involvement in the war against the west, the Soviets had 
exceeded the provisions of their 1939 non agression past with Germany and 
swallowed, in addition to the Baltic States and parts of Pinnland, the nor­
thern parts of Rumania. In the summer of 1940 the two countries were enga- ' 
ged on a regular race aimed at incorporating the whole of eastern Europe as - 
spheres of influence. In this race Hitler, to whom the area was absolutely - 
indispensable as a source of raw materials - in the first line Rumanian oil 
and Finnish nickel - had scored an important wtatwiy in the form of the Second 
Vienna Award, from which the Soviets hsd be«i:«»olM#d. By the late autumn 12
1. The Rlbbentroo Memoirs (London, Nichlson&V/eidanfield, 1954) pp. 148-50.
2. Y. supra, p. •' , 1
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of fh* year he was on the;werfe'of scoring father successes when both Hun- ^ h
■' gary and Rumania «#NMd to'join. the feipartitt.tact. On the other hand, ■
.* •■ • Me susosMr in bringing ever ielftt&r má. Ihgislavi» to Me «m p ,u m  still 
very much in doubt. .-•■
• Partly as a remit of Soviet freeware in north and southeastern Europe, , •' 
which threatened to deprive him of Ms economic hinterland, but also as, the ,:' /
■ result of' «ach' wider mmidenttions,' Hitler had started eealMHeplatlsg. an ■ .
- : ' attack on the Soviet Union during the end ef Jtily. . - Speculating about .Wm'
1 fattart "Äst held England la' the, war»' he' «asu&Med that _ they were to be., - ■ ; ’
- found in the hope for American and'Soviet aid. ¡There w&3 nothing he could " '
'•:'d*“Ä#ut''Ä.e:fo»«*» .b«t to»»ia'wMi-wilMn"r*Ä and could, if necessary,■ ■' ■
• • be crushed* : fMs approach presented the adMfK^advantage of relieving
” : ; Japan from Soviet pressure end thus enabling her to told tee Ü3 in «heck,/ 
fltofllmr 1(rfta*MÍéii of by aoteal warfare. ...aese^oontóld^attes »suited in ■ ; 
en order to OCT %*fai ofif to'prepare the ftooretteal «»yart «^<iei«wWt ha* . ■
■ sis ffcr'iii attack oa'tesMa'ia'''^ ' ^ ^teg ef 1941.^  ■ ft* Importance of s;V  
: ,:v* these 'prtfarttteis«,1 Btarted early in' Angiet end procedding rather slowly.'. ■;
V- : and without any intervention from Hitler*s aide until .'early. la December, ■ 
should 'not :be'Ort»«ÄtlÄted*■ Stwy w e »based' 6a  eral «de» «oír and .had =
; ’'«ofytt\bMá fMMtiit to the IVhmv at the ’time ef “Mrective^  No. 18“ g. ■ . . 
'■■■■"Wm'lm® purpose,': it ’is '"•ä s fact "-iiat. it wM'Mther with Sassia or against; ■
' her that Hitler thought hi' could proceed that is important! either a far- t 
. ' ■ reaching agreement, preferably Involving her in a war against rwgd*«*, was
achieved, or it would 'be;'nwMsä^ /to'.iai»Ä^ hMr» because she vas too dan- h../ 
: gerous e neishbour and «Mid be expected to nttaeli Germany once the US and < '.
• ,:;BiB4^ 1ehd' had 'thMv pt^y>yeti.:W#' Sn.Äo.iwwt.^ •/ . • ■
. 'about'thé middle, ef September 1940» it  mm the "dth tesla“ ^e®s*;,.'
; roach Äat eees&S't# have gained the upper hand in Ätler*s MM« With the
; J« KTB/Halder. ii, 52-4, 43-50, entries for 22, 51.7.1940. ^  »»t dé* 
tailed desoription of these preparations is contained in 1. Ptó»,
Die Entwicklung der PI annum? des Eusslandfeldguges 1940-1941 (Univer- 
: ^  ^ si^ Bom Mss* IM1, . iis., 1956) • ,
' 4* V. Pabxy, Hitler-Stalin. p. 521, esp. footnote No. 460.
■' 5.1 M* a much m m  detailed discussion, ▼. Sillgrabor, PP* V■ ' ■ • 551-75. - ; - '
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invasion of England sbandonadand the war likely to reaoh into 1941, Hi tier 
needed'a secure.back. He therefore was increasingly inclined,to listen to ‘ 
toe flans'of his foreign minister, which now began to assume a »re concrete., 
form, their main postulates wore' 'as follows. Germany would assume toe lea/- ' 
derahip in a European, coalition directed 'against England."' Into this coali- . 
tion he wanted to incorporate Russia and Japan, as well as Italy, Spain and 
possibly. Franoe, so as to Create, an anti-British block stretching from Tokyo ■ 
to the Straits of Gibraltar. All these countries were to reach agreement . ■■' ■; 
between them and participate in the onslaught on the British Empire, each ' 
in its own designated "sphere of influence". By offering the Russians the 
propscst-of' expansionatthe «xpense of Britisn in toe direction of the Per-7' '■ : • 
sian Gulf mi' India, Hitler and Ribbentrop hoped not only to hurt - tot Bri- 
tish but to "divert" the Russians from their traditional. European aims and . 
relieve Gefai^  'rest toeir pressure. :' this, in a very much abridged .and' aim- ■' 
plified form,was the conception which Hitler had Ribbentrop - and who was ■
. bettor''«tritoif - communicate to Mussolini on 19-20 September.
. . Though it would be wrong to regard toe "continental block" conception . ■
as synonymous to Iaeder»s "peripheral" strategy - which also involved the'. " ■ 
use 'of other European states against England - toe two programs had much in ■. 
common.. Both aimed at' bringing Brittain to her knees "by other means" '.than; - _
invasion. Both involved-the waging of war against England with the help of ' 
other''states*. 'Both, wire ultimately based on toe assumption tost, the war ' 
would not end in 1941, ftr otherwise both would, presumably, be dispensable . i 
ant :«vt»'daiifia«w§'ia m  far'as they would result in toe strengthening of ' 
other states, some of them not at all congenial. Th© "continental block" 
conception was. naturally much > toe larger of' the two programs, and ' supplement 
ted toe "peripteral" strategy in a double sense; England »old be' faced with 
more'sasi&fSf■' and. Hitler*s back would be. relieved of Soviet pressure.  ^ ;. -
It is' totref®re. no aosideai that too two systems grew up together, as it 
were. ’. ntt.';n^ ir"«t'6ssMn»So^ .ot relations was probably reached early in ■ ’ ' 
September, after Hitler had excluded the Soviets from participating in toe 
Vienna fn&d andguaranteed Rumania* a frontiers against them; from that time ■ 
onward there are clear signs that, although by m  means ready to renounce
/
. toe adrantagt# he had won In eastern. Europe (which be proved by sending bis 
' troop#' tie§m w 'tbe'Xauadan oil fieli# on 12 October)6 »tier hoped to ..
' improve ' hi#' relations ' with the' big testerà nei^ ibour. Sta#». the preparai?-,., ■ 
ions for a 'lussi« ^ e«*«paiga in 1941 'were ■ increasingly pushed iato - the , 
background until such a campaign vas regarded as nolonger probable in 0®-.;,' 
'■tobùtj■'y^ r ';= - i-"- -,
Even before -teat time effort# to bring about a rapprochement with' ta#» g 
sia tad'beg« la earnest. The »nt step toward the establishment of a ,
' g r a n d ' '  anti-British - ata» incidentally, • anti-American '- coalition ira« ' toe :
. Signatare, on 27 September, of the Tripartito Paot by Germany, Italy «ta ' 
Japan. ; ’ Both 'Eibbentrop tad his Jap&eto colleague, ^ Matsuoka, ' regarded 'too ' 
paot as a prelude to the definitive clarification of too relations between '„ . 
the signatory powers and the Soviet Unlon, ths one by intoiporatiai her in 
the pact and to® other by toe eignature of a Soviet-Japanese nonagression , ' '
- pact, a geta toward to® attainment 'of which ha hoped to «list too good of-
»tos.of Berlin*.®,The t«ii»':toetoftto»!©ontaitod'm  article explicitly ,■, 
Baying i t  was 'tot directed against Russia.9 To create the right atmosphere 
Ribbentrop had given Stalin 24 ' bows' advance notice about .'to# ngtatore' of ’ ,  ^
to«' paot,10whlle » tie r  ordered Sitaet:'industrial order#" t o  be givto top _ 
priority -, that l i » . even-bef«»#'0«emn 'oto#.1^ -' After ■ spending: four days.-., ^ 
» t o 'toe Storte toe 8th - in solitary '«tateiiiplatie& at to«' Ber^of»,- » t ie r . 
emerged vith his decision made. ' Thls resulted, on 19 October, in,Ribbentrop ; 
sending a letter to- Stolta* in which he «®lta®ed:. »tier*# plans and invited 
»lotto te ^ eoi» to Berlin to ditouea teem*12':""'; ; . •.
- 6. Rather ®ptimi#tietaly» he hoped toat statable diplomatic action would \ :
pnvtot' a ' MMtfMBt 'deterioration ■ in. Ooaaaa-Seviet relation#! KTB/OKM.
i , . » 5 ,  m to r  -.fto ®*lo*lf#*. ■; •
.7* KTB/SKI. A 14. "entry für' 50.10.1940. GKlA/000595. !
8. Sommer, o£. pp. 4&»62f tato ftofir. Mtlei^ttaiii»' 52§-ff./: \ ''y;/; ;
9* ¡SSBU- Ìd# ta, .®e,'.lls*. ■ '’\ i" ;
10. WËÈ/ÉÈMmt* li»  li t , «to y  -fto 30*9*1940..'' , r' . ' ; ' ' ' ,
11. Iktoar* »tleiNfttalJi» m. 924-25. ' 1 ■ '.
12. W tt^ D, xi, rn * lTéi. matador* ii, 14®, «stay fw 15.10.19401 fer a, detailed '■ analysis. I^ bCT. Mtïto-S'tolin* pp. 541-41.- " :. ■
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Stall»*s reply turned eut to be satisfactory! the Soviet dictator pro­
fessed his general agreement totha plans brou#t up' by the German govem-■ iïment and consented to have Molotov visit Berlin. ' ^ From Moscow, ambassador ^ 
Schulenburg reported that the Soviets were ready in principle to sign & 
pact with Japan.*^  It was therefore in an optimistic mood that Hitler ini- 
' tinted Mussolini into his plans,*”* and on 4 November Hbbentrop was brimming 
' over with confidence over ' the prospect of. "negotiating an agreement between 
the Tripartite Powers and Russia”, based on mutual recognition of spheres of 
Interest, ahstalnment from helping each other*s eaeoies, friendship and coll­
aboration, a defintion ef the "direction of dynamism" - an euphemism for 
territorial expansion- ©feaeh signatory, and a revision of the Montreux ■'
' Convention. ' ' 'Russia' would then ' join the ' Tripartite Pact. and ' share the' spoils 
of the'British Empire. . So'confident was'Ribbentrop that he prepared a 
draft for a German-Itallan-Japanese-Soviet pact.*^  Should Hitler succeed in' 
•pulling of this trick" as he put it to his foreign minister,*9 then England 
would be'faced; with'the largest coalition of all time, stretching from East'' 
Asia to Western Europe. Whether or not this grand coalition would come into 
being depended on the ©uteiisecf the truly epoch-making visit to Berlin of 
Soviet foreign minister Tladislav Molotow* ' ' " ' ' ■ • V '■
prom the German point of view, the talks with Molotov of 11-13 November 
turned out to be a disappointment. The Soviet foreign minister appeared to ' 
be an «ixtéaeély ' ttwtfi negotiator and was'not impressed even by Hitler*s ora­
tory. ' While expressing agreement "in principle" to the ideas raised by Hit- ■ 
1er and Ribbentrop, 1» refused to be "diverted” into Asia and insisted on 13*6
13. V; •Russia* ‘ Ifilctiw 10,11. Berlin. Stalin*s answer tt the Führer*s letter. 
' He agrees 1» tee explanations 'if the Führer. Molotov will come to Ben- 
'■‘Un. The adherence of Russia to tee Tripartite fait is then expected." 
gl/lalder. ii. 143, entry for 24.10.1940.' '
14* At Florence* - tee Italians were surprised, by the announcement of Kolo- 
V„ tow»s visit. ■
15* dice» L*amrc—u- yp* ■ 608-11. ' lo German record of this rather internal 
'meeting; has been preserved.:: - , .
16. ’MB. 1.. ad. No. 309. y'-/-:./" ' ■ ■
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raisiag»'m® fay one» preciesly tlioss Euipopsaa questiona which had caused «o ' 
auffa frlotion between ta twoeountriea in past aontfasj Binnland, Polaatd, 
Eumania and espscially Hitlsrts raost recant focus of interest, Bulgaria, ' ' 
tette'teietiw Inaiatasi faeléngsd io tfaa Soviet spfaera of influence.18 In 
doingthis, ha allowed tfaa long tera goala of Soviet foreìgn policy to coma 
thre«#» vite a 'frsafasss that mai have faeen shocking te Hitler.*^  ' Even ; 
tfaou# I-Iolotow faad not erpllcltly rejected thè Germaa proposals and prora!sed 
to 'eubmit tfaaa to Stalinj. fais ' insistenee fafaà mede '«ne ' tfaing clear te ' Hitleri ' ; ; 
tfaa Soviet Union would noi stand ispida idly and vatoh Genaan troopa enter ' 
Bulgaria. ■ " ! Vo ■ ' ‘ ., ■_
.'ri n  : v ' k •; " r -VvV. ■
; - ‘ 5 ■’ > : '• ’ ■ ;. : '■ 1 ’.■ ‘ '■ - • - : > ■ > .■ " ' ■  ■ ' J  
Considering tfaa reputation sfa® hai ae<juirtd in thè years iraraediately pre- v 
ceeding World Var I, Migriate raaction to thè outbreak of thè Italia»*" 'V;'- 
Greek var faad faeen remarkably restrained. ' The country vas te much depon- 
deat ©onoraically on Germany te 'asy, other Balkaa stàtei efaa also nursed xm 
visioni©! «lata» t e  t e © ' ! © * © « ,  t e s s i »  t o b n t a a  ter fay gre©#© in 1913» h 1 
which could perhapa fa© satisfieà fay perticipating in ©n Italo-Garcian cara- ' ' 
paign againat thè latta1« ' 'Mi" tfaes© factors notwithstanding, King Boria - -'V ‘ ' 
had refaoed to join Mussolini in Ms aitate «H Greeoe tetti, tal Italian die- 
tata asked him to> refased to folle Slovakia, Hunpay and Bumania In prò- ;v 
mising te ©ign ta Tripartito Itati end shuwn no great enthusiasra, not ;;; 
only for taking part in ta .©a»la»#i on Grosee, faut ©fita. ta thè fw©f©ef! 
of taaan troopo doing ta itrty 'Jet ta fata ©te traversing Ma ' country te* ’ : 
tarfs t r i t a » / . ' : ; . ^  -, r.^..l 5 ■ ;:'i ¡¿-.L-
■ That tela, «te '«%■«©• ite te t a  fattem. •;»»%» t e n 'w n  t a  37 di- . 
visiona tata MI concentrated in tata»:, asd . tette' m m  loudly procl&iraed ^ /
li., fte' testate et telette*© conversations with Mita and lifafaentrop are k
li te» ta. 329, 348* , f, ■ -■ ■ - . - .\-
lf. ta .te .«MOye&a m  tee teU», v. Fafary» in. ». 349-57*; . ■ ;
rn. Boris te- Mita». 22.10.1940» Bi»* D, zi» te* 217.
/
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■ ■’1» be ready :1m. march against Bulgaria la east ihe joined Mussolini. ■ ^Behind " '■'.■ 
Turkey, s»reev«r, Me'/tÊm&m ®f.S»gl®»t I w ^ à  asnmlngÎF»JmnSm had «â»;,'
warned Bnlceei^ egaiMt changing I» 'MKtaA/l4&er when, on 15 Oct©**. 
her,. it ' had e»o»e««8ly ■been reported .fent--.GeMia» ■ troepa w w s , about te - ■ ■. .yOl' -c1 march into ; ■pi® «ouatey* Immediately upon Idle. «atfcaMk of fee ' Italo-Greek ■. ■_
war, ’mwMPreriyfc^ aai had cerne eut with open threats to Bulgaria.22 ' ; '
V, Ivan mtr® pcwerful was fee, M«mi .argument against opening fee doora te . v: - 
' fee tens, army» fee Sevlet ' Union. * few» fee ,Soviet point of view, ®& ;aii#» - 
nment of Bulgaria wife Germany 'wa»,hl#ily undesirable beciaee it would eon-
■ tribute y to the ^ nselidatle® ■ «f seafeeast«« »Wipe • under Oeiaas domination ... '•
' endroits« fee road ; to. the Straits., '.iteittw had mad® this clear to Hitler, \
and fee Soviets also protested against Bulgaria*s reported Intention to 
join fee Tripartite fact. What fee Soviets might do in such a case was, of 
course, anybody*© guess, but the way in which they had seised some islands 
in fee northern arm of fee Danube late in October, completely ignoring Hit- - 
1er* s guarantee to Rumania, as well as the enormous number of troops they 
were concentrating in Bessarabia, * scarcely foreshadowed any good.
Bulgarian fear of Turkey and fee Soviet Union came to light as soon as 
fee Germans started their approaches. One of Hitler*s first decisions fol­
lowing fee Italian defeat in Albania mas to, set up an advanced air-rfcld sys­
tem along the Bulgaro-Greek border as a precaution against possible British 
attacks on fee Human!an oil fields. A German note requesting feat 200 air 
fooe specialists be allowed to set up fee system was therefore handed over 
to fee Bulgarians on 6 Hovember.2^  On fee next day, fee Bulgarians granted 
fee request#2* A few days later, however,' they changed their mind* afraid 213*5
21. Richthofen (German minister in Sofia) to foreign ministry, Hr. 475 v, 
15*10.1940, StoS.Bulgarien, i, GMl/585/242737*
22. Same to same/, Hr. 518, v. 31*10, ibid. GEM/585/242751.
23. Where they were reported to have 34 divisions} Schramm von Thadden,
22» cit.. p. 127.
24* "'Hitter'to' Mfefeofen^  '€.11.1940.-«». BiXVlov;295*
25. ftUhfebfeâ' to" feelgn ministry, Ir* ;540"v.: 7*11*1940, quoted in Dill.
' so. ■345*: ;

Italy or sa Italia» guarantee? If so, Russia vould slso ìnsìst on giving & 
guarantee.  ^&  any case, she vould not telerete Eulgaria becoailng a Mlegio- 
naire state” - presuaably, thet'ls, following tamia into tee German orbit 
Molotov* s demsrche had enxlety in Cef**} ' thè foreign minlster hed '
" betoni nduMous" and_ asked vhether Bulgaria* s aocession to thè Tripartite 
Paot ^ oould net be 'poetfteed Mso m  ■ te ooiteide; lite ' test! of Spaia”.
. ; Zt waa m  enslous Bulgsrien minister, thersfore, vhon Hitler faced on 
2J Hoveaber. Broganov bega» by stating his govemment*® readiness **in 
principi©” te sign te© partiti but ha stili wanted te thè act for .
reaona whìeh he, Braganov, had been lnstructed te «piai«» '■ The minister ■ 
thea triti' to referte SteMMVte talk vtte/llototeif, but Hitler iatewiptei 
bin.  ^He had been iiifiMd ' about test conversatioiyé, he eaid, - and could - . 
aàsurs II. Braganov that thè facta vere not a® thè Soriet foreign minieter 
had presented tette' ZI vas thè Russians vho had insistei on giviag e gu&- 
Mttee te lelgexi® just lika thè ona Geraany had given te Eumania* tee So­
viet go«taitiet:iteUteteUra'inM of » »ite«« .iter. UaA®■. bo®n*e tt ite!»» 
ded tee p^ iftien: that no tea vould come te thè dynasty, and teat te: te*' - 
tenpte vould beatale te ehsngt tee internai regime of Bulgaria. He, tee 
FQhrer, had eavtd Bulgaria by evading tee peetteii and telling Molotov he 
vsuld beve te .«A  i '7 ■ i 7 ;'
Faced vith ’tele account of test had taken place te Berlin, Braganov ■ . ■. 
1 could onlyreply that tee'tateatevt»;”* treacheroue pe®pl#* -a* efher;. 
erguments vere similarly cut to ribhons by Siti«»« The minister asked ■ ■ 
test Iugoslavia*® affitele nlgjht.bei Hitler countered %  asking vhat Bui- ; 
garia wild say i f  lugòslavia was to jote tha Tripartite Fact herself. 
3h»#«ttefi^ ed ebeai tee SufeUb d«n§i*|; »tle»tet®«tei «tei te» tatai ,;/ • 
knew very veli test «&ny ante te their otte vould onte# sa***©««©*. » ' t© ■ *
ehare thè fate of Birmingham and Coventry, 'te te Russia, it vas esseatial, 
«Od poseible, te divert her from thè Balkans to :te» testi Stalin vas a 
good businessman, upon recognizing ther® vas nothing to be gained in . . 
BolfiaU he i«a.é:twa'^ rtlitate^  *te had been proved by thè «pfle' of 30
30. Mehthofen te foreiga ainistry, 21.11.1940, lbid. Ho. 373.
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Rumando, whleh sufferinga at Russla«s hand had besncut short «noe «ad. Ite? ' - 
all t>7 thè German guaranteo. To help Stalin tura eastward, Hitler decl&red 
himself rea^ r to eonslder a «Vision of thè Hmtreu* Convention in Sussi»«» .
' favour. VJhen Draganov took his leav» thè Ftlhrer Urei bis parting shotf . ^ . 
shouid thè Soviet#, marth iato Bulgaria, her fate would te" similar to that ; 
%t ti» Baltta State»!'.and "a tm months or. t«sor. would then shape Bulga» 
ria «*QO*d4ag;te Russia* swishes'1, Stili, Hitler coaoded, “thè arguments
■ advas&ted by thè ©inlstsr,. ala# ,as .«ipgis England, mm; not vithout merit"
- On 5 Becemher, Braganov was again summoned to. thè Reicskanaleij 'sgaia,. . 
to no «r»l.X«' r The Bulgart»®». had in the moantime been subjected to tha at*».', . ; 
ongest Soviet pr«p«rt#;..,-lftep.^ elr oiXer of a guaraatee was rojected, thè ' 
Soviet» had proposeà a mutuai as3istanoe pact aimed ai helping Bulgaria to* ;=1 
gaia.h®r tewit©risj; aspirati*«» at thè «o^entse o£ Oreece, furfcey and Yu- . 
'fesluvl**^ 2 . Vhea .to*» was «leeted they; <»»©rted to 'tmdirfMttd'.meia«* , ,- .
■ On 23 MmmAm & ■gmwà'mm* ♦£ ywpUotf «fOftti&ff latest Soviet tffer '
«ri .f*r wwfe, .togitlior.witli » presi»* d#*HirtpMoa' of thè **iietioaal'aspi* 
rationa* Russia «a» preparai ti. fai!}.. l*d*wfi* in obtaining, ^pMMd' in :;V,;■
-•£ .lÉlitlit»-*»» tha-fe, «a ¿'.amber»' Bragwisv.«glia ./... 
refusai te. stare*#«* ti th* Ytt*i«*».aoVMMttt«f .Balpola was ready to sign, _'
v •,.^ :ai^it»% argomenta «not have mmiamà Hitler, it he had not yet.., 
roalizad. this,. ttmt luli»»la«s probi«« was. «■•oatially e» Of »«#ari%* / '
. f w  lavi § -*>»» »iify* sumrisingly little g>ntrvma-fft^m to *«fee »art in thè" -.
M É  his,w;.^ »l»»t"Mt .th* .^«v^aM«ai vith te««iwr.. V. -
persuade! him that Bulgaria was really prepared to «Ign thè Tripartita . '.;. ',
 ^Pact mi allow German troops to pass if convinced that «A^  was in no ianpgr. ; ; .
■ £wm te»sia mù.taatkip* ; Bhm^i A«** .«•* at^^. he •otì.i .1». t* « rum’ li»'.-,, > .
( Sl.;.'Mtl@r^^^v ». 5®4.;' ' -r:;
■|f. .liA^r«'to.fo»Ì^’^ is^r, ;26.11.1^ #, jJùfr Ho. 403* ; ' ■.
'53.'.;S«e"^;»«f ;t5.1iafe ' -v. \
J54*-'-1 «NMin»»àc^ lSlÌB^  :3«Ì*.Ì$4Ò« IbM»'Hi*'43i*. ■' "■ "' ' ! "
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In September 194Q the Turks started sniffing an old and mortal danger? 
that of the establishment of a German-Soviet “block* To obtain Soviet coo­
peration against England» it was feared in Ankara,' Hitler might veil make 
concessions in the Straits * the more so, as his own interests were not di- 
rectly involved. A greater danger to Turkey was inconceivable, ' , Convin­
ced that Hitler was about to sell ' them to the Russians - if, indeed,' he'had 
not done so already*; - the Turks tried to forestall him by themselves ■ ; 
coming to terms with Stalin, with whom they now hoped to conclude a friend­
ship pact which would guarantee their frontiers in return for free passage 
through (the Straits.^ ,;-. \ \ t
dust when it was thought in Ankara that some headway Was being made in 
this direction»^  the announcement of Molotov*s visit to Berlin struck like 
a bombshell and drove the Turks into a panic. With good reason, too? al­
though Hitler, in consideration of Italy, was not prepared to grant Stalin 
the bases on the Straits the latter asked for, he was certainly not above
putting the Turks under pressure by means of a German-Soviet ra-r?rochementt, *: ■> > . lTr . •42nor would he hesitate to pay for Stalin*s cooperation at Turkey's expense. *3740
. am Main, KLostermann* 1964} pp * 61-7 * According to Massigli Ankara 
first heard of the project from Moscow and not from Paris? and Turkish • consent was never asked because it was clear that it vould not be forth- 
i coming. - Massigli, op. cit.»: p. 3Sl ff., 593 ff. Late in 1940 Germaa- t Turkish relations also suffered from rumours about the establishment of.' 
' British bases in Asia SELnor? Voeraantt memo* 10.10, St.5. TBrkei. ii, 
GPM/265/172421 | iWbrioiu3 (German minister in Bucharest) to foreign mi­
nister. Hr. 1782 v. 15.10. ibid. GRl/265/172424.
37. for a more detailed account v. Kreoker. on. cit.« pp. 101-3.
Hnsi/med memo. 21*9.1940. St.S. Tttrkei. jj. GRl/265/l724l6.
If. Papen to foreign ministry. Hr. 795 v* 20*9, Ibid. GHt/265/172415.. ■
40. According to Turkish foreign minister Saracoglu "Turkish-Soviet rela­
tions were improving and would soon become very intimate”. fabricius 
to foreign ministry, Hr. 1766 v. 12,10, ibid. ORl/265/172423.
4!. "The /JacrmsjJ foreign minister called the breaking of the alliance with 
England by Siuxkey a very desirable goal and stated. •* that in case of 
an agreement between the Axis powers and Russia Turkey would probably 
be very much more accessible", Hitler-Mussolini conversation, 28.10, 
1940. BSPP. B. xl. Ho. 246. •. -
4*.; On 11 Hovember he asked Papen how far he could go without destroying 
Turkey? P. von Papen, Memoirs (London, Beutsoh, 1952) p. 465 ff•
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In the last few days before the visit, Ankara mad© frantic attempts to em­
broil Stalin with Hitler by leaking reports about the latter* s intention 
to attack Turkey and thus “destroy completely Russia*a influence in the 
Balkans“|^ to no avail. Molotov went to Berlin as scheduled, and to An­
kara it seemed that the end had come.
fortunately for the Turks, the German-Soviet talks did not proceed as 
Berlin had planned. Soviet demands in the Straits and elsewhere were such 
that even Hitler, for all his desire to establish a "continental block", 
could not accept them. The talks had made it dear to Hitler that his 
move through southeastern Europe into the eastern Mediterranean would be 
opposed by the Soviets} consequently, German-Turkish relations underwent 
a sudden and dramatic change. Ho more could -there be a question of "sel­
ling" Turkey to Stalin} nor would it be possible to count on Soviet help t® 
hold the Turks quiet during Hitler* s march through Bulgaria. Just as Rus­
sia*® attitude over the Bulgarian question had forced Hitler into long and 
difficult negotiations with Sofia, so her attitude over the Turkish one fo­
rced Mm to approach Ankara directly*
On 15 November, therefore, Hitler surprised Papen - who had come to 
Berlin on the eveof the Molotow visit on the assumption that German and 
Soviet troops would soon cooperate in altering the status quo in the 
Straits^  by ordering him to postpone his departure for Ankara by one 
week. What followed is hot entirely clear. Apparently on 21 November,^  
Hitler seems to have conferred with Papen and furnished him with a comple- 
tly new set of instructions, about the nature of which we have only indirect 
information.^  Papen then flew back to Ankara - inviting himself for a talk
43» Schmidt, to Papen, Hr. 20 v. 28.10, St.S, Tiirkei. ii, G3M/265/l72456t 
' Kroll {counsellor in Ankara) to foreign ministry, Hr. 898 v. 6.11, 
ibid, GFM/2$5/l72477l Richthofen to foreign ministry, Hr. 547 ▼* 3D* 
ltaMoTibid. £1^ 265/172484.
44« Kramers memo, Pol. I M I4669 g., St.S. Grxeohenland. i, GS^4#/
.■ 222898. 1 .: - -V'.. .
45. Panes, on. cit.. n. 464.
46. Hillgruber, Strate/de. p. 359, footnote Ho. 37*
47* Ho record of the conversation between Hitler and Papon has been found. 
In April 1941, however, Papen reoalled the ftthrer*s instructions,
/
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;..vitli king Boris ©n thè way - to fini thè furks in -a panie. Greatly frigii- 
,,t«od %: « te « » ' 'sbout thè resulta ©f Molotov*a visti te Berlin, thè tu r-,
tee night of. 22*2$ lovembar put Turkish Threce under 
. saettai, lev '«ni'etete.tee'tteegw tese*«-’h-:.< -,-V,-->
' Ujpoa arrivine et Ui post on te 23rd, therefore, ^ lapin hai nothing .•
■ more urgent te do tea to assure foreign minister Earacoglu that it had all 
• teen a ♦’misunderatanding*' ' and tei 'te l3dsMvaa. prepared - te respect te 
pessiMMilBS. and aovereignity of furkey te# in seno circumstencea, to 'giva ' 
guarantees te tei '©ifeot, if Turkey conia make up her mina te eeeperate 
in te new order in Europe"/3 .Sia days later ho repeated te siate; te ptà~ 
sident Inontt vho, howerer/was not easily convinced. He asked Papen tei 
Genaany*s atti tnd# ' te ■ tee 'pw>##fVett#n of tee pesce in thè noi Vana v&s, end 
Tinder vhat ciroum3tanoes te would come te te aid of te ally? Papen wm» 
vered tei: tea vould happen only if thè British tried to.tulli up a Molto*
Itet#: te' te cut 'short by te presidente statement that in his opinion
ities «fatasi tette in .te spriJif te iiietttabl*/^  - fhis» f»p«® 
i#, te l i s t e t e .  rteist*50^ Stili#’te 
. dor dii noi «Ite’up| * Deoembi» he vas able te. ' 
of te. point3 on which he thought agreement \
While negotiating 'vite Miler*# envoy in Altera» tee fate hai -else : , . 
bete «etite la' Sofia. On 2| Hovember their minister ther» hai appearad in 
te iteaige adatte? and tefoalei sa ©ffor of his gotefastet, under, te','"
Eibhentrop a re
poasibl©.^  .
"which ?*•*?*« at bringing
ehip vite .flfta'te VeissEeker, 8.4*1941» Mg. B# idi, Io.
48.. Papen to m M m  tetetÌQr» fE.ll.194Q.. 114'»t. J86. ‘
: 49.■ l«te‘:ote#'if.U.194Q# ÌMt.fIo. .4». ;. ; [' :
50. '.'w^^t» tette?, ir. 13 v. 30.ll, liA.. «ateia ' li» .
•fi. ;fip«s'to foreign 'statata?; f.it*lf40.'-'l§lf. 9,'at»'Se, 456." The points 
: ; vere* 1. iute* «Mai«***. a&fh te new oidi» la Satepo. f* A TurkLeh 
, eataateklaf ta.feMp. e»t,ef . t e  ter natesi .tee Atei« 3. - TwMsh ©b- ■' ligatione te toglte, ia s®'fir as teey iter te te «atewe if Turkish 
■ ■ "'iateteats#' «et net «ffeetad terohy. 4* t e  A*is ©adertali»« not to 





draw. into the German orbit# . . h; . ; :v - . - ■ - .
• It was just when Berlin began to think that it had Yugoslavia where it ' 
«h M  hear - 'thtfc ist.'roiiy to * ign the Wfurtite Past57 - that. Ifiissoli- 
ni*3 defeat in <imm& came end turned the table«. For Yugoslavia, this ’ 
defeat was certainly a blessing. : .Bad Mussolini won his war, «he would 
have found herself surrounded on all sides by the Axis and forced to sur­
render her independenca, presumably with parts of her territory! conversely, 
Mussolini *s defeat isnaensly strengthened her position. .
’ By bothhlng up his Greek adventure theBuce had, in offoot, tlxrovn him­
self unto Bslgrade*s mercsy. The Yu^ jslav army haft only to move into the;’ 
rear of his troops in Albania to «ho their vhole position thoro untenable. 
%  the middle of tko, moreover, ^ ««*1^  found in the humi-
to Albania - only to he_ resoundingly rebuffed.  ^But, Hitler, 
mmAm dspndent on th# geo* will of Belgtadei without hoi* t 
operation against Greece wae possible «fc all, while hot i
num the Wehrm&cht lots Ml time and trouble. As wogotlatlon** with 
dragged on, moreover, i t  beoame clear that Anton Mold be much mo 
perative i f  ike German troops were to march through fitfMletla" and 
ifcniii«gfe Bulgaria.^  Maria ■«<*. against by general winter,^
by the two strongest power« In Europe imiatwy’ th# key to the smimm 
or failure of the amdm war against — inria«u| ©p Hitler* s attempt to
reach out. into .the eastern Mediterranean -  Yugoslavia» s position mm m :■
> - Hitler* s to Granfta h»*
Viigrsal ntrlay CaTly in
i f to win
. v  1 *  -  i  .  1 ’  ’54,.. By 26 August the traditionally pro-western Prince Paul was already
declaring his allegiance to Germany, which to him was "the incarnation 
' ’ of order”! Richthofen to foreign ministry, Er. 628 v. 26.8.1940, St.S.
. ' * 3tu»oiwil«U i, GHC/23Q/152301-3. . ’ : , > ’ ■ ,
57« EPB/Halder. ii, 148. entry for 24.10.1940.
• $1« Erbach to foreign ministry, Er* 13 v. 3Q.11.1940# St.S. YBTkel. ii, 
GB!/2S5/172522.
59* Hitler-Ciano "li.ll.lf#» MU. B, «1* SO. 5f3.'' ■
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suitable lever to do tola .in the form of Salonika. - Both before and 'after 
World ¥ar Z the cityhad been the subset «if *  bitter dispute between Yugo­
slavia. and Greece, and when it  was finally awarded to the latter s free ha»» 
rbour was granted to Ihfoalaeia..,' As her «sie port net facing Italy, Salo-
it be possible'to win her over by offering her the «1%? . During the first 
half of November, the. Yugoslavs' gave eveiy indication that - it would.'■ As ■';.
sow as the Italian invasion of Grease had etarted the Prince Begent had ‘ 
aumabned aconference attendedby mini8terpresidentCvetkovic,foieiga 
minister Cincar Markovio, minister of war Setts — o commander in chief ■ ■ . 
Antie. Yhe eonferanoe seems to have resulted in Netto ins tracing the."; 
ttlitisy'ttMM 'in Berlin, colonel Yauhnik, "to put out fl§•ll»1wito, to#".' 
hi^ aest German authorities to .find, what stops. wold be appropriate to se- ■ 
m e  Yugoslavia »sinterest in ;8al«ttn,,•. • Direct negotiations with Ztaly^  ^; 
the military attache said, were/out of tha question", but in return for
in favour of Yugoslavia, 
eavtoin ’ d e>ffmnd a - p>r> Yugoslavia*1*^  ^
later, the stream of hints to the same
might perhaps be 'able '• to make: 
Netto was dismissed a few days 
did not s t s s s » ^ * ::: ‘'
veil 'knewa pro-German. journalist,. Danilo Gregorio, visited' Berlin - presu- 
. mably on tat instruotiona of Cinoar Harkovic himself ’ « and had a long \
' talk with the'hood, of the parts* department at .too team foreign ministry, . 
' ftr*. tail? flsteUt«,. fhfsatotae.; he tad#, wanted a rannrochement with '. - 
many! behind tois^  desire, there loomed toe question of Salonika. Pwhats v.
60. R.L. Khezevic, "Hitler, Prince Paul'and Salonika”, IktnamiBtopnl. ■M<> 
fairs, aocvil (1951), PP* 59-441 also 1.1» Matte, iSfiStf a let»»-
. lution of 1941 (Hoover Institution Publications, 19#6/p.45 **«'■ ' '
61. DOFF. D, tt, No. 320. = . - v"\ ;
62* '< Heeren to foreign ministry, 3.11.1940, St.S. Jugoslawien, i." 1111/250/. 1523551 same to same, Ibid, Nr. 18 v. 14.11 * Gtw230/l52356I litter• mono, Nr* 1940, Ibid. GFti/250/l533511 Grassel (Yugoslav senator of 
the German minosity) memo, ‘ 16.11.1940, Ibid. GKi/250/l52578.
Heeren to foreign ministry. Nr. 795 v. 3*11» St.S. Jugoslawien. 4,d^/230/152332.
tlia Axis vould guaraníes Yugoslavia, sha reoeive Salonika, and payaent be , 
sata in .toé fon of demilitarialng iba Airiati©. ' Aon# Sohaidt etated ' 
that Ribbentrop vas too busy to receive the joumalist - §m once, this vas 
true - the BiMh foreign alnlster thought toe matter suffieiently impor- ; 
tant to'reeelto GreiprA® later on.^ The meeting batveen the tvo, of vhioh 
no reserd ha» been found in thè archivee of toe Germán foreigri minietiy, '
' took place en toe 2Jrd. Aocording to Gregorio*a ovn account, Rlbbentrop ; " 
tmdertook 'te send a to&egnn to ^ leen®, «ni invite Bincar lfa*S»vt©. to 'Bar*. ■
. lin.6^  ' Thia account la by a telegraa from leeren toRibbentrop
of 24 tovember, in which he reporta to have carried ©ut the instructiona ' 
of toe'toreiga adatetor and awsiijpd the yteit. , ' ■ , , V . ■. ;Vv
' Vhile «^ t#tiag Üte fugoslav foreign alaieter, IÜLtler - who correctly 
tottgalMd Ite Salteftte.ftMvttén for vhat it vati io m  ©Ifestlv® lever to ' 
. «pply to ^Itoféelafta • donad the matter • suffioieatly importuni ' to nle* it ' 
vito Giano' m  18 ITovember. Would Mussolini, he atoad toa Itoliaa foreign 
miniater, consent to en &ccord vito Yugoslavia on thè folloving basisi 
1. An Axis guárante© for Yugoslavia*s fronti«»» 2» Denilltarization of \ 
toe MbwMtn toast* 3* In «tusa, IkifWUvla vould reeeito Salonika. 1 
'Giano 'espreeeü Me personal ' agreement end undertook to rale© toe mattar 
vito toe Bote»'«feto»: he satd, vas aure to agree*^  . Mussolini, indeed, haá 
alreády recéived a sonewhat eimilar Yugoslav offer for 'm'Ztalin^ 'foiiel&ir 
agreement,. and had been receptive to to» idea) to hia, it vas. a heaven-sent 
©pp#»1t»hi%•, to, se«»»: his int in Albania, vtiiì©'Ciato th©e#ii-a nev tocto;: 
si av-Itallan accord might be useful if Rome itieuld ai «y time decide in an 
«nti-G©rman Une * toa! it» a reto« to toe Stayaiitoii# arta.6 8 oá t2 \ ,v 
Bétaétartot toe© aceepted toe idea'vito, some enthisiasm.^  Ry '
64. BMT» 1* *1» »©.’324»toi «d.% tote. ' ■ •. ; :. • •
65. D. tattàdia •Se..mà®MLMmaàmàm Cl«ip«ii»; Coldmaim, lf45> pp.-ttifc',
14. , . ■ ;■ ' ,
66. ■ togp, », JJtt./.. -s ■ . - ’. , 'V.
67. •Clato^tl« toswto««t/li.ll.lf## 1IÍM» Ho. 353. ■ ; . \
6i» Ciano, flarsr. entay for 11.11.1940. Gf. aito Inpiner, 0£. citM pp.
■ 1*7*88.. . f ¡v, • ' • _ , ■













-Salder* SSL and OBT - were optimistic about fe® .fute® of German-Soviet ■'
71 ' .V > • ;relations, Hitler himself scarcely sharedtheir confidence. 1 BU own re­
alistic estimate'of ¡fe©'chances ofsuocess wa3 reflected inMdireetivelIo. sv. 
18", which, he' signed ■ during fee visit, ordering "all preparations for which .: 
Yerbal orders have already baengiven" to be pursued ''regardless of the .'7 v " 
outcome"- of: the; talks wife Molotov. ■. On 15 November he. told his closest' as-' . 
sociatea feat "the talks hare shown fee direction in which fee Russian ■ ' 
plans are moving, Molotov has let fee cat out of fee sack. They did not'."'" 
even try tohide feeir plans.; io' allow fee Bussians .into Europe, would 
meanfee end of eentral. Europe. ■ The Balkans and ilnnland are endangered 
flanks”, . Consequently, he ordered his adjutants Engel and Schmundt to co­
ordinate wife master-builder Todt 13» selection of suitable locations for ■; 
now on the northern, central and southern sectors of ths'%v';
Sovietfrentier, and to have then constructed as fast as possible,^2
There followed a period of uncertain!ty lasting fym 16 to 25 November. •' 
During fet#«;;d«ys fee Soviets, made uasMp^*i«ii^ noises - they stepped up 
fesir-'lnferfeMsce in Bulgaria and 4«a»ui»#d fee aspeessioa of Hungary' to 
fe*''Tripi*,tÍté;? w t ^ but Sltlear. de«« not m m  to ham given up all hope.
Chi 18 November'He ’ told'Ciaeo feat "if is.neoessisy to apply strong measure» ■ 
in order to"divert tussla fmm ttiO'.lsitems «id.«root her a ' 7 7
•wt«asie''i&ife:-ho : repeated ''¿Imst. vwtatim in his letter'to Moss&iini' two 
days later.:■ Be.all* told fee IfepfliriaKatnistev president,' Telefci,' feat--.
71. "Conversations wife fee Soviet foreign minister... satisfactory in 
every respect. For the time being, no agreement, which was not ori­
ginally expected. The Russians apparently prepared to join the Tri­
partite Pact in fee foreseeable future, but want to clear up a few 
fuestions first*. (KTB/SKL. A 15, entry for 16.11.1940, GNB/3/000713). 
"Molotowi no binding agreements. Führer not mgratifled" . jgTB/Halder. / 
U, 180, entry fori4.ll.i94O).
72. Taaehueh Engel, entry for 15*11.1940# printed in Hlllgruber, StratedLe,
p. 35a. . . , .
73* Soviet Bocuments on Forets Policy (ed. J. Legras, London, Oxford Uni-
vsSity iraess, 1955/ iix, p. 476 ff, ‘ ' ^ '
74* BGFP, D, xi, Nos. 353» 369« In spite of this, fee highly astute Ciano detected the change that had come over German-Soviet relations# "I 
will immediately state feat after Molotovas visit we speak very little
/
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lussiate conduet vas either Bolshevist oi tessi«, nationalist, . , . (
.deptediiig ©a.te® situation... Hevarthaless va could try.♦* l o ''
teli« her iste, ite ^ a a i . w j r i d - , t e s i  strette#! ;.
- \ fteia Totohsa». to Spato* '
Sha tessi«s» Indeéd* hung "like a threataning eloud óa ite horizon", bui 
sìnoe'.tewy; could al so "think raaliatically" itwould perhaps - t e  .possici©.' 
to "diveri team te tte south Asiatio cvnXinmV'J^  Hitler vas skeptical, 
tei sai entirely despondentj «d whan generai Speidel, comasder of te® 
Gernan ©Ir foro® oission is Smania, asked for instructìons for te© osa© 
of a Geroan-Soviet var tea FUhrer h&d Jodl poatpon© .te# reply midi te®'.'- ■ 
«adiwà of tte Soviet ,,
.-VO»26 Uovember, te® Soviets dld «swer. Stalla had deoided to ®c«#it:. 
Bibbentropte draft for a fot» p@v#r paot subjeot te te® following condi« -
tetes*.. ‘ ■. i ;Vi
1« Provided that te# Gè*»« troopa are ime<teately vitedrawn : .
, froa Binnl«d***
2* Provided that vitela : te# n«*t few «ates' te® secar!ty of ;
; tee Soviet Union in tee Straits is assured te' tei# conolusion 
■ <• of a mutuai assist««# .paci tei»« tee SovietUnion and
- '■ " Bulgaria*♦ • and te tei# #staKLi«aawat''Of. a base-fori«! «ad;,. /
naval force® of tee DSSH vithin ranga of ih# Bospboros and ‘ 
Bard«©ll#s by m#«s of a long tera lease,
5* Provided that thearea eouth of Batum «d Mai ia te# gen#«
■ ral’direction of te© Persi« Gulf ia :»ee©gjai»#á'as.te# «#»•*. 
ter of aspiratioas of.tee Soviet Union* . a/ a ■' / ‘ ■
4* Provided that Jap« MamaMMMr.te'addita to ooncessiona for
co al and oil in norteara Sakhalin*^  • • / a ■ '. ■
■ ■ of Biissias/aiìd'' ia a eoaewhat different tea# 'tei«' that use! by Eibben- 
dnrlng my recent visite** cintela is «o# agito a country not to 
■ b# traste!, of ..tea* it is beat in vi«v ©f tei# pressai circumstancss 
. .■ ;. te «Mk for d«a«éÌT#9 ber fki«dtete ..ratear te« ber beatility» bit ■
\ :<■ : • vii*»* a«tealite »»* b# 'const«tly «d atteratevsly Watched1 • ■ Ciano, 
Plurona* a».616*
75* ' atl#p**#l#tt «nversati«,. 26*11.1940, B f * . D, ad, ■ Io* |65* '
■ '■?6.:?mtei,.l*,:m* «Ktqr ter 19*11*1940. , tedi al#©' told thè «ir fo'rce
>■■■■■. ■ te iSteatinat ita study @©»ci*siiig dipesiti«« in case of & two : 
m m  IMi* ■_18t» Aeiitar - for 25*11»!^.
’■ 77* SUniltebwg'te.lSttviga 3tóaiste^ -,"'26.11.19^ >,-«wlo«re, DGPP, Dt xi,





m  infinitely higherpriee thaa Hitler s w  dreamt 
of payiiig "«aàf • ooinciding aa ■teey did with thè Soviets* . efforts ' to ' estab- 
M.tìi;.,ii*ttielvii«'in p&gmAiàt finally provadto him vtet'hé hadsuspected ' 
all elongy that no long tea» mderstsnding vith Russia vas possible. It 
ime clear that thè attempi to "divert” Stalin iato Asia had failed, and 
' that fcrepe' reaained thè eeater of Soviet aspiratlons# \ 'She Soviet
note vèe therefore left vithout a replyi generai Speidel* on thè other ' 
hand, ' gei his iasiriaeiione "#» thè' vesy next d^,^8 " Hitler*s 'attenti ’to’' 
remte sa' uade»tsiidiiig vith thè Soviet» had falledj he now decided' to' 9» 
io war‘^ «ÌJ»t'»i«'*’the'»©»awr'^ ie batter* - *■ '
Ihis momentous decision • ©xyetalissing from thè Mòlotov vielt onward,^  
but p»bebly''ait'''M^ i'fiai4 bifore thè «rivai mt.thè Soviet note on 26 "1®~ 
veober • had lanedieie and far 3MAin9"M0«^i«Ms*':9» one thing, thè 
var against Great Britàia now turned iato a secondary setter* and thè ”pe-
eliminated at a single «take.yllKr «ateir* 
thè BAie'^«t^'.%;the'Italiea fallure in Greeee tessei, team- setter Me» 
ondaiy (end not wholly «mpia.11 fi edt ■ ae it presented thè Gessane vite 
thè opportunità of thè eastem ubile
ciroumventiiig Italian objeotions) nuisance vlthin thè Jùtmmmtk' ef thè :
ini# ai,#fet''tó^ e.blwi^ r fresa ..thè point of .view of 
■ thè fhtere ver agitesi- R*iì#ff..ai Let us taks up eaoh of theee iesues' in
, v . o..
fhe decision té ' isttaefe Rn.a«j<% in. thè «p*teg of I94I seaat tho an® ®f ■ 
thè ,'nerioheralH stratesv* ' Studies conduoted at fifflf «nd OEM b#d deiaonstra-
ted that Gemanyis forces dii not suffioe to cany out bothj a3 lon" ai 
there vas ' a«® ' <jUMWMày such strong forces vould he
Mei te-tee tueelj» boriai?80 tea* ; thè' lattar, wm lepMudble tettiate.'-. 
•!*••#*. ' G«w*iiiyi"ne, iMAwricon tee.MtUt,lMLe«i90ul&> tela piai*'«ite.
78. m/loìbk i* 190. «ter: far 2S.11.1940. ■ ■ '
79* la febrwgr 1945 M U m  told leimarni ”ny iàdaieu ’• . ' ■ t|ilgr, thè departure '«f .. I ieeided.. *- account with thè Eussiaas in ifee fìrst fine daysM. '
te «etile tee , ;
80, Hitler estimated theia wà »  di visiono.
1
• ioni 9vmm ImyvcA***' operations within te# ùtmsm^ ef "tee
"petefliepte*  sièste®-, «» teesters m 'remote fw» eate otti« a®; Sibrallui? - 
and $®fpt, ìfcwwé* ate’Brieèe. ,'lbe rtf^Mticm ©f «sy’ef teese p»pisas ; . 
iml#d «vt/ftkM ©teerff- .Xft Hovember 1940, Hitler decided to plunge for te® 
Bussiaa solution. Bis Meditorransan offensive a^ ainst England hai, to be
scrappei ineonseqqence, and thisvas a factor about Hitler vaa neverin
82 *■ * . > • . v Y ■
. . .  t • ■ ■ ■ ■ •  •  - •'  V ‘  •  •
, *i^« sirtd tesa don#* ,®a'iìi®'jii#ii of 11-12 Bovember a Roy&l Air « ; : _
.sitate 'ea .'te® "baibear'©f'tarlili' 'itosi'Italy half *f ..ita fleet, ' restii» ' 
Mag Ss forte# bete®®» ber aaà ih* art»;.
MA* ; ìy te«'«®it.#f te® »©»te, mtwmxv hor arate# in Sr®®e®-wire in fall 
fetwjst/bef®*®. £Èmm§ 'irete ewateeeteMpu - 'lf left a».ber mm tee w m  ' ' ' 
likely to involviag a dlsastrous lesa of jwsa§$ge for tee -.M a ' .
and oponing up a vide gap in ovn defenco3, Tìioiish. Hitler pro-
bsbly resented thè ' faci, b® ' no dioico tei to panni©. some Of;te# "lidi.'.,.. 
INànmiteaìtt. y d ^ w É i V . ’Ifitet !stìt1 IÌm  iati« nov uadsmoai.s basi« 
transformation. ' Ibitewl ‘®f fteMLaf : jsri #f, ad ' ©virali ; steli#0  _ §»if gite '5..;
r^wr\ ^my nyjjf f SWWMWS ■ dsri^ BSÉ:'W-'
tii.ii tima «• ' y défensivQ actioiis #4p4*w  to tfifwii tìie conrolots
’ mf italy an e3tì®®##4y® steAjiteAiii® @f-teìteia®# lediiemt* 
manYt seteMeìu^ '- In vi« #f. tea effusivi artainst Eussia. ii votild ■
bo deairable tà commit few forces to thè Hediterranean, Ad te have them 
ItaVt fw'.^a'^rtesi ^ «aibl# p«i#d* te#' larga»seala» prolon-
géd operations vouia te«» to ha ahandoned ' in ' f avour of tee onallar, '- more 
4mmo^ -t«tft ones* - ‘ ’ ,:i.v'V-' ; ■,■ ■.-•■ ; . ,
'-’’I Ìte''Sàteiw the «^ *° afte# commitmeni in tee tejj-t^yy«»iftii^ 4** ■ .■•■'■.•'
faot» Just vhat Hitler eet out to do. At the becinnins of Hovemher, it 
vili he renemberel» he preferred cooperation vite frwaie * in te® interest .
ef'pi^^éfe'teé'étentew^ ^ ®te' Iute UitUm stUsUt ■
81. ' ICDB/rtalder^  'li* iPt' far ' i|*11.19#| ^ Her^ail®b»sit M uaet^
SShttS. BP#' '9*7* /'■ *■■-;•.-' -,'1'.Vr - ‘
82. SU» im.ii» 14^ *58* \ i ; V '■. i. ; / ^  ( ì .' _
83* There 1# a very luoid expo si ti a  in Ster asmi von Thadden> .ài•»;»*

































Hitler*« deolslon to tura against Russia had similar resulta In thè .
" eastern Medlterranaaa. . Sere," thè %ueatlon of Gexaan interrention in Lìhya 
waa eliminated enea »4'for «11 - or so Hitler thou^ it.^ 2 Haring cut down '
* terso of thè four eleaenta foraing thè "perlpheral" stratega, Hitler tur- ;
1 ned' te thè Balkans. Here thè problema inrolred vere more compier, becaas®, ,
. »lite thè ethir Opentlons, ' thè Itali». attack oa Greéoe. had ' already ' he-, 
gun - and failed ' » and Could not, regretably enough, ' he lifuidated by a ‘ ' ' 
'■•trote ©f thè pes.: in, ete' measures nere called ter. '■ ; > vV ' . ' " ‘ ' ■
Hitler*s change of atartegy had, inàeed, gire© a nasty tura to thè ■'
1 Itali» defeat in §reeoe. '. As long a® ■ thè "perlpheral" strategy was ¿Live 
' #1« fatte® ef thè Itali» ef f ensire waa unpleasant enou^ ij with thè deci- 
' «tea to tura againat Russia it hecame »  unjualified ohstaele.. ' 'Hitler ■, 
despeietely »••€#€ « «tibie Balk» to ©orar thè rlght flank of his future ' t 
lussi» offto*£«»|, te »  «Me «é«u he base it ©a a British-infested . 
Greece, povtloaUtljr vite thè aenacing example of thè allied Salonika .
■ Iteat ©f ¥«rld Va? I boterà hi* eyes*^ -. The firat thing t©. do,. obriously, 
vai te A m  hìs.di*ptet»r» te tee Italiani. ■ : Mussolini*« knueles - hìtherto 
. epa?®#* »'w®r® now «ererely ra»p«d in Hitler*« lette? te.„tee.
Bucete 20 Bomber. lather belatedly, Hitler discorered teat Mwhen I m »:. 
■tei you te':fe«itfe me in Meri»©» I beg» ay trip in tee hope that I mlght '
: be abl© te' ptmmb'wt? tlcm te yeti bifore tee bigtnaing ©f thè threatening ' 
©•aflAel vite Sttetef ■ ©oaflBming whioh I had .be» intenti only in a generai 
vsy** There folloved a l©ng liti of paychological and military consequonces 
of tee. Iteli» failure, »d et tee measures Hitler intended te tate, to io- 
prore :tet «itaatto»#,l, Gema» inopi nere promised for te® Beiiterr»®»,. but 
Mtte/teài te.vwld *§*©b«hly* '»ed thea back by March or Aprii,. »  tbey ;7 
.»mi te re^ uired for other tasko. • Mussolini rematati unaoredj on 22 Ho- - ; ;
Jt. KTB/Halder. li, 211, entry for 5.12.1940* KTB/OKV, i, 204, entiy for5.12.1940. The Itali» defeats in Egypt, commencing on 9 Becember, 
forced Hitler to change bis mind, but thia time thè object was no 
longer te attack Great Brltain atrategically or to reach thè Sue a, 
but simplp to sare tee Italiana from complete collapse,
93. p. Bor, Gesnrmche alt Haider (Wiesbaden, Limes, 1950) P* ISO*
94* Partioularly at tee Ribbentrop-Ciano meeting of 4 Eorember.
> 1
vember he anawered teat ha “keenly regretted" that "tee lettor ha had sant. - ' 
e» 19 Qetober, that la 9 days la ' « ta n ic e *  f .'te annorunce bis action haà Hals->
.teat te# worst wm'mm. alreaiy.^ ? .\ ,./'■• 
.irtrately* ©%g«r®ai. te Satolli# that tea 19 Octoberl «rote è'.;' ■
lettor te tee.fBhrsr .test 1 nii.. taking e w  Greeee. : Xhe FJhrerbeingon. /■. 
hls vay, tee letter reached Ma »a tee 24th. Sic itane teeretee stare 
not «t all displeaaad and h^ i all tee tima in tee sorld to talee tee measures 
ef vhioh they thou^ it X had net taken eognizanee. . te# only reason te their 
displea3ura is teat matterà have not prooeeded as they stonli".^  Mussolini 
sa® perfectly rightj and 'it was precisela te tele nasca ^ teat he did m %  ■. 
like Ciano before tee, beginning ef tee offensive» iniiit that Hitler had V" 
giste'hte tee ge, «head. .Y " ' . V ’~\
V Itosi tee Set»*» point ef siew, Mussolini*s ^ conoiliatoiy replywaa in- 
sufficlent to retrito tee situation. Onee he had ddoidtd to attack Eussia . 
in tee sprlng/Eitler eould not dispense site a stable, British-proof flankf 
te  tele neswi prepatotlias te  tee'Sreels eperatien had to ma'» , cren 
tecnte they had lest their originai purpose. : _ Om thè other hand, it sd#.t ; 
peteaps be possible to achieva tee seme Mm by peacsful mene) if tee Greci»
' fiali it) ' ¿tettiti ' te 'telai their ver site’ Italy 'te and ‘«od 'and terow 'tei teìte 
British unita as had already lande! »  their territoiy no milltazy operation 
scali he necassary. ' Having deeided ontheRussian operation, Ette», at thè 
beginning of Recember, thou^ it this approach sorth & tagr. ’
17
"Tliia is ridiculous and 'gi^ tesfs# Ciano ff^ ertMl Ms father in lau as saying 
«i 4 Decomber, “tot it le e teli'se henr». te. cute te «ft'Mndette1« ; The .
ostici in 'ilteaU '«h  'in ' faci a gsda »#•.. teing heen disiti .ìy 'a tese ' .
95. DGFP« D» xi, lo. 38J. ;:'Xt is 'teftMlhle'te jwcr» teat Ifessolini hed 
timed hls lettor infojKing atout tee attote to miss Mtl«| K23 E. j 
Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlln Axis (ifMtemt' tolllas, IfSf) p. 276. .
96/ jr^ llini. m* Mi.. 157.
§7. :,'0icae.'llT. »iBBr te 4.12.1940»
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: movement Soádu • who .had taken over froa Yisconti Prasca on $ Boventber - 
mistook fb# a^ in gesl'.of th® Greek counterattack, which cost hla Horitza 
©a' 22 líovember. ^ Ihis initiated. en Italian retreat > all; along th© linef . : 
Moschopoli® and Progradeta feil on 30 Hovember, Preaeti and Hagia Santa : 
on 4 and 5 Deceaber respeetively. With ,101® capture of Argyrocastro on 8 ;
lively on th® left wing of th® Greek offen» . .
; siv©r• '
As'.'tht.'doféátA. of his troops in Albania multiplied, ■ it seemed to Mus~ 
"aioliai' thaf ther® vas only on® vay out short of a humlliating armistioej 
:«a.'egrgMMmt’«th Yugoslavia that would allow hla to transport relnforee-' 
«•nt« and material* partieularly lorries, by way of th® latter’a terwl- ■
..Sh® Buee, it will be had eeneented to th# FBhr®rfa
.y&iné Ihr an aüerd' withYugoslavia, and eren agreed to eerap on© of Me _ ’
fer «ueh m  noeerd.; Buring th® fixti Iq* ef'SMe» 
ab•»," hmtmm, it begaa trlook as if ttds geeture went tmappreciated in ( \
. isrlitt* «turto .peepte .«eeated te haare lost interest in the matter. ■ fe 'resÉiid'" 
.ÄSS, Hussolini » who had no Inkling ef th® fact that Hitler had in th® ; ’. ; 
MÉBtiai_lost'interest in th® ÄtÜ®rran@«i - on 5 Becember «sp&tiiiei Al-. ■ 
4!Ui¿é mmiáimim in Sea®,'.ti Berlin “vithth® real, '«pe» '
' etfte alsel« .lo ’Mcaeet" th® raúrcr' te. bring ábout a «peedy atotssien 'ef.' ■ ■ ■'. 
f^«iÄa'^ /«li'''»ifarkte;fait,*.' .r
, •' ‘' lássblini vas out fer a Íisii»eÍa«MBi*" Vhen Yugoslavia had'" fírst'' ‘.' 1 
,. M i  liawiSid bflweea' «ti« anA Ciano on 18 amaber th® Gexaan dletator; - 
vas reperted ..te have pe«' ‘•vas®, aloost féteadVt this ti», bis' m m U m  i 
vas dütáeálr imé ■ eaMeMUrtie«;'' 'Saeteo! ef mmáng, «p to th®" subject,he' . •
.berely .nplied that re*y «eel in her attitná®*.■ ¡ Hot '■>
discoureged by « 1  lack «f tatest# Alfieri tried-’to mak® hiasilf hti^ * "■. 
ful be other ways in viiich Gemiany migíit oontribut® towards - th®
■litiiiia^ Ä ii tr militaiy i m m í '.': ■ '■
^  »  V» ror t,. »  t,« " . ' ■ . .
i'AHaUlad«; l i f ' * -  ;
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,; ; Dues thought, .1® hit upon a. diversionary. manoeuvre, possibly ;
■ ■ by bringing Bulgaria to a partial mobilization merely for the'
■: .-purpose of effect. - In this way also the pressure on the front- 
;- ;.: wtttld,be'j^ iaf»i« 'JlmMim possibility of lessening the pros* ,. 
sure he /Ilfieri7 had already sttgsMted to the Eeich foreign 
minister tot the day before.(99) "'It might be possible, namely 
'.; Igr-'aamc ■ of, a ■"journalistic ■ indiscretion",; 1» start a rumour ; 
■.nbriiad^ at^ S«Miiy/iM«.<»f«it»tii^  rath«* large numbers of tffips in Bumania. - All this would, in the opinion of the Dace, 
contributo to relieving the pressure and splitting the enemy
AV't^ i* pbini tha ltalien aribsMsfl»? was tut short by Sibbeattif. who, ob- 
eii«sily',rilliMa«’ in tow atontiUtoi* ;ifi§pe®bs an Immediate Bulgarian mobl- , 
lttAtf.it»'wept ay*» towards a general conflict in the" poured sold
waterm  his"(MfgMtUMi by telling him that fJalgurta w . s m  demobili­
sing, ’ since she was now on the point of «wAng towards an agreement with 
' the ;SiB*»w. \Et #  then -mi# use of' the interruption Is by pass tfee.luoe«* 
and $ps# a discussion of "th# most important thing", which mwcyff *tg 
' to him was Mto bring order isMilfttoly.to the front itself by »»jug barba- 
'■ si#. a«8h'.si/$to shooting of officers, who desorted Jpe» their ,je»
sitions, deoimating the troops, «to* "To be sure, he had alwsiy .startM .. - 
to build up his forces in end he hoped to bo able to .held this ,
Balkan position. (7J But the important thing ways to raiso the morale 'of 
th«i'Stalls» troops* for that puxposs» there was need for a man with iron 
nerves snl barbaric. deteraination who. * *.,Would not «MUdi'. from. serious 
measures". By now the poor tifiori Was thorou^ ily alarmed in itoto:*f this " 
ehow of Furchtbarksit. Hs hastily inteiposed that the situation ns,
• 'tltt 'tfiNHiic* front Vit/apt that bad -after all* ''.apt tliat the Poee'e ^ Uan had 
“io»«tMI4tfei**^'<®m to* tetfctoU leave*
' ' !Ii:ira« a tS8ttbl#4-- Mtltr that ho left behind* ; treaty,days earlier the ' 
t«*** a'lively- interest 4a the Ihgoslair fueetioiit ;.l»t,aw|
'' the ''«peiiphorit“ ■ strategy' etoNfpei and - the atMt m  Insets i m U *  on, the
ff. Xfo verbal of this conversation has been found in the .reoordS' of the 
.. , ..German foreign ministry. Cf. Simoni, oja. cit.. jp# iS?-fS* and B.
Alfieri. Biotatora Face to Face (N.Y University tree»* lf$f) i* *§?•





















'. . Infortanately for Hitler it vas only three days later, on 8 Stóèaber, ' ta«t 
.. the ehief of hia intelligence' servite' reportet tmaStólli taat ¡Franco dii.--..: 
not intani to' enter -fee, var.10^  Thi3 resulted in the whole Gibraltar ope- 
ratlon being scrapped on 10 Deeember* J Franco * s sfasai somded the 
. desta knall Of whatever vi» left of the "peripheral" strategyj it meant : 
that. the Mediterrane an 'would 'remain open, to the British, and thè refore in* ,. , 
.. ©reasod difficulties sbornii it proVe necessary to solre the Greek problea '■ 
hy force of arms. The change in Hitler*s attitude is refleoted in the 
■." fast that thè origliai *'direo tire Io.'' 19% ' proriding a highly pugnacious 
• pian for thè captare of Gibrlatar, vas left unsigaed. . Instetó another, r 
; direotiva hearing the same «naher wa3 issutó, orderlng the ocenpation of
■ ■ unocoupied Franco in case thè de*Gaulle revolt spretó to lorth Wèst iM. '
- es»*0^  ■ Hitler* e'attespt' to' breneh ©ni into tao eiatea and tao veste»;
liediterranean had ended in ftólttfef and in both cases his reaction vas
t a t . i.t reoolliag-ta®le iato Bsnp«« '-. .,
' Pushing Franco into the var vas net'tao only mission Canaria 'had ' to '.foli.
': ■U H  •in Kadrü. ' The Germ&n head of the àbvahr also pali 'a vielt to m.oli 
- crony of his, tao Bungarlaa minister Andorka. Andorka enhseguently app- 
: ' roached:tao IjM  minister, ; edmlral Argyropoulos, .vita, tao followìng German 
. offerì ' 1,' Subject to Greek consent, ‘tao German govemment vould mediate a .
‘ : cease-fire in Albania.. 2. German troop3 vould guarantee the cease-fire by 
: posing themsalyes betveen the bolligorsat ^aswlei. .3*.. .Greto# was to ksep
■ tóì'taitaasitasiet■Ìt.htó'o08^ itó!Ìa.AHtóÌ-»*;,,4*;&.ro^ m,j.|tai;ìi»tìid, . 
drive out the British and become Mtraly neutralM onee more. Argyropouloa •:
; • hai' tao'QMwai-«fftr tnmBltttót" I» Athens,;btrt. wmw nmtomà;
: ■ Set' pntting «Il thsir oggi. in ont beskit, • "Hitler and Eibbentrop”, that is ;
' the very hiebest jtamft agt)ttvitl«#a ,at..sh«it tat carne tino m i . to h**i
104* -QB/OBL- i t  119, 'mkv .ite 8.11*1140. ■' : i: ‘ ! " ' ; ; ■1 ' ■* : ^
,105*. " 1MJU -11% eiitsgr for ' I8.1t*if40* " ^  \   ^ ' ''
.106. «g. 1,'tó, Io. 488. ■ V ' ; :  ^ ’ -, ■
107. ;,Mntii.,t» jfe ¿tt*V**« 4 Ä  i
108. A*i«itiìS: 'to. *8 'pm&mat tótomt,1 priatod ia; Star* •





,Vlfll»d.hy the ..Ml® Army; they mayhavebeon, and probably were, regarded 
as sign® of weakness. At Idle middle of December Idle Greeks were confident 
of ,their ability tc throw the Italians into the Adriatic, and it is not-, 
impossible that they hoped to be able to do so without evoking German re­
action. ; .It, was .this.. layat the bottom of a letter by ¡"
king, Gee*»® ,®f iww#®.. to Gerorgs TX of England, la which «is Greek explai­
ned that* since Germany could not m m  to Italy* a assistance for at least 
a fev months «ad would scarcely risk antagonising furkey «id Yugoslavia in 
t•»„dtiagf_it mm new.» after, the British .victory at ferrate - time for,:..,.:■ 
ths» to .»is&s*e .Greece rad deal Italy "a crippling blow**.3,21. from ad-, 
t£iin, theGreeks ,"vested raw# (¡faff. «w*la that to overcome the Xta» 
liens but not ensu# to provoko German intervention; the two aims were ■ 
iYir!f>-!-,ftM blei'.but Ifee g^fwyfwffft affeated not be recoenise this”*3-22
by «ie German
. lit by. idly,chi m idt. liar, ally 
ted the wn? ^eclated» tut not
n Ankara that Germany would not
, 23h
.It wee with this sraqpose,!»',
that the Greeks was?*
View that. Hetaxas; told! the. German' minister that "in the future, : too,. no di-, 
. eturbanca of the correct relations between Germany rat Greece as a result 
. of ®i#4*hinitiative was t».W feared».. »i w.Mep&sc that area if the,
- cmpmA*. m m TiI «ot advance env further* the Italians w»ic rm 1 «»««*» be able 
to hold out in Ath—aA#® At the *#»e time, M.« «»«» vaja trying to '*P»JP — F»P,PFI c. — ^ F ^PF*F,^f —P*MFVI*IP ^ S F  —F—•«F|F IF*—gN^ PF »PIF*»*» —FFFFSP —*^F
■ drives wedge between ®mmmw and Italy by fpettag "various Sea»» autho- 
: gUM»®.t* f» effect that It ms hi#',-to® far Germany to leave Italy ..
121..;.' sang Go«®» to king: Georg**17 • 11.194®» MB* .
.Iff,'' C, Buckler, Grates «A Greta (London, E*M. Stationary Office, 1952}
■ ;' p. 17*
»5*1 r n m m u n m m ^  *» tmmim'e»®»# 16,12*1940» 'jpeg., 0 15^ 3. 1 ,
124* ■' Irh a it i' to  fo re ig n  a b id e tq rf i r .  59 v .  l l . l f . l f 4 © » ’ St*S... flBjUwfeaaliiffil»
. li'W/uf/mn** , .
Iff. Same to same, 20.12.1940, DGFP* S, ad, No. 540. This declaration maji 
. have had something to do with the desire allegedly expressed by the 
German government for the Greek government to proclaim that the war 
"was not directed against Germany rad that Greece would not be incli- 
! ned to allow British forces to land on Greek mainland thus opening 
front against Germany" • Headquarters BAP Middle East to Air Ministry, 
Bo. 485» 16.12,1940» BEOS. B8940/764/19.
I( rrrrrrrrrrr "",* "*"*"*  t ? ! *1   * ■  » ■      >»■■ »    »—  ..»....
ate«. . In h m  Italy asked, for an armistice# Metaxas said -
.. ho thou#t ¡pmnaqff- would fora a defensive bloek in central I t * - . .
. rope. Eren if ehi occupied SdLoste mi other Italian porta our. '. .
supremacy in the Mediterranean would, he anld, not he in danger.
, In such circumstances Greece and ourselves would continue to .
he separated from Germany by a bolt formed by Yugoslavia# Bulga- •; ' 
ria and Hungary# the neutrality of which it may.bo in nobody*s • . ' - 
■ -intorest to v io la to .^  ' ,
Unbelievable as it may seem in retrospeet,it was this kind of reasoning 
which led Metaxas and'the Greek government to reject the German pesce offer*
; The Greeks were wholly temed in their own little war against Italy) they 
■ w»» çulto unable to grasp it» wider implications.
To Hitler, this was a highly unpleasant outcome. Having liquidated the 
"peripheral* ■ strategy, - he lost his taste ■ for the Greek operation as ' teeoi» ' ' 
tod in "directive He. 18". In ori» to obtain an Italo^ rtok pew» ho sus- 
pended the talks with Turkey, virtually retracted his off» of Salonika to 
Yugoslavia# ant talked around Mussolini*« plans for Gasman military assis- ,
. ta»«#) all in Vain. The prudent itibm* how»»# was not the "man to be ■" 
cau^ it without anoth» card up his «tarirt»' and while putting » i 'f«tó»r;;
' " townie ■ a' eoaso-fire ' in Albania toe' tisi 'ftollowrt his ' usual method ' in: iwftt*
V sing military ' preparations ' for an MtafMd. ' invasion of Gfooie' from the north 
to be continued regardless of the results'of his diplomacy.' If èM'ié»» 
the effort to find a diplomatic »luti»'for the Greek problem should fail# . 
' tito German may te-to be prepared to liquidate it by other means.
126. »bach to -for«!#» .ministry# ». 68 v. I6.12.1940,
i, §¡^ 44f/2faf7f*i0* , ■ Ì : r , - ■ -, : , :■




both voli out of range from Ploesti. As to the&onstruction of new air fields,
work was started on two only; one at Agrinion (on the west coast, north of -
- the Gulf of Corinthos) and one at Amos on the northwestern corner of the, -2Peloponneso. Both were unmistakably directed against Italy.
■ ; Berlin also ■ seems to hare warned the Greeks in no uncertain teas : against 
allowing the British to bomb the oil fields, and ejected the effects of that 
warning to last "for the next few months".^  . leports casing from' Greece e*- \ 
phasized the weakness and nail sice of the British force in the country, and " 
by the middle of December SSI « as we hare seen, a fervent supporter of the 
Greek operation » concluded that "England had not so far shown any inclina­
tion to bomb any targest excpet for those under Italian dominion.. • this is 
not to be feared either, because the English must make do with the forces 
they have end do not want to risk German countermeasures"
. , With -fee scrapping of the "peripheral" strategy the Greek operation lost
its original, offensive purpose; during December attempts were accordingly 
mads to.liquidate the affair by diplomatic means. Should these efforts fail, 
however, the operation would have to be carried out - not so much because 
' ofthe'actual'presence of a few thousand Englishmen in Greece, but because 
of the threat of a Salonika-Front developing in the future. In view of JHt§ 
ler*a plans for a campaign against Succia, the appearance of such a front .
' would be .disastrous*. Sinoe by this tins Hitler had already arrived at the 
conclusion that "the decision over the hegemony in Europe will fall in Bus- 
■ sia", ■ the Greek operation had become a - regrettable - diversion. , Still, : ' ■ 
the .prospects of making it unnecessary by diplomatic action looked slim and ' v 
Hitler, when he ratified the army** plans for an attack on Enssia during a
- conference of 5 December, reluctantly ordered preparations for Greece to go 
,*eaà*5;, ; ; : ;, ;
. Undertaking "Marita",. as the Greek operation had now been dubbed,' bore ■ , ■
2. Buckley, op. cit., pp. 14-16. Winter made the construction of the air­
fields slot work, and they were ready just in time for the Germ««* to 
uso.
5. vw/otw. 1, 204, oatry for 5.12.1940.
4* k H* entry for 13.12.1940, Gim/4/000082.
5, gl/BaMsr. ii, 214* entry for 5*12.1940. '
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tet little resemblance to the "second rete substituto" as originally concei­
ved. Xts ais' was defensive, not offensive*' Its framework was continental- : 
European, not eastern Mediterranean. In the words of Halder,s ADC, "Marita" 
had been "taken out of its context and brought into close relationship with.-'" 
the plans for Russia. Its task asv was to secure Germany* s southern flank 
and eliminate the threatening danger before the start of the offensive ag- 
ainst Russia".^  Greece, in abort,' was taken out of the "Mediterranean" and 
reannexed to Europe. On 15 December the new character of the operation was - 
officially laid down in a Führer directive* '
■ Directive lo. 20
'■ : '• ■ : "■ ■ Operation''"Marita"' •
, fhe outcome of the battles in Albania is still uncertain. In the 
' , light of the threatening situation in Albania it is doubly lmpor-,
' taut for us to- frustrate English efforts to establish, behind the 
- protection of a Balkan front, an air base which would threaten t/ < 
Italy in the first place sad, Incidentally, the Bosnian oil 
' 'fields. ;l , :  ^  ^ ■ v
In ccsipiriao^ to "directive'It'. 18" the most eonspieious feature of this 
prelude is undoubtedly the lack of any reference to the eastern Mediterra­
nean. She operation is said to be dictated by purely defensive reasons* . 
pending on the uncertain outcome of the battles in Albania) this makes it 
: the exact ecnntespirt ef, operation "Attila" which Hitler was at the same ,' 
time preparing in the met* .The menace to the Rumanian oil fields is a n. 
tioned only "Incidentally", and the directive correctly recognises that 
the British air bases in Greece, were directed ‘against Italy.. - fhese ccnsi»' 
derations led Hitler to order,the following* .
.. «*., 'Establish Intha coming mcathe a constantly increasing force in/.
' ■ ■'' southern ana**»!*»'
■ - b. :'fSi the arrival of favourable weather... to more this force ae-
. ■' rose .Bulgaria te occupy the north «fact of tee Aegean and, , ' ' •
■ :' ; should this be necessary, the entire mainland of Greece.
Share. fellow esters as to the buildup in Rumania, about which »re,below.; 
She directive.-gee#on*. ; \
6. MUsa^SUlcteonda. Ä S 2 Ä & ; ? .  10 •
Undertaking "Marita" itaslf will be prepared on tee following -
■ basis i
a. The first objective of the operation is the occupation 
of .the Aegean'Coast and the Salonika Basin.. It may become so-/y'-, 
oessary to pursue the attack via Larissa and the Isthmus of 
Corinth, y ■ '
d* It will be the task of the air force to give effective 
support in all phases of the advance of the anayj to eliminate 
'. the enemy air forcej as far as possible'to seize the English 
bases in the Creek Islands with airborne troops. -
She reference to the occupation of the entire Greek mainland was clearly a 
remnant of the "large", original operation,' and made sense only if it was . ■ < 
intended to carry on into' the eastern Mediterranean. - As for covering the 
flank of the Russian campaign, this objective could clearly be achieved by 
occupying northeastern Greece alone. When it became clear that the British 
were''Sending but few air force units and now ground troops to Greece, the 
operation ■ was therefore limited. to this área, and it was only after ■larger., 
British forces arrived in Greece in March that.Hitler reluctantly extended 
it again.*^ ' The Russian campaign, which Hitler had still ; regarded as "pro­
bable" on 20 November, had now teams a certainity. The last paragraph of ' 
"directive'Ho*:IQ* accordingly linked operation.:"Marita" with Hitler*s 
eastern planst ...... ,... ;
At the conclusion of undertaking "Marita", the forces envisaged - - 
will be withdrawn for NEW MPLGIMEST# . ¿emphasis in the original/ ■ "
"Marita" would have, to be over before the' start of the easts» campaign*;., 
not only because ita aim was to secure the latter*s right flank but beoause 
tho forces engaged on it would be needed in the east. Since it was 'this-.aa-t-. 
peot of the operation - itself,'of no veiy great significance - that was 
latir supposed to have been of crucial importance for the outcome of the war, 
the relationship between it and the flan® for an attack to Russia deserves. -
7. '. This measure, too, show» that the attack on' Greece 'was- mm wording..'
with the one ©a Russia) the occupation of the entire Greek mainland .:
: 'Would obviously prolong operation "Marita" and endanger the timely com­
pletion of pr^pratAms for the Russian easpatgn. T* Greiner, Mato»'1--'
■ ■. m^tfteosig. p. m$* ■ ' ' -;C





X» Decomber I940f preparations for an attack on tosala had already 
golng for six months, A host of operational plana had been examinedj soma ; 
practical prepations, such &s tha conatruction of roads and railways in 
Poland, and tha enlargoment of tha axmy to 180 divisions, ma« tóso' under 
niy* litxing tha last days of Hoveaber vaavgames vere organlzed in order 
ti detonine thè basic linea of tha deployment, under tha direction of Htó- 
dori* deputi et QKH, generai Paulus*^  Chi 5 Decomber tha plana vere duly 
eubmitted to Hitler* On 18 Decomber they vere laid to« in "directlve Ho*
21* 10
The: generai fora 'of tha pian vas' detennined by geography. ^ fha bordar . ■ 
betveen tha Soviet Union and vhat oould effeotively b» reg*ried''e® tha io®-- 
man «phere of influenoe stretched over some 1500 milas aerosa thè Euroopean ' 
©ontinint from thè Daltic to thè BAUsk Sta* Por oparationtó purposes thia ■ - 
gigantic front' vas ' divided into ' a northern and a southern secotr by thè fri« 
pje^ t marshes, 250 miles long and 120 miles 'vide# vhich vere « vrongly, mi 
it tuxned ©ut - consldered unsuitable for'larga scale ailitaiy operations. 
Prora thè baginning, thè German piena envisagedthe division ef thè attac- /. 
king foroes into two main groups, one operating north of thè marshes, thè 
other south of thè au ihe fuastion aa to where .thè main thrust va» to he 
delivered, ' and therefore vhere thè bulk of ■ thè .forte« vai to be conoentra- 
ted, vai answered in different vays by thè varimi officera responaible for . 
thè early plana* The ona flnally adopted by OKH formar thè oommitraent of •
tw®
11
gern®» • Vmaemgmff® * m ä  ©f thè





.»or «to gswis, v. P# von Patów# 
«s0iain, Bemard&Graefe, 1965} P<
Print ed in F*.Ä* iP* 49»52#
For a auch bettar description of thè plano than 
A. ^ Philipp! . ». Heim, Ma ltód~ " -....
(Frankfurt












































































































—So-dark was the- that @81 decided to send a
• MMMMaA 3»©©'a»®i«s«B©« staff ■ % © ' this time consisting of officers 
fa»»'the units that would later hare to copevith the problems posed by ■ 
th#;laJ,,pgd,«a roada :a»d climate. The bbwaiseives did not like
the idea} they had just rejected the Soviet proposal for a mutual assis- 
: tan*» past, aM wort afraid lest. the latMiaur. should take military coun­
ter measures. fheir demand for the greatest secrecy led to some delay/ 
«MUt^ ms'only»» 13' Beteiiber, that-:. the staff, camouflaged as a oar age- 
■ ncy# ofatped with special cross '©ount^ 'viMeleO «®d commanded by'colonel 
. Zeitzler -of' PanserCTUTOe' gleist got under way. The mission lasted for two 
'weeks#'end at its end Zefczler reported Ms findings ;to Brauchitsch and 
< ^Haider. In essence,:his;reports coffirmed Kinzel1sf thei weather'end the 
. state;Of, the roads did not allow an operation against Greece to take place 
' before''itiireh.21. ._/./■« -
In view of the Russian operation, which by this time has been defini- '
'■ tely decided upon, Kinzel‘ 3 report was bad news. The relationship between 
1 **MaritaM and 'ttBerbKmsi(aM, formed mm of 'tht'kiy 'issues discussed between 
Hitler and Ms top brass during a conference on 3 December. As usual, it 
was Haider who did most of the reporting. In carrying out the attack on 
Greece, he explained, it would be necessary to overcome the difficulties 
created by the narrowness of the Struma Valley end concentrate the stron­
gest forces opposite the Hupei pass on the extreme western end of the Bui« 
garo-Greek frontier, for it was there that the Ketaxas line was at its vsa- 
kest. Another corps would advance into Greek Thrace from the extreme 
eastern end of the frontier, wMle the rest of the border would be covered 
by relatively weak forces* The armoured and motorised divisions could 
only be brought into action after the breaching of the Bhodope mountains, 
that is in the second stage. In all, 13 divisions would have to be trans­
ferred to Bulgaria, Of these, 7 * including 5 infantry, 1 armoured and 1 
motorized - were to carry out the actual attack. The remaining 6 divisions 
would serve as cover on the Turkish border, and the need to bring them up
' 21. ■ for the" getiler MssiOa.' of. Fabry.' Balkan. ». 76.: - ^-'V •
'2.2, 'Wmm** ■■ ■ - - . ' 1

evexy opportunity to veaken thè Aris. ■ Preparations againat ber therefore 
tot to to ehiftod into high gear. . The attack would presuaatly etart 'loto'' " 
in May* 0 . . . , _ , , ■ '■ • ; ! ;v
lating received thiagree» lighl froa Hitler, OSE pushed ahead with V 
ita preparations. fhe number of divisione earmarksd far Bulgaria was now 
so larga that they had .to to put andar ito' cosmand, not of a ' ■
but of aa àm®wìm^mm&M orifinalSy OKB had designate! fielàmarshal ' 
ira, litigo*©' 4. anay for thè purpoee, but von Hugo had 'fiT«,». ertraosdi* : 
nary acoount of himsalf during Via french caapaign and after thè deeision . 
ho attack Eussia wao made OKU did not tMnk it could dispensa vith. hia èer- 
fiioo during thè poslot of preparati«®''for thè eaèt.2^  Operation "Marita" •. ■ 
vaa therefors entraste! to Mtltemhikl Vii.Alfa Hot*« 12. army, vhich at ; ; 
that 'tino '«aé 'nn^Unr ito ©ohÌmmÌ of Heereaisroppe B in MIm ì  «A vaa rapi*» '
•©A th«fo by 11. ;«ny m  14 loooófct*.28". M  9 'lottato» m i m e  elgned and 
Ì*.i»^ .tte:d^|l^»«kt'©Miw for 12.'«syt "tha politi«»! altantio« may stata 
it naceasary to occupy Groek Thraoe t9m lutante»' Sto «xtoitoi«'©f .thè • / 
opemtioa to 'Staaftly io possibìe*'.2^  ih© ordir .dii agl «■ m  a «omlt .of . 
Milor*« ''<w>*fO»MÉi«n«Ìfd King tela ani alaititti* DraganoT » ..tomi m  oo*,7; - 
tino Bulgaria^  porticìpation, but thè MlgKiiWR could ho ©xpectad to ,
©•©■*©' thoàr tordo*© «ith. Sfótto m i fwÉay.hy ■©©■© of ;to#r.®m;tr©«#s. ' 
Greece vaà expected to fi^ it, Turkey to alt by idly. Prpcautions against  ^^; " 
«i— aifMji lntorvontlott vero neverthelesa to to takan. . ©fa* tuilduu .
wm' to procead in suoi a wsy as to malo it poaoitla for |2, aray to march 
into Bulgaria vlthia 12 hours at aay timo from 25 S m m m T 1941 onvard, and , 
to atart operations for tot occupation of @mtk Thxaco vithin 35 days of - 
mMtiAK tha Banuha.^ 0 ' dm 11 toetator «BE isoiioA & «ir» dotdlod tlaotohio' 
for fho transportatlon 9$ tot W m m  ooMoaw to tmii» .
26. ; KTB/ilalder. ii§ '211»ilf mte? £ m  S.12.1f4®# ,
27. ■ Sgolato» m N m *  »> 7* ' ' ' / V .
a. ■' Kr. 31093/40 g.uoo t. 14*12.1940# ©s/427/ ^
• WI57*ff.: .
' 2|. 1 W*t#i in. Baltoa. ‘ p. 78.
50. ctb/oev. i, 224# ll.p.19#.'
?
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. X* buildup echelon, ' >24 January* antsy high Command 12., hi# w m k id' fun»7'
• i*»qi* Heist, high commando ITT* and mi* army corps, 5.» 9** 11. aav .
moured divisions, .60* motorised division, m  "Adolf Hitler” (AH) division,
' *50., ft., I64* infantry divisions, l/3 arms'- troops and 50 trains each for.'
-.air foree'aad supplies.' \ y :V V . v , ■ ,/y-e 'WV:
. U. buildup echelon, 24 January •*. 8 February* high command II. corps, 2. 
armoured division, 5«, 6* mountain divisions, 75* infantry division, in* ■ 
fantiy regiment 125*, 2/3 army trempa and 60 supply trains. V V
. , III. buildup echelon, 5-.fi February* hi# ©elands mil.,' m *  '«nvV•D*f*s: ; ' 
4^ «# 76., 198., 294, infantry divisions, remaining «ppïy -trains*!.’ "/V. . . ' ., : v , '
''.'In' all, the' forces earmakred for Rumania consisted of seventeen and' a third 
â^ivlsiws,.;fli^ ':àM:'air"so9S «* gener^ L von Hiehthofen's Ho* Till* . She'" 
timetable for the transportation of these fortes» however, was made'Obsolete
'"even before’lt:ifi»S''iss»(|#.beiwio-'€BI Ml once-mors underestimated the di­
fficulties of the operation*'"fh lO December Haider had a report about the '
:©OSStraction 'of bridge* dolivarod to hfelf > it;'then- appeared that tho- job • ■
">»ald.t«to'nd.lo#«''!'Mi«,»aw#.''iioAif'''as.i»8ll‘'#'70 to 100 trains of bridg- ■ 
hdai'-ttydlgNM^ «^ ';If',tiiO'bridges wore'to! be-'toady for the Danube crossing 
"Von.25 January as speoified in the deployment order, haste was essential) - 
the trains had therefore to be incorporated into I* bbulldup echelon, while 
nisi ooiipsiiies of/el^ aeow''laid "bridge bolide«-'«ore added to the transporte 
of i6.,''i»u«i';'iivlsioa.^  :t <tt4s'«*twâly/ri!»lt^  in delays, which by the 
iKMIi of 'lio«Bber.h«l already grown-ft'fir* day#. this, Haider calculated»
' ! meant -that 'the' attaet: '«did not"Start.on 1 Wtmk a* planned» but only on 6 ■
:'»»#i^ 'VV'';;'i 'v';\V'/''' ' v ' ^ I ;.;r 1 ■ ’ - v v'"
■ '1 -V.■ ; là*. delay ■ tn: the: starüng 'dot# of ; •«nritof*. In“ turn endangered the timely ■
.'m4y 'M4t' ibid, h On m  December 'fee' following changes wero introduced*
. 'M# eoaaand-XXX.. mew corps wish included ■ in 1* builds® echelon, high- ■
. :‘'v-'oaonnd;ZffXZI,*'nngr ooqprinJX« eefeelaa, hi# command II. army corps 
in HZs.oM m u Ibid* 1, 240, entry for 20.12.1940. ,
Vashinîrton 'r■ ^T^r' s
M. " ra/foldar. il. 238.' ente- for 20.12.1940. :'v ■
il, '22©,' entry for lO.12.1940.
- D.C, swt«
• tir i Of "iw te te te # *  te' someteing had te h# t e » '  » t e i ’ it t e i « ’y tir- fi' 1»«*
./.p«rls on te© Rumanlan railways te their usa te'6te®*& MHtsa^ \trÉlte >
' ; followed consultatioaa vhich led, on 27 Becember, te tha adoption of » coa- 
; proalsa oolution that gavo only partial sétisfaction te thè Gensan demands.
■ < ■.; ®r©n. iteri te te»' Muslr ;stari o£ tee ©fi*»t£*a te ■ thè tete«?«
Oa 24 Deoemien Ealder notai "abnormal enov atro»»* la Rumarla, te'tell#'#*■ 
ving vent to M»; woiiitjr .Ite! tele sbenda tara an adverso effact on tea mo­
rale of th® Rumanlsn poople and teerefora on te» posltion of Antonascu hs -
, ©spesate', ili»  oyiiattei th**i*tii» teuMfiatiwm 
; te’tee^ e^ ete'-ea^ attteite*. ;tefid.te'f«teteia#*57 
'■ ,tìmt‘«ÈàaiÌi®£ te*, gtkùhù. s taff hi® itera t e  ¿ te lia te  :te»s teÉteiit'teii'^:'^'.’
' vorriea rsaulting from ths reallj- frightful weather now commencing on other 
,^tatuata«.,, Oa 21 ;Mteihtei » ta* ..UrateMi i i M  -te -te» •tarai» mwamié ■ ■
. ite' litflratti ibite.tfcif! -tee «d el l* -.Hill»»- teteiMi had beenpostponed 
, irw;S4' Jl»aatete;.5, ia Jamaxy, heavy ne*.tmmà tei-.-....'-
Rn^ruariainri a# all trarusoort moveaent® te ««1» iixiii»» Rumanla.^  ihis lama-. - '■ 
di&tdly Mtelted in a frssh tlmetahle being issued te OH, in wfcich Z. tedi»
- 35. .'9«»i&il)*'.te'itaiMPfc alvUteft fi«I2.Ìf#r m  J. ad, Io. 5441 iJteX "V.;, directive. 21.12.1940. ibld. Io. 5Sé. - - r ; v-v:,v-,, :.j:,... :
▼. .P , i t , Ì f # r *S»ite 
15 "»t thè Zaip«ial Wm
ìft , B É |  *> 247» entry for 6.1.1941
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fìùrgàu «roo*^; v/'' ''V'- ' ' ■
1 Prsparationa for the bridging of the Danube had also been delayed by , . 
ths veatlisr. The aatlaircraft units earmarked for the protection of the' :
' crossing had originally keen supposed to reach their, positions "on theri- ■ 
ver by 24 January, hut the catastrophic transport situation had made it '
: impossible for the trains carrying 99* antiaircraft regiment, to reach their - 
, destination* ' She regiment was' therefore forced' to" disentrain south of the 
Oa^athlaiis, from where troops’ and " equipment were to 'march ' to ' the Danube by - 
• Rumanian - road* : this meant that tie ' crossing," even by such troops as 
were available, hadto be postponed* In'order to save time, therefore, ' 
Eitler on 9 January ratified Brauchitsoh*s proposal to march' the first ■' 
echelon over the ice Nas soon as'.the river is frozen".^  ' fortune, however,
was clearly hiding her face from the ifhrer j ' the ' days passed and - the Danube 
refused to freeze. Sven if it did, the crossing would have been obstructed 
by the fact that the Danube, with its strong current, does not form a conti­
nuous later of lee but piles blocks on top of each other, 'lor'"thé formation 
of a reliable « intha sense that 'it' is passable for light vehicles - layer 
of let 14 days' of, severe frost were needed, vhichmeant that no crossing '1 
could be expected before the end of January*^  " (ha 10 January Varlimont re»' 
a’iirtoMve' to' this ' effect.^ 8 Moreover, 12* army itaelf was 
unhappy about the entire plant it was know that the' locati; inhabitants used . 
to drive 1 and' 2 ton vehicles over the ist, ' but what would happen if an at- 
tempt were made to .get the 16 ton vsliilss of the 'any across was anybody*s
guess. actually seying so, the staff of 12. sassy therefore gave
1 , 299-60, «try for,25.I.
¿5* ' if*. Inliiai« m » 136-37* ", . ' , \
' 46,', fiotitgi*,: 1i«b**s«htf®ta»g, p. 249f KEB/OBf, 2ff-60, antsy for 10.1. _ 
<, . .  "i$H* v .  ,  .
47*. 'finer» Wehnachtftffij^ » i» 2*9» ;
49*' OEV/ivTSt/Abt.L Er. 44 4IO/4I g.Kdos Chrfsache v* 10.1.1941, «IfMA-ly 
; Waxlimont, item No. Ml/l4/¿55 at the Imperial Var l-fuseum., ;T* also1 '




/ ''parts of Grasii8!i,s '«my had «tased to exist, 'iMle. th® *®st'v«.fidling..
' back la disorder across the frontier into Libya, There fallowed one of - 
th® mightiest marches in tbe history of war faro, with the British advaa- ^
: cing rapidly over hundreds of miles end. taking one i fortified Italian posi- 
. tioa 'after 1*® other*. Solium "fell on 17 Xtasaibfr*---on 5; January. t 
Soon 'the capital of Cyxenaioa,: Tobruk, was also 'endangered*: ;■ - ■ j ' ■ ,
, • ' OSW was heft informed about the situation by the idlitioy nttaab«- i»'-j 
Home. ; in If'leoesibe» Siat#l«B;®«M^''tM mHam weeks. ag6 .the :®it»ati®a; 
in Albania wa3' so critical that' a heavy defeat Ml to' ba ^ taken tut® acc-: - 
'v amt» ' The front has sew. been stabilized and is expected to hold. , After 
the transfer of further divisions it will be. f®aslbl®.%'consider the par#» 
f«l»i!on 'of., an offensive for the spring". Thesituationin Mbya# ho.’!»«•*■ 
ported, was .“«t^ ely''uaf«too3?i*le,--..te»^ aid ti $^ jh£iag adelaying 
tie near Bardia and Tobruk, which loss must be reckoned with... It has,.,ns* 
yet been possible':to see whefeer'the British' oAvmmo .«tan be halted*#■The 
:' Bucq had 'there!##®' ofdersd Cavallero' to ‘nedc 'Germany to hold ono armoured 
'•division ' and ;s«^Sy the 'aatasiia. to equip no less 'than, tail
: divisions#^ ':'ft#o dart latef,' after a'revis» if. the
■: and'itirtiii,-"Jfassolini eenoluded itbaf troops would be of tii .«*«-4» '
Ai%u»jwti#t in Africa, on the other hand, was weeded'sa Mde-■ w S V i p M a e i l ^  /mmm • M p *  * * » '* * i « p  '•“ *<*» f w ®  w  ##»*• «'*#  *# *» .**  <».i «m . j y w 1 w * # r w • •  w Wf  W  wpK* *<B W ^^w pw t I # ’' » »  W P . , W » “
.  _ • . ,  . ■  ■ ■  . f • ■ s I  '  • *■  '  ’ • '•• • .
This relatively euphoric mood in Some did not last for very long. On 
23 December Karras returned to his post as military attache in Berlin and 
vent straight to Keitel f although the Greeks were seldom attacking with 
more than one or two battalions, he «explained, there could be no question 
of the Italian front in Albania being stabilised. Sven now it was rather 
a matter of retreating oombattendo. He was convinced that the engagement 
of only a few German mountain regiments would stabilise the front, not 
least because of the extraordinary effect on the morale of the Italian 
troops, as well as that of the Greeks. As for Libya, it was becoming
17* ■. wa/motm i, «#* mter-**'- t§.it*ii#§. •: . ■ :' ‘ ’• ' . . \


































• " British. Ultijnatoly, of '«si«««* these forces would hare to he deducted froa
,‘ttMMR# fea? m m  '^mmêam tipiü ä »  fe feeef
' ■ fee»«  im¡U ’«§ .ftMÍVS*» ■ ■ ®ás «asiétrntloa n m  to him li»« the 'jhhÌmhi 
’ JfftaÄätiibfe*: ' fegp the dispatch of ft tiny* aingiy —útil • fesMMl
■;:' la all '•#;©■% feiOQ* m u ’ '«ni 335t »tot,.Tfe«il«i * ìmpÌAmnIUj ’ ■
;■' lee» feaai «hm ilviefejav ‘ y y ; ’ . :■ y* ■;■.:■ - Vv-: v
! Hitler then m m  to ^  situation in Albania. Secent reports
txm feft;«>§« had . t a M d  fet fee'Xfeiiesu ver® aowwt loa#'Met able
fe i» -.«fya,. ■ -feaqMt was M  yffpo#- 4n ' fand4«g• ,
' troop3 there unless they could 'felfe the offensire.: Such m  offensive vould
y/. fertwjr ueefal 4» eejfeiMfeto» vife. fee'atfeÄ of It* "mv tñá Mämßi®*' but 
; ’@©nM .-fed/ b# undertaken fefe ' «meiieaislly etreag« ferees than ' feo#e re* '■
; Íqt' fei Ifelife**r'feÄuMaf tmnut» - -la viev of fee fact feat tfew
feferwafeoa ln Äfeeta *l#ri it' óptete* fe'»Mew fee ^ Mrnsmé on the .
: ',, J U i i m à  la but becaaee ' of fee’ ¡ÉtamiSjr * ti#t"'tfee*
: ■ ,tfel# tmmatag-[pè--XÊlm of fee iomm'imé. •M*¿ítft< feé '*B«barM¡stfV''
, , it ««id be m , w m m  If 'fee' offasaÉtè la àlìme&tt. oould'fett pièce ’tefe*# .; l.
■ fest o f  It* ( isfejr*' X rfefeiftfe Ùâ&Mfm 'feiaid ol*mmm; fo r  »# o »fe i»«Ä «e  
-.v.'ia Albfelfti which tttl*? gswatfei*^  'fee' rtfttsiè'ef-feir a»y comaMer la 
. chief, va» of ^rattier pòrtiti iröttt» bee»»#' at feat Mai''general SfeMfe 
¡*1**®%\it fee 'Mali« feas**■' ’ • ' '■ - v' ' •'’■•■' '■■''■ ' ■ '
"*"■ ■ ta 'll ' Jaaa^ 'fee »wife tf fee '«eafkifeoe«' m m  ifeâ’dé«» la 'à feu»''
y,y; y vy yy " yyyyy ' ,y ,."Mre«fewfe*”tt ■' '.y y:’ ;y
• ■ ■ '■ :-V; -f' 'émim tóppjft'têt tattle» in'fee; liMfe***»#«'fee«'■ “ 'f''■’v: ■'
, - < - ■ ?  - V !  ■’  , V  .. ■: i ;  •  ’  ;  '  ■ ■ - ,  ■ ■ ■ ■  . ■ .  ■ < ': ,  .  ■ ¡ '  ■ • / ■ . ■■.■„>■ “I»' altofttlfla ia fee:li<itfefeMi m*i,: itmm ia^ Lfei le «p#>i ■, ■ âm» auueriÉli'fiaMMie xh****® *»**»■ Miti— > rnmlroe feat Gernaav .
. y i, • ' .'feMlâ «iwiet £m M a i  »feisty* pMtioe 'fed psychology.
62* K3a/ga3-der. il, 252, entry for; 24.I.I94I. ; 
6j. ro/(g. 1 , 253-55» entry for 9*1.1941*
64. Printed la Brevor-Roper, oj¿, cit., pp. 53-5* /
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Tripolitanla must ba hold and the danger of collapse on the 
Albanian front must be eliminated# Furthermore, the Pavallero 
' army group ^/I.e the Italian army in Albania/ most be enabled, in „
■ ; , i cooperation with the later .operations of-12# any, to go over to 
- the offensive in Albania.. ..1 therefor* order as follows* 1 ' ' • ' • > •
1« " Commander .in chief army will provide covering forces suf­
ficient to render valuable service to sour allies in the defense 
; '"of iripolitania,.. • :
,2«’ X; air corps will continue to operate from Sicily.• •
J. German formations in the approximate strength of one 
corps, including 1. mountain division and armoured units, will 
. . be detailed and made ready to move to Albania. ••
, It will be the task of the German forces* ,
a." So act as immediate stiffening in Albania in case fur- 
. ther critical situations should arise.
... b. So enable the Italian army group to go over to the off en»
1 ' sivo at a later date with the purpose*
.1. , Of breaking through Greek defences at a decisive point 
for extensive operations.
2. Of opening the passages west of Salonika from the rear,
. thereby supporting a frontal attack by the List army.
As the opening statements indicate, the overall aim of both operations was 
purely1 defensive, and it is here that the crucial difference between, the 
present directive and “directive No. 18w of November lies.^  The transfer 
of German forces to both Libya and Greece had originally been conceived as 
part of’A grand Mediterranean offensive against the positions of Great Bri­
tain in the area| but the present directive only deals with makeshift mea­
sures intended to relieve immediate dangers in & rather uncoordinated way,
E en the eventual offensive operations evnisaged for Albania were meant only 
to support the much larger - but still essentially defensive - operations of 
12« 'army* Convinced that “the decision over the hegemony in Europe would
fall in Bus si a”, Hitler was bent on limiting his forces elsewhere to the in-
,  • ! . . . .  .  ; . . . .  , , ' • • ‘ ,  '  - . ;  _ -f
dispensable minimum* and When Bommel arrived in Tripoli on 17 February he 
did in fact dispose of only one division«
While Hitler was so enthusiastically ordering much stronger forces than 
the Italians had asked for into Albania, Mussolini began to have second
if.1" Aa if'to 5«*t scrapped what wm  left- #f Of#*
■ ration “feU*“| MlMf« i, 255# «1ay t** M.ÎML* ' , . ■ . '
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thoughts* (hi 4 January & long telegram from the military attache In Berlin 
reached Borne* The Germans, Karras claimed, had arrived at the conclusion» 
that the Mediterranean vas just as vital Tor them as it vas for Italy or 
England* They vere determined to turn the Greek affir to their own advan­
tage! and in this respect their present move into the Balkans vas nothing 
hut another step in their traditional pursuit of hegemony in southeastern 
Europe* Germany*« principal aim vas the occupation of Salonika» a city in 
vhieh powerful German political and economio circles had for long shown 
great interest* The military attache postulated a number of "proofs" for . 
his theory! 1* during his conversations with Badàglio at Innsbruck Keitel 
insisted that Salonika should be occupied by German troops» and even eug- 
gestii German participation on the left flank of future Italian offensives'"
 ^Albania* >. 2*' (Mbmhsv'tabi virtuallr 7,IP—PP* —PPPP*—— TPPf Bp * . . **  PP*P*—*Pt—IPPPfkW — *| P^ K^^P*PMPNjy  ^—P**— F—PPP* , PP**P ——' ^ PPPF^P— .PPB Rgj»F .^PI— —Wp ^P —PP— P—I—  I
eimbling her to concentrato on southeaster Europe if*# the Mediterranean* . -
'EM w a ll  I W P ^ ^ t io a ^ th s t  S a lo s i t i l  Van  G<|fiy»f|yy'ty  at^^|j|ÌJMPl:'
' ' tSy <|%^ y VVX* j^ WPIttMSg ÌÌ^ OSllÉia' fffw' Mw the ; ' ;
. ; of Srotooi «AaM.-titt' iity! would obviously be the Sosti* first •bjeetivo* . \ ' 
. Marras hn-i more bad nows to announce. Tae Greeks, he declared, vere . 
unable to offer Mal' resistance to tit# German advance imt
- " the British, they not SQfVfft the -^{¡yt-44 to tran-' ' ^
- ' . § i m  strong foxces fTOB Cyrenaica f o r  the p o f o c o »  preferring instead t o  , '\ -  
. consolidate their hold on circumstances it W^ S possible that
' ' the *ff><t** ' fé*** **■*>**’ to & am'- the '
•'. ' «airtli MMliif 'tfct -la 'Htélt and thus depriving Zta&gr of fc«r:'$ittrt 'ini*, ■ ';
■ v«nae* ’ uaa more*' the atees® and «*11 «auinued German forces:could Imi' <• ’/■ 
exoected tei ranidlv not ■ ewitpp Salwilea*- : but oOft-«*» pa will" is, *s4a~.. .
onn-hayt it Vas significant tMt OTJf the pMMdkUity of : :
sending a mountain division to . expressed the desire 'to have it v.; 7
link up -'witfe' the forces against yiw* tngr out Of.. ■
this situation, Karras argued, va3 to conclude - as early as possible - po- 
. ' ìitìéii’ «jjl.^ py ^gveaÉMÌMrtai. i^lSiy tb#
, of the future sf^MliN# against Greece. Sinoe she vaa the weaker uartner*,  —— *F—^ S*. P»r ^p. ^PapP|P*PP w 9  ^P *»F*P> ■B*’*— *p —P *p*p*pi^v'^pp ^ P » '* — PPPPBPp — *^ P * ^ * «P  P* *éP^ p^
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ell the advantages of each coordination would 91 to Italy*66
'■ It goes without «aytog'ttot Karras^  report ma hopelessly wrongj noth­
ing was further from Hitler’s mind than German expansion in the eastern 
; ■ mt • tto#' time he was thd#ilgi«g» of the Medili» ’ #ng ''gfiyBMffy I»
'fatare tohens.mgTU -■ itataaltoi,.-'. Memrnm* did not know thi® ito wa* ‘ gMNctir ' ' ' 
Anniarde! Xton*** litter to .WwHùlàto'tai Albania with to* *»• '
' tmnant.. t.ha-h mtmà/iskimè.àmjMt to he in order to' ’’forestall” the German®"
to’to***®*^ *' <wi>Uim-xapll«d-idto.*;lMg tol«f^ ''ia;toifh'M:pisbM' ' 
^É'‘'^ *t'to«"atat«'':if Mstoreeé «ai»' to;topcisfllÙU to'gè’«tòt ¡té ttó off«;' - 
'«iato*: Jtai Ito time totogf: ¡tastoni# ho ■ suggested ' a peliti««! 'toiartiau 'tot1 
a toilitoaqr jNMMm Ì® ato ®«totoed-'totoM*** yftofÓNl that too §mm&' 
"%é'mèèmèàjtotoiw'tolto tto Itoli** ' ta»«*** ' • '■' :; i;:' v 1 ■•* ■ • ■= 1 :, '
'•■'■?1 f to t tA to to to  m f c t o l ■ té ; . « t to s k  ' to iw t to e d  ISìiséliHi ' toat a '¿totiàg 'with : 
'Jttttóta toltoli*'toift 'itoii'tfviiJtoi'toé tosar òf'being scolded for hi3 '
totoUU tottato to'OMéé* »:iii«'n®#®it»a*y» '«to it was duly totttogsi' .to : tolto 
 ^placa on 19-20 J&iauary* In tho meantime, he end Mi brass began to talee & :
,.'tohr éltof'*f-'tottit-'toi|r «¡®w regatoto'®® to* toaa»i* -efforts 'to reb-xtaly if ■/■_';.
■ 'tew ®piuH*t 'fldt infide®«®.' "GU'll ■ *|S* ¿nftpitmmA ' thit'’® P»®!! '
. ‘ reconnaissance ‘staff would leave tells tor Albania m  too 15th.69 ' Oa 17: ;:
teall«»» *®portod-that fte:#^#é®rutoer toe command of *é*lé*' V.
é #®#*’«*  *sn*toto tosto**} ' t e  « M it o  i l  h i» ;-
. : headquarters* OKW, 'tolto' told Catotltoé»';totf--yltoatot m  , ;-5;.?.
;' toMtos'tstotostotof 'toitoitotori*'to®'Xtoliatt¿®ni««lto 'fteti«i:to' •'■' ‘
; WtoiilMtotf'IÌÌÉA'Aato- «£to*i*ed with the German «taste*'toot tolgsatoi 
iiif' toil. W' German mountain'diviste»®' were ' going' to #pemtovto-toé'-ltollto ■
' left :iÉ*ÉrÌ3i Albania, "ito to attack ttto''toaJ^«^ Ulto torlttoltó Aifto®1 
; ' ' litolliKo« of oour»©# ! into*' tout W ®  'iattmMaà to commit' ®tp®ag
: Gexstan forces to'llMto'iito tot'«* tol-U'lto» with Bissoli^ *«’toiito'to' - .'
» n r >11 r  i n i « ' U n i . ’ ' h i '  ^  V  • '  ■ '• ; '  ' ' 1'
to«.itoton*;to.’to* otoistiy of -ms* Ir*. 2648/A., 4*1.1941# M ^ 29/WWé7«71«
il. to:«totoi*to^ tototo«i®. M / 129/Goooéf,
'to* itototolto* to' »««rfiM»
' ,. i-'.
#. to»®ni to ««ndto**« to. 3385/%.# 11.1.1940, E®/l2f/<





had already concluded that the All sail an project waa impractical. On 15 fa- 
anaaqr Rlntelen reported to the FUiirer in person alout viiat he had observed ' 
in Albania. ¡The situation on the ltalian front, he concluded, was a hlesk 
' ant» Ho successful offensive was possible without more troops and equiaaent
The Italian •©lifif* were ■doing their heat, ■ hut months ■ ®#. OdMftag without ■
' food,.- without' heat*' sad in ■ «oil hit sapped tbftir-fttnnftlu.  ^#h*
rain was veiy roB^ J, ci*Qatin^  great difficulties for the supply system.' 
Kies' were the only means of irarisport 'in many areas. 1 lateral Communion« '
' tte*»l«oh#: tt»'front■ singly, iit.net exist. ' The ports on which the entire 
army depnded foritssupplieswere congested and ill organised. Though an 
occasional Groeh attwk:'might still hook some local successes - as witnessed 
%*' the ftqptaow of .Xkimam§; where: Sintelen himself narrowly escaped capture, 
oh 10'S$mmKy: *' the idMtiiiy'attach® did not think the front was in‘danger ' 
ft#’ fto21^pti»+ ':-^«i*lw'^srgtio«f: however, could not he attempted.*^ 2 ‘ - 1 
" 'The pessimistic picitre painted by Eintelen evoked no comment from Hit«
; lor,' who crisfift' Mi' to attend the conference that had, after infinite de­
lays,' been fixed for 19-20 Januazy. Eintelen next travelled to Zoseen, the 
Sint ;«f'€i^;^^:’i^Crfeed.'t®. l»itt«Mtsch.^  His report imist have made it 1 
Slew? that 'IW 'fttoriftilft #•«% Operation "Alpenveilchen*, as' the pro- 
_'4ftet;tM^ he# dsftfeftAf^f 1«» the problem of supply and transportation; thl3 
'‘Mnitti 4s' ON iiwttu«ti^ ;«i# m m  high command to study the practicality 
'of: sending to. .Tripoli and Albania. , ‘ ’*
" ' On 16 January Hitler apia SinaSoii« .his top brass to the Bergfrof.' The 
star of the' ©«tasiea Wa# .genara! flattest Ac in the meantime had made some : 
at^ .of^ 'ti^ 'possihllitiis.if sending.to «hftaia*. It now appeared 
that 'litlef had'.llieij '^.hs tatomiftA tbs hope that his • '•
forcos would be ready for .«M« itt Albania even before 12« assay;' true, 1. ’
a»r4* mountain «visions could he made .ready iter te^i^tatioa^'20 Is-
fait one port'was " ■ _
ia^ ,^.f«^ _h«ia®.,"^ tflly..in»ecurQt - and even
p,b.^itiatet«ii,. ©£. |||^ s'p.'ia ; f f . ‘ J 
73. toi'tHl«
74. :-aaSMt. if' 268» for 8.1.1941.'
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thst one eould take only tòrta vasai» at a time, meant tòat tòt transf or of 
tò® divisions froa Brindisi eould not be compiette before add-March.*^
This, ofcourse, .Mimi tòat tòey eould Mi start' tòeir attack until Aprii. ’
'"'•'tòat' is, until after 12. array*s advanee veuld hopefully moke tò® putirò . 
projeot suparfluous. . Itela condiàerationa, togethar vith a considerable V' ' 
improvement in tòs situation on tòt Albanian front, convinced Berlin'tòat. - "
.''tòe aulire ptejeei tenia'be dispensai vitti.', - d . .
: ’ Operation "Alpenveilchen" la anotòer exaatple of Bone interpretine a _■ '
Gexman projeet for milìtary aotion in thè Mediterranean as a foul Teutonie . .
"attedi tò 'penetrate into Italy*s "living spaoe". - From Hitler*s pelai of , 
.'vie» tòere «ai no paini insending a '«all'tòrce on a defensive nission, /„ 
because Eintelen had informed hixa tòat tòt front:in Albaniacouldbe teli. ,
' The cornaitment of largar tòrcea on an offensive nission tòat eould have been 
' of use iii'tòin tòé trmam&k'mt' "Marita" ' and even tòat of "Barbarossa", on 
' tòo otte» tetti, vaa prevénted by a coabination of ebjootivo ciroumstancea 
and Italian obstruotionisn. ' ite Germane vanted to' eoe thè front in Albania' '
. teli} . iter 'tei'- but ' little tentitene# in thè prospeots of a new offensive. tòé ...
,r Italiane had pronised,*^^ and, ' resigned" a®. tòey vere tò ■ having to ^ ««Try. out ;: 
thè llti&datàitt of Gtiteiè vith tòeir' mìà. tòrte», ■ aivieed-' tòeir allies set _... ■ ■
tò engage in Offensives that vere eausing aitò harm thaa good«^ Mussolini 
tei started thè (fcNMdt affairj as long am he did not boteh it up even fur- 
: tòif,;te’,‘i#aldr» t W  in hii'juiesé v L r . ..
" The aèieipi’ ®fted thè ' lÌ<iuÌdation of ,'tòe Greek eftòir ìy.tean®. of a . 
§01^4 attitò:'tò^ ;'Albi«ia.htelng'»affetòd a«isoarriaget Mtler.^ in.. tur*
ned his gaza to thè buildup for "Marita". Hsre things vere on thè »tele ." 
going slightly better, and on 21 Januaxy^ tòtt tiansports of I. \.e«tiiil«n vere
.'M ' .. .. . ' r ìì v ì\ :v • •
75. ì BEBdMUter. ài, 244, 246, entry'tò* 16,1.1941.
•- 76. -■ fn/tBf. ■ i. 871.;. anter tòr 22.1.1941. ■ • ’V / ; ! ;  .
77. «tedia. mete tò* M h h L| 1.2.1941, IMR/129/000052. ' '
t t

ite fi«lt mmmP* ter Ite fir»t 4«p* «f temtey. ■" '
■ ^ /■ In thè 'MOMbif #f 7 January Filov 'Ma recaived by Eibbentrop «t thè lai» 
ter» e estate in Puschl. In p*ipa?»ti«ii t e  thè w m % i m  thè I t e  tote#!- - ; 
mlnluter tod received tvo meiaoranda £mm Ma principal politicai mi mili- 
■ tary adviaera, which are of some interest because they show what th® iisMa 
- vere. Veizsacker stress«! thè need to arrive at in agreement with Bulgaria 
conceraing te conduct of ■negotiations viti ' Turkey| ^ te impórtanos 'of die»- - 
thè •Rnigarian« raising te Mtotofiatf«i ipKa^ tloni i# as not to ^ in­
di»*« a possibl® German-Tugoalav accordi Bulgarian accession to te M»' >. 
partite Pact, thè »tate secretary suggested, vaa dssirable tot thè Greek. ;
: operation should not tototàfi dependent on It. A3 to te tefitosy that waa 
to to' pronised to Bulgaria, te MMTtlSff of Saltati» to Yugoslavia and "tho 
giaci» m, Greek eoli ending in tofint of Btin» to te fitotetot*. to Tur- ,
' toy.82' ' fa'" Mi «tetetetàà 'Bitte '«ò^tainaA. tet te aaln a£l£tej yateú» : 
á t e lt e  vto’tet fif teteti QKtf, in accordano» «ito *4itetiv» »•  20**, ’■
' máte 'te tolteteli1' themselres to provki cover m  te Turkish frontier, ; 
and for thia purpose it was necessary that they ehould 'inte in ftoff «•»-g 
; M t e i  fiti,'iàiWmìtàuA-Jáit »te as potetti*.83 ' :
' -’Afte" an inconcluaiva talk vith fiteatosp# Filov ascended to .te Ber- 
ghof in thè afternoon of 7 January. ' If fitte had hoped te tote vould
to' to' te tot fi* a teffiiafi® ' tnifi» Mito «torte V  «tattaf to» , '
'§teia«it^;telMM *in pfiiioÉpli* 'to |te te «pnrtoto tetf'totew#":
:' Mi fears of Russian, Turkish «ito Yugoalav reactions vere as lively as ever. 
fitte ifiid'to ditesi fnitor «to Insite* tot «f tonti Wmmim to «dai--' 
ttody te %o» iifftelt** 'tot te* to itoli» lite it'te teMntoly • 
impossible tei Russia should 'fitte anything agàinst Germany, provided thè 
epheres of influincé vere clearly deliminated*. Thsre tolteti fi lectura 
atout Germany»! militaiy strength, calculated loto to impresa and to in- ; ■ - 
Staitela te'ttfite.' fitte "ialite te'irte fittoli«* '
il. aMMtefte to''tote«» fififitet *«• ^ 53 ▼. 23.12.1940# st.s. Buiga-
fm  u  llbtontett to fiehthofen, 27.12.1940, MM,m 9:m T m .  ■ : ■ ''.'; ■ ... .
ii. ' Velaste»? marno £m fibto»t»ip» 2.1.1941, 1, fi» to* 594*, . ; ;
83. fitte m m  te fitoentrop, IMA. X»,. 593. ' . v :
'il
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’ VEXlety of reasons” • thè «Mi. natxire of vhich he conia not, of course, dia- ^
' «Iì m : to'ito'«itoti*'« taf ite UcaMflMt» po»*»ted m  toUtMqr ftottto .to ;
&amim v.' 'fhis v&s Bulgaria* a cnoortmiity te ohtala "further revisionate 
tea toro. o£ sa eutlet te tea ¿essali Se&«* Bnssi*a Hitler <sosoloded> ImmI -.*’epa^P^F « a  appoppai pipi«  ewflMe « ppp* 1»*®*'«. pfpf « « « p p  '•p*8P8&^ pp,®®®w «*#«* *i^ *« ffwìww
reoently ehovn conslderahle interest in Sulgsria) if ehe vanted to eecnpe 
thè fate of Ut» Ealtio States eh« had tettar sign iEmediately. . : * ,
‘ , ;' '.’to t IBlbto*»:ltoto*». lo ft  'WUm .«&***■*•€.  ^ ,tote» ho mmémmà* thè v
' Soviet3 vere of ' date ehowing ' interest • in Bulgaria!:. th&t imi precsd» •' -
■ eely vhy she wm «tedi, te alpi* • The Turks vere more don^ erous than thè
" 'tototo .tentoni «ad. te totottef of SalooilBi te vould not .te .; ' ■
' wdl,'toooifto ia teipwi«» ;• A «ai^ y»te..litl«ir te»'..i*li,wi»4 :
enothsr lecitre# ntoltef from tetta te ite United States and their te» "'"
! importantH ‘«ù te ftolNari te m '.«vati* . filo? .tototood te*;SM^»'toito . 
elsvla «si tetta i w t e i . rosi t«®i*ora ;«®I, ©oald sot. te wpd away*. ;. -, ' ; / ■'
' »attorte* ho 2s^ rtte§'.wwtt sigia • tet «éIj to ter, «ma «pad tla»»*f. ,: ’ '.•'. .'
" 'V ’.; tet «to a iiftetwtte ètfote» mH Hitler mototet it# , Stilli, a pwttel'■ .:
' '‘»«¿t-hte'.h^ 'oiteiiMii'.ldhtetiP^ i te i  «m n M ì. ta «Éroattiif »terto-, ;.-. 
■' «HtfNMt • "la fcitotete%' te te' «a »  - t e  te teLttettef of »teff ’ ■
_ otoions#®^  . Stta tomi tet te all iaptotato ailitexy papirate» «wll ;
' te ahead« Qn Q Jannsry Hitler accordin^ rlr »tmmimM f.Vm he^ inniiiÉ; of tette 1jraper piM *. _ HRpw j f f  W»WWl*»**WP*»i»|E W P > 'P | »  « W  W T P  p*»<»l»wpgj|'*"s^f ^w»W»W^IPlP> : W *I»I»W W l^ ^yWwleWwWWWWl*p|  ^ ■ l«iP»|ip^w»Wf •- ■ y
te^ta-ii* te tewtew«^ ©f( fMortes« far .te f&rat.tmop» te ■ \ ■. ■
te Bamite.®6 Vldlo te' «i«t «tp«fc »Uitioy m m m m  m m  .tea,,:.; ■ ;,
■ CEved imm teter tepri te 'plitttel; teteottoa w  «ttll. fm^twm SMgr*'. ■
" r^ ij^ i"' «e» "ittUteflt-tet «Itelithough he coult not
tetet tet;te lllara te «m «m» of tetewtmtte te teli patite w »  te! . 
ipni| somathic^  hfflA to ho dfftw nhout then*
Thia vas te task of te forateti oiaistiy, iMch disployod anususl tao»
: teitte' to ite '«eea^M^wt* ; Saa% to Jaimaiy te Germana «teli. ÌN* tote ; ',:
■ m* ■ Mmmmàrn'mmmmMmi T«ia»4i> liii»  to. /'
85. ' «MmM«ll«% 7.1.194!# Gehainnkten Schaldt« G£^6?/ , '
■ /;;_■ •‘ jlISIWte--- ;." v . ■ ■;■ . -. ■ ; -■ . ' 5- .-V, ,: .;.■■■■ .. ," '.;
66. ■ OSW/lnsland te f i » l # i  aiaittxy* iO.1.1941# 1 &  -Se.-to»' 'Ho* 644* '
W* -• B ^ ttd o r*  I t *  m *  «Ktaar Ito ;84*1.1941*" ’ ' 5 -■.■ ' 'v . '  ■ ■
/
few fore«® to StaBMaiaf aetMiig with iI«.. oppose. to®.. 34 Soviet divisions 
to' B®«#»toiA|'''5T furfeisli Mviiions'tn Thrace,'' and the million men Yugoslav 
army. To counter toes® forces, toe Vilhelmstrasse - and behind it Hitler, 
who took a peronal interest in to® matter..«* had to''rely «a. shier bivtt 
While' d»llh«mt#ly ''reigning•from iay-®ttl«iil''«a0ia®«i«to,'lihhiat»f : 
on 7 January gent a circular to Ms «toys to Moscow, Ankara, Belgrade end 
" .Athens.': larked "for to*', pertonai! infismaitom ef■ tot ambassador '¿itoisto|7. 
and toe Mllti^ -"attoeh«^ , the circular to f«M'regulated toe -«ttltnAt'-to'- '
. W  MSUffiffld tovard. »»..m. «»•«<»■ «gardlng tta t a d  1U*«i ««*, 
title« to Rumania* The tramsfortatioa ®Y Gerattm trotfs tores# lumpily''®M 
Rumania and their concentration an .toe'fcfflahe,;liht«»tr^  tireetei.» ;'«bM3A;, 
be adaittedi they could net be concslied enyhow^ end the knowledge might >'■ 
have a beneficial effect on the Greek«• As to the purpose of these measu­
res, the foreign minister Instructed Ms representatives to say that Ger- 
,wm^  had "received reports of increasingly lar|te reinforcements of every 
kind in Greece", and authorised them to mention the World War I Salonika 
front* Any father inquiries should be referred to Berlin* The note,' to­
gether with toe official silence maintained by the foreign ministry, had 
the desired effect* from Moscow and Ankara Sehulcnburg and Papen reported 
that although the respective governments had not reacted officially to the 
news exaggerated rumours, fear and anxiety were to the air.8^
If Berlin had ever hoped that fear would deter the Soviets from oppo­
sing its plan to march through Bulgaria, these hopes were soon dispelled*
On 13 January Tags news agency published a Soviet demarche clearly aimed at 
"■toe" adrtss of Sofia*90, ( - "
If German troops really are present to Bulgaria, end if toe 
further despatch of German troops to Bulgaria is really tak­
ing place, then all this scoured* * * without the knowledge and 
consent of the USSR* '* * * the Bulgarian government never approached the USSR
it. Eibbentrop to Sohulenburg, Papen, Heeren add Erbach, 7*1*1941, R&ffP* 
B, ad, Ho. 615. ,
if* Shhulenburg to foreign ministry, 8.1.1941* ibid. Ho. $24j Papen to 
foreign ministry* ibid. Ho. 634«
As If this imp# Bit 
nr ;«t 17
enoxigii» Sorifit ambassador Dekanosow called on .
to dMiver«.togli atafeiieat.^  &m®wt$xi$ ,to «31 ye»
were being concentrated In XmeBia.is proparation for . .
fhe Britieh and the !Turka would undoubtedly try to, forestall the.
. field. . This' the SvfflMtt Union could met tolerate, since^  Bulgaria' belonged 
to her. ioiprity" Wne and the entry of German tr ops into .the country vould _ 
therefore be regarded aa a tvlolatioa of the aecurity interests of' the
had the effeot of clarifying the Soviet ■/;
, but not' in ^ the desired. direction. p ^ few now on, there could be 
no doubt whatsoever but that the Soviets would oppose the German plans - > 
with all available means. Despite Me brave words to Filov - 
the fact that the leading experts in the forelgn ministry, fell 
Sohiflenburg, were unanimous that Wm Mmmiim' should net be; regarded too 
' tragically^ 2 • Hitler was not ,ih* man to tafce" the 'threat* of his Geers&ttt'
January he MMVil: ^ertiiwee ef the aettewSIk*. 
pre§*PBii#»s fer the Danube evoataiag' te himself.^  _ . ".. ", ' ■'. ■
had e.'i»»",b«tt»tt«lel''effeet on .Turkey* ."Seg®»'-
tiations with Ankara had been abruptly halted on 5'leseiiberf suspended, in
$1. Veiss&eker memo, 17.1.1941, DGffP. D, xi, Ho. 668.; In Moscow, an ide- 
, ntieal mote was handed to Schulenburg by Molotov. However, the Sov- 
, let foreign minister tried to sugar the pill by asking the ambassador 
why the USSR had never received a reply to her proposal to join the 
Tripartite Pact. Schulenburg to foreign ministry, 17.1.1941. ibid,
' BO. ,663*
32, Veiss&oker memo, 20.1.1941* ibid. Ho. 678.
33. KTB/Halder. ii, 249, entry for 20.1.1941J Hitler-Jfussolini conversa­
tion, 20.1.1941, DGFP. D, xi, Ho. 679. In the fehrmachtfShrungstab
- Varllmont anxiously asked Jodi whether the demarche meant that "Ma­
rita” would lead to a conflict with Russia) but the Chef WSt did not 
think eo. ETB/OSf. i, 268, entry for 18.1.1941.
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.. complete disregard of Papen*s urgent appeals,^  for the coining fortnight! ' 
end resumed only on ¿1 December, that is approximately at the same time as 
;.those with Bulgaria. Despite declarations of enthusiasm, the Turks 
. had been .dragging their feet and on 10 January Papon reported that in his 
opinion the only way to keep her out was to promise that the German troops 
■ in Bulgaria would respect a sons of 50 Em* (*50 mile) from her frontier*^  
This, however, was a proposal which the foreign minis try could not accept, 
since if leaked to the Bulgarians it would supply them with proof that 
Germany was double crossing them concerning the "glacis” on Greek territo- 
, ay Which tfeisstoker was planning to set aside for Turkey. >
; ;0n lj January there came a breakthrough. Saracoglu told the Bulgarian 
, minister in Ankara that his government was now prepared to cede the Bulga­
rian demand that thrbd parties be left out of the talks between the two 
, countries. Whether this rather surprising Turkish surrender was a result 
of Ribbentrop*a bluff we do not know, ^  but In any case it brought treaen-
94* On 6 December Papen bitterly complained to Blbbentro? that he and Hit- 
- - ler had themselves instructed him to give the Turk3 assurances against 
: a German attack, end suggested that unless the talks were resumed the 
Turks would be driven irrevocably into the arms of England. (Papen to 
foreign ministry* 6*12.1940, DC-ff?, D, x±* Bo* 459)* On 14 December he reported that his fears had apprently been justified, for Swscoglu 
resented German reluetanca and warned that there could be "no question" 
of Turko-Bul garden negotiations. Same to same, 14*12.1940* ibid. Bo*
■ 515* ;/"* • 'r • • ' '
95* Eibbentrop to Papen, 21*12.1940* Ibid* Bo. 543*
96* On 24 December Saracoglu told Papon "he was glad that it was still 
Germany*! intention to find a new basis for a relationship of greater 
trust". Pepen to foreign ministry* 24.12.1940* ibid. Bo* 559*
97* Same to same, 10.1.1941* Ibid.' Bo. 624* ‘ '
93* Richthofen to foreign ministry* Br* 41 v. 17.1.1941* St.S* Bulgarlen. i, GIH/585/2428880. ■ ; .
9P« It has been argued that the Turkish agreement was the result of British 
pressure. The assumption is that London wanted to protect the Straits 
against the Bulgarians and possibly the Germans. Since the Turkish 
army was believed to be inferior to the German-supplied Bulgarian one 
London is uppoaed to have given Ankara the go ahead. Cf. E. Batovski,
■: ^ \ fl(jnap uno alliance b&lkanifue e» 1941 faevna d*Mstolre de la Detodeme 
Guerre Hondlale^  vol#' 19* ‘1967*' Bo* 74* 'pt* W  ”

to tofOr» Draganor that Germany consented /to Bulgarians territorial 
wThiig&tM»|*),• 'tot told, tos'MnistWp "mtaf now' state her full r®aSia#s#'to
the Tripartite Pact in Berlin at a tine to be set by us,' Germany would .tins 
deteimine the time itself, 'tat taking into account tost we vonld then be in 
,'n"'f6siMta to' to#«' with all eventualities"■ With this reply in hie |to> 
'tat’ Braganov flow to Sofia, froa whence toe answer came on 2) January* lie*.:
: hto®ftata>®wtta‘to&t Filor had said his eountaqr' was ready to1 Join "to# tact# .
' provided the German-Bulgarians staff talks emerged with some effectiva means
by taito'Bulgaria eouia, and would, be proteetodf; tar to# .rest, ■'HIwv'mn- 
;'ted''a,;WElttta oeittrwKtion #f what Welssictar had told >■ < /:
placing tareelf ■under, Oesataysototttaa Bulgaria must hswetopelrto ; 
extricate herself from between the Turkish 'and Soviet Edllstones.Vhether ;
it was fear of greed that pushed her toward Hitler is impossible to oayj
•Stotawifp" tto':®«gi*iata m m  m  taeeeesfal in-ptotitatiiig toe'tagotonttossjr 
(others might »ay, in getting a good ygito' for. their neutrality)' that llta 
: end OKW ^had' to: go through May1, an anxious moment. : Her' decision to' opt - for 
tae^ 'j^ da'aito' if ptsaihl#' .to' go ahedd with the military ]Kr^ «tatdttBiV' tat-.it, 
'M«n: tatttoi. tot that tat all difficulties had beta dWtmMf tata'tbaA « ./ \
month was still to
i i ;  ! I k- 'i  >Danube.
until firman troops could at long' last «rtsi' the.
The military preparations for "Marita" were, when we left them, in a con­
siderable mess« While the original timetable was based on tha assumption 
that 1. echelon would be ready to cross from Rumania into Bulgaria oh 26 
January, the weather had already caused such delay that only four of the 
eight ■ divisions comprising that echelon had reached Rumania by that date* 
According to toe most recent timetable, issued on 8 January, the last 
transports of X. echelon would not arrive in Rumania until 16 February, 




to foreign adai*toir»; 23.1.1941* 1M4U-1».
*
185
M-'jioiMwitiw sSubwE»^® ' l*ur thermo re. tha stats of' the ■ €*■». a»* 'Mm Ti»w»ik« ,' made It impossible to foresee When-tot :lMrt4ftag®■:'tot bento-the'«tos«blg» v.;:'.- 
: «mia be .#IXMtoi*v .;-• ?-.:r'‘ .\:.": ■:. -h- / : :, : v  -  ■■•■',' ■• '^.i.■ v.\'-•.  ^ ,.;n.
..'.;:..;..ftot timely relief/is* :±r.t4«»-.',
of: thito ettotttoto«»*». tatoilgv «topisIsf. Vtot.thing. to to*::to;ri,;..-
''totoJfenfttok '-the '•toft ii*w«witi«»fv«adfo^  «1 toy«itotoa«t# ■ «til.ttotoiv.:
, toto:tol*«toi'at;iiio e«tito#'.i»«#ble M i i :;.te if'tonMaqr» ,v/
' ifffiafc. toed oU'.’ ttit'««14 to.i»to.#tMa:ttotoithr#® weeks«^’:-Ml»■ it;.,^ 
'■■»aisy'ef' ito!*wi«Mtow»lp this ttatMUto t*s.«tl#iitiWl ilsest ■
..hi®» It «1« «MMottM* , On 1 7 •*««»*'to* Sivtit m*ito taa»«A\lti'4a«f*.';:-
mentioned ‘ demarche. eoflntaf torsi f§i®j»f , to» 91«. if vt*»#* I ♦;; $ ,-
\ pnhatnrt cross the iiver before tha arrival of the rest of forces was ‘■|^F IFepKIIIr.FlFVFwW ™ PSNSI1 Se^ eep^S|MHfc. HP f  HP* ® 1 HP*® .P®*H P '*P^H|F®iPHF SPfafcw^F VPH F.»F . FW.'SpB#|f
Oh it 'JsaaiMy '»tier«Mlttoi'.tol» ItotoVfJl# tot.-r .
' iviat. to irtat% aHUtafel* j««pjMllM».'ftar. to* badd«s etottowtoittto M»-.-,: 
■ till* :' ®ti it January ho Issued a mm IlMtolto: 1» to :tbo yctototoUfcto .|J ,
■ that i««u to^to.WftdCUlto'tofito.to* mmmim 'tonU.totoftotof =■#;
\ enaelal fores vould hava to be mmMm rotor to firotect Constata against a.
' ftoalhlo-attMk*'■ Md «Mti-ka•». te'to :
Eumania in such a way as to be able to -«o^Uw an attack on tho ro.sx oflji
' «tor*»«••«•»'* ‘ 'ato tfei MLtoaii' AenlA. bomb :-
'oil fields his troops into" and he therefore
«U ^'■’Imi&gea themselveslif.
'tolJtosirto
■';v;;,-.»»:'«SiiW^ 'to"to taken in ord^to
Alt tois stoat to' §*^4*^*^ •
v ’ iel»» ot>i B-tsto'.
pr)^ furkisb. cmry-Mnag to %• fvf>Ay^-tnatftd by fhft Gar7ngn»Thi1gft-H»n staff
lif. ■ Anlage .to &&&» i. fefcjL '«to* «... » . .if/tt,
.• •;■; -. 80044tt9»3O; < ,: ■'.:/ = ’ • ‘ ‘ • '.■ •-: • ■• ;.. ■• ' V ' '
106. ■’ iitter to »to^tot 11.1.11#» SS7P. 0. xi. Ho. 660. '■ ■
107i 44 030/# *.«&»» Chefsi^ v. #.l..lf#*"Aiga®i by
. •. ■ .ybmmi**. iton Ss. «W/6ff st ilto..toi«d# «» H m m *.;
100.. llU«MltotolSsi' eosvertotitot ®.14f#t bGFP, D, si* «0, 679. >_;■•
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z t»U»e «a>á ^ citailftd «MMtlaa* to t%# 'twteyly  |0, «-i-nrr 4w
msém' te itei *t tea iiifiitetteii«,*0^  ' iftatr » Mftlpi Wtiiaai . ' -; . •' ' > - ■ . ’ •■ ■ "r ' ■ ' - - ' ■■■•!■. List «ná M.« senior snbordinate oificer« seneral von Helst. talks vera ;
; tettiate! ©a ,82' .¿imagr. tatete» '. a lama 'dM#g«ttea. «atar general. ®r*4- ; 
fSmimm* te» raaaatiy,. ajpitetei ■ tetei ©f atefiT. §#-. 12. ■ ersgr*. «ai a tal»»»
■ rtea telóte» andar. ganaral-lgritff* ■..llana» fctet ü€ aot awfc te laart 
hi a taaitoiiartera ."111® taiks <44 a wat tAa- atea® te Austria as t-Vio ’ a»Tt mn*4»«0J1 woi *p « ip!»'»ii^ . ii»i laiii,imi • w  "knp w  9 <p m í m » w  W * W  peweF w  W M P * *  j p w w w  . WWW* '” *WF*W- WNp  ■ WHgF I fW K w  «^ ^wwW^ W^ WlPWIlilWIIIWWWwWP
' t a i x » f i a a t a f t » . t e i  i t l n i f « & ^  l i i N N i a *  ' ' ’., ;’V? V . / .'. .■.' -.'' >''-'v, .V’ ;_v *.
■'.i'. ,If te® I«»m » sii® hai erxpeetad tee mmmmM&mm ,te,i« aáigr, y»»»
‘ ©ut » teete. anqpla»« ';tta,li4j«rten» tafaalr demandine ttafr'flNMMNar’:.,
“aMulá-nat «tettala te®' .©*•*•»4®» te te* teteartóS* l*®t «aaAter tea»;tea ' : 'Ut ' ' '■ start a¡T military ©»«aaMaa®“» ■ Sud»*' tew «itia—wf (m«>M»M¡iiiiii . • •■
to te in tr.mh ^  May SS to leaVQ te*t**: f#»y ' ¡fig wSUt)S©-«
p^iijnt usa «agaat^ ananla 4a te# I «Srtenaiy teay hop^i, -te-' ir^m#. ■ ■
. ~ te#jy ©1©¡tea' Ite tea «aá 'itf ®#64tewi a í a  ^ d
■ - m i suit ;te^®  «IX» '-■ I n í M a i  mm «teteliid. - '
• .«»■ lúgn&an». tei tusar Utete te- -te» w  í«f teliteaor fmtmtím ». ®Xi".te . .
could■ pisi te tea .te» »»MMteaA' Üt4»^»;teite teiáf *®te.a«á#r
te'te«»'.lKte' teÍ«tete-8teia tea i©lwüj«i* tei teiab «f ©•»# «MlÁ'afti.’ '4te>':
v foni tíia ' country a&ainst British borntardment •• casi ' the ^ ttetejpMi resented - \ 
‘' tete* ■; te *5-temaa^ r XU»r a@ite teli, ateteif« tea.4 Ma govemment regaru; ; :;
' ':.M' te» ateftete' 3^»i«te«a. «f te» «avateor W  i«»«; totopa te » „©mííM^ ;;
• ' B-twa wna v.Btw #oa» l i* »  *mbw®WI.^4»»44MmL' ' Jhf # » ’ t iro »  th e  fnyCtlpn | Ú t e '  , ';
tai», Ir W  < w »  *»i!ia»tei Siai- te ooaqpte 4t te» .te» latef ■■,1
. 10§. Sítete aam» 15.1.1941* iMt* lo. 662. Iteala* vas "vaateMibl» te ";
■ •-:' 'tea nUite far aateif test MI tete«!« «f ^14^; .
■ . te tete flaaly la-tea' toata;#f '
- . ' . ' " .  (te »  » * » i» t a r <V .  ‘ i ; - . ■  -.•■•■ ; ' - •■■;’ ■ : ( V. ■;. - / "
119. Sha Germán » « a te f d f tea n e ^ t l* « ,^  te  te ^ A i » « t e l t e ^ ' ' ;te' (: •'■. Bitter, m. -145 ▼. t6 .1 .1 i41 . St.5. Mlgarien, i, 6^ 585/242950-31. ' - ■
'Hl,. Weiasacker memo, 24.1.1941* ^  K0. 704.
. 11* . Mchteoten to foreign ateistry. Ir, 69 ?. 25.1.1141,
'- ■ ;■ %  gg/m 1/ t e W l  gEB/OW. 1| a ^ r ' ter _i f , l4 3 Ü ñ T ^ T  ; -
pointof irisw the teiiii'pvefeiiie me/teeet #f.tijalaf* ;, . 
Here, tee, ' th® Bolgariaas vere everythin but easy partners, for they bad . 
in mind teMMtevte 'te\tte'teKte^\«mi made even tela 'dependent «/tee, ÄH* ' 
vesy of w itói^':'i«a«ay'’iid;promised'Mt ml supplied.13^  ’ On 14 .Äa* 
uary Haidar 'SÄetem*' tee question with lipMtttMlu/ Ä© chief of tee/g«*' 
neral ■ staff. «ipsreiitiy did not : täte the Bulgarian objections too a«l«lgf|: 
for. to mad® the following teS'anUèian« Mat' needed W  days for the fiaadi'n 
state of his bridge construction.. fhe antiaircraft mite earmarked to pro* 
teot the operation' had. already arrived in Eumania,11* and would be at hand 
te*protest the bridges on 7:feb¥aiay4 the two armoured divisions earmarked 
to shiBOld Bulgaria against Eurkey would be «onoentrateÉ in the Bobrudja - ■ 
where tlxey wsra not dependent m  tee eonstruction of bridges - by 1 Fobra* 
i«f*— ''-‘SsiÄ»;bov '»ted :'te'«peed: up'tee aoveneiite of sons of the/«ti»-' 
aircraft units and to use them as protection inside Bulgaria» for this 
pwqpts% testers. té be thrown iter the 'river by boat On 5 February. On . 
the same day* the (armoured divisions would also move. ' fhe bridges for the 
miin fortes 'would 'hate te". be eMStfuitei without antiaircraft protection, 
but by the time ,tbiy were; ready »u«b.'protesti«'w»ld be available sad tee 
«••sing 'MMfrI'' 'teas ' tetat" plate «  7 ’ February. la vi« ef tee, feet' teat «  
e»ly4tert,@f ;"Ä^teM ».'desirable'1» order te’rtMeve tee presterò in 
vierte1-'Afvitei*; 'not. te Mtetie* opitetteii aMÀmmmrnm, .Balter oMeldeN* ét ■ 5- 
WBm  »S-IM Llt 10 M M t  WMl JplUI. # (
. \ Soon, however* it became tie« that the chief of staff's impatience . 
had got away with him onoe more* On 25 January Brauchitsch had to inform 
QW .teat pregati«» §m :wo,0m tee Danube would be ready on 10, not'on
111.  / Bitter mm»- 2 1 .n .l9 Ì0 . / : ;J /
114*" She 'e^ dynent to.futetion insisted peate« bridges* «lri»ftt',«tl»V 
■ r «ipWMft'lMkHiapiei: end canaon* • For tee itole «aeettae v. VttaipV : //
: ' " Mb»» ». 'S4*t7. V. ". ~
2§, ® d ’»  V
116. ‘ im/QWi i, tfl#! « W - ’.i»' ».1.1941. '
117. : MM/SteldMfw ii, 252, 'entry' for 24.Ì.I94I.
:
' lis7 February. On 27 January colonel Bruckaaan raised the Question as te ;
. who should supply the German army units in Bulgaria, painted out ..-feat ..fee- 
Bulgarians themselves would take il. days to mobilize instead of the 17 Bal», 
dor had reckoned with, and that there still was a host of uncompleted 'fesfe» ’iff ■ ■ " . ■ 'alasi preparations. ■/ When, fesrtfere, :Bitter on the *na d«y tasked. JoS3l_ 
.about the date of the crossing the Chief of the Wehr-machtföhrungstab could 
Mtt.btB. nothing "conclusive". . "Personally", however, Jodi told the mini«»,
. ter -that'' fee bridges osuld.be ready within tro or, feres days, from 10-tetara*
■ ary' onward j the bulk of 1. ■ echelon would by then hero arrived ih 'Bimani*» . 
but the commander Of Till, air ©o'rps wanted to,start the crossing only áXHR
■ establishing an 'air'base inside Bulgari*. -, If this request were granted''it "'
■ would tike 16 days to construct the base, since the Bulgarians could pro»','" - 
; cessonly è traino a day out of the 100 needed for the puaposef. Jodialso.'
hoped that some ’if fee units of II. edition would be allowed to reach Bn* '■ 
«nia'« as a precaution’against fee Soviets • before fee crossing, all;of " '
' vhichiaeant feat fee move into Bulgaria would begin only "considerably : ' 
later’* than 10 February. - In view of fesse circumstances Jodi did not be* .- : 1 1 , 12Q ,' lieve fee eross'iag'Cwild-'start btfera ffrfehruaiy*” ? -r _ ■ _ i ;. ■
On 'a':J«aa^ Mat aportad about fee .*aarna«tln* wife ih* Bulgsrliit - 
'«panal‘ifelf* vr 'Bulgaria v»s "absolutely willing", but ansfene,lest her ■ ■.
; M n a n ' i M U  prove laalifMtt* '. Alt mctstr wae Jntlflsd in «o' far. n
- • fee bulk éf'&'~ttijiaià»'wtÊtr had art yet bn»'ntililsd «*d would;'refutr»- 
at least 17 - der® fe ' dipliy m  fe» fuAlsb frontier« ■, Sott«**« ' augpaiin fe. . 
. ’'fei» :*afe.tf*«^ t‘unit*'®v«- fee Swabs ly-feat was .iagcAfenhl*.. -SÄs 
pÄtecti» for fee bridge# would be available only on 7 febroasy* end all ' \
the ,iÄfe:'if 1Í* ''mm «sept fea armoured divisions atafeäoad’in' fee Bob*»«
' -’di» Wtr» dependent on fea briden» even asdest military .protection for BtíU 
■ '< "pnù'n* i^feible befere mid februsiy.. Sines this'was m  it was nées« :'
110. : EEB/ogy. i, f7f*», ' entry for 25.1.I94I1 ggeinor. -WArasohtfiliggig. ■ - 
■.: , ( p. 254* , . ’ ■
.. .Ilf. KTB/HaMer. li, iff, 'entry fer 17.1«lf41* .:
..^1»,. Bitter memo, 274*1141.» WÊÊ* %  *t# S»* Tlf. ;
asary ' te wait vite thè «»saiiÉg at lavai rntll i«W protection could te made '. 
available by :tteér a®ate,\teaite iwktl 'after YXXX. air eorpa tediai«!, ita .
■ ,  ;  '1 »  j m u %  )  . i .  ,  ,
'dapte^ at' ia'ifflawdUi salo fehwiay. " ' ' . ..
' ; Eiscouragin^  aa thia rcporfc vas, it tei aaa mariti it mata it elear ente ; 
«mi ter 'ali ' that thè aia#«' factor contributing moat tovarda thè endlesa da- 
leys vas thè faot that uo antiaricraft unite vere immediately avallableto . 
protect te© bridge® and Bulgaria, There vas only one vajr te solve thia pro- 
blte, and aolveit thorougblyi the antiaircraft batteries eanaarksd for Bui- 
garia tei te teli through Iugoslavia. ' tela, lisi told te© foreign ministry» . ; 
vould make it possibla to erosa thè Basate on 10 ftteuasy or immediately ai- 
ter,1 and vould ala© bring’tremendous relief to te© everburdened railvays ©£ \ 
Bteèa^'MA'SaNMdAù . Oa ¿9 Januaiy a re^ uast from OSH te try and open 
thè vay ' mdfà' in iB i. ^  ' teliti««! ioaaii©r«te#te, havavar» made it ' iite : 
fftlitówa:te"teuiu’t ó  ; / ‘ \
' ';'0n 2S' Jwbnaór ,H t!«r  ite» tea ' #©B*ÌwtóL©ns ffe « ,’te©’®©rwÉì-ailffrf.aa atelf 
aaiteMMftianft, ' ; Stey tettai1 ’ \ .... ,
, Ma'«atti iste MlittVia sili iti*, piata .«t late «® possible * ■. ' that ie, ia' no case before 10 tetes»^  - and t e i  before» ' . ’ ,
#*tewfta§8wi ^ *^i*»ti©aa ©f tXZX* air mxpt*è* ©te , '
©Qinpleted* ,• •. j -, : ; , I<( . . ' . .! . • ; •. . ;v :
v;’”.' v2*":&è'tetteàfwaW» mé'mmita! d«f«»sM ime Co&ate&ta» :
' -‘.'ftcìstmi Mftvthé' «tsslic 'te© Mante «**‘*tter*'; ' '
V.54..JM* teXnMMUaaiBM.iia ■.entry into Eumania necessaiy. (125)
' " • fba ©nviiapi tate Per thè atert ®£ «f«w ti©iii (1 ifjril)la '■<
-, te te'Mteteteai*«,»..tea.tete.alter tee «tsaiàg of thè . ■ ■. . / ; ; ■■. -
"lanute ©sa te aqptetet.ta Maa'lteB.atetaalaa aanaaiifegr..tea .
n i . mÈi/mt,. if
ili: ' te'mte^ ri ». U5 ▼. 26.1.1941, '»*&*.MlMBlite 1, <■'
123* !-na/MÉb’L..-iai» entry for 29,1.19411 gj^.d«r» li, 261,. eatry far. ‘
124. ter 'tea sAUteaal. tetea«^ w»as Tagoaliifla, ▼. aagah »..130-3#-',' ;
. ni laftM.te '200-^ 09.
1.23. Bue to congestion on .tee' Rumanicn railvays IH. i^ftl«& could aafe «tari 
■ ■ ' 'te* Utet atealaa «roasad tea lanate, i^wvibtJb Ir.
33 460/41 flhafaatea ▼. 6.1.1941, "latemehmen «Marita*", itea Io.
. XZ/14/695 at te® Zaparial Var Huaeua. ;
it wm necassary to giva tha game away at ths latest possible moment, that . 
/ia to cross tlie Danuba at the latest date compatible vite tea stsrt of . 
itions early in Aprii. ; On $1 January 0S¥ translated bis instruotions 
ai on order, and staso ths data of tha Crossing vaa no# contingant on / ,
:concentration of USI. ' alr. coxpa. olearance waa giren for ; teis opera- 
tion. ' At.thia point, hovever, thè veatbar interferred once mora j not 
onljr vas thè conatruction of bridges still baing mede ia§®»sible by tho " *
ioei but thè molting of thesnovmade it ifpossibla to bring up thè »4* ' 712S ■’ 1 ; !
-Uniot-#*lte a fte #  te*teti fweo* : > , ..V-■
iSMft thè Batate Crossing, " ; 
it #f Ws tebiteaL atlitoggr «sfstiti®#« te» tee letchs- ■
(DA'J, Ìebruaiy. fb# main sub^ ect of thè disoussion imi, - m  usual in '
I,: tessi«. Ilalàsr delivered a long leotnre about various aspecta 
future Eussian campaign, and thè .dapìoprtiit oi*àer vhich OSE had $ust \ 
complete! vas eubmittedto Hitler.^ Ontha facaof it tede ofder, ènviaa- ■ 
’ ging aa attaok vith tette aimy groups, correaponded vite Hitler « s Mdirective 
Io. 21H for fljÉtetìitt *’EarbaiossaMl but a dosar scrutiny revaals that ®M7"' ;
' vas trying ' to tette ite Ffihrer by allocating considerably strongar forcea ■; 
teof avAgA«iiiil.|r; yliBiìMai to thè northera Central ttìOKf- groupa, viyllj» vaa- .
, kening thè southern one»1^ 0. Since, , Iter obvioua geographical reasons, : thè ' '.
126. Ìf i*% «Atey. fot tt.l.lfllf ' dso iodi io Bitter,- 2®.l.lf41,
127. ogtf tooìétos» '11,10141. ESI?. t,'*i#te. -TP. •'
'12®.''' :Ì4'‘'te*'i.'^ ;#:8.\ià''ftas.^ «'It*‘t4|/4l i*KS»f v. 4,1*1141*,///; 1 Mi’eststellungen und Beaerkungen anl&slich dar 1*1,00' des Herrn 01
'426/8005061j Visahaupt, •, befehlhabera naoh Giurgiu an J.2.j
v  O »  « k  ‘ Jk ,* ^ ■ y rsSl* JEsS*# m  4* -
; iff *' ‘ ®it' ' litt1 'if te»s -Iti#* (ir. "OS 
* ; >’■. ;■ VMHAdLtaOii) ' io pateiMl te'
HO, : This vas te» result of a dispute betveen Siti« and «s to tes;ii- 
; ■ / m#|tflA. Af te# *#te ÉftwteiM*' ' teso 'te Cleuaewitzan theory, ME'hod: ■ '• . 'v 
te%t te» purpose of thè stte^ t.vss to destroy tee eneay
io v. ■ 51*1 «1941, fi#*' 
ii, 461*69, app» 2.
M i «a-"Marita.* were now for 'ite M a ite i pari eaxmarked .. ■ ■ tu 'for thi0 last aia?- group,  ^ tMs mm% that their relative importane® ^
vithìn M i  group greatly increasod, ' te a result, it waa now more than ■
essential to "counter the àanger that tho forces of *Karitat will he
in Milite1»' opinion, thè Bulgariens would resist being lo f t  alone.
Mora dangerous still was te attitude of Turkey, which had not |»t commi-
. tipi itself and might intervene vhen thè German troops entered Bulgaria,,.
OKU had prepared a. fissi for a counierattack, tei. such an operation would
.tate so mich timi ànd forces t e i ' tes to be
- Since te outcoma of te diplomatic negotiations with Turkey was etili by
«tetti certain, , «11. that Ute? could te te tei account was to express .
Ma itaf©: i t e s i % « i i i *   ^ 'v : ' ’ ■ ' ;v ;':
r§; ItertteWr was » teit§iiaii»if©» for te future* " fba iiimadiate' - :
, Bulgaria.,- fotta» ^ te -51. Januaiy Boydeff Ite retumed te 'Predeal
, and Mite Mit- now authorized by '00 te /affàr adequate protection. tei' talks '
pid progress*It waa agreed that thè Bulgariens should stari mobi-
llzing te 6 Pebruary, so aa to be ready on thè froniier by 27 'f»brtesy'
2 Pebi*uaiy, inoreOTer, List could sete Mi superiora a draft agreement.: 1?5
- ;■;'‘: 1 iteti"foróaaf far.'te» pat®«©, -4* »«ite,a* éàimm' «Ite airone fate; V; ; ces on lioscow as the most important oenter in front of vhlch thè Ru- : 
v : \ . asiana watt presumably bare to stand ite fighi. . Hitler, 'an'tea ot-
' ' . ' ' ter' tette*' was more i&teraatoi iß ideological tei- economie goals «te. ,.vanted to capture Leningrad and the Ukraine first. In "directiva Io.
, . 21" he had hia wey io thè extent that army group center «u directed
\H: hall''al ÌM4éÙ--ate'«èat airone forca»..'te tea tei of amr«ro^? ■
' - ■ - north vith -tea itele 'of. capturing Leningrad. In ita deployment order
, OKH tried te' get round teli conception hy making «my'fteottf north so 
■ atrong that it could fulfill ite iatle on ite mm$ - thè «Avaxaio on ,li»a* 
oew was eerved by tea «llooaiion ©f. areaftionmlly aironi forata te-,' ' '! army group; center,' ’teil» army ' group soute waa greatly weakened, ' es- '
, pocially in oompaii8on with tee Soviet forcea assumed to ba
safte fi. Cf. llrfaiiadUJKhBÉ - .«a» "Mi.. ». 42-8. ■
111. 14 fu t-.o f .IS .'iir ia ia * »  o f «Marlte*, «ara aaaaMitet fo r  an gr
. ...-a, te irA  ©f ite tetti stMnffeif 47 .tiriti© » » .
i ,  2 ^ 8 ,  . a n t t y .  '' 
9, idi, No, 59«




Sofia hai m  ehje*t4#as..te thè article under vhich ber forese vould not be  ^
oomsitted offensirely against ÌPurkey or Greecej those dealing with thè mak- 
ing araiiabl« of Seraiia protection - inoluding aaaiinrei» motorlzed and anti- 
tóreraft ..unito - «ere. *l*e ostensibly regsried with eatisfaction.On thè : 
other haad, thè Bulgaria»» ueed thè etili unelarlfied question of thè Chain - 
ofcosaaaad t#;*t®re.eff their signature» ** and it was enly oa 10 l^ teuary. 
that.thte.ite* e meaber of Boydeff*» delegatlon, ooloael Popor, te Berlin , ; 
i®.«wàm te ^ liseusi thè queetion. In Berlin Popov joined forese vithaiai- 
eter Bragaaer end tHBfhcs they lei thè cat out of thè sackj afraid of ®tg*\
' lish. bombardaent, ■ Bulgaria 'vaated i stili ■ stronger guarantees. of ber ■ seourity* '■ 
Vhile the3e could, end vere, readily graated their other deaand was bardar 
to fulfilt ’ in thè hope1 ©f 'conciliai ing furksy» ' they professa to' halt. their ' ' ■. 
;«p1434pMAm  mtil.';th« «wi'ral.of thè Serali» troops. From thè Strana .,';''; 
point ©f rLew this meaat 'test thè ©rosèlnf vouldbecome even morerisliy* ■ - lo 
vender# theref«». thai. ©a 12, lite«gr List strongly protested againat thè ■' 
;fctl#*rlaa plsa* ' " . V . ; . ' V :
1 la' ih© '¿»terest of ;&n ‘earìy e®es*iiig#. litler deeiied to refuse thè Bui*.: 
pad» 'reqmesi»' Mmmmt, he 'mt hoped to '«»ed' ap .their ìaobilisation aad 
'to ®08®ltte'it* If'pessibie# on 24 feteaasy* : 0»2l lebruaryhe waated-■to';..,.':, 
©eastruet thè tei^t‘'ó«it»ue,tt«iti»0fwi thè araoured divisiona statici, in 
thè;Dobrudja - fÈAih.wert not A^ MnliKt.on.'ttw bridge* - iato Bulgari© te - ; V,
: et*** sp&asi.fe?^ i.;s*ià ®4iiuli«»©itt8ly prorite .«atlslroraft-hatteiiea;5 of 
UH.'ito oerps'for thriefiiiseof. Sella* ’ Ihe wossiiig proper was to'tate'-.'-' 
place .three.'dtes.'later* As a resnlt.of thè endless delcys# MS tua tew -, 
glri^ 'west ;t# iti .eMdétyj. it «■». feteOd thnt prepsrailsjis ■ inside B&lgsrts^  ' 
eeuld not he ©oatleted"!» Ila» for thè attack te start oa schedale# that È»-\ 






For deisti* 'irv Fahiy,
' Vsrlimont mm, ' 12*2.1141#
». 142-45*
U# ,t?f# entry fm l f . f . l f 4 l .v ' =
iiwstiw#. 14*2.1941»' Ma*' B»: aii, NO. II.
, 1.2.1941#'iMi* le* 7•
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ft# aeacl day 12*' « a y ' r®p©rt«d ft»t * ■; ' ; .........  ... t,
•. th® taiAfi «ast»eti#i|7 and ft® laaab® ;■.<•' ■ sing oa 21 and I4 Jebruaiy ara possibl© for 12. aray, Mt not for. . , '
71IX.*dr ©osf®. ■■ . : ;'
On ft® mmat&ttm ftat ft® «taftsar stsys g®#i». ft® Rusani&n . .
■ alr flslds «am b« ready by 2§ Februaiy. • ■’ ',1t 1s ftyossibl® ft hava smppli®s /for fffi. air corps/ ready' /
■. in Baikal» taffer® 2 iarft..«
Bulgari« isobllisation ®*»pl«ft oa 28 februaay st ft® earliest»; Sine® prerequisitas gier entry not giren, 12. arny proposeat 
: , ■ ■ a. **t«p®tt3ra»®®® not befor® 28 februsry.
v. , lo Banxib® Crossing b#f®r®' 2 I®r®h..
OKE iorwardad 'ft® »pest; ft OBI, «ith ft« Tmmmm&mMm ftat bist** r®f*». • (,
est b® gr antedf it vould b® possibl® to Start “Marita* on tim® in
ftile ft® end of the Operation depdaded not so mueh in its starting dato a®
« 'f t®  nftiftd® ff Stonlqr»' In case ft« latftr-lirttsfisspsA *l«iai»f®#®*,.i' : ;  ^
«®11. haare ft b® •^ •Ift.iätfgrfti».1^ ’' ; '
•' Quito unexpeetedly, List*s regnest ft bare ft® Crossing pstpfaed. by & 
£m daya-yeplpi jfnspzVffeoat anorther Quarter. On 15 ifbraasy fte.^lttig** 
riaas, :ft'uij®ii Eitler*s deeislon had been «oamdcfftA» 9croftsW/ft*i s 
§mmm entry ®» ft® 24ft would vrMk haroc with their own sittt' iMMflfft.' 
Äftlisatioa.^ Behlnd this raquest liebthofen sa^ ®«t®dirMowed.i *« .< 
ff fertign intenrention, and on 13 Yfftoasy Bibbentrop asofrdiiigiy aasured ■ 
ft» Bulgarians ftat'ft®?# was not "mm *tb® '«¿U m * ßmmä* faa? .swl®%-*1^ ' 
Coming as it did on top of th® difficultles w s a t o l  ly ft« Xnfft*ft% , 
Hitler eaw no oh®!®® Mt to coraplyj ;«';lf %bR»«y M'd®Äd«i-ftint *1®®?®«* . / 
Strasse" wut ft; tatet yM»'«  28 f®bra«iy, ft® emmiag it#®lf m  2 
Eis . decision' formed ft® basis 'of y«t anotb r tbwWbU». Loiting ft «MUfe1 45
144. OKW/MFSt/Abt.IHi/Op. Er. 44 I86/4I ff,Kdos Cbefsacbe T. 18.2.1141»,'
' m/782/5508532*33.
145. Riehthofen ft OK3/Genst.d.I^ Att. Abt., Er. 173 ▼* 1 li»l.l>41>'miü»lg»;-’ after Ritter» Bulgarien, i. Gf!l/839/281565. . ,
14^ . Eicbthofen to foreign ministry, 18.2.1941, St.5* Balgarien, ii, OKI/ 
274/1777111 Rlbbentrop to RichtEofen, Er. 72 v. 19.2.1941» ibld. 
0^ V274/177713.
141*. ^tet/ttt* iir. .44 l«7/4i- faliM r* 19*2.1941» ffl/7®5/
the first forces of 1*  echelon were to arrive on the Greek frontier on 8» 
the deployment of II* echelon in Bulgaria to he completed on 29 March, De­
pending on the weather, which sight make it expedient to advance or post­
pone the date by a few days, the attack could then start on ^  April.
; '.FeasiblybeOaussf he feared.lest they might coma up with yet »re obje­
ctions, Hitler dia nof communicate his decision to the Bulgarians,' So the 
; latt«|; h»»v®r,/knowledg«' of 'the date ’ ifie«’®! to/be of the'greatest im­
portant, throughout February the Soviets had continued their pressure on 
Balpria, ' tulm^ting in' an ostensibly innocent warning by Tyschinsld. on 
■;».^bai«iy*^/;la.03rt«*;tei»lnsi«.;th«»®lvos, the Bulgarians were pre- ' 
fffjtiafVkot« for the Kremlin, in which thtjf i«9l«lMd that their accession 
1 to .the .feijMirtitol Feat was in'm ■way 'directed against Russia, This ’note '
, tosy.Winied'to deliver on the eve of •»leertatrasse**, which was also the one 
before the one ok which the entry of toe first German forces - toes# sta­
tioned in ;the Dobrudja- into Solaria was scheduled.'1'^ 0 to'19 February 
: Kitov; therefor® inquired no less torn three times as i# when toe. Bridging 
was supposed' to;stirtf :.#la3Mag toat''aH sated tost if
t»uli:.tike /place. v«y: early art .sataastLng "a few *ap»''«idtfwea notice*',1 1^ 
All. he’; ttoid1'git. in /keply*'however# was to:; ■ statement toat'toe" operation 
hsd'i^ f yet beto'tlewwd*3' ^ Sofia was left in to® a»* fovanoto« few. ‘ 
•days# .and.it.was kaf until 26 February that Richthofen announced Hitler»»
148, Anlaga eu OKWA/FSt/Abt.I* Ur. 33 460/41 g.Kdos Chefsache v, 19,2,1941, 
"Zeittafel »Marita*", signed by Varlimont, lbld/782/5508527-30* Ac­
cording to this order, III, echelon was - in the interest of "Barba- 
rossa", of course * expected to stay in Rumania.
149* Richthofen to foreign ministry, Nr. 2I4 v. 22.2.1941, St.S, Bulga- 
rim, li. Gill/274/177755, . ‘
i§8,'; Sibe to same, Hr, 222 v, 24,2.1941» St,5, Bulrarien. ii. GBi/274/ 
1777441 same to same, Nr, 223 v, 24,2,1941# ibid. GBl/274/177745t (transmitting the text of the Bulgarian note) end same to seme, Nr.
. ' 224 v. 25*2.1941» iMd, GIM/274/177748.
111.' Richthofen to foreign ministry, Nx. 198 v. 19.2.1941, ibid. GBj/274/
• 177715» same to same, Nr. 199 v. 19.2.1941, ibid, GRM/274/177720«
same to same, Nr. 201 v. 19,2,1941» ibid. GM7Tufxm21.
t|2, Killinger to Richthofen, 20*2,1941» Deutsche Legation Bucharest. Mi- 
v lltorlsohes. QIM/371QI/b036659.
Even teta te® Bulgarian3 dld not reçoive collets 3atiefaction| 
in te® intereat of koeping Starkey ont, ' Hitler at the last moment décidai te, 
il ter his plan, refused the Bolgariaat rsquest te hara te® Dobrudia group
..«iw^ teatetealar wite -12» awov".' -;v;’ . •'
. ’ :Ialiy. iéUc.wi«ta behiad te® .©rifiaal- steedtii®,:'.lf•vaangr ww aow raady te . 
arasa'tee;'li»Mb«». The veather, vhioh IwÀ^tesa#partofthedelay, '1 
remoineduncooperativeion 27 Februaiy, raia and fresli snow wbre.agaia en-: 'IRA ;daagaadaç^ tlM lidd«iN*a«aMitra«'ti»* ? Tboughthla obstacle was . '
te® aperatita. wa# 8»d';w»aiB*d; a risky onaj for it fcad net yet been possible 
to obtaln full security for'ita flaaks. ' '-fru®, negotiationa vite bâte ïurksy .
. and. lugoalavia wera faradvaaced, but te® reactions of bote mmtxiéa re- : 7. 
mainod 'te b#' «««a*: 'v v
; ", ■ ' ' ' " ■ ’ . '. - .• V,
. * • « . » < ■ • * .  *. ;*>; ;  /  r '  :. • “  • p f - '  > '  ! . .
■ c  • '  -  - ♦  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , • .  ;  :  v  \  ,  X « .  i  • '  , i ,  7 .  • . : (
‘  ■ . 1 1 . ,t , 7 . ■:W#.bpr® loft ®mÊm»fmâAék aa«itiati®ms at a «wiial.;,
point, just wb®n the furka ®om#^ ®i-te#1lal.pâîi.®a i«aâ that teadi pt*rte®a\:; 
be left ont o£ the talks bôtween teea. îhis concession, made on 13 January, 
nndoubtedly présentai amajor breakthrough| froa now on, it could bo erpec-.
'ted teatte®, fruka ter# willlng 'te' -«rite af a #p®#ly '®gr®e®iàt. " ' 7 * ■ ■ [ . 
v; ïh® moves èMignad' te s#o«r®' Ofèralioa' **l#rita*< agaiaat eràeà 'fa^daîi'."' ■ 
iaterwntio» bâte .b##a .iooeriboi elsswhere,1^  ao teat 'it la #a*«#i 
.a;bri®£ Milite'lwr#*v.:ait 20 fa*ki b^éd'Sifin a i«f»»«il ;f#|7
a joint Bulgarian-Tuikieh déclaration, viiich vas duly tnmed over te'te# ;
for anproval»^ ^^  mat consoiclous foatore of tee Turkish 
draft .wm - a iittetg:te® '«1« «T te® iiMléniiin’
10. • Bibbentrop to Richthofen, Hr. l02 v. 25.2.1M1.' St.l. 'lie-v -
gki/274/177756. _
10.;' Wissteppt, 0£. Oit.,
Ï5S. ‘ Kreoker, 0£. cit., pp. li§«4l§ B#lkau, pp. 105-1?.
I56, Richthofen to foreign tenister, ®P. 48 T. 
i, 0Hî/5Q5/242887t sam® te sa», ». 50 t. 
, 24288^ -90. •
».1.1941, St.5« Bulgarie^ , 
20.1,1941*” bidt GIw 585/
. ; /
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- thè quiet and thè peate iathe 1®!!«**», lai referring to thè preamble of 
thè accori of 15 January 19#, vhich said that Turkey;
and Bulgaria vere "in perfect aocord about thè maintenance ©f tha peaoe /.
In thè Balkane and of thè neutrali ty proclaimed ty thè Bulgari sa 'cove»»»''
. , Beat”. Artici© 1, tha only ose that is ralevaat in our context, aaid that 
"Bulgaria and furkey regard thè abetainment £sm any attaòk as a corner- . • V - ' 
eton© of their foreiga polic^ , Both Richthofen and Sofia thought thè 
ftakisb'’draft'wae acceptahla. ' ^ ■ ■ /./ ‘
,fhe foreiga minlstxy took a different view «f thè mattar, Veizs&cker 
examined thè dfaft» then pointed out that thè referenoe to thè Bulgariaa- 
, lurkish deolaration eould not he alloved to stand| ita obvioue aim vas to 
eompel Bulgaria to pursue a polioy of neutrali ty, and thus prevent her ' ’
, • aooeAslÉn't© thè Tripartite Pact.1*^  Bihbentrop oa'27 Januaiy decided to .■ 
indorsa tha oh^ ection of hi© ©tate secrataxy, hut since he suspeoteà that • '
. thè !Durksvould he unwilling to osateti thè point he had Richthofen req^uest 
thi Bulgarlana to maka a counter proposai. Artide 1 now reoeived a aev . -
formulation at thè haads of tha Ctarun foreiga ministeri "eaoh of thè tvo 
eignatories coaaite itself, in accordance vith thè previously expressed 
destre. f©3f neutrali ty» not io sapport .«et attack conducted through its te» ■. 
fritory .npoa that ' of ' thè other*.1^ 8 Ibis,, of course, 'vould ' asay Sreeo# ».1 ' ; -
preoiselythe sort ofdiplomatic prstectioa furisay vaa trying to ohtaia for
; V y . . ' ì.!
, :• • :'lf; th# ie*w«e;Vtre:eatisfled «itti their device, thè Bd,geM«is , "■ -,
vere not, ■ .lady in f#teua*y 'their fears lesi thè entxy of German troops
©iftse them to a furkteh atteek vere roused againf1^  they vere supportai
by thi Qwmm ailitsxy attaché in Ankara» generai Rohde, vho argued that - ■ .
fttvfa^ s'mfaqr' iato thè va#,vss ,iaevit»hle naie»« ierswny offerii .to. rei* ■ ■ ' ■ ■lftj 'peot,*: zone, of 50-Xtau .fiso« herfrontier. Por reasons that bave already ' / 
brà'davlaiMt# hovever, thts idea Could not he accepted, or at leaet noi •
opaely. ; At thè meltiag of thè io© ©a'thè liamb# ansie tl'm «wraeing appesar ,
157* ...W«ì*SBbw1» Ribbentrop, 21.1.1941, £bid# SI2/585/2429Q1-2.
IfS, Ribbentrop to BilMote, Ir. 46 v. 27.1.1941# IMA.»; GIW/585/242954.
159. Richthofen to foreiga adniatry, Hr. I36 v. 6.2.1941, iMd. ii, QM/ '
274/177764S-49.
ì . • 160." i.'  110. '¿ter for 7.2.1941.' ■ ,
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. imminent, Bulgarian-Turkish relations rapidly appro ached a crisis. 0nl2 
February the Bulgarians purported to know "for certain" that an invasion ■ M 
By the Turkish army was imminent* ‘ha 13 February the spread of a rumour
in Ankara to the effect that German troops had already crossed the Danube '• ngo ■and were marching south made war.iappear inevitable. ■ . In a remarkable 1 
% document, OH on the next day laid down Its plans for suoh a case. ■ Should’ 
the Turks enter. the' war, it would'be possible tot •' hy
, " a. Launch a simultaneous attack on Greece and Turkey, while restric- 
ting the objectives’as regards the former. Such an attack wa3 to/start ‘ 
on 7 April "at the latest"♦
b.' Invade Turkey after reaching the full objectives in Greefc. Thrace ’ 
and the subsequent regrouping. Such an attack could presumably start on 
14 April. ■' : •
From idle point of view of coordination with "Barbarossa", OSS calculated»;' , 
both plans' were equally bad« both Would oaks a postponement of :that .Cfs* . '■ 
ration inevitable. Plan (b.),‘ however, woe oonsidwi safer and €®I.re*;' ■ 
commended it to OKW.^ The' really interesting point in this 'doCisMKit; - 
is the extremely short'duration MttMfod ftv' stl^e.wsk«;'' /
. Obviously,’ such a short operation was thou^ it possible solely because"/ ■ 
its objectives -did not include the occupation of the entire Greek posi»* . 
eula, but only of a narrow strip oh the'Aegean'Goasi* : ■
: HeanwMle the diplomatic crisis’Was passing. ' In his’'decision on l| i 
; February Hitler followed Rhode*a advice ’in's«' far as he ordered his assy'/., 
'to «void crossing the line ftm»vo»l«rgas: to the'south'"for’politic«!'/' -; 
reasons" It is 'not impossible' that Fapen was ‘secretly allowed 'to ’ :■ * • 
past 'this decision'to the Turks, 'for it was dly «* day later that"A»*7’ ■<■/■/. 
kara suddenly gave its consent to alt«?-the preamble.*^  Sibbentrop new . , 162*4
161. Ibid. 120, entry for 12.2.1941. v :
162. Richthofen to foreign ministr, Hr. 171 v. 15.2.1941,
«iSIU 11. GFM/274/177687-88. ,
165. OKR/Genst.d.I^ Op.Abt. Hr. 225/41 g.Kdcs fhefsache'v. 14.2.1941» ; 
: " " item Ho. A1 835 *t -fee Imperial War Hhaeua.
164. ' OBf directive» 14.2.1941, M 1P .1. adi, It. 51. : > ■ - '\N ' '
165 T' M ‘!'l w "5Uti4s1
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Bulgaria... and Eumania likewise”. Ho hadordered Ms forces to «remain 
at a' sufficient distance" from the (Turkish frontier.' .ffca- letter was mm* 
ciliatoryin form and contents, and Inond was gratified. On 4 March fcgM 
could .report, that it had "been received with satisfaction.^ 0 
- In the nick of time, Hitler had succeeded in securing Ms left flank
■ ©gainst foreign intervention. Considerable as tMs success indubitably 
was, ■ it was. nevertheless' incomplete* „ diplomatic failure was waiting on. -
■ Ms:Mght flank.: ■' v;- ' ,.. . ■. '
" * - \ ' : v * ; .
. Early in December, it will be remembered, Geinaan-Yugoslav negotiations.'
: aimed; at „obtaining Yugoslav. cooperation,. or at least connivance, in the 
liquidation of Greece had reached a deadlock.. fhe Hitler-Cincar Mar-
■ kovio conversation of 28 November resulted, nine days later, in a state- 
aent from Belgrade that "Yugoslavia willing to discuss withthe Reich
-^ ¡vei»»snt.i»d.the,Italian government .the' possibilities of signing a 
non agression, pant".. * At that time, however, Hitler had already laun­
ched Ms attempt, to. end, the Itala-Greek war, and the Yugoslav note was "!
' therefore left unanswered* If was only on 21 December - that' is,' exa- - 
ctly on the day on wMeh negotiations with (Turkey ware also resumed - . ■, 
that .the Wilhelms-trasse.shook off its, two-week'logarthy and renewed'mi*' 
tacts. . V'', I'■■ ■' ’ .V . ''/''
. BY now, eircuastances had changed.’ On 2S November Hitler Mi pres- .; 
sod for a nonagression pact* he. was willing to grant Salonika to Tugos- ^ 
lavla, and emphasised. .that "Germany did not ask for anything, not even 
;.the,.»t#-t.,®f p«*i^®,fo»;tff©ops".1^  By the and of,December, in contrast*
, "larbaross# fas, a _ settled aattcay what ns. more,. the' relationship bet* \ ■ 
ween it and "Marita" had been thoroughly clarifiii' by OH. ' Thou^ i' "di- ' 
reetive No. 30" of 13 December prudently advised that the 1»» of the _ *172
' 170. 1.3.1941, Mg. », Mi,' No. il3f tapen to tomlm'. ■ (-' ministry,;4.3.1941, iMA. ftTTtt,;, ,
171. " f. mubbL'-.wb* 130-3 .^ . :
172. ,Heeren,te foreign ministry, 7.12.1940» Mlf. D, No. 467.
■173* Sltler-Ginaer lhadavi* conversation, 28.11.1940, ibid. »0. 417. ' ■
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Tugoslav rallways was not to he reckoned with, thè possibility of shorte- 
ning thè buildup for "Marita" from ten (as ©rlgìnally planned) 1© si* '■ - •.
’ weeks vas too IVMpttSf to he disrcgarded* On 21 Deceaber, therefore,
' Bibbentrop answered Cincar Martorio that «*. ;
ihe PQhrer and I... gave consideration to thè proposai... that ’-V/ ' - 
non agres3Ìon paet he concluded between Geroany, Jtaly and - / 
Ihgpesiavin.**.'thè conclusion of sueh a paet would of «auree _ . v
■ ' :.net meet thè specificatlona for 'thè strengthening of Yugosla- 
. . -Ir_*!»*» .^ lattea. with te Aals powers' that, we had envisaged in
’ thè eonversations with Cintar Markovio at te Berghof and ' ■ _ ;■ -
ftuMhl*,,/’} '■ ■' ■ ■ " -v " *• 4 , .v,. , ¡.
'■ Inview of wBarbarossa", a non agressioa pact was not siaply insufficienti 
it waspositivelydangerous, beeause it would allow Iugoslavia to dose _ 
her frontiera with impunity to thè pasaage of Germana troops and war ma- •
- terial«, ; The Iugoslava, on thè other hand, knew nothing atout "Barbarosaa" 
and vere - or pratended tabe - surprised. -‘After all, Cincar Markovio f 
politely reminded Eibhentrop, thè propoaal for a non agression pact had '
1 ■ mm.inm Mtler hiwself#1^ ^  *.. ■ / ■; . ; - < ; --v- • '
Deadlock again followed. With most of thè delire in thè buildup for 
^ "Marita" stili in thè future, Hitler aay possibly bave hoped that " t e  ’  
matter could be dispensed tfith| in any o m o, ha did not renew te conta- - 
: cts., The Inalava, on te ©ter head, could not rest eontent 'with their 
' suceessful parrying of Hitler *s thrustf te Ìsxmsri troops streaming into . 
tannala were too àangerous for that. A diplomatic reooxmaissance appearod 
to he in order, as long .as'it did not commit Iugoslavia to anything. Some- 
whert, afte te middle of January, therefore, miniate presldent Cvetkovio 
indicated hit willingness to go for talk®' in Geimany to Gregorio, whose - 
' ' Services had 'alreedy heen utilized in a slmilar aanner by Cincar Btoiìttfvg* 
in Boveaber* Gregorio fulfilled his task in an admirable way, for he 
prasjptly' iterperabed thè suggestion at thè end of a long epistle in vhich 
hs ezplained that te tatì» hetween Hitler and Cincar Markovio hai failed 
hecause of Italy»s defeats and thè influence exercised by te friends of
174* tlbbeatrop. t® Berna*' 21.12.1940, Iga. B, *i, le*. 549*
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"did not present a treaty of alliance againat England1*. ; Öeranny, too, ' 
would have preferred not to fight in ßreece, tut British maohinations ■ 
thera « remember the Salonika front? - madea elash inovitable. If, Cre- 
tfewi« «omtarad» towing Äa'lriti^ i out of_Grasce'was Geimanytsobjeo- 
■ tive, Yugoal&via would he willing to assist) - sh® could try and mediata a 
7 diplomati® solution forthe Italian-Greek war and then conatruct a neut­
ral Balkan block, comprising also of Turkey, vith the aia of keeping the 
British out. a® prere<iuisite, of oourse, was that Germany should also 
stay out. VJhat did the Beich foreign minister think of suoh a pian? lot 
auch, asked a somewhat. surprised Eihbentrop. ^ ' frtely, ' he doubted 'whether 
; it teditele't® drlvaout thè British by peaceful means.18*5
■ Éttì®r*s ■ aftesipt 'in the afteameoa '©f'-the saae day to succeed where ■
' his foreign minister had failed similarly suffered ahipvreck. - Sie fugo-.
, alay premier soaroely listened to the exposition of the Führer*s plana}..,
. instead, he kepi returaing to hisown schema for a diplomatic solution : 
and a neutral Balkan block. ; Hitler never evea got the chhnce of raising 
- thè all important ^ uestlon of transit, or pexhaps he sente! that reising 
it would oontribute nothing toward disaming Mie Iugoslava, às to Cvet- 
kovio*® pian for a diplomatio solution, he vaa ss skeoptical atout ite 
prospeots as hit foreign minister) but he agreed to bave the propesai 
tranaaifted to Home which, for apperance*s aake, § m  stili presente! te 
, theworld as thè Aatteappointed arbitrate for all Balkan gestioni.
. Having dealt vith thè Führer*s piene in such an mm^laxy fashion Cvet- ' 
kovic, alvays aware of the menaoing presenoe of the German divisions in 
Rumsnia sai intet on gaining time, hai thè 'Mite to te for a meeting 
' ,bet*teMtl#rte. Irte® Fte.1Sf'V;'''
, Hitler, of oourse, had no use te a pian whieh would oblige Germany 
to «tay out #f te ' Balkans.187 lot' wanting to ' appoar as te iistete ; *18
1®5. '. Mbìtetrop-teteirio ©snrersation, 14.2.1941* » . 1  ! 'adii* ' Ito. 47»
18S. ' Hitlex^ Ctekovio ooiwersatisn# 14.2.1941.' ibld. lo. 48»
' ' 1§7. ttlngii»«àe SiaflMraiigl”’ h r r s t e M  'to M s  tssosiatef Stadorf/' ■
of the'peaoe, however, he did not ear© to say so hut left this task to Mu­
ssolini. , The latter received-© strongly doctored'record of the'ooayofsai- ’’ 
tions, "bristling with professions of unbounded leyality to tho Axis part-» : ;• 
ner and giving special emphasis to the Führer*s oplntcnthat "the whole . 
conception 'Of Yugoslavia entering into an alliance with 'states like Tur- 
■ key, which had a past with England, ln ordf«'to/exercise pressure on R&- ' (
■ gland was lrrealistie". . ,'Yhe trick worked, and the luce .swiftly rsp- / 
lied that the Yugoslav proposal smacked of m  attempt to revive the .MV /
.'tlo'fctente which was "in accord with the mentality of Benes".18^  This 
served Hitler*s purpose well' eaou#.;On the other hand, his pressure on 
Cvetkovio now began to have the - effect'of pushing Belgrade and Home into' 
<ea«h other*© arms} .-the former hoped that by separate negotiations with' 
Italy it would "be shielded from Germany, while ■fee latter planned to ex- ' 
ploit Yugoslav fear of Germany ant to negotiate a bllateralltalo-Yugos- 
lav accord; dirtctei,/ like'; the: one of: If57,, against Germany«1^ 0 This, 
:thou^ i',«Nit«iihly. iatet^ «d-;fej".li^  ^ oslavia;ao.ro-olosely^  to the Axis,
■ did 'net., suit BjRcSia;at all»and Mussolini was told to desist.1^*1 -
, ,-.:Th# ©tteispt -t© .get Yugoslavia'laV'll» with the liquidation of 
Greece had thus failed for the second time. Heedless to say, the mill* 
,tssy were unhappy with the fact) not only had the prospect of utilising 
the Yugoslav railways been postponed into the indefinite future, hut tho 
right flank appeared insecure in view of the 700,000 trepps Yugoslavia' 
he# reported to have concentrated on her eastern border.1**2 It was with 
growing apprehension that list requested information about the outcome of 
the conversations with Yugoslavia, and particularly as to whether the ;
180. Ribbentrop to Mackensen, Hr. %  v. 14.2.1941, St.S« Griechenland, 
i. CiH/449/2250467.
189, Bismarck to foreign ministry, Hr. 326 v. 15.2.1941, St.S» Jugosla- 
Wien, ii. Gflfl/230/152501.
190. For the Italo-Yugoslav negotiations v, Hoptner, 0£. cit.. pp. 208-9, .
211-12. ... ,
If!« Simoni, eg. cit«, p. 2741 Hintelen to Welss&cker, Hr* 108 v. 27*2» . 
1941, St.S.. Bentsoh-ltallenSsehe Beziehungen« GIH/BI5/001572.




























































































eentatives ofGermany, Italy» Japan, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria ani Sio» 
vakla* " In draggtüg their heela so' long, ^ the Iugoslava had shown falte , 
«nqßualed courage in thè faoo of a staio so ondi strenge? than themsel- 
’ve». " Theyachieved all their demands, dffectively undoing the act of " 
■'aoeession befere' it evor eaae to the vorld. ' They m m  obtained Hitler's 
. consent to bare those concessions published * all except one. In the - 
m&9 'this'vas’ io prove Iugoslavia*© undoing. " . . ' i ; » "/, ; .
' ' 'v‘ ‘ ' '■ - : fn
"HEESES TRASSE" clicked thè teleprinter at the heaifuartera of 
12. _ aray in ' the evening of 27 Februaryi "Eeerestrasse" ' vent ' thè ' orde? to 
a score ©f subordinate! unita next moming, triggering eff feverish aot- 
iirity everywhere. .'"At three places along thè Banube, ships wer© brou^ it ■ 
lnto Position and aoored to thè xiver bed) pontoon bridgea vere bullt and ■ 
' securedj antiaircraft batterica moved into positi», to protect the®. ■ %  
thè evening of thè saae d^ r, the bridges » from vost to east, at Bechet, 
Turnu-Magurele and Giurgiu - vere ready.. On 1 March the 'first antiairc- 
raft units passe! over the bridgea on their vay to Sofia and Bur gas,
' ' 'Stiri*« plan jmmm. tà entxy inte Bulgaria in four ©olusns. . At ■ 
extreme ri^ it ving, consisting of parta of VIII. air corp3 and of XVHI. 
army corps, vould brusii the lugoslav frontier on itv vay to .Sofia and, 
using road No. 1, vould àaréh south to Ih© Rüpel Fass through the valley 
of Ae'Starna. The bulk of XIS. corpa vas to »arah over thè bridge at 
tei Magurelè, but 60, motorized division, although eubordinated to that 
' corpa, vaa referred A  thè bridgi st Bechet in Order to «veld congeetion. , ; 
XI7. arrgy corps Baroàed further east th*eu#i Giurgiu, iMle 5» and 11. ' - ' 
armoured divisions raoed over the frontier betveen thè Sobria and Bulgw ' 
aria and deployed against Turkey, their first units reaohing the frontier ; 
as early aa 4 March. ' Generally epeaking thè march vent according to 
plan! serious deleys took place only on road Re. 1, vhare the veak Bechet ' 
bridge was > temporarily put out of action. ;• The .aeoti©» of the Mal mar ' ' • 
Orjecbovo - vhich vas bai'ia'imy case - vas blocked ly enov, delaying the
210
unit» of TER*  air oorps aM XVIII. .«wy corpa behind it* Furthermore, 
it was essential to throw forward a screen to cover Hie Greek frontier . 
at its most vulnerable point opposite the Hupei 'Warn*- for this purpose ^ ' 
units of 2. amoured division received priority on road Is* 1, as did 
6* mountain division, which was loaded on' transport units and diap*telif4 ’ - 
to tèe. border, ' where it took up positions on 4' March. ' - She movements of 
tossi units resulted in the rest of XVIII. being dispersed 'over «act**»' ■ ; 
ordinarily long ’distances* >'■
1 Thatraaefer of the infantry and mountain divisions over the Balkan 
mountains made it necessary to overcome unusually great difficulties . - ,
created by the weather and the terrain* Inevitably, Mie marching columns -, 
were dispersed and strung out, and needed-sotas M m  in order to get to- 
gether sgain. The motorized advance ga»ris"eC 50«, 72. end I64. infantry 
divisions, following hard on the heels of 6« mountain division, reached - . 
the sectors allocated to them in the levxokop, Pasmalki and listarli i m ».
high command of UH* air corps also started Its march on 2 Horch* 
by the favourable weather, tho teas#« of the flying' units of the. 
waS coÈ^ pleted on the "stsui day* ' - She ground organization «dM its .
• The antiaircraft mâts generally marched in mm.
¿unction with ' the army units they 'were supposed - '-to ' protect, the main 
foroesbsingconcentrated round Mbs Bamba bridges and-in tbs passes of . , 
• to» Balkan mokntains. ; The antiairerfift units dotaáloi for the protection 
Of too bridges stayed in their positions until tos« bulk of I* echelon had 
gone aoross on 8 Maroh, then departed for their stoo&ulsd positions round 
Karlovo, Sofia, Turnovo, Burga3 and too quarters of 6* mountain divi--; '
o n  jUwri-âs Bulanria. H .  eohelon warn
203. ''iÊÊAii/Èêé Äef dea Generalstahes/la Ilr. 595/4I g.Kdos v. 20.5.I94I, 
' V. • "Belicht über Versamlung und Yhnarselt der 12* Armee bis zum Errei-
• der OHnitoi^ .'ilisIMMig teto' die 8@m » ter Inf anterie Bivi- '










j®ct help in Albania, and thè nov hoped tbat it vanii siili be possibls 
- to 'pii m  mí te tes teils affair before teeir alliea would arriva oa 
■. tes. eoene sai sisal tes ehow.21^  • ©a 16 February, hovever, distrubing .
news arxived froa Barila) CVá was'reportad io lift tesi thè Greeks 
. couldbe induced to makepeace before thè Wehrmacht intervened, and "lea»- 
. ding German ciroles" vere sali te ba in favour of.an 'arrangement tesi .
vould inveivo Greek eoncessiona ’in return for avoiding a ter vite I m »
.■ ny. . To Mussolini .ibi* vas, shocking neve, and bs ordered Marras "te . _
V’site» ¿Berlin/ understand thatltaly intenda te dsfeai Greeee... it is a 
q,ueation of preatige, and nobody should understand tela beiter iban-tea 
' ■ German ailiiaay*. . 'Iteras*# reaonstrations apparently fallad ■ te maka .
. ' ' ¿inte 'of an ía§maaá§m on tea §e*»ia 'brasa, ■ for oa 3 Marte Simoni ‘ reeer- 
dad "a sacrai Gara*»/«»■Maiaaii«- in his diary* "tea troops of tea ..
■> Beleb vili oaroh very slovly tovard Salordka in order to allov tea Grates. 
: planty of1 ila» te' ’«tmtiider ’ tea ' «ppertuaitiea of srrendering wiihout ',*•»
: eistanca” .222 : 'te; tea ; neri day ba mied"-that "the . foreign alai- .
- stiy siill ..hipea' traeos vili giva 'in vithout a fi^ xt".22* In a remar- 
kable aairy tated:3 ,»uetei HnUotf notad ihai - ■.
tW§ «sai tesar «femt tea flIMbif«.’ \ a* ■' tea« tea polltioal leadership attribute any valué te thè '.■'■■■ 
'early, arrivai- of tea ftrsi Gtrman troop# «  tea Grete fron- .
1 iiar,. te er&sr to sites it olaar te' .thè Crete# teai sur. tmpa :
■ : vili «rrivt'beiere thoae of Ir» Man, wh® is nev in Atbsa»? .
te te (a.)* Olir vsleomes aaything teai «su «mtribttte te te«.,.;..
;v aarly agitara»«« of tanrn troops on thè tate froniiar»^• '. ; *21
¡!2Í9.Í tessimi memo, "appunto'per il Buca", 24.2.1941* IMB/129/000023-6.
v ' ^ 220. ' Marra», te ministry ©f war, ' Ho. 813/1., ^ 26.2.1941»
221. léummAUrnietm, Ho. 68l4/0p«» 28.2.1941» ibid/l29/000014. On 1 ve ; r Kaste tea stili tary otteslis" reportad that 1» lite te&ria& afti testa 
tei^«ii«si,Ä»» to SM0, H0. 861/A., 1.3.1941,
■ 222. 'liiBOJil* ¿I* Sii», p. 211.
223.y^i,:^.;;,;\,.,,,y,v'';  ^V
. 224. «l/teMar, li, 219, e»isy..f0r 5.3.1941. ' Äs ©hl#f of staff dit 
' not think that jaaapsat* fbr tea desired peaceful eettlement vera 
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Ae Piraeus. ' fo Hitler, Als looked very mah Xike a eonfixmation of «bat 
‘he had suspected all alongj nothing but German armed force would dlslodge 
the British. '
■' The results vere twofold, On one hand, Berlin now eategorically re- 
jected - all peace feelers extended from AAens » and of these there vere:' 
plenty, for varlous Greek cireles, though refusing to renounoe any part ; - 
of the national territozy, vere desperately hanting for a diplooatic sol- 
ution Aat vculdst&ve off the isrpending diaaster, " On 6 March former‘ ■ 
Greek dictator Pangalos approached Erbach in the name of "inf luential 
pereons" vith a plan to eetabllsh a pro-Axis government by meana of a 
m m  d*etat. join the Tripartlte Pact and terminate the war with Italy 
on the basis of the etataa quo«228 On 11 Maroh Merkooris Aqaired with/:/ 
Erbach as to how a German Invasion could be avolded.22^  On the next day,
there came an inofficial appAach from Ae Greek srmy, vhich offereä to ; 
throw out the British in return for acease firein Albania and Ae hal- 
ting ef'A® German advance in Bulgaria.2'*0 On 15 March the Germanmilit- 
aiy attache, Clemm,von Hohenberg, talked with Merkouris who #aid that . 
"Ae Greek government deslred nothing so mach as an early peace in Al- ' 
bania that woa|d preserve Greek honour and would make possible the with« 
drawal #f the Inglish from Ae continent",2^ - 0n l8 March WeAeteker; .■: v 
foiled an attemptby lAae Rangabe to raise Ae subjeet, Alling him that 
GreeeeA fatal miatake had been A e  acceptanoe of Ae British gtniriaäAe : 
ln 1939«2 2^ On Ae s«b* day Ribbentrop, obviously with an eye A  psttlag 
and ml A  these epp»aoh«§f prepared a dxaft telegram claiming that Mthe 
Greek government ismistaken if it assrned that it can pass on A.n». the . 
' reppensibility for taking Ae. initiative in terminating Ae esmflAt* In
228« -lrtMh A  aüdetoqr, -*r* 17t ▼. 8,3.1941»
7 i. GPM/449/223075. ; , ■; •
229,' Same A  aame, Kr. 274 v. 11.3*1141» lMi».®^ /449/2230l6. 7. '
t3§.:\Sia» Aeaaie, 12.3.1941, M b  - * * ***» »®* 155. •
f|l,. fl« «'BArtririKgM«*' A  fereiga aAlaAy, 16.3.1941» 
■■■/■*•. 170. . ■ ■; ■:  ^ ;
232. WeAsiilser memo, 18.3.1941» IMi» »®. 1 » .  « w h #  U w  langebt 
claimed A  be aoting. on his own, OKW had A A r t e p A d  his Astru-
etions.
partioular,however, it seeas to hartes» illusions conceming the pries 
it wsall hâve te pay for sunti a terraination".2^  - Kibbentrop apparently ,/ 
reconsidérai,, and Ms draft never left the Vilhelmstrasse. ■ ; , . r ;f H, - : -
' The militare resulta of thè British landing in Greece wer© even moi*© ^
lafbvtant* ' Although "directive Ko» 20" had mentloned the possibili ty 
that operation "Marita" would b® e^Äded to inolude ao»e''6reek't«xsit*fgr 
thsn the Aegean Co&st only, all préparations had Mtherto been saie en ' ; 
thè assumption that thlsvould not be the ease.:- Sims, the OSE plan of 14
allocated only -one week to the entire Operation, and 'as. late as, 
8 March Warlimont complainedthat there existed no clarity as to what 
' point 'the •@£mpatien:was to be extended to.2^  Inview of the British ~ 
laatings-in.-Sresoe the questlon bacarne mors urgent thaa «ver» and on 17 ■ ■ 
March it was drastically answered by Eitlerjthe Operation, he ordered, 
was to b® continue! until the British vere driven from the entire tittefc ■
. mainland, including the Peloponnese.2^ ' ; ' : ■ ’ v. " ' - l" 1;
; From _the point öfviev■ of the 'coordination between ■ "Stólta" «ni.'' "Sar- 
. ha»»*»" » ; Hitler»s decision ^carried ■ distette«« eoi»etuen«es*, Sh# Same»
' rousdelsys in  thè start of the former, as .'well m  thè continuai growth ' 
of .the number of troops involtai» had caused OXH oonsiderable headaches . 
during the winterf ani Hitler»s decision coxapletely upset the timetahles
i  .  •. . governing the relationship between the . two. cappaigns. : For one thing, ■ 
V.thf duiatlofl «f "MÄStta";- that of the Operation' itself as well aa the !
' time reguired to transfert the tteops-baok northward - was extended very 
iimsiiarsbly. / A® a esulti", thè chief of staff 'of 12. aroy told OSE, • it '
 ^was no i longer posslble. to count on thè unita of the anqy for "Barbarossa"
: Haider hlmsslf iid net go that fari; and after' a' eonfereae# with leusings» 
. he «s^ rassad hi* hop# that it would still im posslble to bring «p the - 
"fast"'.» i.e ateoured aad-mstortsed'- divislona af 12. amy\ia.tlmsit® *234
235. ' Mbbœttep'’tete* 18.3.1941» IMi» Bo. 179« . . , ■ m
234. jSÜSÊb,l* .55*»'¡«“W  for 8.3 .19 4 1 • v.., . - ■'
; 215* * Ali.'388. iriqr ftt 18.3.1941. ' iooaritag to Bald«»»* rather un*, 
'. ' '.{¡Eu? aooeunt, Silier»« aim in orderäi« the Operation «Ktended ' 
«to for» a baais for- the domination of thè eastem Medi terra- 
S o m the air". Era/Halder. ii, 318-19* eatay ito. 17.3.1941.
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• :; v‘-fbt order to occupy the entire Greek mainland had still another re- 
suit. ^ In ^ «fits' of all alterations, Haider on 16 March still ' hoped it - 
. would he possibleto start the Eussian esz^ aign - ©inns the inf entry di- 
• visions of 12* «ay - at the date originally envisaged, provided Hitler ' ■ 
con^ lied with therequest of OKS not to march ili, echelon into Bulgaria, 
that the latter' could start redeploying for ’Barbarossa" on 10 'Af*• 
ril.2^  Hitler»s decision, however, made it necessary to commit stronger 
. forces than originally intended on operation •’Marita”, and thissealed the 
. fate of the timely start of "Barbarossa”. On 12 Harsh,' & dispute had 
1 broken out between WKM aand OKH as to which of the forces of IH*' echelon : 
should, if necessaiy, he marched into Bulgaria* 183« infaatry division 
or 4« mountain division. Although Haider argued that the apoeptanoe of ■ 
the proposal of OIW to select 4« mountain division muid entail' a delay 
■' to "Barbarossa",2^ ' - Hitler !allowed;Äir to have'its- way ■ and-ordered'4*.' ' 
mountain division to enter Bulgaria on 19 March* Following Hitler »s "
■ ■ order to occupy the entire Greek mainland (MM seems to have realised 'its. 1 ' 
: error, for Warlimont now suggested that only 4« mountain division was to 
■ he subordinated to 12* anor, while the rest of III. echelon was to star 
. in Bátanla** 24043
How, however! the positions vere reserved* Branchitsch claimed that ;
' he needed alditional forces in orderto 099® with the extended objectives 
. of ’»Merita", and on 22 March he got his way. Hi# commands 21. and Xi*
,■. army '@®rps, together with 46*, " 294* ' snd 76* infantry divisions were or*
' , Philippi-Heim, «* ©it.* pp. 49, 60. the weakening of tagr 
• . ■ ■ south and the aBemlloa in its dispositions forced to '
attaok frontally snd made him lag behind the other two' «y' -pm^ s*'.
' îhis resulted in Hitler*s decision of August 1941 to detaoh strong 
'.'/.'forces fron army group center and send thea to ,1dm. ttetin®, instead 
of going to Moscow*In the ©pinion of such experts as Haider and* ■ - 
; Guderianthis decision cost Hitler the Eussian campaign.
240. glAaMer. ii. 314. 311». enter for 16.3.1941. -'V
24I * ■ jCbj^i* Ä4*
242. A0i:.12/la ».. 5I7/4I g.Kdos v. 12.3.1941, GME/426/8OO5O4OI AQg.12/
Za. Mr*. 52I/4I g.Kdos v. 12.3.1941. ' ibii/421¿7áQ05039. .
243. m/oiaf*.1« 363* entry for 18.3.1941.
i
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dered te crossthe Banube andjoin 4« mountain division.2^  Sie rest of ' 
tha forces of III. échelon were te stay in Bumania and vere divided bet- 
ween the Eussianfront and tha ermy mission»2^  Antieipating these 
ders, OKH had already given instructions test tes forces of III, échelon 
' nov eaxmarked for Bulgatia should not marte to tee Dobrudja - from teere : 
they had originally been supposed to take up positions against Turkey - 
but concentrais 'in' tee Corabiaz-Craiova^ latina-Bucherest-Oltenita area, ' ' 
fcom vhere they wäre to pass over tee bridges at Turnu Magurele and ' - 
ßiurgiu'and so os by roads Äs. 2 and J te tee Greek frontier.2^  te 
22 Marte Mst, who %  nov muet hâve been thorou^ ily confused, receired 
' a liât of the unit* of white he could dispose for the attack on Greeee. 
These'included high commanda XXH.» XVIII., XXX. and &• army corps, 2, ' 
and 9» armoured divisions, 46»» 50,» 73«, 164. and 294. infantiy divi­
sions, 4*» 5« e*4 6. mountain divisions, and infantry régiment 125. Th# 
staff of Wmmcsxmm Heist vas assigaed completely new task3 vithin 
the framework of the new deployaent plan of "Barbarossa**, and vas there- 
fore ordered back to Bueharest, «»and HT,' army corps, 1ta well
as 5* end 11. armoured divisions, were detailed for cover against Turkey 
"for a limited period", and vere to be back in Eumania between 10 and 18 
April. SS "AI", 'teo,-waa te be béofc'in Brairai* by 5 May, white me#at";- ■ 
that It could participate in tee' early stages 'of "Marita".2^  fiaally, • =' 
the teanges in "Barbarossa" laft 16. armoured division vithout an offen­
sive taok in tuaània,. and OSH nov hoped to estraot it by 25 Marte.2^ 8 24
244. A0K.12/la Nr. OI84/4I g.Kdos Chefsatee v. 22.3.1941# Oim/426/. , 8005026-27, As it turned out, none of teeso forces vas te set - ■ 
action. ^
243« A01.12/Ia Ir. 578/41 g.Kdos v. 18.5.1941, lbid/426/8005034. 56. infantry division vas detailed to the Eusaianfront, 198. infantry




A0K.12/I# Ir. 560/41 g.Xâos v. 15.5.1941» ibld/425/8005056j A0K.12/ 
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Warllmont thereupon 'undertool:' to inform the high oommand of the army of 
these facts, and did so in a letter two days later. ^  .However, the mat­
ter was too' important' to. end' there*. Semite. the ^ 06? directive ladder on - 
16 March kept wondering whether it'would not, -.after'all,. he possible to 
utilise,the Yugoslav railroads on the way back from Greece. . After
Hitler emended the arayto objectives in Greece the question became even 
’• mom-'urgent)' although the German radio, promised thatGermsny would not . - 
demand ri$its of transit for either troops or war material,. . 06? on 21
March demanded that "the question of transport through Yugoslavia will.
be raised immediately after the accession to the tripartite Pact, as . -■ • ■ ....... 261 ' ■ 'there is no railway connection from Bulgaria to Greece". . On 24 March
Varlimont, despite everything, still hoped that some arrangement would '
be'' arrived at) - and two days later Haider noted .that without the use of
Yugoslavia**’railways, operation "Marita" would be "exeeddingly diffi­
cult".258 *6062 v-j '■ ; ; V J
■ '06? and 0IH left no stone unturned in their efforts to convince the'
foreign 'ministry of. the importance of opening a way through Yugoslavia,
' b ut on 25‘ March they had to. admit - defeat. On tlat day Yugoslavia signed ' 
the Tripartite Pact, receiving in return a written assurance that Germany 
would not demand the passage or transportation of troops throu^ x her " 
territory during the war." In so far as the beginning of the attaok was 
now imminent, it was "too late to. blip 12« mmp anyhow. Only material' - 
■ could be ‘eapected:-.perhaps - to be allowed to pass through Yugoslavia 
'■ on the way back» ■ ;/ ■ . • -■ . .-. «.
On 25 March 1941 the deployment of 12. army and Till, air oorps in ■
' Bulgaria was,' for all - practical purposed, - completed. Mot has fed.® 
hoadfmarters at Camkorja* Eichthofen at Esumaja« from vast to east* t&e
258. Ibid. 357» entry for 15.3.1f#l| 06?/w?St/Abt.L Nr. 44 320/41 g.Edos 
. ■1 Chefsache v. 15.5*1941, signed by 'Iodi, it« I#. Ml/l4/$55 at toe ■ Imperial ¥ar Museum. , .. :
258. KTB/Halder. li. 5I4, entry for I6.3.I94I, : ;
260. Mstio.' on.'iát.é v, 81.
261*- TCB/m* ' 1. • 365.' entry'for 21,3.1941.- .'v .: . - , _ • r
'";2é2^  KTB/Halder.■ il.- 329. entry for 26,3*1941.
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-■ following f orces were rsnged on the Greek fTontier» 6. mountaln división 
at the extern® southwestem córner of Bulgaria) 3» mountain división with 
infantry regiment 125, la the Henlik arta) 72. infantry divsion near the 
point where the river llesta (lestes) entera Gresca. All these forees were 
under the commana @í X7III. mountain copra. Further to the east, 164* and 
30. infantry divisions were atanding on thefrontier under the command of 
XXX. corpa vitó its headquarters at Chaskovo. 4* mountain división was on 
ita way on road lo. X in order to join 3» mountain división. 2. armoured 
. and SS ‘’AH" divisions were atanding on the Tugoslav frontier, the one in 
the EhatendiX arta and the other further north in the Sofia-Bimotrovgrad 
arta. 73* infantry erad 60. motorizad divisions were concentrated round 
Plovdiv under the command of XXIX. corpa aerving as. strategic reserve. ' ; , 
9* armoured división was stationed further to the east round Stara Zagora 
under the command of XIY* corpa.' Even farther to the east stood the two ■ 
divisions whioh ver® to cover "Marita” against Turkish interventiont XX.- 
armoured in the Sliven-Jambol area, 5* armoured round Burgas. Prom the 
north, 294«» 4*>» and 76. infantry divisions, all belénging to XIX. eche- 
Xon, were stiXX on their way. Everything was getting into position when 
a dramatio event tumed the tahXesi in the night of 26-27 Maroh, a m m  
' d»etat overturned the govemaent in Belgrado. ,
' Charter 6
' 27 March and After
. ;.v -f ; '  ■ ?■ ' ■ 1 ;* ' v /. -  ■ -v
"Ifear", Prince Paul told Hitler on 4 Mareh» "that if I follow your ad­
vice and sign the Tripartite Pact I shall no longer he here in six months" 
Opposition to the past 'was, indeed, 'strong in Yugoslavia. .During the en­
tire winter, when it looted'as if Yugoslavia was slowly by inexolerably -, ■ 
drawn into the orbit of .idle Axis, Prince Paul and the members of his •**’ , 
binet were constantly pestered' t$rth warnings by the opponents of the 
Pact.;'; v: v - '
The most important of these were not Yugoslavs at all, but outsiders. 
Roosevelt, ■ Churchill «id Stalin understood Yugoslavia*s importance just ; ' 
as ’well as' 'Hitler did* due to her strategical position on the rear of ; 
the,'Itali»'forces’in Albania ted on the flank of the German army in" Bul­
garia 'aheutralYugo si aviawasdesir able to none of the great powers 
. President Roosevelt. In' particular, was persistent in his attempts to 00»» 
vince 'the Yugoslavs that it was' in' their own' Interest to resist Hitler* '■. 
on 23 January a special eamisssry of his, colonel William Donovan, «ni* ■ 
ved in 'Belgrade with some high sounding phrases 'about the preservation of 
national honour, and a not so. veiled ultimatum'.to the effect .that if Yu­
goslavia allowed the passage of German troops the lini ted States would not 
interfere on her behald 'at the peace table*- ’ ■ '
■' '-^jho recepient of this Warning, .thè Prince Regent, was.by this timo a 
broken miai. ' ; I*»n: his «emits have- scarcely: questioned the sincerity mf : - 
his sympathies for England* he had be« .educated, at, tatard* ; felt like m  
Englishman and was tended to a Greek princess. Yet his regency was to. 
corno-to/ted 'end'’in'a few teatri sudate did not .want to hand ©ver -a coste» 
try devastated by war to his nephew, King Peter II, On IS ted again on23 
February he 'plained Yugoslavia1 s position to United States Minister
1# ■ and Gleason, d.. eit., pp, ,
Arthuer Laaej Yugoslavia would not take military action in case the Gar»' ' 
mans entered Bulgaria, for to do so would clearly put her in the wrong''ant 
. the need for such action would not he understood hy the Croat andSlovene' 
parts of the population*. The Yugoslav army was not ready for warj even if 
it were, it would he impossible to do the strategically correct thing and 
concentrate the troops in the southern part of the country, for political 
considerations made it imperative that Croatia and' Slovenia should not he . 
• abandoned* " ■Operating from "both' Temesvar -' where the' frontier' was "unfortf** 
fled » and Sofia, the Germans could easily cut the country in half ®nd''’':' 
crush her within two weeks. ' Roosevel*s assurance that the United States 
were looking nnot merely to the present but to the future** was of little 
-value to the'Prince'Regent f Hitler* s armoured divisions were so very much 
■ nearer than say aid the American president, of for that matter 'the' British 
prime minister,-'.could promise.'" Yugoslavia, Prince' Paul and Cvetkovic 'ass­
ured''.'tea United 'States mlniatir,- would resist 'attack and'net-'all*» tee.' 
transportation of German troops across her territory| but that was ’a» far'' 
. as -'she 'would -go*' She would sign tee5tripartite 'fact •» 's&tecugh not 'the' ■' 
article providing for military assistance '» andwould certainly not fight, 
even'-'if'the GeaMiaa ecfupled Salonika.^  ' _ '.‘l '5 -'
' Liko their American friends, the British exercised heavy pressure on ' : 
Yugoslavia1 to resist the Iaais§ ttfliito»'th*«*'',yh^"' wav» ait prepared 'te' 
trice -**n®** ’ tm an ‘answer* ; While Bane admitted' fidlnre ‘by' feinting ’rift .to" ’' 
Prince: Paul that the united 'State# had never asked Yhgealafia it attack'--' 
Germ«?©' er the’Aida, ^ GtteteiU»'iteiftaitd ‘teat It Was the fL^ xt aril' erisi 
tee' ‘date’' tf 'great powers -'te sacrifice aiarti neutrals far the sate ef vie* - 
toiy ever Nazism, wanted them to do just teat* ' In his view a magnificent *6
2* ..Bane to Hull, 18.2.1941, BSt ■ »a «45-4^ * ' ; ':' ' "
3* Hull to Bane, 22.2.1941,
4* -lane 1® Sill# 23*2.1941,. >,91 ll same.to same, 16.3.
HU»' 95« l.t«* *  m m * , ,  ,, .. . . . ...,
5*"' 22.3*I94i»-^^ 5«4-^ 5*"
6, ' 'in 1959 he i*ett teat- It wee.tee -.si#* an# tee duty ef Gnat M W a  • to abrogate tee principles she was trying to reaffirm for some time,
IMA, 947*
IMA," 947-481955-5«*, same toto 15.3.1941, Hi*» o  sma, U.S.lfpT
toro
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alternative to which wo may have to resort if we find present government 
have gone beyond recall” Yet the man who was to form the brain behind 
the coup, general Bora Mirkovio of the Yugoslav air force, seems to have 
started contemplating a revolt as early as 1937, when Stoyadinovie was 
apparently, out to turn the country into an Italian satelite.1 2. Thou^ i 
it may be true, as some allege, that the c¿inspirators received British 
aid and were promised in advance that their government would be recog­
nised, there ©an be little doubt but that the origins of the coup were 
essentially Yugoslav - or rather, Serb - and not foreign.
 ^ The details of the coup have been described elsewhere and need not ube repeated here. The brain behind it was, aa already said,' general 
Kirkovlo who was motivated by a peculiar mixture of Serb nationalism and 
a romantic conception of the traditional role of the Serb army in setting 
ri^ ht erring politicians in the national interest. Its figurehehd - or 
was he more than a figurehead? * was general Busan Simovlc, commander of ■ 
the Yugoslav air force, a man who had been demoted several times for his 
! political activities and always managed to reach the top again. On 25 
March he is reported to have warned Prince Paul that he would "have tro­
uble restraining his fliers” in case Yugoslavia signed the Pact.1^  The 
Other conspirators were air force officers, members of the Belgrade Be- 
serve Office Club and civilians from the Serb Cultural Club, This central
11. Mden, ©jj. cit.. pp. 227-28| Churchill, on. clt.» iii, 142.
12. For Mrkovic»s background v. Boptner, ©¡». cit., pp. 250-53*
15« Basically there are three distinct views of the coup» 1. that of its 
opponents, mostly ex members of the legitimate Yugoslav government,
! who denounce it as a criminal of at least mistaken attempt, more <br 
less inspired by foreign intervention, to alter the country*s policy 
in an irresponsible way leading to national disaster. 2. That of the 
' ’ • conspirators themselves, in whose eyes it was a just retribution to 
, a government that had abandoned Yugoslavia*s traditional pro-western 
policy and bowed to Basi agression out of fear and desire. Though causing Yugoslavia to be overrun, they argue, the coup decisively, 
contributed to the victory over Baal Germany by forcing Hitler to 
postpone his attack on Bussia. 5* Ihat of the communists, to whom 
it was the working class that revS&ed against a capitalist govern­
ment that had sold out to the Basis*
14« Bistio, o£. oit.« pp. 75-76* *
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group fonati personal contacts among Sorto officers - all o£ juniorrank 
- disperse! in garrisons all o w  te country. " It semiti that onlya very 
sanali mate?' of people ' knev thè istalla or bai tooon assigned specific te» 
ska 'In advsaoe* '. She coup va© directed by Mirkovie irosi Sinovie*s office 
vhile thè coasaanderof te air force - ©iter because ho waa a mere fi- 
, gurehead or because he fctov ho vas being folloved 'and vantai to cover up 
thè aotivitisa of hia fsllov conspiratora • cpent thè ni#t of thè cono 
' ’ at homa. ’ - ' ' • ‘ ■ ; ' " h ^  1 ^ v ■ i - ' '
' : Cvetkovio and Cincar Markovio returnsd to Belgrado froa Tisana early 
on 26 March* A few houra later Mirkovie end Sinovie decide! to' ’Htv&t' 
eama iiight* Thatevening te cossaander ©f thè air forca vaa piace! on" : 
thè ratired liat, but thie belate! oounter aeasure no longer distobed ' 
llirkovic, One after thè other, he suaaoned thè officers of thè air force 
head^ uarters to Sinovie‘s office, piace!' tea in eoaitaad of te' troop3 ^ ; 
protecting -te baso and dispatched ' thea to ' oedupy te ■Belgrado polioa 
1 heaqaurters, te' naia post offices and telephone centrale» ' te 'Mo' ;
casting station, thè niniatry of ter. ■ Special 'teteteatè vero : sant te :
. orrest Cvetkovic, Cincar Karkovic and other ninistsrs. By thè noming ; ~ 
te xoyai fise# outside Belgrado had tetto surrounded and yo-xig Peter*3 ; 
voice va» initated on thè radio in a'csll'-te thè Yugoslav peoples to
■ V rally'bobini te '^ 'flioinai o^ tìotìt tee resistano© of te'roysl :
ripari ma tosiate-Riditemi» however, a shot being fireoà *’ «od Poter--.■
fetched te te 'ter ministry. h. By this tine,1 te court vai. an abconplished 
' ' fact. - Brino* Paul» vite vas on his vay te his estate ih thè north of thè 
'«©tmtiy* m  interteptoi 'iiMfr laifte» tati’ 'afte' eìiaitaaiag Mteìtséèt'
, ; and rtieeM^. te latte***. auggastion 'te ; «all upon thè ^ troops in ' Croatia 
. - to ; eupres s ' te ' coito retumed ’ te 'Belgrado. '! Received by itevi©* tei vas . 
irtela ter©«# te'stieote ©f;te’aiutai'* ìrtiieli by nè* «ì m 'teàtitei 
vith French, Engliah and ìhioslav flags and vere wmm&m vith a vildly 
« te s ia s tio ',»opaatioa * te 'te,' mat tedi*«?© ' vhe*e,it©' sàie*' Ma' m » '
. signation as regent. _ ' tette in thè evoning of te sene day he and his 
'■'!f«adlyt'ite»ttel'f©r>4«te.\ , / u; ;
■ ■ ' '  ' ' ' ';i ' : : ' :  : '... ' V : ■ • ; . ' , '. ; ; i l' u ; i i ■ ! ' * ;
•:15*' ' Iter te ii, -¡0/2^ /158996*■. ■ - :■

-i;''S®i»b®Íy else, hovever, did not require montos to mal» decisions, 'ñor 
to put tosía intopractica. fo Illtler til# Yugoslar oona cam© m  a jtaiaftiL ■ 
surprie®." 2he flaok which ha believed had b#aa mém' secura by 'Tugeslwria*® , 
aoO®sai«a t© toe fripartite Pact was now threatoaed bythe milllon usa '■ 
army "&£ a govarnment that had eatahlished itself iá protest agalnst toat.' - 
Paót* , Draatic actioa seemed to be ealled for. y ,
II '.;-'VV
’ "Sto populatioa of tha capital", Ileerea wired on 26 Haroh, nis uniror- 
eslly dost deeply ímpressed" by th® signatura of tho frlpartite Pact. Sho 
govenuaent, he added, had to disperso & few mlnor ’ deaonstrationa, but wm 
,\"@©6#l®t«ly masteroftha situation''.1^  Driving through tha, beflaggedi - 
' streets. of Belgrado next aomlag, he arust heve vanted te' eat hts torda. 
':H##f®a'siiid® Ma firat attoapt to get ia touoh vito tha nmr governaent m  
¿eea' a# he heard about ‘fe#' @gmi ‘arrlrl&g at th® var ministiy on the m®*
,ning ©f: 27 Harto# hoverer, he vaa told ■ that Siaori© ves ■ too bw*y to re» ■' • 
• oaito hla and had to coatent himself with a talk to .atocio, «he '#a«ur®i 
him that his' own seleotion as forelga minister "guaranteed the coatá»» 
ity oí tlie iooferaiita with the Jxia powers, particular ly vito a«ntoiyV 
Be would sea to' it that ^ "those obligationa which had hoto '#•»
: cuaed would sámM .ohnwwei"*23 Beceived by Simovio ©a. the sí» wmáam^ ■ 
tha nev minister president triad; te convine®. the Germán minister that hé 
' had aJaf*¡rh toen;® 'firiittd of r: On 30 'Mersb' liooi®. Otmm .
. to. itthiidt. th# stotowit, that "th# pmmmM. Boyal .l^ osisar ,gov^»«t m*., 
mains .tei# .to the fggtosiy&a of raspeot for iatoraational totati#*'Ai«ii. ; 
;tow» hsoa '«topad#' among ’totítoh.-lho '.ptotoeol aigned oa the 2§th of toi»'. . ,■ - ; 
‘toath.at-fi«na b#l#^ »w«2^  , ©a to# same day fieerea r^ortM that he had. . 
¡tosrat' that the majority of' to® new eahdtoaf 'mm .ia íasmm of meoiiiitf«»iil
19*
20.
m m m  to.ftoMto^  aiai'Stoyi 26*3.1941# Mff* B, 
Same to «M# 27.3.1911. ibid. Ko. 219. ' \ ' 
8«m to ®w*; 28.3.1941*Bo. 22S; '
«•" S^ao to «MM»,' ¿i* á^5. ■
toi#'v»; n u
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recognition of Yugoslavia* a accession to the Tripartita Pact,2'5 This was 
the last report leeren'Waä to send because, having already been instructed 
to exercise the greatest"reserve', he was called home on the same day"for 
■-the’-purpose of 'reporting". .' \ •; ’ ■ / ■' .
■ To Hitler the Yugoslav attempts to save what could he saved were so 
'mueh; drivel#' " H© must have' received-news' of the coup 'as early as 1000 or", 
1100 hours in the' morning, for Eibbentrop informed his Japanese colleague 
.. of the. Putsch during & conversation between them. "At this moment", the ■ 
-■'verbal ends, "the Reich foreign minister was summoned to the Reich Chan» 
cellexy* ' Contrary to his original assumption that this would mean only a 
short ’'tfhienc©*' the discussion there' lasted $uite a while# so that the"
/, . conversation with Matsuoka could not be continued before linch* ..There».'.-''; 
.' • upon the lunch which was on'the program vas held in a very intimate/.- 
V. circle ¿£*9 in -toe company of totally insignificant clerksJV at first ‘ " 
.without the Reich foreign'minister, who did not appear until later".2^
. ■ It1 is very hard to trace the 'exact sequence of -Hie events that followed*; ■ -;
At 1155 hours'Heeren* a first telegram, announcing larg© demonstratxcns "in 
favour of the Ring and 'the army* * * and explicitly directed again3t the 
aocession to the Tripartite Pact" arrived in Berlin.2^ . üve minutes later 
Ealder receivad a telephone call ordering him to the M>chek«tfclei.;. The :" 
chief of thi: general * Staff must have heard about the mm from enothcr ; '■ 
source, ’'Ihr he did not fin&it 'too' hard to guess vhat tho diseus-tion witäh . 
Hitler'would'be'about■ ; v -:
' ■ After the war rauch has been made of the fast that the need to prepare 1 
a can^ aign against Yugoslavia took the German army by surprise. - The Vary V. 
speed Willi which Balder' eouidt; durlag. hi# vcyag©' ly car £raa Zossen. to' ; 
StriiA»1' p«#«» * planprovldiiig fer tho' Invasion of Yugoslavia frea na
13*-S«e to- same, M. 315 v. 30.3.1941.■ St*S*: il, SO/*#/
....152663; - ■ ■
. 24» lintol«..tö .Beere», ».3.1941» jgffis J>, xü, ». 252» Mbbeatrep .to 
■ ..Bassen« 30.5.1941* ■/ .
■''25./Mbbente^ *«»t«^ »'i®a'f«»«ti©n,/I7.3*lMl* iMl* »* 218." !
'26.; leeren- to fo-r^ Lga,ÄistjBy,;'i27.*5*i94i* MMA» lo.; 214*' '.;. ■
27. ■ «wa/gaidsw. ii, 330, .«atry for 27.3*1941» ’«4 note.
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less than four directions belies this "fact”. Indeed» he and Heusinger 
had always thought such an operation possible» and had studied it in
October. According to ther plan, it was to be carried out by XXXX. axay28'' ■corps» then stationed in Vienna and now forming part of 12. army. More­
over, there are indications that Haider did not limit himself to military 
planning only, but went on to prepare the diplomatic background of the 
operation. In Nuremberg evidence was produced by the Soviet prosecution 
that he and Keitel had, in November and December 1940» got in touch with 
the Hungarian chief of the general staff and war minister by means of the 
German military attache in Budapest. 015, Haider explained to his Hunga- 
' v ri&n opposite number, wanted to prepare an eventual preventive war against 
Yugoslavia, to be launched in the spring, fhe aim of the operation was to '■ 
exclude the menace "at a later date" of a Soviet attack "from the rear".
For this purpose, Germany would supply Hungary with 10 cm. cannon and mo- 1 
dera tanks to equip a mobile brigade.2^  Thus it is clear that Hitler* s 
decision to smash Yugoslavia did not catch the army unawares} in Haider*# 
own subsequent words (which, of course, differ markedly from what he said 
at Nuremberg) the theoretical (gedankllchen) preparations had been made 
: many ■ rnoMbh earlier, and it was necessary only to' complete the material 
preparations.^ 0 Even here OKH did not have to start from scratch, be­
cause the establishment of a large supply depot tear Vienna in the summer 
’ of' 1940,made it■unnecessary to bring up supplies from the interior 4f the■ 
Reich «ad greatly facilitated the operation.^1
, Upon his ««rival in Berlin at 1300 hours^ 2 the chief of staff found
2®. ; Ibid. 131, 134# 140, 143* entries for 10, 12, 15, 18.10.1940.
• 29. ' MS« vii, 33I-32. The Soviet prosecution here quotes the testimony ■
• • of one Stephen Ujszaszyn (11 USSH-155) during the trial of Keitel.,
. 30, ’ lor.,; ■ j|&#*' p. 182.
51. ■ Blau.. pp. pit*, p. 47«
32. It is here that the difficulty in tlMng Ues. According to Haider,
- the conference. lasted from 1300 to 1430 hours. " From the SagaHt
• on German Foreign Policy, however, it would appear that filler* to- 
gether with fiibbentropj spent the time from 1310 to 1325 hours'in', 
oonversation with the Bulgarian minister (Ibid, D, mil, No. 215) and - 
from 1415 to 1420 with the Bulgarian one (ibid, Ho. 216). The mill-
233
: that' a conference attended by Hitler,' fed tel, ■ Jell, ■ GSring end ■ the itihrer»s -,:i 
' ' • four' adjutants 'was' already' in fall swing./ 'Seen Brauchitsch, Heusinger,
1 Rintelen and Ribbentrop were also ©ailed in. . Hitler spoke in curt, tough /
' ''sentences..' Yugoslavia had always been an uncertain factor, especially in ■ 
view of -toe future operation "Barbarossa" • ■. Serbs Mid Slovenes were tradi- . 
/•''tionaily' anti-German. No document signed by a Yugoslav .mw&i.' ;
be trusted, because the danger of a co u p  was always there. As it was, the 
’ ■ Situation was 'not too bad, for the '©©an would have been far more 'dangerous.
' ■ if it had taken place after the start of the Russian campaign. Hitler pro- 'v ^ 
feased himself determined to smash Yugoslavia as a political entity without 
waiting for' the diplomatic explanations and declarationaof leyallty which /
, ■ were' sure to 'arrive in a few days. , Hungarian Mid Bulgarian «soperatioii /.
could be reckoned with, the Ftihrer then laid down the outlines of a con- 
■ centric" attack to be launched against Yugoslavia from Bulgaria (Sofia.»/' / ■
■' Eustendil) 'and Austria (Gras) with strong Hungarian forces invading teo; ■
' country from' the north and Italian troops operating from the 'full«» Alps.  ^< 
The operation was to open with a bombardment of Belgrade. „ .
! • None of thse present tried to dispute Hitler's decision, the seed for 
' which was only too'obvious. " Brauchitsch pointed out that the FBhrer's 
plans largely coincided with the ones prepared by the army, G8ring that V  ; 
/ his air force could Immediately start action against Yugoslavia from Bui- ; ■
■ garian air fields but would refulre two or 'three 'days to bring up rein- 
forcements.' Hitler tete instructed. Goil to lay down the reeulte"Of the ; ' -
discussion in a. directive to be signedby himself. . With that the confewhnoe 
®ij®u3»n®d.^ v.
In tee evening of •the sate day "directive No.' 25" was issued. '■ It read* "; ;
. -  ' (
■ tary conference which'Haider attended my conceivably have been heli";’' ■' 'J 
in between, but this would leave open the fueoticn why Xibbeiitrep' > . *
‘ (and Hewel, who took tee'»cord of Hitler's conversations with tho , i 
ministers)-had to be ealled in later* , l
33. 0KW/WP3t/Abt.L(IM) Mr. 44 791/41 g.Kdos Chefsache v. 27.1.1941, "Be- \! 
eprechung ilber Rage Jusoelawian". printed in Ml* 1, zii. No. 217. ■ ■ ■
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The military revolt la Yugoslavia has changed the political posl- ..:
- tion In the Balkans,■ Yugoslavia... m a t  be regarded as «a essay. ■
. . end. beaten dew'«« fuiekly ,as:'posi&ble. , t *.. . ■
' ■ • It is ay intention to break into Yugoslavia in"fee"general; 
direction of Belgrade and to the south by a concentric, operation— . ■
; ^, from the Fiume«Gras area on one side, and the Sofia area on the'
,■ other, 'and to deal',an annihilating bio» to the Yugoslav forces. — ; •
. V. Farther, the extreme southern region of the country vill be occ*; ■
„. upied as a base from which the German*Italian offensive against ■ /
'■ Greece can be continued.,. 1
I issue fee'following detailed, order»*,; . , , _ „ / ; ;t>
- a. As soon as sufficient forces are available and the weather
- allows, the ground installations of the Yugoslav air force and the;-". .
city #1 Belgrade will be destroyed from the sir...
b. If possible simultaneously - but in no event earlier • un- 
, dertekiiig. "Maatita". will begin with fee temporarily limited objec- n.;
. tive of occupying the Salonika Basin and gaining a foothold ontha ; 
heists of Edessa. For this purpose XVIII. array corps can advance1 
v through.Yugoslav territory... - - •' J ;
o. All forces still available in Bulgaria and Rumania will be ' 
committed to the attacks which will be carried out from the Sofia-r:. \ 
j"' area- to the northwest and from the lust«^il«G@raa»l«»^'h m m  be v.-; 
fee west# with the exception that a force of about one division,";;:"- 
’ with air support, must remain to protect the Rumanian oil fields. - 
Use protection of the TosMalt frontier will, for-Hie-til»'being*/';'. -
- . , be left to fee' Bulgarians*: A German formation consisting, if, pec*; - ■' Bible of an armoured division vill stand by in fee' rear in swp- 
ii; W ■ port./. ;
,. ' ; d.", The thrust from fee general direction of .Gras towards,..fee 
'southeast villbe made .as soon as fee necessary forces have been , 
assembled. ■ „9 m . aray is ft«»' to decide whether Hungarian territory 
should,be eNeeed''in breaehtsg fee''frontier**.*
‘ e. The air force vill support wife two g»ups fee'«^rations :'
■*; ■ of 12. amy and of fee assault group now being formed in fee Gras ' _
area**.' fee' pisslbilife of Macing, qp X*. air corps'inis actios;:. , -
from Italian bases will be considered.,.
; ‘ / ' !! '■3 4 '\ •' V  ' ‘ " V V ; . ; ; , Vi
The Ftihrer, Haider told talus when placing him in command of fee opiffaMos 
, on the suite. day, had decided to invade Yugoslavia for fee Hollowing- res» - '
' sons* 1. to protect fee flank of the offensive to be launched from Bulgaria 
.’. against Greece.2.' To gain .possession of. fee railway line' from Belgrade ■
via Hiseh 'to fee soufe. 3* To" make 'sure-Of his ri#t flank before' starting
M. printed in Twor-Roper, £&• £&*• PP* 61-2. The invasion of Yugos- 





































































































































































mountain división, as already soid» vas teten back northvard and 
under Kleist, üíie only force that remained virtually uiiaffected by tíie 
changas vas XXX.corpa deployed in western Thrace opposite Xanthi.' All 
■ in all, 12. army thus shifted the bulk '©f ita forcea to the west in a '
• series of complicated and very difflcult - becsuse of the quality of the 
Bulgarian roads aró the weather •» aovementsj on the other hand, ithad 
" been necessary to bring up only two divisions (16. armoured and 198 • in- 
fantxy) not originally esrasrkedfor wMarita% 'non of which vas tó eee V:
/■aotion«- Y.;"’’.: -- Y J Y YYY Y',1 "
Xf the movements of 12, array were greatly hampered by the State of - 
-' the Bulgaria* road net, it did at least have its unita within reasonable 
distare© from their new deployaent áreos, líot so colonel general von 
Veich'e 2. ' aroy, which vas detailed to oarry' out tha attack o» Yugoslavia
froa the north. .. When first allocating forcea for oper&tion "Marita” the
Wehrmacht^  had had at.' its disposal a larga number of üvisleiis unengaged 
, on anjr operation, anong which OKU vas freo to ehooss. .- In Maroh 1941* ■ •; 
, however, such divisions as were not usad os garrisona in the occupied 
territories or engaged in" reogganization within the plan for the enlarge- 
aent of the artay were for the most part inoorporated in a series of vast 
xnoveaents fros west to eaat 'aró from east to west j there vas no "free" - 
reservoir of forte®'ÜS could eend to Yugoslavia* and the divisions of 2. 
army therefore had to be taken out Iten'tte 'enes earmarked for MBarba-
rossa’*. ' In order to understand the problema connected vith the concen- 
tration of 2. anqy, as well as the all Important question 'of the effeet 
. ■ of thls concentration on the buildup for "Barbaros sa% it 'iá necessary 
• to delta a littáe''into 'the histoag''©f .tha latter. , NÍ
> The tablea laying dovn the detalla of the sxmy buxldup for "Barba»
. ros#** were prepaxed by Heusinger^  operations departaent and submitted 
to lalder on 29 Januaxy»^  together vith tha dsplapMai order to whJLoh ' 
' they vera appended* Four dsys later Ealder exaplined them to. Hitler* '
44* "?®*y garó w*kl" 
■for 29.1.1941* ■:
.ted the chief of staffj ii<
VONK\<\J
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■ it ia doubtfol whetker thè beginning of th® attack croia. hav® bean dotesv 
minsd at so ©arly adate* lata in March it vagatili open, with 15 May as 
y th© tarainna ooat ere«>.*; ■ On 24 February Haider raised thè idea of aero» 
; ; arisg 'th® ■ «¡falpngnt of thè reserves before that of thè divisione to ba su® 
pplied with French material, vhich accordine to thia suggestion vere to " '
, b® ready only on 1 Jan**^ ? -'Sino©' fi ve crucially importasi ar&oured 'divi®
. sions ver® involved, thè very faci that such a suggestion couldbe raised 
ahowathatio date earlier than Jua® was ’ envisaged. Thia, even befort /• 
.■yth#'«stwnsion of thè objectives of ’‘Ilarità” on 17 March mòdo it impóssì- 
• ble for thè infantry divisione of 12* 'army to arxive on tiae. All in.!';', 
all, it ia unsfa® to. place thè dét® far thè projected invasioa of Russia1 
eaarller than thè Hrst w#®k of Jun®. ' v " ' * ,4 ’; ' : " ■
Vhat vaa tho offeot of Hitler*© decision to invade Iugoslavia on' thè 
buildup for “Barbarossa"?. Having analyzed thè latter in ©ose detali, ' «© ' 
;.;«p© now in a poaltion to supply an enswer that is »re than a aere/gu©««* 
To begin with, ' it d.s perftotly clear that thè redeploynsnt of 12* axny 
with more than half of all thè forces allócated to' both "Marita” 'salÉ':”25,*
, could not bave any effect on “Barbsrossa” because this asay had pnisiie® ■ 
ally all ita unita in Bulgaria. 'As to 2. army and thè OSE is«Bérf©a/forr: - 
”25”, it vrold seem that th® detachment òf 12. divisioni fron thè ¿Kgan»'' 
tic buildup for “Barbarossa” 'ani their diversion to thè aouth could 
hardly have .tlam#t@d.'ti© -latter: to a veiy largo eactent, 'parti«td«ly.'; 
.b©ff«s©.:lt luriLjMUaMF'Ctist goi"under w©y.’' A''o@s#s*l®oa 'of .th© 'ti»©®' ' .
. tibie© "of 11*- and X U *.©Oheicm© of wlartwro»#a, with a lisi of 'tho©© '
' forcee o©HwLtt©d In' iti» 'iaMeana^ 8 àev$ .'that,. when • th© Belgrado coiai - . : ■, 
■tool! pi*©©,..®®' th» foresi't© detach a grand total ©f'4 divisiona - 1. v 
;:^«atidtt,;'79*i "125*‘«ni 152.'infantry"® from thè transfert© of II..©ai® ■ ; 
elon and a©sd,tlJ©is sonthwiad# " Asnone of thesa fiere«'bad'yot st*rt«d"®n
. 56*' : Zusammexhans* pp. ,14®15* , ■ ’ ' . ' ■
« » 7 . ■ . '  il. 298,' rot^ -’for 24«2*lf41* --l'Jiam la also thè date 
■ .fitta by a «©»««In» on th* ©il aituation, OKW/i.B&/ZI ?/Qu/iHQa of 
24 ¿«masy, iti» Ho. m/14/688 at th© Imperiai Var HuMtam* , ;  ' . ■
' ■ 5i* Aa pMsteft is 9« -moil^ iilltbrand, Baa Heer (Frankfurt ' as^ Iain,
/ Mittler, 1956) ii,. 15§®5$t ■ ala# mtSB* i.H34. appendix 9. '
their way .ta'th* Russian. border,*^ it mm not mm.mmmaxp, to "divert"
' fb®»f rather, a gap mm opened In the last phases of XI. echelon, a' gap 
. which oould be, and was, filled up fro» the Oil reserves.^ 0 . Since tfc»:.. 
''tiaetdil« of III* echelon toes not include «y of .the fore« listed as 
ftaalng fart of 12. and 2. armies,^1 the. rest of the traits which 
' fer to the Ml»® was caused by the oouf came fro» either IF* echeloin . 
or the OSS reserve® for "Bárbaross»", the start of the transportation of 
which was still a very long way off* ■ These forces were* 14», 3* and 19* 
«rorsd divisions, 100*, 101* ("light”) notorized divisions, SS "das 
teich* and 16* motorized divisions, and SS infantry regiment "§»ssd®«** 
-ttotóaná®'*^ 2 When the cou» took place these forces had to he hastily 
■ ®#ri^ p#d together fro» France,^  the leich and Czechoslovakia,^  #®t;ef 
the 2f'divisions that were in one way or «oolfcer involved in the Balks» 
campaign. only oat • 14# armoured'«* had already been transported to the 
-eest*^  Since 'the' forces tata, out of II, echelon could.be, and were,~ 
replaced by' «aito-fw» the OSH reserves' for "Mtwfia",' while the . 
t»«aip>rlatioa;©f those' included in IF* and T* echelons was still .warn- 
time etffy, the delay cansed by the outbreak of the Tufoslav campaign 
to'the'buildup for "lutMNMe»" was limited to the time seeded to'pro- 
‘ pare .the CO resorwi®: fir twsisportnMoii* . *v®a this delay, however, ■;'
59* Footnote No* 47 supra* The divisions in question were supposed t* 
start rolling east between 29 March and 7 April* ,
60* l-hiellerwdlillebrand, Zussmnenhaa;?. pp. 15-5, ■ In the present tolWsht 
the figures given by the actual timetables Jucms been preferred to.; 
those in KTB/Halder* ii, 347, entry for 4*4*1941, with lijich'th^ r partly conflict.
Si* Footnote No* 43 supra. Ill* echelon did, however, include 52, and
, 260* infantry divisions, which we shall meet again*
62* The SS divisions in particular were supposed to move east only at 
the last moment* Hausser, eg, cit,* p, 45*
63* Those coming from France had been idle for months following the mm 
< celation of operation "Felix" • On 11 February OSM had already pit 
- - these divisions at the free disposal of^ OKH.' 8H/<Mf* i, 317,
64. Bor, f|* j||*, f* lit.* ■"
65.; R. (Pozdun, Henning, 1957) p* 16.
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, :, How mach delay did Operation "25", iapos®. on ■ th® beginning of: "Marl-, .
■' > ta"?; Sia©© thè lattar tra«' orlglnally supposed to ' start around 1 Aprii 
and did so f ir© days later, thè diff©rance caa bardly hav© beea of thè 
1 greatest significane©. ■ Za ita originai veraion, thè plan for Operation '
- "25"' called for m  intensive tir bombardasent of Belgrado end thè ground l ■ 
installationa of thè Tugoslsv «dr force to be carried out by Richthofen* e
, vizi.!©iir ©ofps’oa 1 Aprili thè Invasion of Groeo© was to start ©a 2 or /
J Aprili Idi© attack ©a Iugoslavia on 12 April* fhis, then, was a sta®*,
' gered attack with each foro© going into action as soon as it got r e a d y ■
_ In' thè afternoon ©f 29 March, however, Paulus presided over a conferenc© " >
. in which took pari, together with thair respective chiefa of staff»List, , 
Veiohs and Kleist. , It was egreed that Operation "Marita" would suo©«©!','7:;; 
■ more «julcklyif brought into oleser relatioaship tritìi "25", that is if.- '\y; -;'iy 
' XXX. corps delayed ita attack on th© Metaxas Un© until 2. ' anaoured di» ; /" :. -, 
Vision «ad U è  «nqr oorps reàeployed in order to circucvent it. y . 
Coasetuently OXH iesusd a new tiaetable according to which thè bcnihard- 
; ment by thè luftwaffe and th© beginning of "Marita" vero postponed to;5,-^ ,v| 
-.-Aprii* tea» tote» it possiti© for 2. arooured division to oeapltt© ■ '
, ita deployment end eircuafeent thè Ketaxas lina by a lusg© 0ver fusosi©? 
territory on thè setti day. The attack froa thè Sofia-Xustendil area';' ; y
- trai' to Btart on 8 Aprii, tubile 2. anay trai to attaek on 12 Aprii "with ' ly 
; th® foro««-thi« «vailabl# to it"*^ 2 0» 2 Aprii tìiis tiaetabl© was stili 
■b©lng.SÄrtd to*^ * but oacday afler.iàtler opanada.QKE and «lorsed;
Liat's ragtest' te jaslpea© th© bombartaent ©f Belgrad© and t^.optaiagl/^ '.';.,'^  70*2
70. ©lMy%SSt/Abt.S, ir. 44 382/41 g.Kdoa Chefsufih© v. 23.3.1941* "Toa>
, ; - schlag «r di© ' BlMmiaetlana* «®r ' i©«t»eli®a.. • Operationen g®g«& ;. ;.=
\ . :*y Jbgsslssdstt"* ■■itssa So. Ml/14/626 at thè Iaperlal War lAxe«ue* ' • ' , '; |
' 71b-v^ « #':Ä. sàif »• .30» - ■ ■ '.' -.-'.i
72. «/MVAht.h .Ir* 44 406/41 g.Xdos Chefsache v. 31.3.1941* ®i#»d :/i
' ■ '■ ,'ìgr Warlinont, it« So. Mtyl4/°55 at tha Imperial War Ifuseun} also
! ' «gi/kaldar.. li. 337. e»t*y for 3®.5.1f41.
W » .  44 433/41 ¿«noe'-eiMfiaehe v. 2.4.1941* "2©itt#*
• fei für Wmisßßm tei Anlaufs der Operati©»»» *25» und «Marit**»" , y 









U m 9 "or both.76
In & eerles ©£ eonferenees in Eid-January, thè Greeks presente! their 
' stnrtegioal probiem to thè British. Both tugoslaviaand furkey, Matassa 
■ thou^ it» vere likely 'to stay neutra! in face of thè Gernan-Bulgarian 
’threat to Greeca. Since thè irtele aray had 14 of ita divieions in Alba- 
' aia only 4 incompleta divisions could he 'spara! toreinforco thè frontier ' 
guarda in fhrace. - At thè Germaa foro# being ooncentrated in Rumante vas / 
at that tiae estimate! at 12 divisions Papagos thought that 9 British di» ' 
' -risimi ' vould be needed to reinforoe thè Greek; aray in ' ffarace* ' Assuioing , 
Iugoslavia stayed neutral, the combined Anglo-Greek forcss could W m  be 
deployed oppositethe Bulgarian border from thè Tardar (Axios) in thè 
' veat to • thè Haritsa (Evros) in thè east, ■ thas covering 'Salonika' but not 
eaatern fhrace. If csrried out in tino thè deployaent of such strong 
foree® «L#t influence Iugoslavia and furkejr in Greeoe*s favour,7 ' *;
■ General Wavtlì» however» replied that he did not have sufficient ita» 
eoa available. All he eould' ©pare froa North Africa vere to or three di­
visione and a few toste tank©, fhis, Ketaxas countered, vas insufficienti 
it vould contribute hot vexy little''to Greelt etrength teli# serWag «tu»' 
©any ' m  m  escuso to attack. ' He ' therefore: rejected thè Insaldati dispatch 
’ ' ©f'teese'fèroèi. r' ; ? ■
làia ieft Bapagos vith no choice but' to tty and deploy thè Uve ©r ■ - 1 
six divisions he nov thought he could spare f*oa Albania in thè beat pos- 
sible positions. Vith hi* veak foroes»1 thè Greek chief of staff v m m m A* 
'"'it vas hèpeleis to tiy and hold eastem Macedonia and'western fhraeè*.' ■.
' particularly because thè Ketaxasline Vas atltsweakest in thè west near 
i I-Ìount Miei "tei could be' outflanked by thè Gemini who ite thus cut off 
’ tteterfteastern pàri"®f @ite«è." Wmm thè military pèint ©f vite it vas , 
therefore bitter to abandon eastern Macedonia and western Arte« altoge- 
ther and deploy te thè much shorter end more easily defensibla Kaimaktsa- 
■ l8^ fèrrt.©a4ìipiitts (Aliakhnon line," in British temiaologf) strttohiag .'
76. 'fhep^i«ntvtetetet km daliberately bete kept m . m m t m  as p***ibl© ' and ita baeed on Papagos» 1* ’30« ff. • •• • ; ■->./
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tho Erltiah or Ma mra government conccmln-j Yb^ tslertata atti tuda, ^ V.list 
la clear, in any m m «" ie that both the Greeks and the British grossly 
overestimated the speed of tta S w  advence acro33 Bulgaria. : Popagos , . 
and Mil thought tta attack sight start within 15»t0 days of the Danube. - 
crossing, whereas tho tersane at this tim ware thinking sore in terms , , 
of '36"dajf»,^® Papsgoa etili had twenty dsysia which he could have
withdrawnhia troppa, bat h®' did "not Jaw this, - ani perhaps did sot, mark' ■ 
to know. This error, whether deliberate or not, 'cm'2 March made his r®-' \ v 
fase'the British request to withdraw Ms forces from arac®, be©«* ®' he ■ .' 
feared lest they sight bo cousit in the process by the advancing coloma ,
\
of the Vehatabti lastest* ■ he decided on a mm plan*. he would lam ouch 
forces es were already Banning the Hateas line in their positions, while 
deploying the rest of this divisions and such British forces as would V v ■ 
arrive on the KMaaMsMin-Versdon^ lly^ us line* By thus splitting up 
Ms 'forces Pipages hoped to be able to nove them forward or backward upon
■ start »tic# in accordance with Yugoslavia's attitude*^ . : '
■ ■' îhe difficulties did not end here, On 8-9 Msrch' ita Greek® and ita ; d 
British conferred in Athens with colonel Peresitch of the Yugoslav gens- ' 
»1. staff* .fo definite conclusions tare arrived at, tat tta very foot 
■'that the talks' could tita .piaos ienonstrated. ta® suprans folly, of atan- . 
donlng Salonika prematurely, , While Pepagos was thus encouraged to tali >. 
m  in Macedonia, Churchill took a different view of the natter) "ta «fid#-'; : 
ntly did not believe that Yugoslavia could ta brou^ t in,' therefore
demanded why on earth tta Greeks were holding so many forces in Albania,* ' -
■ ■ 80 ' 1where he could see no hope of victory without met intervention* . •: Gaw0bt :
- ... , .
78* Papagos, 0£. cit** p* 325) Churchill, oj>* cit,* iii, p* 8f| Ä«%, 
on* cit** p* 201* The Anglo-Greek Mscalculation was evia worse 
' that these figures suggest, because they assumed that the Carmans 
would be able to reach not only tta Bulgsro-Greek frontier tat «tea 
« tta taimaktsalazi-Permion-Olyapus line within 15*20 days* The ori-
• ginatar of tta error mom to have ta« the British military attache / ;
. ■ . in tafia, «tartin« to whoa tta G o » » "  could «oes lalpa4a wia tat '• 
i®ys or iei»w* tarie (n sinister in tafia) to Hull, 7*2.1941, FEES- 
. 1941» ii# 64>44*
7f* Mäß* pp*'2tû*13* ’
«3* Churchill, da. Mt** iii* 96. ‘
\In tills cross fire Papagos stuck to Ms dispotitions until, on 25 March, ' 
the signing of ■ the frifartite Past If Yugoslavia seemed to justify the 
Britiah 'view. Si© latter accordingly offered Papagoa transport. to nove 1 
.Ms forces back from Thrace to the KMmaktsMan-Yermioa-Glympus line. ■
■ "Just as tMs decision was being taken” the Belgrade coup again over­
turned the tables. _ Unlike li tier, who immediately made up'Ms 'mind, to >.
■ disregard any possible diplomatic assurances and took the military meat*
urea necessary to smash Yugoslavia, ' the Greeks and the British were not
at' all clear about the significane© of the coup. On one hand, the nag­
ging fear lest ; the/Yugoslavs should allow German troops to operate from’
. their territory could now finally b©' discarded. On the other handjt the 
new government of Belgrade quickly erne to. realizethe da8^r@^ .’'«dUu»»
:tion into'which it had thrust itself.and exercised great reserve'di' its . 
dealings with the a l l i e s . " ' ' ' ' ' '  ; \  .
/ There followàd a few days of uncertainity. Yhe British on 28 March 
considered that Simovic "could maintain thè unity of thè country, in any 
case in thè south". . It was hoped that thè Yugoslav arny, wMch morsi9 / 
was suppose! to be high, wouldetgge an offensive against thè Italian 
resr and liquidate thea ”in two or three weeka". Ih# Gezmans, in thè ;
meantime, vere supposed to be held up by the "difficulty of the ground 
and communications on the Balkan frontier". J, fapagsa regarded the coup 
as a vindication of Ms demand to hold on to Salonika, and was eager te 
push''forward the Greek' and British forces that had in the ms»tiai§ ©.ecu»' 
■ pied the Kaimktsalan-Yermion-Olympus line«8^  Otis, however, was not 
’'done, possibly because the Greek goveramant under Alexander Kory zi s- 
Ketax&s having, died on 19 January * feared lest the presence #f British
?troop# in Salonika would present Germany with a emana belli.’ o m i s e  fee«* - 
cause ' the Sinovie gcvernmiiit continued ' to vacillate. thus the allied 81
81. Pap«®©«, on. oil., p. J26. ■;
®2* p. 229.- :
85* :< Butler, on.: tit., ii, 458-59*
.  ■:•/■■'-■ / .
, 85.., *t«t, a. ' j|£«t: pp.: f 11-14. ' ' '
5
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; •- Operating under the overall.coordination .of.genera1 Paulus,. Äe:(Mhn
88mens were qpick to exploit the situation. ■. ,■ Bis early .»ruing of .6 April 
witnessed a spectacular bombardment of Belgrade* ; Besides the losseslt . 
caused among the civilian population of the capital it dmtroyed; tlie.•e«ìi•
. trai organisation of the Yugoslav army and thus rendered communications 
between.#» widely dispersed armies even moro difficult. At the same 
time X7III. and XXX. army corpsbegan to prod the Mataxas line opposte 
Serro» and Xanthi* However, the line was very well constructed and the 
fortifications made the best possible use of the exceedingly difficult 
terrain, so that even heavy artillery failed to make much of an impres» 
sion. ïhe Greek forces fought .with the utmost tenacity and won the ad- _ • 
miration of their opponents. Although local advances.were made every*, 
where, the lina in general held.;.,. At noon on 7 April 12. army had to re*
■ ekon with the possibility that its forces operating against the line -, 
would not be .able to.oven»» the unexpeotedly tough Greek resistance. ;
; ■ : Vhile the Greeks were holding out. in the north the campaign was- being 
decided elsewhere* Advancing vesteard into Yugoslavia, 9* armoured m i ■
. 75» .inf»try, divisions »der hi# command XXXX. army corps initially made 
good progresa in the direction of Skoplje, but the third division, «ubi»*, 
dinated to the corps, S3 flff*, ran into sash stiff resistance bythe Yu*
, goals*. third «ray..during the night of 6*7April that it ms doubtful -n 
whether the corps would,!» able to o«qpgr out all its tasks, i*s reaeh 
the. Albanian frontier, .break through Monastir and Fiorina to the south, 
and secure its own northern flank against ooumter attacks* ; She smaller . 
hook by 2* armoured division across Yhgislar territory likewise enjoyed -
■ a good start,. and the division »»bed Strumica in the morning of. 6 April 
after fighting its way throu# the Yugoslav frontier guards* At this . 
point, however, the division found Itself »able to disengage and 8
88. For the detailed German, plans, v* Anlage m  OD0/F3t/Abt.I. Hr.' 44,
■ 478/41 g.Edos Chefsache v. 6.4*1941, i|8/78ô/558€i2ô.21. .
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In only three days tea' fox«®# of 12., army had thus succeeded in' brea­
king through the first Greek lira' of defease' and' occupying their second 
largest city. Its units were.now facing^  the second 'and aosi iajerbwtN 
line of defense, while the occupation of Honaatir by SS HAE" severed the . : 
aost Important road from Greece’ to' Yugoslavia' and made it possible.''to ■ 
mop thorn up sepcfktely;; In Yugoslavia, three different forces were on»’ 
gacpd on this task. Proa the area west of Sofia* Paagergrupne Heist with 
5«-'and'll. '.armoured* .60. motorised*1 4« oouatain and 294. 'infantry,':divi-'"' 
sions - started its advance ■ ini# Serbia on 8 April* encountering stiff .
> . . . . . . . . .  '  • ‘  -  »  ■ ' ; .  i  ,  . .  ■ ■resistance. and' a great many., road demolitions. ' Fighting teeir way ’: '• •
through the Yugoslav fifth army Kleist*a divisions ©coupled Kisch on9 \ ■ 
April* terns opening tee way to Belgrade from, tee south. It was only '«£•;/, 
tsr the fall of Hlseh'that Ealder changed his orders, for he now realised, 
that he and Heist had overestimated the strength ©f the Yugoslav ^ risis- " 
tance in this" area and therefore, allowed list to detach 5* armoured divi- 
sion from' tee fmamaxmm and send it' back south to reinforce tee three ■ 
'diilsions of'XXaC."oorps.^ 1 ' . . v :
Meanwhile other forces were also 'advancing on Belgrade. ■ Ifcwfsmeo»
; 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ,■  M t ■ N 'var general Reinhardt*3 XXXXI. corps with S3 "das Belch* and SS' infante^  ■ 
foglasat‘ "Groasdeutschland" was descending on tee city. ' Originally this 
corps'had"beta supposed to "attack Only on 12 April* but Ealder overruled ^  " 
Eeinhardt*® objections and made him'start two days'earlier.^ 2 fhe ftfld' *92
Jl. M t l M  mlii to «© tele■©»# April, but «1 teat time Haider hat . .
. , refused to-'aatherise tee change. at reversal of his position on 9 
'’"'April may have had something to do with a dispute he had with Be«-» '» 
.«fcttooh (behind whoa stood Hitler) as to "whether or not to send /■
. . p «rt of tee force# of mx. corps -to tee AlbMd«'f»entl«e'to limit, ;.
up with tho Italians, Haider, id» did not Ittttsidcsr tee Italian-.-, 
front was in any. danger, resisted’teis move* and since ho was ©vs*«* :
', fulled he may have wanted .to reinforce ■ tee corps in carrying out ,
" • what he '»girded as its mala task, i.e .tee. mtOaBkiac of tee malm. .
■" .•■■"Aa#e-4rerfe.'^ iltieas. KYB/foteAer, 'll*" S5&$ IS7-P# m ^ eim  .for «* .,:
, 9» 1®*4*1941 *. - ■ ' / ' jr
92, ' This was wether »salt of the List-Heist dispute* ■ fbllowiAf new information reaching OXH on 4 sad 5 April* suggesting that tee thf»* 
v • Slav fere« In sente»*» Serbia were «tnapr' teaa suspected* lAMr ■ ,
began to .few lest he had «nroi- la overuling M»t. ■ Afriid lost he - 
' wobU  have to wdiiforee KS* oeapo with Heist*a and
itaM of Kleist oonwiJiosd' MS that it was also possible to
bring forward to starting' date of to attack from the north and north- ' 
;west by 2.' army*"'to m  10*11 April such divisions as had arrived got off 
to a '’flying start” without waiting for the concentration to be completed* 
14 *; armoured division advanced almost without encountering opposition - 
: through Croatia, where the enemy troops* in' so faa as they were not en­
gaged 'in''«five 'figjhtbag bstw« Serb«. to Croat«* : threw '«»ir'wssp«®' '
sway tod deserted ea toto* .’Zagreb was' reached' two days toad of sto*' ■ 
dale on to evAning of 10 April, while on 11''April' the 'division' lintai''-’
• ■ . up with the Italian 2. army 'tovaaeiag f r «  itoae*. §*.M»®«y®d t o  IS.
' • 'nateriiei' ’divisioi»' stiarled descending to Brava' and' -fee' paimbe 'in' the '" ■
, direction of '3«lg*wts on: 11 April, reaching Borl ‘ Sed on to same day*
' 'Bto*;!to %p»sl»/«^ tai'ms''fere«teKie4,fi*: m  less than three di- 
':: 'frota ä s ' south- by''Heist*'from to : north' by Reinhardt, and'
' from' to 'nortoest %  Veichs.'After 11*' «aaaoured had' oooupied to ’Ava- 
■ "Ha'heists' doatotiii* 'to'city in'the gMBtag'gf' 12 April the honour of 
' being ■ first to enter-it'fell''to'eh 'toaaqp«Uiaf captain Klingenberg from 
. SS1 “das Rüoh“' to* ‘Sdtk' a" few mm*' *’ '«©«sei' to itoabe' during to ’ .
"' 'Mto to toistei'to Stotto‘'toe«rr on to Ocmt legation in to mor* - 
■■ nlng of''IS'April* :
■ ':^®e.'«pta'w«y# to'adwtot «a'Älgsaie tot'neither 2*'nor 12* army' 
;evergat'to1 tonet to'«Msntratd'all toir"Horses*^  On 1J April üal- - 
> - ‘'dir ditosto'’ to' haltog’ of'* si* M d t o i  with Braachitsch,^  end defi- . 
aits' orders weat out on'to. next dsy»^ ,'fea» of to divisions earmarked 93*
tos' OÄoel -to. attack on Belgrade* he made Reinhardt start earlier 
than to latter would have liked. KTB/Kalder. ii, 345* 349» entries
; for 4. 5.4.1941. ! .. "
93. OKE had town 30 April as to last day for Yugoslavia, but in fact 
it was as good us over by 14 April* Bor, oju cit.» p. 185« V. also
Ätl«»41Ä0fi;^ afto«ti», 7*4*1941» BGffg. B* xii, Ro. 290.
94* 79*» 4 *^* 198* sad 125. infantry* 60. mororized divisions* ibid, ii,
'" |6'4* ent^ r for 13«4*1941*'. '■ ■ -
’ ■ 95*’ 1* »«tain*"7 *^» 79**' 185*' to; 1|8. infantry*1101* "light“ moto-
' - toeii ■ ibid*. ii* 365* entry for 14*4*1941* 80* notorized division 
was net ipp®»ent2y halted because it reappes®» in ibid. 368* entry
lavisj thia refera to lOO, ("li^ itw) Hiotoriied and l. moTmtain division, . 
toth of which wôre transportQd directif from Germany to their edisduled 
deployment areas on thô eastern fronti er,^ and especially to 19* ‘mamw- . ■ 
red divisiorxf vhicîi men nevQr eren got the fainiest inkling that they had
 ^ Af terthef all of Belgrado 2«'aznqr contiaued operations with only 
three of tha divisions originally allocated to it* ' 16. notorized end 
. 0. araoured marched sonili along thè Brina» vhile 14« axmoured. vas sent / - 
to ©ooujy: Sapevo* In addition ELelst’s Immmxmam vas transfer*»! 
from List toWeich3,vhoordered it to tum -to the Southwest along th© 
valley of th© Morava« ; On 14 Aprii' iis tanks occupisi Erusevac. : By that ' 
tins the Yugoslav had decided to gire up, and sent over officers to ne- ' 
gotiate a surrender. ^ Though the actual treaty of capitulation vas si#* 
ned only three,&ays later - the main delaying factor heing that» after 
thè flight of King Peter and his governsent» there vas nohody left in . 
Yugoslavia with authority to sign. • the eampai§tt vas as good as orar«58 . 
v, . After the occupation of Thrace and Haosdonia List» too, vas loft with ; - 
only a fraction of his forces to continue operations agallisi Greece. In , 
thè 'essi XVIII* corps with 2* aMôured» 5* and 6« mountain divisions vas 
aduancing along the toast from Salonika and preparing an assault against 
the right flank of thè Kaimakt saian-Yerndon-Olympus line« ’ Purther to , . 
'thè east XXXX« corps, its three divisions aow reinforced hy 5« ermoured, 
vas menaeing the same line on its 'loft"flank* List figured that, due *967
‘ ‘ for 15«4«1941, as contlnuing its aimées together with 11. ■ a*s»urei« • ■
96. 0O^ /Genst.d«ïl/0p.Abt, (III) Kr. 502/41 g.Kdos Chefsache v« 12*4.1941,
;■ ' : ü^ EMi' by Paulus, GISt/430/6402039-441 TO/gaMer» ' il, 550» entry ' t e  
■ §.4*1941« \ j
97, A. Xrull, ' Bas g^^veria^e "ieidiieiib 71« (Hannover, BstgMmtteawwfc»
■ sehift 75«,»,!.)pji, j ^ 2« 75* Ï^Stt 'vas pari of 19» '®wmrit 
division« *
.98« V* Bepteer» i||» 290-92• Ironically, it vas Ctnear lanlwfit
- ' vho bal to sigr the surrender. ■ ■
t® '4te mtural strength of the ^ Aagie-Sreek.positions and
 ^pa*«Oaisriy; i m m m  ‘the «•twsti^’ialliw'^ lMit' blown up «11 the bridges 
;me. f«Cas>';»'frontal nttaA on 'the' It»» would be very difficult,
‘ He’t^i»fere iteided to'exploit the successes gained insouthera Serbia, 
'«feile'5»:;«^^:Mirmoed'; to''-fee "west'.and linked'tip "with the Italian 
an^ r, in/Albania 'north of .-the OsMteUfce on'lO April,^  the rest of the 
corps, headed by "AH", started moving south;In the direction of Fio­
rina, -tbreateiiag to outflank the entire Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olynrpus 
'position and to .cut off tthe*¡Break'aaajr in western Kaoodoaia and Epirus* 
.SMs^  stove had ^been foreseen by Papagos and the British oonhander, Wil­
son, on 8 April and the latter decided to abandon Bdessa and to move 
/.what :&lti»hiforces ^ho could muster to the Veve Pass in order to protect 
the espoaed lift flank* Papsgos'on his side should have taken his own 
rt$it flank back fro® western Macedonia to a line sunning from the west
; . . > -j >, c.. ¿.-r-si i 'i , . •_ , ; •, ; k ,• . . • ^
, coast wtarSaaia Querists, across/the Pindus to the Aliakhxaon, but he was
• V i 't- a 1 » I- . \  ' 4 •. . ■ , 'i ; < ' • . ■ '  i  . .  1 ; - - < >
. relueiittt./1to.;take.th!»'decision'.boocaso-he "feared - with justice, as it 
' teased t out ^ - _ that _ a retreat '.in ’ front of ’■ ties'; Italiaiis would lead to the 
' disint««r»tioa of ©^¿'»r*ae.:;':'(M It^Aprtl'.he did in fact issue these 
Outers# but ■■by;, the» it was too late* ■ Arriving 'in front of the Veve Pass 
' on 11 April,. 88, **AHW ■ and- 9* aaaewed.^fowad'' the' going unexpectedly tough* 
It *>• «s^lata'ai thelfth that# /after h®aS fitting, they succeeded 
in br®ail^:«ireu^ 19* - iaf«itry 'bripsie and 1. armoured bri-
;ptdo-gf0up» ;;-By.'thaii,' however, both fenian diviaiens had run out of pet­
rol and ammunition and -were unable to■ follow up their 'success. ,■
’ ^Meanwhile X7III. corps - now consisting of only two divisions 
. was’ advancing against the. right ’flank. of the' Kaimaktsalan-Termion-Olym-
99* Ehis was done oa the Order of Brauchitsch, who littst have been inspi- 
■ , red by Hitler directly. ; Kalter on hia aide, saw in it the influence 
of ■politieai; rt«ai^ on «il4t«y'.^ «wtioast-^ snd offösed the mov©
\i \Ä:Äe'^«i8;;Äat;itht mmmwmm  r^ resntet m  unnecessary diver- 
aion'froo the main taak' of XXXX. corps* ' In Äis he was right, for •. 
v— the''©eff« did in f«rt waste two days in front of Teve* KfB/Halder*
' iif 559,. entries for 9, 10, 11*4.1941. .:










































' besides himself with reho and insisted that •fee Greeks should surrender : \ 
- to him, too. ' Bis demand vas referred to Hitler vie Guzzoni and Ilarras. 
i According to Haider, Hitler hadoriginallygiven his tacit consent''te'./ V
M s t 1® more in the hope’of presenting his ally with.» fait accompli, .but , / ~ 
the trick failed «ad he could not stake German-Italian friendship on a< ’’
; ^ question of preserving Greek honour. He therefore disowned the-.agree»
: »«at signed by the commander of 12, army end dispatched general Jodi to '
■ Salonika to sign yet a third'’armistice to which the Italians, too, would''' 
be a party.^- Tsolakoglu protested against this indignity hut he had’ -
no ebolee. Earlyon the 23rd the third agreement .was signed, to ©ome,. . " \
• into force at 2300 hours of the same day. ■- ■ -V. :
4 * , ' ¥hile the Greeks surrender the British did not fare much better• - ’ . <;!
■ ' They had started their withdrawal from the Olympus across toe plain of .
: Thessaly on 16 April,■ but were caught on the way by a sudden improvement;' V.;
. in the weather which brought in its wake toe inevitable attacks by the ’
■ - Luftwaffe. - The’ retreating British forces we*e hotly pursued by the Ger- - 
, mans, who were now divided into three groups. la toe east, XVIII. corps
■ was preparing for a frontal attack on. &«*s®^lae, with 2. armoured ope- ^
rating along toe coast and 6. mountain more inland. 5. armoured passed . '
■ through .toe gap opened by 9,'armoured and Si WA1" at Teve and, racing 
.down toe center of Greece, followed hard on toe heels of toe retreating 
Australians’.«id Cached Lamia in front of, toe Theaaopyiae. os 21 April, '
, In the east, MAIi" was advancing almost unopposed to Arts.and. beyond.. .
■ j The battle of the Thermopylae was fought by 2. armoured and.6, moun- . ;'■■'
■ tain divisions. While the former attacked frontally along toe coast, a
■ regiment of the latter under a colonel Jaasi tried to repeat the class!«»'-' ^ 
eal manoeuvre "of outflanking the pees. However, Jassifs mountaineers
. 'Were forestalled.by toe tanks of 2, armoured;division,-supported bjr;toe.-, . , ■
. - Luftwaffe, which emceeeded■,in brewing’throu# the British position* 'and, ./V
■ occupying Tolos oh 22 April "«'just in time'to open toe. way to 5» armoured»' ■ 103
103. '’m/todor.- 11, 3^ 4-65, entries for 21, 22.4.1941f siso Greiner, ■’ f Wehrmachtftthrung. u. 234* In private Hitler assured both Dietrich '■ 
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• 112 7 ' , ' /i' divisions. .' 111 these arrangements, of course, were made with the spe- 
elfie intention of sparing Germany the burden of garrisoning yet more 
countries so as not to diminish the number of divisions that would be 
’• free for the east* However, the hurried character of the entire Germah:;'- 
Balkan campaign did not make it possible thorou^ ily to policy the oecu- 
< pied territories, a fact which was one of the main causes for the sue« 
'«ess of the subsefueat guerrillamovement, •
from the strategic point of view, the most remarkable aspect of the 
German campaign in both Yugoslavia and Greece is their gross overestima* 
tion of . the enemy* To operate against the six weak divisions which Pm* 
pages could, with the greatest difficulty, spare from Albania the Ger­
mans had brought up no less than 13 first class divisions to Buaania and 
Bulgaria, with the result that many of'them- (46*, 76*# 193*, 294. infan» ' 
try, 16, armoured) never saw action at’all even after the campaign was ’ 
extended to include Yugoslavia, too* As to the latter country, only 
' four divisions and one regiment (8, and 14* armoured, 16* motorized, and 
■ . S3 “das Reich“ and SS infantry regiment ‘’Grosadeutsehland") out of the 
; twelve divisions brought up'for it saw action, and even they sufficed to 
(i , , bring the operation to an end in less than half the time allocated to it. 
i; Out of the 29 divisions involved in the Balkans in one way or another, '■
, only 10 - or scarcely more than half those originally assigned to 12«
. anay-saw action for more than, six days* In view of the bad.- transport 
i, . situation in southeastern Europe, and'particularly'of the nedd to start '
.'; MBarbarossan at an early date," this 'gross overestimate of the enemy’s * . - 
forces and fighting abilities was a serious blunder. '
1('._ . There was, however, one more operation which Hitler wanted to ©any \ 
../out before turning his undivided attention to the east. ' Crete, the po- 
k tentially most valuable part of Greece,' had .not been included in .the m - , 
....;, sentially defensive plan for "Marita"• Throughout the winter the island • 
' . was scarcely, mentioned in the German documents. Somewhere near the ' • 1. 
middle of April, however, Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded that the 
occupation of the island was, after all, worth his while. 10
110. Ibid, ibidt also CM/Chinst.d.S/Op.Abt.(lS) Hr. 42241/41 g.Kdos v.
' • 9^19^01^/427/8005186-87. ;
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" Perhaps' the nest interesting question shout the German Sprung nach 15ft»
■ is not how it was carried out, hut why. In September and October 1940» '
' • it will be remembered, the German nary had t pointed "to Crete as the most
■' valuable "garget to be ’ entered in an eventual operation against Greece} .
' it was to Greece what frondhaim and Narvik were to Norway, i.e the most 
' ; important naval and aerial base. ’ the island'was the ideal starting / 
point from which to dominate the eastern Mediterranean from the alrf .
' also, situated as it was on the flank of the Italian advance and subse» ■^ 
■' quent retreat’in North Africa, it could play an important role in sup» .
" port of the offense or defense there* ’ Crete, in short, was an important " 
base within the framework of the war against the British in the eastern 
; Mediterranean and its capture, as Hitler did not fail 1» grasp, within . 
such a framework made perfect strategic sense*
In the winter and spring of 1941, however, most of these aftvmtsgi* 
waned away* For one thing, nothing was now further removed from Hit­
ler* s intentions than a large scale offensive in the eastern Mediterra» '
nena* . fhe war in North Africa had’ largely lost such strategic objective : ; 
as it had previously had{' late in February the British advance' was .hpi#’
"'' ■/ ted, April' saw a stormlike advance aero»# Cyrenaica by itaipwtl, sod My 
• - a' statl«a#te. in front of febxuk* OSH ’ was mane too hap^ - about Baiajkel*s ”
1' advance * in’ their lyes, ’ it was but a diveriion from their much m m  dan- 
■ ■'. "gerous: trap', in Greece • but in ary case the danger of the «hole of lorth . /
" Africa' being'last to the Axis had’ been removed, and if any new step#^ were../ 
still needed to consolidate the" situation there it would be much reisOii» \ 
able to attack MOlta as a base from which large chunks of Besml*a.otqh> 
plies were continually being wont'to'.the bottom*' ’She trouble with Crete, ^
’ ‘ then,: was not that it had lest ite strategic value ’for warfare in the ‘.
'•! '■ eastern ’ rather, that M i l «  had lost interest in the Modi*»
t e w a i » « * ' ■’■ ” v ,
■ • ‘ - Why, "theH, did he decide on the oopturo of the island? there are two
Ite is that Creta would serve as
rrler between Alexandria and tha Aegean, preventins the British from en* • 
 ^tering the latter and:thus securing the important maid.time.oil route from 
. Constanta via the Dardanelles to Italy. ' fids was the reason Hitler him- - 
self gave in his .speech totoe Eiichsieg on,4 .Ipy»“ .^ She ©toer'©a#lsis»« 
tion lies 'in. the' nMttou of the Eüfümffe, or, raster in .ihosn’of/it#;, 
commander in .chief,' Eeichsmarschal Gdring, and those of .tie commander of ,
'its only parachutist division,.general Hurt Student* She latter vas an« 
xious that his elite force should be committted in more important miss- 
• ions than had hitherto been.the' case, and during March he prepared a jdtca 
. for .’ an’ airborne attack on ' Crete."’ ' Though favourable impressed V : toe ; m*. 
onomy of the scheme, Keitel and Jodi thought that the p«afepoopers;Ä*Äd,. 
ito'better‘to’spend .their Mood in'occupying Malta and on 15 April" 1 
called for Student in an attempt to make him modify Mg views« S1 
however, replied .that Crete with" its ssusagsrliks fora aftd sisgl<rftiiJr: 
road ".was .a'suitable target for his »#%''Whereas the better communication 
"inside Malta would make it possible'for the enemy rapidly to 'confront 
them With '©werwftelmiiig foroes* ' In order to’'justify bis plea fir'IÉ at 
Egtlnst Crete rather than Malta he proposed that 'the captare of tho 
mer shouldbe only the first state ih' a: series ©J? “ieap frog*1'Vat 
thè" eastern Mediterranean* : '"At this §tsj§n the "plea was seized upon 
.Siring, ’ who Saw lft ' it ah opportunity •. to ''©rings ' his husdUiattsh; ift; the 
battle of Britain end to. substantiate his claim that "his’* sir forte «togli 
iri.n campaigns all by itself without help from the army. - It was Siring .
"presented toe plan to toe Äh»«?' on 21 April without, . however, belilg 
Vety enthusiastically received, for Eitler had no use for lei
from Crete to Cyprus and beyond.115 GÖring nevertheless. persisted gal.
,111* 1 After'thè ver, lt vas suggested by various British authors toni thè 
.. ...Cermaa osptuxe ©f. Cinte was .diotated hy Hitler** tosire to.. §14 tot- 
/ ' Araba and tot Prench. agallisi 'tot British in &at:aai Syria. The
- available èsldepoe does notsupport this interpretation. The entire 
.....r.,., business was ratoer marginai in Hitl®r*s mind, end saeh limitai 
■ . ' German aid ai' vas flown to thè Màdie East west thrcu^  Ehodos*
112#..' Ite«», m* cit.* iv* 1699 j al so Playfair, ^ * ojji*, 'li, -128*
113* '. fhe '.pressai ' aeooani is based ©a ■ B.H* ' Màile-B*rtf "fto'Otoer tede 
of thè Hill (New York, Cassel, 1948) p* 238 ff» •
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Ms persistence finally "bore fruit* for on -25-, April Hitler issued Ms „■ 
"directive So« ■ 28" for the. operation wMch, appropriately* wi named
■. "Merkur"« : . , \ . s';
As a base for. air warfare against Great Britain in the eastern •'■ Mediterranean we must prepare to.occupy the island of Crete...
. - For the purpose of planning* it will be assumed that the whole ■ ■ ■
Greek ahtnland including the Peloponnese is in the hands of >
■ v the Axis powers. :■■■;, , ■ ■ v .
She lack of a clear strategic objective semes out from the fact that* ' 
vMle tMs directive endows the operation with an offensive purpose (and 
one which* not surprisingly, was never aqfed upon) Hitler himself, in V 
' Ms speech tothe Reichstag, gave its reasons as defensive« . Far from 
'being part of any coherent strategy, therefore, "Merkur" was little 
more than a sop to G8ring, whose air force was destined to play, a sub- 
ordinate role in'the coming Russian campaign« Hitler was evidently af­
raid lest the ambitions of Ms air fores commander should run away with ' 
Mm, for he took care to order that the "transport movements fimr "Her*' 
kaxfi must not entail any delay in the mountingof undertaking *Barba- 
rossa*| sad that "after the occupation of the island all or part of 1de­
forces must be ready for new tasks" 5o makQ doubly sure, he ¡tattarii» 
cted the say to Im p  in Greece only such forces ae ware indispensable 
for the supply of "lerkur"Shis operation was hamstrung before It."., 
'was -'born#'
■ Under the energetic leadersMp of general Student the ’ planning 
verthlea3 went ahead« ■ In' addition to Ms own 7« parachute division he ' 
got 5« mountain division* which was one of the wait#' ’ memmeksA \to stay 
in Greecefor occupation'duties,'..and also managed to lay Ms hands on a 
regiment of 5* armoured division, a'unit OKH was in no particular busy 
to withdraw' because it was not scheduled to take part in the initial: 
phases of "Barbaressa"«' These forces were to .be 'tnaaiifered to ;ChN>ta. by 
the transport planes of XI« air corps "and by a fleet of barges, escorted 14
114. ■ "Directive Ho. 28", printed' M  fi^ vor^ oper^  gg* pit»« pp. 68-9. . 
115« "Directive lo,.29", ibid, pp. 6J-71.. t ■.
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"by sosie Italien torpedo boats» while. the filters end dlTer feombers of ■ 
TOI. air «erpa, Mt flying f*oa «Ani»#* feaaes Sm Soaa**»tof - .
; end Belisi#,. ver® te aot in eiost ' support.' Sb® operation »  a whole was . 
pit 'ander the command ef general Lohr of 4* air fleet, a fast which gave '.
■ ", rise to jealously in the cngr*. . / fhe actual descent was to fee 'made at,-,; 
three places* in the west'near Kaleme, in the ©eater near Retino, -and Sa* 
.:.: >. the/east'near IfeiMien*,. At each of theta areas there was.« eir^ stfli 
.^.-..tO/.oaftar®^. upon which it would then fee/possiti© to land reinforcement#
üao® Lote «as convinced that Háleme 'vat/th®’'»fit.
■ :. isfortant efejeitiwe, h® eatitested its'capture to the 1, assault regLaadtt, ■
, an elite unit within the elite unit that vat 7« paratrooper division.
/..After 4.tritar Of three days imposed fey the'nttd 'to Taring up the,"»**. 
.oaftMttgr fael#.the operation started on 20 Hey»' In our context, the ■
of .importance oatyid so far as they feore pjdMtwi. 
to Hitler*© overall strategy,.of which they had feut precious little*; the
attafti^ .paswkai^ e*# eaoouateret. uaaapeotedly stiff reiittaae#.,^ feèMNM 
. the. defenders, ** a motley s*rsy. totalling aoai 40,000 men, half of wheat 
. / had .fetid 'eviouated t m m  Greece and retained neither their ogoljMmt. n e t ; 
tfetir órg®»i»atio» - had festa forewarned about every detail of the. CMaa* , 
»«i plan,. including a tactical manual of the paratroopers that had'fallen 
/J’. ini©'’their hands and was put to gioi us©.*18 / IJnder the indiff«#®at .mg#*
' 'wmA' of general freyfeerg,' the àmimllmaê lew Zealanders and Greeks. ■ ■
 ^/ fought t«iiis©i©ttslft assists fey 'wM ^ ilig h t. Freiaschftrler1» fsm tfar pò- ;, 
filiation*^ . As «toa ’as ( the landings started, the entire : Alexandria. s®*»- 
/ '’droh■ of the 'British navy left 'port and ’ feegaa ’oraleing round. the. islsiit, ■ : 
foiling to German attest®"to get throng fey sea during the nijsjbt of 2©- /
.'21 with7 some loss'of lift* ' . : , . ,
'!■ ■ 116*'"IMÁtaldsa.■ 11« 3Sf, «»try for 1.5.1941* tad et.1# note.' / .
■: tt7*'Ty JSÉ&«» ill 150? also HLtn, ' &• Ml*» '.»*. ^ T-Ä.
pi. 240..., , ,  . V ,
- .119.'; Visshaupt, ,op. oit., p. 48. An investigation ©©«ducted fey the Ger- s 
, „ . auntsft«* W» mmmlm. 'revealed' that the IxslasUkAm hat- not fessa '. 
■’ ’ .'/ so unmenschlich after all. 1 .,■■■■
\
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- : '  ■ :• . . . . . .  \  . .  ■ ■   ^ • . *  . ‘ n : . v . r r iThe crisis of the battle came at noon on 21 Hay. Until that time none 
of the three air strips had been captured, and the paratroopers, greatly 
outnumbered and their supplies running out, were in. a desperate position.
An attempt to land reinforcements on the beach near Retimo failed because 
■ fee '^^dne''pyas; of the Hew Zealnders riddled the planes with bullets be- x 
y tt^ -m e rfb o ty : could 'get out* The paratroopers landed near Eetimo add He^
, ■ raklion in particular were. .almost annihilated, - During the afternoon of 
ii*e same diy, the man of assault regiment finally succeeded
, in ..Qooapylng'tlt« air strip at !-!aleme, at least to the extent of driving 
' the British artillery away Sato the surrounding hills. Despite the in­
tensive fire it was now pissible to. land a regiment of 5« mountain divi- 
sion# complet# .with, some light artillery, on the air strip. Although 1.
' aeecalt r«#ae®t was by now too exhausted to iii» a farther part-in the • 
battls.end the transport planes:m m 'prevented £ran departing end des- 
;|wyfd.-ty..»till«y .fire,'.the estsis of the battle was over,
22 May was the gmmt day of the huftwaffe. Pitting itself ..egadnat 
, the British fleet* it proved' -.that* .granted' favourable weaiSier*' ships we»» 
no match for planes* ,81* eguisers and four.destroyers "were snide*, ass^:: .
, ether .449* ,**egid* „The. «tire' fleet -fled.bask to Measnirt** tall he*.
, / ttmsa lege*. .H essiitiile §* m ountain'division started i t s  oouhtts3^ bbt^ iobi*
., woalsimg its/, wiy from Helens.to-the.eastf ih©t#i the i n r t M l l a M t . ■" 
■ 1 Zt*l«gil«rs, *usi .Cbreofc» feed' at to this point proved m m  :tttad a match- fir 
', the §e*»wh.pt»taw«e. who .wmm handicapped by the loss of 'part <&' ;'
. theirtqpigpiftV dispersion and- untedllaaritgr with the tMcmdae ttiy 
could not successfully resist general'lingo!*s will organised moonfttito*; .
.■ eers whose chaia of. command was intact. Although hard fighting ©soured 
'. , in many places the■Qmmm drlvo-td.t&».*aSt.irae irresistible* fhestl» /
. & ■ * ! • *  fell on 2TUgr'amA with It'Seda lay*
■ .. Iisrto a r* :'. in  29 H a g s! ** fo rte s* ' m r s m l m  '*•»*»** 'opposition thnt, , '
( Ws**««!* Unhid m  With the' «ttfMac IMtoifn'
lotlBO and H u rid ia o * , The latter group, having been reinfob^'tern
1laA.tfarmady •««©••dtd-la -feeing the ®4r-'«tiiip» ■ %  ttoict t is * '.« »  ...
! . B r it t * ,  •vspw ttga m m  w U n r i s v  wsy* B tta r 'iw it f» * *  m l  JtoM ttiea * -, ■
;
German unit caught up with a British rearguard which was trying to hoard 
ship near Sfakta and» after a tou^ h fight, tooV: the rest prisoner*
With the occupation of Crete Hitler had shot his last hüllet in the 
eastern Mediterranean) from now on, all his attention would he focused 
on the Russian front* Although the high command of the navy early in 
June made desperate attempts to convince Hitler to use Crete as a base
for "the opening of intensive operations against the English bases and'• •; ■ ■ 120 : ■fleet in the eastern Mediterranean”, the Führer did not regard the 
island as a highway to the Middle East hut as a cul de sac which only - 
'function, if any, was to 'foam’ an "obetaole between Alexandria and the ^ * 
■Axis maritime traffic ia‘the~ Aegean*' It was, moreover, a cul de sac ' 
which was increasingly co®t2|r to hold, because a British-instigated . ,; 1 
guerrilla movement mm soon’ in full swing' and Hitler*s fear of a pos- • • 
pible invasion attempt 3aaÄ0'hiÄ''^ :^;fi©airf.d«ahle resources on its "v 
fortification during the year# 194f»If4 5 .
; .. Finally,' Crete had yti;'aaoÄ«'iaf#rt«t'res^ t# German losses in 
Crete were #xts»el^ es^ '':*»;a:®öt%’'»ad#'iiÄiately after the events ' 
admits 1032 dead sod 2097 missing, which meant more fatal casualties 
than the Wehrmacht had suffer‘during th#'entire Balkan campaign. • 
and the losses in material, fwtieal«ily: adrtraft, were also heavy.' ,
Möst important, however, Was the faoi'Äat 'the back of the only German 
paratrooper division was broken for good. "The day of parachute 
troops", Hitler told Student Acrtly''iyPt#' the end.of tiro campaign, , 
«is'over^ *121,--..
We now come to the last part of the present study, i*e an analysis of the 
troop movements back from the Balkans to the Baselm' front and the reis»; 
tsionship between the German campaigns in' the Balkans '«aid operation "Bar-
memo, 1.6.1941, wMe' «IntatUsM'Uee'ia Ostlichhn '
;S ■ 'SL&tftaiia* jMtffe. l^ tepfelä»ug nnd.'.lretÄeset»iag und die weitere 
!■ \ KMitttoKUiflf | >*' 3» "I* 'Sß%- 'ÄV .
121. Iddile-Äert,'git■,*&&•* P* 242* : j ■' : ;
In. thè itele histoxy ©f''World ¥ar II It is hard to' find snother 
(jueotion toltiti has «roustd so mich discus3Ìon and toioh haa rsceired so
■ ; ' Lons hefore to® Balksn cac^ aign wasover, Isfora it started even,
, tede cool look at this phoblem. It vas a diffieult one, to te euro,
ito sizo vas novher® lite tote is usually believed. Vhile a grand total 
of 152 divisiona had beta forese« far ite tessi« cccnpaign, • only 29 • 
or lesa, to« one fifth of tot total - had ih 0«  vay or: anotoer teen in«*
, -. volved in ,tte Belkans* and this iste includes aot ®n3y thè austro«®. '
' : .«ito ttet had never sten action tei' even tosse which, lite' 19« ' araoured,
■ '■ never even knev they had teen dtsiisn«ieà for to® lalteas*^ 2^  \ ' ' h
A second look at thè probità reduco3 ito lise stili further. Out of 
: thè «bove aentioàed 29 divisione, torte'* 9* end 6. oountain, «  veli as 
164» infantry « vere to stay in Grttct for occ«ation duties. Out of thè 
' renainins 26 largo unita, 11 * includine 2 armoured, 1 motorized, 1 aoun* 
tain and 7 infestar divlsions * vere earmarked for thè SI reserves for - 
"MaaMM"! tolto traneportation to thè eaat vaa not suppose! to start 
. • until 'after' tot teginning of tot canq?aign. - ■ Ihus, OKU vas loft 'with
only 15 dlvisions - or some 10$ o f'tot total • plus, of eenr§t$ TU f. 





It 'is''r®gretted tosi lato of «pae« preventa a te li«  discussion of ' 
tei prohlem in tote context. Ite prosimi author, however, has .«te**-'
■ ttan m  astiti« atout tot - subject vhich is ém 'to shortly in ,
thè Review of Eurooean Studi««.
■ ^luiing.123 in to t 'first lina» 21 in «trategl® rasawa,. «A 8 te. ', 
' Norvsy, to«» titor vere to ' launch Operation ’•Silberfuchs" u»4er tot.
«osatevi of CSSff teell.«iiilillt'fcr«»d# tea te « , i i , 102.. :
T# MHNrtteate Ektegiigitettiung (itai.io*
te. 791 <**• War JtoaopO to«* asong toose of otoile ■ h ' ■
Itasta* tetto* la a «^ stentati® conparison of to« *«®t* te to« Sai " , 
kans «ito 'teoaa te 'tea «tei- tosÀMA.iate* *940 to M m
1941* : -.. ■ • '■'■■■
KTB/Halder. ii* f§7§ totry.ter Jt*4.1f41* W  13 Jtitjr corcateti** ; red thè kussiaa ctinpaign vas *®a and arderti thè hm armoured di vi­
siona to «ter te « « n w :  WA9BVtetJ<I.0i«/n0KgO Ir. 441179/ 
41 g.Kdos Chefsache y, 1 3.7.I94I, signed by Haider. ;
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' day*.before' toe start of *M«3Eita* »4 *25*# on 4 April 1541# Hoto,
sing«? toltoíttod to* toast»!»!«« prepared by hi# operatoi»* iopNtotopft
, the 'tweiapKrtati©» of toese torees -to- Balder*® scrutiny.. Like eflslf•b#^ , ■
' «»lif  overestimated the Yugoslavs and "based hf* yfto»a on ., ' \g£ . -.7 .'.to© assusiftiea that oyovotioa "25" would be over only by 30J#ril. ,: ■,•-
■ .v.'.Si««-to#', journey back.fr©» Greece; and Togos!«*!» would, on the- «waw^f, ■ ; ‘ ■ 
''■:r'rifuir©:t«'iv«# -.«Idle mi«? «n®eiiprt»'^ s«.'M^ te4.;í,or.me jiqpad^MÚL'' - 
, end tMlndoaZ. NteMtaMi of the troops. It was hofed that it wouidbe
■ /^ possible' to; f»t;.to»«to with it by the first Say» of r. la ' ■ ':
' Aaaimái with ‘till# h^* now' M«Ntta>bl«Mfc for ’BarbaTOSSa* W9*®’
...tetoa’iip«' in./eohaloii# toar toon being d e l ^ ^ : wa«, aotually. iftiift# . ■. '
'. tmtttsA by .©nrweek'iaii made to start rolling on 8 Jpril# a move wí¡¿eb . ' ■/:■. 
;• wii probably toflfttfNt to prevent any tos» of tía® that id&t tof»'*»»«Ít»d'- : 
tmm tos m»i*«#loitoti«. of to® 'rtolroads*.--Os'.to»' other hand* this «• .
■;.- •,' helon.'wa». *sto»toiied .out* toon -25 April 1»- 20 Bay# toe wad«» «spirtlir: . ■ \
■v:/. pito'under which it had originally .been' sifpo*rti to toll being Mplnint/
■•' _ by, a » very voUsMft'» pea©« too •ohetule nv«rafloc.3W. teaias a diy.^,' ■
, . 'SkU*. toto# - »Mat tost to® áO'vwwat» of toe 17 -divisions toyntoft to*
■ ,, .etoeloa^ 'nea® of whioh had: anything to do with top.'toltoe» *.»»»»íitósstol ' T" 
X ir. down M&.ottoiiitMd ©ub'ower a mofe tong«? period thin bad ©riftiiilly beta /
.,...' intuid#'' furto#»««#. leasing«*« new toft -divided toe toy»« If# .trite»■ ■» 
,;7 7'ttos into two parts* If a# 'tod'llb#' too ton&sr w»s:to. .«taiiot of. ■
., .. toy divisions «uñotoft to ran bi#wi«a. 23 Hay »a .2 Smm$. to® latter «C IS1 ■.
.." ai»ured' and 12 *©terii«4 '«ItisloM' {itolnAiag w o  ®©»i»« ftm the south- - 7
' ■ " east) and was to m n-tm m 3 to 23 Ha#.,’/ Boto ««iM&aao w«*a. to ifaploy,»' ■ :'"...: ■ ; 1 / ■. ■ ■ ;■- . ....... . _ ... ‘ .
, 126#’ gJB/TIalder. ü¿ J27, entry for 4.4.1941. '
127. Ibid. 353# 395# entries for 7»4# 5.5.1941? Iiueller-miebrand, 2«^  sammehhshj?. p. 19. For detailed plans of toe refreshment and the 
principles behind it v. 0KE/Genst.d.í^ Gen.Qu*/Abt.I^ Qw.2) ITr. 1/0333/ 
41 g.Kdos Chef sache v. 8.4.1941 signed by Haider.















. OKH also had another factor operating in its favour. ^ The rapid oceu- 
pation of Yugoslavia made it possible to march back many of the divisions 
V earmarked for "Barbarossa" over those very Yugeelav roads and railways ' '
■ which OH'had fou#t# tenaciously but unsuccessfully» 'to open up before  ^
the Belgrade coup took plaoi. This refers in particular to 46. and 73. 
infantry, 5» and 9* armoured end SS "AH" divisions, all of which hid or*
: iginally formed part of 12, easy, and would have had to march back from " 
Greece in any case*^ ? Also, Hitler*s decision of 17 March to dispense 
with the-right wing of army group aouth meant that 11. army in. Rumania . 
would not participate in the Initial assault and that the four divisions , 
of 12* army which were allocated to it had all the time in the world to 
• march back through Bulgaria without reference to' Heusinger's grand time*
■ t a b l e 33ms the number of divisions which had to be extricated and 
refershed before the start of the Bussian campaign went down to eleven*
The ■ fuestion, ■ then, ; is why the timetables for the "Barbarossa"
. buildup were not revised when it ■ became olear that operations in lugo- 
.'■alaria and Greece were easier and less prolonged than had been expected* . 
' The answer is that, to some extent, this. was done*; Thus, a revised time-'' 
table of IVb. echelon drawn up on 22 April withdrew 52. and 260. infinity 
divisions ftorn ITa* to V, echelon, that is the OSH reserves, while their : *1
133. ■ 46# infantry started its march back from the Frilep-Bitolj area if*
V ter banding it over to the Bulgarians on 7 Mayj A0K.12/la Ir, H 55/ ■ 
41 g.Kdos v. 3.5.1941# QKH/427/8005285. and A0K.12/Ia Hr. 1153/41 \
g.Kdoa v. 5.5.1941» ibid/8005236* 73* infantry left Greece for
1 Belgrade on 10 May, but was then halted in the same area until - the'- ' 
termination of wMerkurw| A0K.12/la Ir. U 46/4I g.Kdos v. 4.5.1941, 
ibid/8005203. and AGI.12/la Hr. 1218/41 g.Idoa II. Ang. v.11.5.
: Tfll# lbid/8005190. 5. armoured division left Salonika by rail on 
■ - '3l'iW Tugoslaviaf A0K.12/la Ir. IO86/4I g.Kdos v. 1*5.1941,
\ lbld/8005292. SS "AH“, the last of fee "Barbaroasa" units , to leave 
Greece, departed from Salonika on 27 May via Yugoslavia for refrash- 
, meat near Prague) A0K.12/I& Hr. 1123/41 g.Kdos v. 3.5.1941« ibid/ 
80052J9. . . '
134* These were 50»» 72., 76, and 198. infantry divisions. For their 
movements, v. MX.12/U Ir. 1127/41 g,Kdos v. 4.5.1941, SMR/427/ 
8005280*fl| A0K.12/la Hr. 1166/41 g.Hoa v. 18.4.1941# lbid/800529«li 
and AGK.12/Ia Ir. 1008/41 g.Kdos v. 20.4.1941# ibid/80052?7*98.
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. ■ pía®# mm tafeas hy I* arastalaf wft 101* “liglit" aotorised iMaribima» boíl 
'■ imita that 1*4'I»®« brought up for operation "2$" and wers M m n I' ©». 13 
‘ Aprll, Aleo, 4* ©ountain división w*s incorporated by Heusinger ta 
IVb* echelon, but vas takenout again visa it becsae olear that the Eun- 
, gariaf», ’ £tom vbém territoxylt wm' suppostd to admos*,' muid not j«ia 
■.in.'-yw :iaitial assaalt. 156 \ ' \ : ' , .'; v//y:/,..
■ An éxamination of the evidence, however, suggests that mol more , 
could have been done. Thus, 14* aasaoured división, arriving *t its **• ■ 
' freshment arca near Berlín on 3 May, must have been ready for the e¡®st - 
, . o» tío 24th of the same month but vas in fast dispaiched there only ■©»'■/■ 
6' Jhne.^ ■ 19* anaonred, insteod of being shifted inte III* esheloh, ■. ■ 
calnly continued its tralning at Augustdorf -mi was ssnt to the ea3t iv, ^ 
only on 12 Jtsne**^ ® SS Md»s B«ieh% relaased by 2. 'ssragr on th©'áaQT '
.  ^following :the fall of Belgrado, was, kept' waltlng nntil; ti# ■ i w ' day* ^  , 
while 88 infmtsy_r^ ii«it ^SrossdiatsollMd1* had to wait four d^ ri"- 
longer.^ 0 Pinally there ara, ti» cases of 8» and 16. a»s®«r#d. üvt** '
’■ ■ sien®, which eupply oonvincing proof that the Yugsslcr ©perstion' shhnM ,
■ n#v®r;to•®!,eAs®4(_,lMb^as&, to be postppned by tSm wmiw* ;/8* «*»
■ " iionred had originally been gi{pt«i to .travel to th# Bmmám' bordar ©a .•
■ 13 Mayj taken out of IT. #«h#loa for operation *25% it me relei»se«É by
■ 2. aiaay on 23 Aprll .«ni nrust thttwfoM.lwr* ©©»pieted its mfws&Mtat
or soarcsly two weeks behlnd sechedule. Yet it na© s .
■ kept walting for enother tbree weeks until it wm Seat t© tle esst.oa . ■
135* OIH/Genst.d.H/Op.Abt.(Bl) Ir. 722 /41 g.Kdos Chefsaehe v. 22.4,
: . - . 1941# GHR/450/64020S4.' ; : , ■ ■ ' . ; ■
136. OKH/Genst.d.H/Op.Abt.(Hl) Nr. 975/41 g.Kdos Chefsache v. 25*$* 
1941, ibid/6402127-331 siso gPB/nalder, ii, 445, entrty for 7*5. 
1941. He división, no longer needed for the initial attaok, ■wm 
referred to th© OKU reserves* .
■ 137* ■ Qmmt m »-8ÉÁ** W* 22*3»,: ■- ■>
#*5
- ____________________________________________¿£—
140. rbld. lbldi m/OBí/»m*%.4..n/Og.rn.(U), «atiy for 29.5.1941.
gW30^7o2597Q8.
138. Krull, 0£. ©ii.
41 g.Kdos v. ¿3
139. Ibid. ibidi m
f* 92| 90.» 0KH/Genst.d.l^ /0p.Abt.(lIl) Nr. 975/ 
•W41»..S®/430/6402ia7.33* .. ,■
i,'^$«3, w t e ? .ífcp' 21*449-Ü * . ..
14 June.*^  Still more interesting is-the ease of 16. armoured, & unit.
i  .  ■ .which, it will he remembered, had not seen action in the Balkans because 
■ its task consisted of guarding the Bulgaro-Turkish frontier* BeleasM - 
by 12* army on 21 April, this division was back in Bucharest for refre- 
‘shment on 25 April,and.suit therefore have been ready to roll east v 
on 15 Hay, that is only three days later than the date originally envi­
saged for it within the framework of the original If. buildup echelon) 
yet it was sent there only between 6 and 10 June.*^ , These two exam­
ples make it abundantly clear that the refreshment of numerous forces 
from the Balkans, and particularly from Yugoslavia, was collate ten to 
; twenty days before they were actually sent to the eastern front and 
only a short time behind the original schedule, without doubt, there 
• . must.have been compelling reaons which prevented the full exploitation 
' of the unexpectedly quick termination of the Yugoslav campaign. . 
w' ■' These reasons aare not far. to seek. Haiderfe diary bristles with 
' references to various units, none of which had naything to do with the - 
Balkans,' which equipment and training were not yet complete as late as 
• ■ the end of May 1941* ; Long before the Yugsoalav campaign was in sight 
" and entry reads! "the conversion of tanks into underwater tanks will 
require 12 weeks"Grant another few days for transportation and 
"Barbarossa", for vhich these machines were vital,^ could not start . 
before the first days of dune. As early 'as 3 April Haider was aware 
that the last infantry division would not be ready before 20 Kay, ant 
; even this could be achieved only by equipping a number of armoured and 14*3
141. Ibid, ibiti also ini age 2d au OISJ/Genat .4.l/0p.Abt • (IN) Nr. 050/41
. ,..V..S3Sbaohe v.;51*i4Mlfaj/335/6t91487. ■
■ 142. Mueller-Sillcbrand. Zussmmenhang, p. 21. ,V., .
143. Anlage 24 zu OKH/genst.d.E/Op.Abt.fll) Nr. 050/41 g^ Sdos .CfeefitAe,
■ ' GKR/535/6291487i and 0WGenst.d.E/0p.Abt.(lIl) Nr. 97^11 
■- ■ ■ \ v. 25.5.1941» |^6#tl27-53* ;
144. ii, 301, entry for 3*3*1941* ' ;
' I45. For details of, f.. Oarreli, » M jeU ........... (Bendon, lunp
1964) |p. 2>$. ‘ The'tanks-ware to spearhead me «ttadk ty §«de- 
gisn>s Pmseiiaru^ e across the river. Bag. ■
»
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motorized divisions with captured'french material.1^  CbvoQ^ hout lftgr.,-.. • 
Haider was recording the difficulties encountered in »applying tudrii»", . 
nr«»«‘unite as 100. armoured Brigade, 13., 17. and IS. «wired divl» . - 
sions and 14. and 18. motorized divisions, units which may have had no­
thing in common except for the fact that they had not .he« ooimee^ i In 
anyway with', the Balkan campaign.1^  Indeed, 'it is hardly p#»ible', to’, 
open‘a history "of any "fast" unit that ■took part in the'war’agaiJiirb 
Russian without being struck by the belatedness with which it was sop*, 
plied with its full »tor vehicle park. Thus, the so called fgngerzCge. 
the construction of five of which had been decided upon before the Ttt* ■ 
goel&v oei»«' were ready for transportation to the east ©sly In 
after finally receiving their French material.1^ 8 10. motorized div&* ■' ;• 
sion did not receive its equipment until Hf® marching to M t m '  , ■ 
10 June, and even then, the vehicles had to be collected piecemeal fro»#*.' '' 
Germany, Belgium, Holland and France l ^  ' 20. «soured, 14,, 18., -25# ‘  ^ .
and 35. motorized divisions were-all supplied with French vehicles,‘ M% 
even so the postponement of' their transportation to the east was' again , 
being considered on 20 May.1'*0 Indeed,'' the problems created by tfe* ge­
neral shortage of equipment, particularly motor vehicles, were net’ll» ■' 
mi ted to the wfa3t"unlts only. At the time of the Germ« offensive 
against Russia, no less than 92 - or 40$! - of the aray division»''hAd.ty- 
be supplied, wholly or la part, with French material. J ' Since the" 14678*50
146. ‘ milder. 11. 343. entry for f.d.1141. . ’ . r: .
147. Ibid. 395, 417, 421, 4*4, 4*7, mUsetm tor 5, 17, »# ¡S, 22.f,-" .
148. The Panzerzttfle were freight trains adapted to the carrying and
fast unloading of armour and material to serve for the rapid occ­
upation of bridges, strongholds, etc. Cf. OKH/Genst.d.H/Op.Abt. 7
(IN) Nr. 517/41 g.Kdos Chefsache v. 26.3.1941, GMR/430/6402022t 0SI3/Genst.d.2/0p.Abt.(l) Nr. IO42/4I g.Kdos Chefsache v. 28.5.
1941, lbid/355/62919201 and 0KH/0enst.d.^ Op.Abt.(lIl) Nr. 8225/
- 41 glldSTv. 10.6.1941, ibid/6291920.
149* A.^ Sohaidt^ ^echichte ifti.(0*A hash«!*, Pozdun, 7
150, KTB/lI&lj^ ri ii, 421, entry for 20«5*1941* '
151* laell#»*«itlebrtod, las' Beer, ii, 105.
/
I .■ . , - '
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' losses in material resulting from the Balkan campaign were extremely li­
mited, it la quite clear. that, the la*, of equipment of all kinds would • 
not have permitted "Barbarossa" to start before end June if neither "Ma­
rita" nor "25" had ever cime into the world,152 53 * , . . ; v
To some extent, this hypothesis is borne out by the "Barbarpssa" 
timetables themselves* Thus, ve have already noted the remarkable fact 
that 52* and 260* infantry divisions, neither of vhich had anything at 
all to do with the Balkans, were for some unexplained reason taken out 
of III* buildup echelon to which they had originally belonged and 
feferred, first to Ub. and then to V. echelon.155 156 On 25 May, moreover, 
the timetable of ITb* echelon underwent a thorough revision* On one head,
4* mountain division was referred to the Oil reserves| on the other, seven 
new divisions were now added to the echelon, raising the total number ©f  ^
units it consisted of to 24-1+7*30 divisions* The forces added to Ifb. 
echelon veret 5«» 9*» 12* and 15* armoured, 8* infantry, 3« and 20* mo«* 
torited divisions* Of these, the only one which belated appearance
in the timetable may be ascribed to the Balkan campaign is 9* armoured 
which had been released by 12* army after helping to break through the ■ „
Veve Pass* As to the others, we possess some remarkable information*
An entry in Haider* s diary» reading "the last infantry division will be 
ready on 20 May" 1 may very well explain the otherwise incomprehensible ^ 
inclusion of an infantry division in an echelon that, for reasons of C®*
152. Idem. Zusammenhang* ■ p* 24$ BB/keld». ii, 581* «tty for 25.4*if41«
153* As it was? the tanks for about If armoured divisions were predated 
* in the last six weeks proceeding the start of "Barbaro®«#! Jodi 
■ memo, ■ "Stellungnahae suer Riistungfertigung", 3*12.194®» printed in -
was started without any reserves. v.
154* V* jgiggj» p*2kZ » footnote Ho* 6 1.
155* Cf. the timetable of IVb*: echelon (Anlage 2e su OSE/Genst.d.Il/Qp. . 
. Abt.(Ill) ft?, 050/41 g*£dos Chefsaahe, GHR/430/6401935) mi tbs rw -, vised version of 25 May as quoted in footnote Mo. 153'tiara. ^ "
156. Ibid* ibid. .
157*. ‘ m/Hilder* ii. 343* entry for 3*4*1941* ■
MttfUg»» ''*•* ,t»«i supposed to «iJisiot of »'fast” units only. ■' About 13. 
sxmoured division we know that itwasresdy for tte' east only *&i ttie-'--1. 
- last moment", whieh ia"ttiB. itoM'MflKt 28 Moy,1^ 3 As to 3* »Otorised;;‘’V  ■ 
• division, Its; belattd inoorporation la tha tinetable is explainodbythe 
faet that it receiveditsmotor veMelea only at the'last''moment before : 
travelling to tte east on 6 June.1*^  Haas, it’ia' possible .to' egplsin' .
' tha late appearaaoe of thee out of tha' sie divisions ln question by thalr 
tsperfeot material preparation, As to the otherthree, ve hart ;«o’infi** 
mationi bat it is Interesting ttai'on 29 Hay a furtter delay in the trsa-
■ eportation 'to ‘ the east1 of aaother; six fast units (20. arooured, ■ 3.#; 10,g • - 
14*i 18* and 25. motorised) was belüg considered,1^ 0 and that ttsrüite-
■ of oanivil of «1® last i**laA«®»asaM di Vision, SS "AS»*,' in its. deplopipit v 
area was dioated not by any trsnaportatioa difficulties bat by tW
■ that the general shortage of vehiclea prevented its timely
Äese faots aake it faito oloxr/that» Ixmqpootiv» of the Balkan campaign, 
■; tte offensive a&einst ßussia could not haw^ t^fetwd much '4t
' dii* ' i • • :V ■ ; :■ V- r, ■'
'■ y' -i"mH. ehould be Said here about theeffect ©f Wudett", #» tlii:;st*sfci^ .
■ hing late of *Siittare#*aw*; v As far as the land mi «Arborne trofpi» f*^ »’ ■' ■ ■
' tieipating in this Operation vere eonoeimed it is obviou3 that tb®y: bore' 
no relation to the Russian campaign sine# m m  of ttam was snpposed to ■
1' ttfer part in it*162 On' tte Otter hand»: the' fast' ttat Hitler made Me ■ ■ - 
decielon to eooufiy the island about a fortni^ t after Hensinger had laid'
3L.-- !---i--- .....................‘
15S. Ibid. 417, entry for 17*5« 19411 «nd G. Tessin, TerbSnde und Traunen der deutschen Wehrmacht und V/affen SS ln Zweiten Weltkrieg« 1939- 
1945 (Frankfurt aa/Hhein, Mittler, n.d) p. 2^ : ,
159. ,G« Dieckhoff, 3« Infantearfe Division* 3« Xnfanterfe.PiyiMmiM5>.t».)*' . . ■ , 3. Panzergrenadier Mvision (Göttingen« Bdrries* 1950) pp* 90-91*
160* OKH/Genst.d.H/0p.Abt.(l) Kr. 947/41 g.Idos Chefsache v. 29*5*1941» 
GSH/450/6402124* ' '
161, ETB/Ilalder* ii, 453» 459, entriss f« 20, 21,6,1941* Äe fast Unit 
'■this division - which presence was mmMmnA araaial to tto ifurf
of "Barbarossa" - did not go into aotioa until 27 Swm (li»s««P, 
op.' ciW b* 44) lends credence to tha view that tte mifi&m- ooald have been started without vaiting fo» tte last division.
162, lluoller-Hillebrand, Zu-samaerihang* p* 2|,
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down his revised timetable for "Barbarossa" meant that OKH now envi­
saged difficulties in the timely transportation to the east of'VIII* 
163air corps* In addition« the Cretan business forced the army to
leave in Greece two mixed and four light antiaircraft battalions164which had originally been earmarked for Russia*
In a conference held at Salzburg on 12 May under the presidency 
of Jodi, these problems were trabhed out. As to the antiaircraft ba­
ttalions« the army finally conceded that it would be possible to de­
lay their withdrawal from Greece until 25 May without thereby endan­
gering the timely start of "Barbarossa". A more difficult problem 
was the transportation of VIII* air corps? after some discussion, 
the army agreed to provide for the transfer of most of the corps fro* 
Craiova to Oderberg between 28 May and 9 June#1 ? Within two week®,
however, the air force upset this arrangement and demanded that the
166corps should be transported to East Prussia instead* The accep­
tance of this demand would entail a delay of no less than ten days in 
the start of, "Barbarossa" ? since the deployment could not be camouf­
laged after the start of IVa. echelon, that is after 23 May, the Rus­
sians would, in such case'have some six weeks advance warning, during . 
which they would be able to "thoroughly change their dispositions”#
For this reason OKH insisted that B day should remain 22 June, and
> after. OKW compelled, the air force to-'accept Suwalki instead of East
167Prussia it had.,its way# ' ■ Thus it is clear that, although "Merkur" ' 
caused-Haider, more than one anxious and angry moment, there can be no 
question of "Barbarossa".being delayed by it#
- 163# CTiyfaider. ii, 407-8, entry for 12.5*194i; As for XI. air-'
” 'bombers 'and antiaircraft units were released by Hit-
leter as early as 14 April? "directive Ho, 27”, printed in Tre­
vor-Roper, 21* bit»« pp» 65-68# .
164. KTB/Halder. ii. 433« entry for 28.5.1941.
165# 0KW/WF3t/Abt#L Hr# 4%70B/41 g.Kdos Chefsacho v. 12.5.1941, "Pro- 
: tokol■'der Bespreohung 'am 12.5»' 1800 Uhr bei GKV/WFSt/Abt.L "in 
Salzburg". GKR/3/000706.
166. KTB/OKW. 1. 397. entry for 26.5.1941.
167. KT3/Genst.d.H/0p.Abt.(Ia), entry for 28.5.1941, GKR/306/6257030t
, KT3/0KW. i, 397* entry for 2c.5»194l. ' -
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• - ■ \With the withdrawal of the last divisions from Greece and Yugoslavia, 
the German campaign in the Balkans came to an end. It remains to a. 
say something about the fate of the two countries during the next 
four years, and b. consider the place of the Balkan campaign in the 
history of World War II*
Although often very dramatic, marked as it is by heroic resistance 
and the most brutal repression, the fate of Greece and Yugoslavia is \ 
not of first rate importance for the rest of the history of World War 
IX. In June 19*H Hitler had no intention of pursuing the war in the 
Mediterranean further; consequently, the two countries became a back­
yard instead of the forward base they couldjiave been and which, for a 
brief period, had been intended to become* Moreover, it was a baek- 
, yard which was both indispensable and expensive to hold* Indispen­
sable because of the raw materials it contained; expensive because of 
the guerrilla movements which were soon in full swing - aided as they 
were by the character of the terrain and the fact that the Wbhrmacht 
did not have time to thoroughly police the newly conquered areas - 
and because of Hitler*s anxiety, which was not without reason, lest 
the allies might attempt a landing in Crete and Greece from their 
bases in North Africa. Sucn an invasion would have created just that 
situation to prevent which Hitler had decided to go ahead with opera- 
tion ’♦Marita,”, in December 19^ 0: it would have threatened the rear of , 
his armies in Kussia* In 19^ 5» therefore, he went to great trouble 
and expense in order to strengthen and fortify the long and exposed 
coasts of the region - in itself, an impossible task. Thanks to 
losevelt’s opposition to Churchill^ s plans, his'fortifications were 
never put to the test; however, this did not save Hitler from the 
need to maintain many more troops in the area thali he would have 
'/'liked-» by 19V#, there were 125*000 German soldiers fighting the' 
'partisans in .Yugoslavia alone*
Ferocious and widespread aa it was, it was not the guerrilla move­
ment which finally turned the Germans out of Greece and Yugoslavia* > 
Nor was it any military operation conducted on their soil* The two 
countries were considered as being of so little strategic importance 
that they were bypassed by all the great military movements of the 
war* It was only in 19^ 5* under the threat of being cut off from 
their home-country by the allied advance in northern Italy, that the " 
German armies, still unbeaten, started to retreat* In the process, 
they handed over Greece to the British in return for a safe conduct 
from the islands* In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, Tito's parti­
sans were strong enough to take over the country without foreign in­
tervention*
As part of World War 11, the German campaign in the Balkans pre­
sents more than one aspect* Thus, among other things, it was the 
last of the ’'pragmatic” or "tactical” of Hitler*s conquests* What­
ever our view of Hitler's subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union, 
there can be no doubt but that here we are dealing with something 
qualitatively different from everyting that went before* For, a£- 
. though it was perfectly possible to explain that invasion on purely 
rational, politico-military grounds, these io not exhaust the rea-■ 
sons for which it took place* "Ideological”, "historical” and ”hio—' 
logical” factors also played a part in this decision which,'more ' 
than any other except perhaps for his .determination to exterminate, 
the Jews, resulted from Hitl®r*s program, which has been standing 
there, quite regardless of the circumstances of the moment, for 
about twenty year**-
'■ Conversely, there is nothing programatie in the origins,. ieve-,. 
lopment or execution of the Balkan .campaign*. In this sense, the/; , 
latter stands on a par with Hitler* s violation of■the Versailles 
Treaty, the rearmament of Germany,' the. remilitarisation of the thine- ■
168.■'For' this aspect of the Russian campaign v. the excellent anti- 
cle by 1*1* ■ Trevor-Roper, ’Hitlers Krlegsslele”, VientelHahrm- . 
h.fte far Zeltitoeqtilcht«. Till (1960), 121-33.
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land, the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, the wars against Po* 
land, Franc®, England. However desirable and important, whether pla­
nned in advance or the result of external clrcinstances, none of 
these presented the great "goal" which alone could justify and ful* 
fill the National Socialist Mrevolution".^ ^ Esther, they were a «* 
more or less essential - prelude to that goal.
”If someone had said two years ago”, Hitler told a visitor early 
in 19M* ”thet one day I would be standing with ny armies from Norway 
to Spain, I would have had him declared insane”. Whatever the truth 
of these words concerning other countries, there is no indication 
that the Führer had ever included the occupation of Greece and Yugon-* 
lavia in any of the manifold versions of his "program”* Her® is a ' 
war which Hitler neither planned nor, except for a short period la' 
October and November 19%0, wanted* A war which, perhaps more thus 
any other, was dictated by purely political and strategic considers- 
; tions, a means toward a very definite end. As such, it proved tu b® 
the'last of its kind* . In Hitier*a crusade against Bussia-means and' 
ends were inextricably connected! here was another kind of war#/Lafar 
still, with the initiative seized from his hands, the distinction 
■ loses any meaning, - since .there was no more 'any program to be' realised* 
Thus, Hitler*s war'in Greece and Yugoslavia was a pragmatic one 
- par exollence* one which, perhaps more than any other, was the'result '
of circumstances and. not of advance planning*- It was also the last"''170of the successful German I11t.aftld»ig®* ' A mountain of military - 
leterature notwithstanding, the secret of the lightening war remains,
• . .  . i  .. , '
169. Assuming, of course, that such a goal existed in the first /,. 
placet that is, that the justification of Nazism was not just
Hi tier *0 personal crave for power*
170* The word,Blitzfeldaug is used here In preference to the more -
common «#Kriea*.fro« the' German point of view, the early' yoar».. ■
s of World War 11 wore not a war at all but a series of campaigns|and when a war finally developed, Germany was lost. Cf. the on-
. »•. ■ / lightening analysis in A* Milward. The German Mmmom at War *'• 
(London, 196,5)*
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to the present writer, something of a mystery. He has not yet eucce- 
eded in discovering sob® kind of factor which, hy its presence or ab-
, sene®,'.will.sake it possible to explain the success of certain cam- 
paigns of this kind and the failure of others. However, it would 
hopefully not be too rash a statement to say that there is a limit to 
what even the best conceived, best led, best executed and most spiri­
ted of Blitgfeldztfge can achieve, -These limits'are'presumably set.by 
the odds against which the particular campaign is up. That is, there 
is a certain frontier beyond which the best Imaginable method put to 
the best imaginable execution cannot overcome the disparity in forces 
and resources. The German successes in the arly years of the war 
pushed this frontier steadily backward. But, however elastic the 
frontier - and the Balkan campaign did not require any very greqt 
elasticity on its part, since the German forces were so clearly sup­
erior - it, too, has a breaking point. In lussla, this breaking 
point was reached and passed. Thus, although Hitler was still des­
tined to win many abattle and gain many a tactical victory, the Bal­
kan campaign was,the last one that brought strategic success in the 1 
classical, Clauzewitsan sense) i,e the last one in which na series of 
battles" compelled the enemy "to bend to our will". The very facility 
with which this aim was achieved may have encouraged - although it 
certainly did not creqte - Hitler’s determination to try his luck ag­
ainst even the greatest odds) for, to him, the Balkan campaign had 
proved that "the German soldier can do anything"
Finally, the Balkan campaign marks the apogee of Hitler’s mete­
oric career. Never again after 31 May was he to confront the world 
with such unlimited - and, to all appearances, justified - confidence* 
After six years of diplomacy and two of war Hitler had reduced France 
to impotence, thrown the British out of their last continental foot­
hold, and either conquered or reduced tc satelite status most of the 
other states of non-Soviet Europe, True, there were still a few sore 
thumbs sticking out - Spain being a prominent one - but these could
/ .\ ... 1 T T \171, "Bern deutsche Soldat 1st nlohts unmSgliehl" was the phrase he 
. used in his speech of 31 May,
easily be eat down to siae after the destruction of the Soviet,Union* 
Howeverf this'was the one aim in which« although he came to within an 
acme of achieving it* Hitler failed*
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Parîxaps th© no3t striking aspeot of Hitler*s Greek and Yugoslavpolicy 
in là« years 1940-1941 1* the différence in fais attitude toward the te® ■
, ' countries* ' Onthe faeeofit the existence of such a différence m u  . . 
'.' ratlier surprisin^ , fer the two 'countries hâve much in eoxaaon geographi- - 
•; ■. : caîly,' Mstoriéally, politically and econoaically, Both Greece and Th* 
gèkialria Delong te southeastem Europe, " Both had benefitted '£ro»; tho 
■ ( ;. f.. peu#© treaiies of 1919 and their 'general' orientation in foreign policy . .
., vas therofore pro-westem* Vhile Gexmany did not realiy hâve territi« 
v v Y-rial Maias/'a^ iùt either, both regarded Ita2y as their aost danger®«»
* eneay* ; îheir. économies being based on the export of surplus agfffaoX» ■
 ^tunai 'prétuotS end tmt i&ateriaï«, ■ iâieir 'relation ''to the ..Mghly ; InâÉétasi^ 
'iâieêi Germa» eeoaêiîy oould not but b© basioally siailar. ■'
, ; - , ""'^ ihêfit# ©f';th©se factors, Geiman policy immtA lhe £ws '©ouatrlii ' 
devêloped along entirely "différât lises, fhat this ms so vas net'as* ;
■ t - *. fily a natter of ôxpediency * or $ath«r, as so often happens, «#©dl* ;
•■■f ■;|,'«ic^*;îiaé"4ïésiiè'%'ln ¿1# sounding principles. '.*o CtaMngr êmém.imm - 
■' • ' tM'ïmé i^ ortsat'.politically, eoo»aiCaîly and
\ : ; .'s^ ##c^ ly''.teto’fBgi*la«iaé '..l&ile tha latter vas vatoàed with in*
■-.'teteirl ’miâ' ®È%m' MxœÎM, the former vas looked'.upon with sons iniifÉi«, - ' 
' : v ï*nc«* * W #  4bi,iatii è£ ‘boasolidating M s  ailiaaee Midi Xtaly SitteT.
'i,'did jlët hisitaie"'£» renounce any .intarest in. Greecef ©ver ïtt*
©à' thé oth©r ha»&* ' h© behafed in. an entirely different ' ■
; • r. oittMItÿèiië' èMiië afleT là©' Othér wilMn tha ixis and deliberately 
; ''.r'IêsMâg'Àe.'tSesticn as to'whô'së sphere of inifluahc© sh© belongod ia , 
>viam&ëe*i m U Î  th® occupation'of'ifa© eouatiy in 194I#2. Shese dÜf#* 'i
■ i«ht;'attitudes formally laid dowa in.a goopolitical System . ^
.■; .:.;M«.à4grf;<><g-s^ac© tô','fâî© :M^ditirrin©Én*,''and Mscus to Italy, wMl© ' .
■ ’> '*'^tl«viÀ *** »ide1 to i@ld'ng'"feî''ià@ ill .Iefined and oontroveralal area
(' . l. in ^  ^ © c © ,  thic ia :tru© onîy Cmhb 1939 onward* ■ _
-  ^. 2.,';«dA»s»liM:'risist«i-*-' - ■' '' ; ■"
/ .
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of.te® Sate®**#.5 ■. - ' A . »
 ^-■' '■ fid* ;divi®t#a ©f southeastern loop® tot® a <% M i t a n d : * ! « ! »
■ kanio" region 'iajpJUdn»' why Hitler, uh» •». «nsistently end «ariwj^ Néiéaklgr * 
opposed. Ms colleague*s designs on Iugoslavia, regarded Ms Greek flans 
with an indifference bordering m  , f§® indifference did ;.
 ^tn feet turn into encouragement when, following the abandoning of tee ;.
• .  .  • 1 .  . ' i  • •plans for a landing in the United Kingdom, be decided to transfer the.;' " ■ 
war to the »periphery». ‘la »is •satext -fee possession of the Greek . 
jnainland and especially as a bastion for the »fare of the Axis in the 
eastem;Midit«paie«a;»^«©i worth while« ■ At.the Brenner, on 4 @©teb®r."
1940, Hitler apparently ally,«« «»«« lt#t* . ... . ,>/V
' ‘ Hitler’s own consequent decision «  invade Greece ns caused .neither
by his fusi?'tesi th» Iste« a±#t «aplod# nor by eny «xl«ty I4»t te®/. 
Itatiite «houli bomb "te® MI Halis# ■ It in» «e resali of oflfensivof -i*Ét 
defunsi», Manierati©»»« * It »  «e Itali« fnilwe te a*eoi£/!•••*»-. 
and thè fa®t tesi neteiag oould te «spettei twm Grasiani’s . , ;
Egyptthat detamined Ms action. In coaparlson vith Urte Africa " ; ; '
■ Greece, ®f oows«f ».«ly »a «§»»»1»te «batitete»f a sate«.tet%;,
bmmmtf which hai thè great teai i t t e , i r t e :  ;
im m #  ‘te® I ta li«  «pimr® #f laftntt»# 'la «di».te r®a®b li« .
- ' Bn»§, 'tee TlBii Geman pian f»r «  attack on Greece »  bom. Ita ‘
■ ' i • •*.. .É M t e . t e  ofiiiieif®,. ite te. Miei .te» tesi» ter thè variare .
■ «fili®'Aids'-in'te® Hmmm M M  mtomtimMm
of Mussolini*6 piane in ©iteti®, lite .tee §mmm «£f#r ter h®tf in Egypt
■ and 'Ite®vitti .pi« «  «afta*# Cibraltar «d  «osa te Berte West Africa, ■ 
te® ralaott d*etr®^of ’« d i  deoiiil®» tat te i-wmt .«piasi S S 5 X I ® ,• / .
teanny te ore*#® 11*noi':p®*i-ter«#, te# ■Itali«' w0m m ni 
. influence, it dii pus» te*«#'a reglon tiileà te® m»si«iiÉ .iMishttik''..
as their »mi «ewrity wm> ;..i®rtly te* tate ;*»»p%.tet ;»!••..• . 
. «  a '»vttlt of «ite wlder t*à®i te bMnt.itot n ;
h te , alternatively, te' tee' »AdMatl# wtoàiti « «  V « t  •M frt'ÌP terranean”. ' «Chi» va® the definition adopted ito tedisela w 
to calm down teelr Mli#*« ,= ■ ■ - ■
to «ho «Itil
entered onlyreluctantly and for »  ostensibly limited period of tt*i*
Wm§^hoimmT$\,§mmer «Bid. the operation against her were bodily lifted '' 
ont of their Mediterranean context and reincorporated in the "Solfatti”*',
•11 of which bad ■'by .on® means or another to be' seemed 'as a’bssls.,|“er
and,'flank'or the. attack’on the Soviet Union.
; - ,■ Mtl«», then, did not have one but two plana for an invaion of, ’ /
Greece, s^«ated from each other, by approximately two 'and a half weeks.;
Paring this period the FShrer must have hoped to dispense with the Greek 
operation. He therefore suspended negotiations with the three countries 
whose cooperation or neutrality were needed for the purpose and. extended
feelers to Athens. Only after failing to find a political solution for
the Creek affa ir he resumed diplomatic preparations for “Usrits'*. on 21 
Pfosaber. V ,,. V-Vf/.;''■
The plan, for attacking Greece now fell entirely under the 
shadow cast ahead by the scheduled war against Bussia, to which it formed 
«  indispensable preliminary* ,The relationship between the two campaigns 
was «ora. complicated than is usually realised. ■ The lattar could 'not.. ■ 
start before the former, securing its 'Hank and lying down som of its 
divisions, ,vas over. .These' facts were realised from the very .be^ teda* 
and, as the requirements of the Greek cacpaign skyrocketed because,éf
the danger of Soviet, Turkish and possibly. fugsillir intervention itey;''"', 
caused ,OBI considerable, concern. ’ In view of what was planned for' fhe ; '. 
east it,was tMmttal .to'",end matters in Greece, «s. èarïy. as jpssibl®|.;^ it, 
' tìte ©tart of the operation suffered successive delays because of Üie  ^' ;
weather, Bulgarian obstinacy, fuglilav reluctance and Soviet threats'# ; 
As effort'to speed up the termination, of the'affair by sending,'Ooomml'; 
forces to Albania alalia*^  aot with failure. _ , . ‘ vy.
: ,, ■ Hitler*s preparations for the invasion of Greeee put ïnpaslavta in ", 
a position that was both weak and strong. It was weak, in the sense; 
that Bagoslavls' wm h«self surrsu^ed on all sides..by the aAlitaaqr 
foro# of the Axis f . it was. strong in the sense, that her attitude would, ■ 
la last resort detersine whether Hitler* a design for a short and
« H I £
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. rito" » a  ”WseAmmm* mi of ftosrond mate tbo‘tom oli'itori o f to» lit- .
' ter douttful| no la tha a«»», tliat it contrìbuted practicolly nothing to - 
prolonf alMtosy operati©» in .C*o»eo*. , >. •.. , ■ ■'.- '
■ • As to .to»'foipsl«y canpaign, it was far leso *une^ |e®tod®. in a mili- ■ ,
’tasf sanse than is usually believed. Although it drew on force* from - 
. "Barbarossa", it cannot reallybe said t®. bare delayed, spati lesa' disi* 
rupted, ' thè buildup for thè, lattw* It should not bave caused any do- . , - 
lay at all to "IlNXlto", end sueh postponement as did ensue was not : 
strictly necessaxy. . In more than one sanse thè Belgrado 'eoa can he., ^ 
said to bave come si esesotly thè ri^l _moment fóom thè Semai point ©f . '
view. Its ©Wall effect m  .thè Balkan eaapaiga was a eeafidewdil# 
speeding up of thè military operatlons end parricul&rly of thè trans- . -
pori ©f thè troops ftom "Marita'' lack northward. / '/ ■
The f aotor which really determined thè starting date' of "Barba»»#»*"'■ 
vmp it seems, thè generai shortage of equipment in thè Chuasa' asagr* :
1ommar this may be9 it is clear that nany unita from botti■ *Ha*AtoP: «A/? 
»25** could ber® heen brou#i up considerably earlier than they mr*,"»' 
fact whioh provea that wbatever delay was caused to "Barba»»# was ITO! - 
primarily caused by 12» Albati campai©», ;
Prom Greece and Tugoalavia Hitler went on to oootapy Crete.. Althougb 
this island was thè potentìally moat valuablo prize to he won in thè ■' . V. 
Balkan campaign» must remain doubtful whether ito oaptor® serred any ' 
strategical aim at all. Bathor, it was to» result of thè pmml'«»' 
bitions of two generala, vho for a short timo succeeded in capturing 
Hitler1 s imaginatioa* ' ,
. fha present study should not be alloved to end without saying a word 
about thè cttto of eonslderation that guided Hitler in bis ' attitude tewari, ’ ' 
Gre#©# :®ai Yugoalarla. Hitler*a strategy was not alw^ rs dictatod' by 
reasoa,. or In any case not by reason alone. "Ideological" and "sptet*»' 
tual" factors, ' not to mentìon "Mol0gl®al’, ansa, often flagrato a wsay 
important part in bis conaiderations, strengthening of wteiag his 
deteroination to fi#t this or tbat particular .opponaat» loodiag Ms^te ’ 
nnder- or overostimate pila or tbat factor* - Io a fedto remarkable ex- ■ ^ 
tent, this kind of consideration is absent from Hitler*s policy toward .■ x
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. . 6m m « «il Yugoslavia. With 'Uta possible exoeptioa of Crete, «bere the .
1.. PHiTor’s. adairation for "hard” men Jumping oat .of the shy Is m m M m  : '
. supposai.to have plcyed a part, .it seems perfectly possible to eaçlaiÂ 
■ ; his thoughts «Mut,, his appreciation of tot .’attitude to these countries 
. on rational grounds.' In discussing the subject at hand there'is m  need/ 
to refer to any unusual aspects of his mentality, vhich Muid eertádnly 
. be necessaiy when posing his ambivalent attitude to England or his - 
Crosa uaderestimation of Russia. '®0 a large extent, this rational atti- 
. _ ■tede derives from the.feet •feat',«Mt®e"Âd'ïb^ »la?iawere,'after «ät, 
only a small item in Eitler«s strategy. ‘ Perhaps' the' number of pMbi«®» 
encountered in this Mali item should teach us that no study of history 
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